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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 15, 2013 3:42:32 GMT -6
At the Washita Custer well outnumbered to occupants in the Indian Camp;
Washita
Black Kettles Camp (Around 250) 7th Cavalry (Around 700) Lt. Col. Custer: A, C, D & K Companies (West) Maj. Elliot: G, H & M Companies (Northeast) Capt. Thompson: B & F Companies (South) Lt. Johnson: E & I Companies (Southwest)
BLBH
Indian Village (a lot more than 250)
7th Cavalry (Around 650) Lt. Col. Custer: C, E, F, I & L Companies (North) Maj. Reno: A, G & M Companies (Northwest) Capt. Benteen: D, H & K Companies (East)
Now shortly after he wrapped up the camp, Warriors appeared on the high ground, I don’t know how many, maybe up to a 1000, so now Custer realises that he had to get out of the area pretty quick (leaving Elliot and his Detail to a horrible fate).
So the point I am trying to make is this; Custer had virtually the same amount of men in both attacks. At the Washita the objective was a relatively small camp compared to the one located at the LBH, but still his Regiment was forced off the field, now he has been told or had a good idea that this was going to be a bigger camp then Black Kettles, so what made him think that he could achieve with the same number of men against a larger village with the chance of more villages being in the area, did he think that he could do another smash and grab and pull it off before any of the surrounding villages could react?
Ian.
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Post by mac on Jul 15, 2013 5:23:07 GMT -6
I suspect that is exactly what he thought Ian. (Thanks for not mentioning the Ashes, or the Rugby for that matter!) Chuck love that definition! Cheers
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Post by fuchs on Jul 15, 2013 6:52:17 GMT -6
At the Washita Custer well outnumbered to occupants in the Indian Camp; Washita Black Kettles Camp (Around 250) BLBH Indian Village (a lot more than 250) So the point I am trying to make is this; Custer had virtually the same amount of men in both attacks. At the Washita the objective was a relatively small camp compared to the one located at the LBH, but still his Regiment was forced off the field, now he has been told or had a good idea that this was going to be a bigger camp then Black Kettles, so what made him think that he could achieve with the same number of men against a larger village with the chance of more villages being in the area, did he think that he could do another smash and grab and pull it off before any of the surrounding villages could react? Ian. For a change I might point out that there might have been even slightly more people in Black Kettles camp than those 250 And those that forced Custer off the field where from other camps, which in aggregate might have contained numbers not all that much lower than at the LBH. Still, it cannot be stressed enough that Washita is not a good comparison to the LBH. The main action at the Washita involved 50 lodges / 50-100 warriors against 700 soldiers concentrated into a single, coordinated attack with complete surprise at dawn. At the LBH there were at least 20 times that number, and Custer had sufficient information to expect about 8 times the numbers he faced at the Washita (that ~400 lodges camp he was trailing). Against which he send effectively only half the force he had at the Washita, the larger part of that half on a detour that would delay its combat entry by something like half an hour, with the Indians having enough warning to mount an effective defense even against the first Army elements entering combat. So the relative strength of the opposing force must habe been expected to be about a factor of 15 higher then at the Washita, in reality probably more like a factor of 40. Never mind the lost surprise. And people are suggesting that the LBH attack plan might be modeled after the Washita?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 15, 2013 8:07:35 GMT -6
Fuchs; I know that at the Washita the Warriors who later appeared came from other camps, in fact I have been stressing that for a couple of days.
You have also touched on a few points in your post that I have seen relevant;
Custer thought he faced 8x more than at the Washita, and he was also concerned with being attacked by Warriors from satellite Camps (like at the Washita).
Now at the Washita both he and his whole Regiment of 700 men were forced to withdraw for the lives because of intrusion of these Warriors from the other Camps, so at the BLBH, what made him think that by sending out Benteen with three Weak Companies on a detour to locate any satellite Camps that this would prevent this happening again? Did he expect Benteen to take care of all these Satellite Camps on his own?, and as you have said above he expected eight times as many in this one village and he still attacked it with a reduced force. Talk about a disaster waiting to happen.
Hi Mac, I told you that your Cricket team would give a good show, I have learnt from the past that you should never right off an Ashes touring team, the Rugby on the other hand, Hmmm.. You should change codes to League, I am sick to death of the Kangaroos beating our national side.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2013 8:24:43 GMT -6
I think what Montrose and I are trying to highlight is that victory or defeat is much more than numbers and weapons, logistics, even tactics and the operational arts. It is not even a matter of how smart you are, although smarts help greatly. Sometimes victory or defeat is what lies in the heart of man. That is not something you can train to achieve. The basis must be there to begin with.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 15, 2013 9:12:50 GMT -6
Good Afternoon Chuck; reading again what both you and Montrose are saying; the 7th was not the US equivalent of the Blues and Royals, so was this down to the Colonel in charge? I don’t know how the system worked in the US around this period of time but you hear that certain Troops were detached from the Regiment and placed in various Forts in different states, so if this was the case would the training of the Troop be down to Captain (and his two Lieutenants and First Sergeant) or would it be the responsibility of the Station Commander; Remember our talk a while ago when you referred to these stations or Forts contained; 1 x Cavalry Troop 1 x Infantry Company 1 x Engineer Platoon 1 x Battery of Artillery
So would the Fort Commander (who I would expect to be at least a Major or higher) be expected to maintain that his Command be fully trained or would he leave it down to the respected Commanders of each Detachment under his Command. So if a Cavalry Regiment was split up and sent to the four corners of the map and then later re-assembled to take the field as complete Regiment, would the Regimental Commander be at fault if his various Troops returned back from their assignments in poor shape.
Ian.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 15, 2013 9:56:51 GMT -6
Custer apparently did not know or suspect there were other camps along the Washita. He had followed a specific trail selected by his main scout. While the 7th was a better unit in 68 than 76, had complete surprise, the Washita was something less than what it should have been. Numbers of warriors in bare feet ran and escaped to the other camps, hardly fighting to the death for hearth and kin who if not shot were captured. The aggressive posturing later that day credited with deflecting the advance of other warriors was not likely his idea, but the scout Ben Clark's.
The 4th was probably better than the others, but as fighting units I've read the 9th and 10th - the Buffalo Soldiers - were somewhat feared by the Indians, probably because they were together a long time and because they had stuff to prove. MacKenzie was, apparently, brilliant and strict and well regarded and insane at the end when he was removed from duty. It's best to recall how bad the Army was through the start of our participation in WWI. Cuba, the Philippines, Villa were not examples of great military work, top to bottom, despite Imperial designs and bombast. When we captured Aguinaldo's wife, it made the headlines. Yes. It did. Such was the need for good news. Less said about Villa (we had airplanes and lots of men looking), the better.
Bourke's description of the entire nation cowering in its bed when some aged Apache medicine man announced he could raise the dead sort of sets the tone.
I do want to say that capitalizing 'warrior' and 'soldier' is sort of condescending. The sort of thing that drips of pro wrestling titles. I haven't done a complete check, but guys with combat experience don't do that. Only the Bevo Boy and Costume Lad types.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2013 10:01:09 GMT -6
Ian: The commander at every level is always responsible for what his unit (command) does or fails to do. The problem is much more basic that being stationed are various installations. The problem was that there was no standard, and what guidance that did exist was hopelessly inadequate for the situation that confronted the army in 1876. You train for the war you have not the one you wish you had. You modify what doctrine you possess to fit the situation that confronts you.
In this modern age it is difficult enough to accomplish this, and we have many more tools available to accomplish it. In those days rarely did a regiment assemble. Therefore what training that was done largely rested on the company commander, what he felt was needed. There was nothing to my knowledge but the current cavalry manual, and that document is not adequate alone. Above that there was nothing. We got what we paid for. Not much.
Getting specifically to your question. Had Custer survived and was called to account, it would indeed be a very poor defense to say for instance it was all the fault of those units that were in Louisiana. You sure can't train a regiment or even part of a regiment from a box seat on Broadway. Tell you the truth if nothing else upset me about Custer it is his deliberate absence in pursuit of his own desires, that would make him as a commander, who someone should have had the good graces and common sense to shoot.
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Post by benteen on Jul 15, 2013 11:51:42 GMT -6
Ian: The commander at every level is always responsible for what his unit (command) does or fails to do. The problem is much more basic that being stationed are various installations. The problem was that there was no standard, and what guidance that did exist was hopelessly inadequate for the situation that confronted the army in 1876. You train for the war you have not the one you wish you had. You modify what doctrine you possess to fit the situation that confronts you. /quote] Chuck.....I of course agree with you on Custer. He was more interested with hob-knobbing with actors than training his troops. In fact after Reno had been training them, when he comes back, he yanks men off the horses they were training on and puts them on others. Custer was always about Custer. But your statement above gives me pause to think, do you believe that the over all lack of training in the Army was due to arrogance. In other words who needs training to slap around a bunch of stone age savages who are always looking to run away. Be Well Dan
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 15, 2013 12:40:54 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, you are not suggesting that someone should have fragged Custer are you?
Hello Dan, I didn’t know about Custer changing their horses, I wonder what would be the point of such a stupid act.
Dark Cloud; I never said that Custer knew or suspected that other Camps lay a few miles away on the Washita, what I was trying to say was that he had to move his Regiment out before he got cut off or attacked, and due to this event he should have realised that this could easily happen again and by the looks of it he didn’t, he still wanted to take on another larger village with less men than before, he had Benteen with around 120 men sweep round to the left virtually taking him out of the fight, and what was Benteen going to do if he came across one or two of these small camps around the size of Black Kettles? Plough through them and Round up the survivors and take them prisoner, all with 120 men.
It was good of you to bring up the story about Scout Ben Clark though, a very handy thing to know and thanks, it is one to remember when you come across sites that say it was GACs idea, but if you are trying to stop me from using capitols when I write Soldier or Warrior Then You Have Another Thing Coming, Such Nit Picking Sounds Like The First Signs Of A Compulsive Disorder.
Unless I have it wrong of course and you mean someone else, if so then then I apologise.
Ian.
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Post by benteen on Jul 15, 2013 12:58:14 GMT -6
Hello Dan, I didn’t know about Custer changing their horses, I wonder what would be the point of such a stupid act. Ian...When Custer returned to FAL he had each company have their own colored horses. The most notable being the Band Box Troop (Company E) which had the grey horses. As far as why Custer did anything I am the last person to ask my friend, all I believe about Custers actions is that they benefited Custer. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2013 12:59:28 GMT -6
Dan: What I am saying that there is infinitely more professionalism at happy hour at the local VFW on Saturday night than there was in the United States Army in 1876.
Ian: What I am suggesting is that some well meaning confederate could have done the United States Army an infinite amount of good by putting one between Custer's eyes as the First Battle of Bull Run.
Dan: Changing the horses around so that each company had like colored mounts is not the problem. It in fact was not unknown at the time as an aid to command and control before electronic means. So it is not the act itself, but the timing of when he did it that makes it poor judgment.
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Post by benteen on Jul 15, 2013 18:10:30 GMT -6
Dan: What I am saying that there is infinitely more professionalism at happy hour at the local VFW on Saturday night than there was in the United States Army in 1876. Ian: What I am suggesting is that some well meaning confederate could have done the United States Army an infinite amount of good by putting one between Custer's eyes as the First Battle of Bull Run. Dan: Changing the horses around so that each company had like colored mounts is not the problem. It in fact was not unknown at the time as an aid to command and control before electronic means. So it is not the act itself, but the timing of when he did it that makes it poor judgment. Chuck...I agree with all 3 of your statements. I had also been aware that the practice of horse colors was not unique to Custer. However your point of the timing was a valid one. I had asked before a while back if this would effect a novice horseman after he had trained on a certain horse and gotten used to him would this effect him, and I am sorry to say I forgot the answer. Perhaps if Terry (Z Gal) or Steve(AZ Ranger) or Justin (RB) read this would you be kind enough to give your opinion if there was enough time for a novice horseman to get used to a new mount or not. And could this be a factor on why some of the men couldn't control their mounts. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2013 22:50:42 GMT -6
Dan: If I remember Steve correctly it was about a year to achieve combat readiness. I would imagine that would mean training, not just riding down the trail. Regardless, it took more time than was available so it's a moot point.
I think, don't know for sure, that was one reason the confederate cavalry was so effective early in the ACW. The confederate soldier supplied his own mount and tack, while the Union soldier was furnished with government supplied mounts.
Where Bolling AFB is now used to be the remount depot from the Army of the Potomac. Another reason logistics matter. Any AoP Union soldier losing his mount was within 50 to 60 miles of a source of replacement. The confederate soldier would have to take leave (thereby reducing unit strength) and go home to find another mount. If that home was in North Carolina or Georgia, it can make a big difference.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 16, 2013 2:56:23 GMT -6
Hi Dan you are right; each Troop had mounts of a similar colour, for some reason I just forgot all about that. I would think that this scheme of mounting each Troop on different coloured horses could be for tactical reasons rather than just pretty parade ground marching, if a Commander was overlooking his Regiment on the field of battle, he could determine which Troop was were and who was the Commander.
Hello Chuck; Custer copping one at Bull Run eh, rather like what happened to Maj. Gen. Sedgwick at Spotsylvania Court House. Apparently at the first Bull Run Custer served as a courier between Gen. Scott and Maj. Gen. McDowell, dangerous work that couriering lark, you don’t know who could be drawing a bead on you.
Ian.
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