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Post by mac on Jul 13, 2013 2:59:37 GMT -6
Custer makes some assumptions
1. The Indians will run from cavalry attack
2. Indians will not assault cavalry when troops are in reasonable numbers
These is a third important assumption. He assumes that the Indians are camped in their normal manner of villages spread out along the river. He knows there are many Indians but he assumes he will encounter them in "bite sized bits". This is why he sends Benteen off to the left to scout for (and pile into them) villages. That is also why he sends Reno in then does not follow him but rather head off himself to flank what he thinks will be a bite sized village. We know this is the case because when he realizes his assumption is erroneous he sends for Benteen and in the note tells him it is a "Big Village".
I can't see that these assumptions are that unreasonable at that time. (Yes he should do further scouting) After sending the note he does not turn back but continues his attack. When he continues his attack he still relies on assumptions 1 and 2. If he went back timing suggests he would be there too late to help Reno. Does he know this? When Custer begins an attack (here and earlier in his career) he does not seem capable doing anything other than all out attack. Is this his great personal military failing? Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 13, 2013 7:32:37 GMT -6
Hello Mac, there are some small similarities between BLBH and Washita Fight, at Washita Custer again divided his Regiment (into four this time) and later he finds that Black Kettles Camp was only one of a series of Camps along the river and not wanting to be cut of and mascaraed (he notices large bands of mounted Sioux on the high ground) he skilfully withdraws, so really GAC must be a creature of habit, because at the BLBH he again divides his Regiment but this time into three (I am not counting the pack train) but thie time has Benteen sweep to the left to seek any satellite Camps.
You would think though that after what happened at the Fetterman fight and how the Indians were capable of causing an upset by attacking a Company sized military force, he would treat the Warriors with a little more respect, I know that the 7th was much more stronger than the mixed force of Infantry and Cavalry (around 80) that Fetterman had, and Custer had seen first-hand how quickly even in bad weather at the Washita that the Warriors from neighbouring Camps could react and form War Bands, so he should have taken stock of these two counts and realised that both Benteen and Reno had small under strength Battalions and if they ran into any large bands of Sioux they would indeed be stretched.
Ian.
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Post by fuchs on Jul 13, 2013 8:15:10 GMT -6
He assumes that the Indians are camped in their normal manner of villages spread out along the river. He knows there are many Indians but he assumes he will encounter them in "bite sized bits". One out of one examples where this was the case make "normal manner"? The situation at the Washita was completely different, winter camps versus summer camp. Can you even provide one example for an army attack on a Plains Indian camp in summer before the LBH where we find this "normal", spread out configuration of multiple camps with a few miles distance in between, let alone show that this was the rule? And never mind that he was on the trail of one large camp before the attack, encountering multiple, compact campsites of similar size, estimated to about 400 lodges by his scouts. In good agreement with the threat estimate by the Indian office for the total number of "Hostiles" (i.e. winter roamers). Leading to an expected number (by "Army formula" of 2-3 warriors per lodge) of ballpark 1000 warriors. Numbers almost ten times as large as for Black Kettles camp. If Custer did indeed generalize from his one-time Indian camp attack experience, this would be far from "reasonable".
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Post by quincannon on Jul 13, 2013 8:36:17 GMT -6
Seeing that Fuchs was on when I checked in this morning, I purposely waited to see what he had to say, because I knew that this thread, its content, would draw his attention.
I principle I agree with him. That does not mean however that Custer saw it the way we both do. I agree with Mac. Custer anticipated several camps spread out piecemeal and that could be attacked in turn. Custer and Custer's reputation as an Indian fighter were two different things. Should he have known better? I suspect so. Did he? I expect not judging only from the attack dispositions he made. Then finding himself in error (the big village message) he continued. Bad form.
Mac I think it would be more accurate to say that Custer thought the Indians would mount a hasty defense, establish a screen line, then withdraw under the protection of that screen line. If this is a correct assumption, then his attack dispositions make some sense in that the best way to break down a screen is to attack it head on, followed shortly by a subsequent attack from a different quarter, oriented on the near rear of the screen.
By Custer sending in such low numbers, we see the screen initially established, but the numbers manning that screen line soon increased to the point where the best way to screen quickly became attack.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 13, 2013 11:53:50 GMT -6
I must congratulate the Warriors from the Arapaho, Kiowa and Cheyenne Camps, we are talking a distance of around five or six miles from Black Kettles Camp to the other three Circles, but even early in the morning and in Bad weather they still managed to form War Bands and force the 7th to withdraw. Ian. Attachments:
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Post by fuchs on Jul 13, 2013 12:03:11 GMT -6
Mac I think it would be more accurate to say that Custer thought the Indians would mount a hasty defense, establish a screen line, then withdraw under the protection of that screen line. If this is a correct assumption, then his attack dispositions make some sense in that the best way to break down a screen is to attack it head on, followed shortly by a subsequent attack from a different quarter, oriented on the near rear of the screen. I do not understand how a time consuming detour over difficult terrain is a sensible approach if you know that the clock is ticking, and any minute you waste will be used more productively by the opponent. Custer knew the Indians were alerted, and that he wouldn't catch them once they were in full flight mode. In the case that possible satellite villages would mount a counter attack, you would want to secure your first target before that counterattack, again speed is essential. And that detour over the bluffs doesn't look like a as-fast-as-possible flank attack, with the main part never approaching the village. If we assume that Custer assumed that there were multiple small villages, with a total warrior count of 1500 or less, then it would follow that even the half of his command that was at his immediate disposed should be able to simply overwhelm any possible screen. If any fancy footwork was desired, wouldn't the other side of the valley be more suitable for Cavalry operations, with easier terrain? The one advantage I can see of the route taken historically would be that it concealed the true strength of Custer's force for a while. And even that backfired, giving the warriors confidence by making the enemy strength appearing more managable at each of the separated fights.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 13, 2013 12:14:12 GMT -6
Fuchs? What you quoted was how to handle the situation in both the abstract and in theory. If this is what Custer intended it was a poor application of theory, very poor.
The only place that any measure of success could be achieved given the totality of the situation is in the valley, and with numbers approaching full regimental strength. That would necessitate recognizing that any victory that could be achieved would be something less than Cannae. Custer's hubris would not allow anything but Cannae, and the battle became the Battle of Grasping at Straws.
The man was not competent to organize and lead a police detail on a football field after the game, and I hope you do not expect me to make counterpoints in support of a nincompoop.
I suppose before I get myself in trouble with the Custer Chowder and Marching Society and League of Cut Rate Plumbers, I had better say that competence is not only measured by knowing what to and what not to do, but it also includes emotional competence, the ability to control, or hold in check personal feelings or goals, in the furtherance of the mission and objective. Custer was not in my opinion emotionally competent to command.
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Post by montrose on Jul 13, 2013 16:01:57 GMT -6
These assumptions may have been valid at the divide. Yet they were all proven false by known facts before Reno crossed Ford A. At 3411 LTC Custer could see the centralized Indian village, the pony herds and the Indian counterattacks against MAJ Reno.
At what point does a commander react to what the enemy is doing, not what he wishes the enemy would do?
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 13, 2013 19:02:55 GMT -6
Suspect Custer thought, and had been informed, he could hurl down MTC into the camp and relieve Reno until Benteen made his appearance and acted appropriate to the situation. I think that was his plan, finalized in MTC. There's logic and precedent - Indians run, keep the pressure on - to it, but it was wrong that day. Big villages do not act, cannot act, like large small villages. Whole different set of kinetic activity and disrupted communications.
Also suspect that he had an awful moment when he himself pulled up and realized there were too many for the whole 7th regardless what he did. It would be too perfect if that thought arrived with the bullet that I further suspect wounded him in MTC, and the column became two columns moving north, Keogh relatively clueless.
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Post by mac on Jul 14, 2013 2:30:49 GMT -6
Thank you all! Fuchs I appreciate both your posts, as you remove the need for me to reply as to Custer's experience of "normal" behaviour. You also inform me of the fact that there is a variance in camp formation, which I guess is hardly surprising. quincannon I agree Custer seems emotionally unsuitable for the task and perhaps this event was inevitable once he was allowed off leash. Ian I love the way you find stuff that is relevant and interesting. Dark Cloud You perceive my point exactly, then take it where I expected you would . I am sure there must have been a point where Custer knew what was going on and I wonder what he thought. We cannnot know when or what, but I am not sure he cared. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Jul 14, 2013 7:55:13 GMT -6
Mac: Anyone who aspires to be a leader must grow in the job. That is true in any walk of life. The foundation of this is what we learn from out mothers, fathers, and family when we are young. This knowledge is then built on when the leader emerges into life in general, and is a continual learning process. Armies take young men and women and give them the further tools, but even then expect them to grow, become more proficient and mature. This maturity is how growth is achieved as one progresses. I think that Custer, was both never allowed to grow, and he had little desire to do so. Achieving fame and adulation at an early age has a detrimental effect on many, and it, in many, stops the natural progression of things.
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Post by montrose on Jul 14, 2013 9:45:13 GMT -6
Let me expand on QC's post. I have a background in assessing, selecting and training Special Forces Soldiers. I have conducted numerous studies on this process, both while serving and after. My assessment follows.
Character matters. We can teach tactics. I can only go so far in teaching integrity, honor, work ethic, and duty. It is here that upbringing matters. There are traits that are developed growing up that are too hard to fix. When we identify character deficiencies in the course that is a fast track to an NTR. NTR means never to return, individual is sent o his way and told never to reapply.
New experience matters. New soldiers develop training and discipline habits in their first assignment that shapes them for the rest of their careers. We have units that consistently produce top performers. We also have units that produce duds. What is interesting is that bad units can change. The top trait to predict the future of a unit is identifying the incoming command and CSM. A bad leader can wreck a good unit insanely fast. And it takes time to fix a poor unit.
The 7th Cavalry was a bad unit. It was bad not just because the Army of 1876 was bad (one of the worst we have ever had). It was bad at unit level, and was a bad unit compared to the other 34 regiments in the Army. The go to unit in this Army was the 4th Cavalry, not the 7th. The 7th had severe training deficiencies in individual skills, and anything above company level.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 14, 2013 13:03:17 GMT -6
And let me add to Montrose. Bad leaders make a great difference. The unit that I like to point to is the 5th Marines. On Guadalcanal the 5th was an also ran, even though the makeup of the unit was as well trained as any Marine Regiment or any individual Marine. All this changed literally overnight, and in combat when the Regiment was taken over by Red Mike Edson. This also ran became a star performer and remained so. I would put Edson on a tier above Puller, and I think highly of both.
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Post by mac on Jul 14, 2013 22:30:42 GMT -6
When I first began the quest to understand this battle I knew little of Custer or his character. Now I can see that,not surprisingly, it is an intergral part of the solution. Leadership is a very complex business but if I owed allegiance to the US I would be very pleased to see the processes and policies outlined above being used. Character is always and has always been of paramount importance. Interestingly there is an Australian Rules football team here called the Sydney Swans and in recent years they have never dropped from the highest ranks to look for high draft choices. They always develop their own players and only occasionally recruit a high level "star". They are always a top ranked team. Last year they won the equivalent of the Super Bowl. Their first rule is character! They will not recruit anyone, regardless of athletic ability, if he does not meet their character stadards, which are administered by the leaders of the playing group. The only thing that counts is the team performance and individual success is measured only in how well a player carries out his assigned job on the day. Other teams just cannot seem to match this because it is a leadership driven culture and not just a process. You can learn and do a process but you must have and build character in leadership to do what they do. This is not just "Moneyball" it is the step beyond. They do not just hire the right man, they take young men and work with them to help them earn a place in their team. A great management study waiting to be done! To get back to the LBH. As with all disasters the decisions taken are often understandable but ultimately it was Custer's short comings (character deficits) that were the root cause. To momentarily leap to his defence. If Custer had waited and say sent a messenger to Terry. Would he have been chastised for not being bold enough? If the only answer for Custer was that he should have followed on after Reno down the valley then sadly it surely does become all his fault. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Jul 14, 2013 23:04:17 GMT -6
Mac: I think the best definition of character I have ever heard is - Trying to do the right thing even when no one is looking.
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