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Post by Dr Evil on Apr 22, 2019 8:27:27 GMT -6
Much of my point regarding skirmish lines/volley firing tactics & training had to do w/ deciphering the firing heard on Reno Hill. Meaning the firing heard could signify the beginning OR the end of fighting in a particular area of fighting. It appears that most assume the volleys heard was the beginning. But that may b a false assumption. Neither of Reno’s 3 company’s utilized any volley firing in the valley (as discussed). Meaning they didn’t BEGIN the attack using volley firing. On top of the ridges, Godfrey used the volleys to hold back the hordes temporarily then fell back. Did Keogh do the same? Perhaps he started just as the 3 companies in the valley did - soldiers firing at will. The enemy numbers were sparse early on, so it seems logical. Then as the numbers grew rather quickly - Keogh decided to fall back via volley fire. Not having a wooded area to run to like Reno’s men had to make things appear all the more dire. If Keogh had 30 men in skirmish on Luce. And 30 more on N-C Ridge, it wouldn’t take long for Indian numbers to become overwhelming. 60 soldiers holding that area. 100 Indians would be a handful. 200 a problem. 300-400, too many to hold that ground. 700 or 800? Game over. Very quickly. Consider if many/most of the Indians approached just Luce. Coming from the south fighting Reno, around the bend at Ford B & attacking the first soldiers they see - the 30 on Luce. (30 soldiers against ?!!!) You could see that soldier position folding rather quickly. Then the collapse of all 5 to follow like dominos. A question regarding Indian movement in the Ford B area. From the Indians perspective, as they crossed the Ford B area & entered the western end of MTC, is there room &/or necessary geographical cover to move up that area & flank Luce Ridge on their right (the soldiers left)? (assuming there were soldiers in skirmish lines on Luce Ridge). DE I have found two things that help me. The Bonafede archeological map and the Weibert book on Indian sites. This last year I went from MTC to Luce. I had been at some of the Weibert sites before and seen where he had placed metal pins in the ground. From looking at the Indian sites (4) they seem to represent small numbers of Indians firing. The terrain prevents a direct attack and I can see a volley fired to suppress them. I believe some dead horses were found in the vicinity. I think Custer was on the move north and still thinking offense. From Luce through NC a line leads toward Deep Coulée which is a significant drainage between Luce and the Calhoun Area. I don't think there is many significant casualties between Luce and NC and that the soldiers continued north into Deep Coulée and egressed close to CA and Battle Ridge. I think the soldiers on Luce and NC were moving and in a position of advantage but the Indians were using the terrain features to provide cover and concealment. I think some Dog Soldiers and Sioux came up MTC. I think Crazy Horse used MTC also. There certainly was not enough Indians available to fix the 5 companies between MTC and DC which is where Luce and NC are located. The lack of causalities should also be a clue to the nature of the contact. Regards AZ Ranger R u talking bout Custer Cases & Cartridges by Weibert? Is there a site containing his info? I can’t find his book for under $175.
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Post by noggy on Apr 22, 2019 9:40:23 GMT -6
R u talking bout Custer Cases & Cartridges by Weibert? Is there a site containing his info? I can’t find his book for under $175. I found it as "cheap" as 150 USD www.chazmatic.com/custer/buy.html... Good God, that`s one book I`ll never get, I see. All the best, Noggy
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Post by Dr Evil on Apr 22, 2019 15:24:30 GMT -6
Much of my point regarding skirmish lines/volley firing tactics & training had to do w/ deciphering the firing heard on Reno Hill. Meaning the firing heard could signify the beginning OR the end of fighting in a particular area of fighting. It appears that most assume the volleys heard was the beginning. But that may b a false assumption. Neither of Reno’s 3 company’s utilized any volley firing in the valley (as discussed). Meaning they didn’t BEGIN the attack using volley firing. On top of the ridges, Godfrey used the volleys to hold back the hordes temporarily then fell back. Did Keogh do the same? Perhaps he started just as the 3 companies in the valley did - soldiers firing at will. The enemy numbers were sparse early on, so it seems logical. Then as the numbers grew rather quickly - Keogh decided to fall back via volley fire. Not having a wooded area to run to like Reno’s men had to make things appear all the more dire. If Keogh had 30 men in skirmish on Luce. And 30 more on N-C Ridge, it wouldn’t take long for Indian numbers to become overwhelming. 60 soldiers holding that area. 100 Indians would be a handful. 200 a problem. 300-400, too many to hold that ground. 700 or 800? Game over. Very quickly. Consider if many/most of the Indians approached just Luce. Coming from the south fighting Reno, around the bend at Ford B & attacking the first soldiers they see - the 30 on Luce. (30 soldiers against ?!!!) You could see that soldier position folding rather quickly. Then the collapse of all 5 to follow like dominos. A question regarding Indian movement in the Ford B area. From the Indians perspective, as they crossed the Ford B area & entered the western end of MTC, is there room &/or necessary geographical cover to move up that area & flank Luce Ridge on their right (the soldiers left)? (assuming there were soldiers in skirmish lines on Luce Ridge). DE I have found two things that help me. The Bonafede archeological map and the Weibert book on Indian sites. This last year I went from MTC to Luce. I had been at some of the Weibert sites before and seen where he had placed metal pins in the ground. From looking at the Indian sites (4) they seem to represent small numbers of Indians firing. The terrain prevents a direct attack and I can see a volley fired to suppress them. I believe some dead horses were found in the vicinity. I think Custer was on the move north and still thinking offense. From Luce through NC a line leads toward Deep Coulée which is a significant drainage between Luce and the Calhoun Area. I don't think there is many significant casualties between Luce and NC and that the soldiers continued north into Deep Coulée and egressed close to CA and Battle Ridge. I think the soldiers on Luce and NC were moving and in a position of advantage but the Indians were using the terrain features to provide cover and concealment. I think some Dog Soldiers and Sioux came up MTC. I think Crazy Horse used MTC also. There certainly was not enough Indians available to fix the 5 companies between MTC and DC which is where Luce and NC are located. The lack of causalities should also be a clue to the nature of the contact. Regards AZ Ranger What kind of finds have been discovered in the valley where Reno fought as far as Indian spent rounds? I would assume an immense number.
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Post by Dr Evil on Apr 22, 2019 17:16:51 GMT -6
DE I have found two things that help me. The Bonafede archeological map and the Weibert book on Indian sites. This last year I went from MTC to Luce. I had been at some of the Weibert sites before and seen where he had placed metal pins in the ground. From looking at the Indian sites (4) they seem to represent small numbers of Indians firing. The terrain prevents a direct attack and I can see a volley fired to suppress them. I believe some dead horses were found in the vicinity. I think Custer was on the move north and still thinking offense. From Luce through NC a line leads toward Deep Coulée which is a significant drainage between Luce and the Calhoun Area. I don't think there is many significant casualties between Luce and NC and that the soldiers continued north into Deep Coulée and egressed close to CA and Battle Ridge. I think the soldiers on Luce and NC were moving and in a position of advantage but the Indians were using the terrain features to provide cover and concealment. I think some Dog Soldiers and Sioux came up MTC. I think Crazy Horse used MTC also. There certainly was not enough Indians available to fix the 5 companies between MTC and DC which is where Luce and NC are located. The lack of causalities should also be a clue to the nature of the contact. Regards AZ Ranger What kind of finds have been discovered in the valley where Reno fought as far as Indian spent rounds? I would assume an immense number. Hope u don’t think my question above is taking the conversation elsewhere AZ. Not so. I believe that there isn’t a better historical model ever to compare Keogh’s battle in the Luce/N-C areas to than what occurred in the valley. Reno’s men in skirmish lines. Many similarities to Keogh at Luce & N-C. Which brings up a previous question, is there the space &/or necessary geographical cover to flank Keogh’s men on Luce (on the soldiers left)? As u stated, there isn’t much evidence of Indian heavy fighting in MTC/Luce/N-C. Not many casualties as well. So it is assumed that there wasn’t much fighting in that area. But how much evidence of Indians shooting have been found in Reno’s skirmish positions & the surrounding areas in the valley? Casualties were low in those areas. Just like in Keoghs positions above Ford B. Yet there was a helluva lot of fighting going on. If there’s immense shell casings & bullet evidence in the Reno skirmish areas & the ridges on the soldiers left (where the Indians were firing from) - case closed. If not - then we to discuss further.
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Post by montrose on Apr 23, 2019 8:05:15 GMT -6
1. Valley data. AN immense number of shells and bullets were recovered in the valley. Not by trained archeologists, so exact numbers and places do not exist. L/C/N ridge (really all are the same terrain feature) was not recognized as being part of the battle for decades, so the folks who searched the area kept better records.
2. L/C/N debris indicate long range fire at small Indian groups. They may have hit a horse, but certainly zero Indian killed or wounded. (Horse bones found decades later could have been any horse, no links to this battle). Controlled long range fire means a command was given at company level to open fire. This could cause an illusion of volley fire, which did not happen at LBH.
3. Look at the debris shown on Ian's map (Weibert?). Firing shows not individual fire but company and battalion fire. (A battalion in 1876 was any grouping of two or more companies, today we would call this a task force or detachment). Look at range fans from the shells. I can see why they didn't hit anything.
4. Mounted fire. Because of distances between shell piles, there is a chance that US forces were conducted skirmish fire mounted. US doctrine was for skirmish fire dismounted only, this was not a tactic of this Army, and totally unsuited for the 1873 Carbine. If it happened, it shows gross ignorance of the officer and NCO chain of command.
5. Magic. The Indians were very skittish about long range fires. They learned that their rush tactics were useless against repeating weapons in the wagon box and Beech Island fight. They used a unique tactic of individual rushes to test accuracy of US fire. They would lay low if under effective fire, and be encouraged under ineffective fire. This doesn't mean just hits, anyone shot at knows the difference between fires not near you, and ones close. It is not just seeing bullets hit near you, there is a distinct difference in sound.
So here we have a situation where long range ineffective fire is very, very bad for US forces. Many Indians would sit out the fight at the slightest excuse, especially if they only a melee weapon or a bow. I can make an argument that properly trained officers, NCOs and enlisted folks would have kept hundreds on Indians (maybe more than a thousand) out of the fight. If you fight like an idiot, even the cowards come after you.
The L/C/N debris show US forces wasting an enormous amount of ammunition, with zero hits. This set the condition for the disaster that followed. The US inability to control fires encouraged the Indians and depleted ammo. When Indians actually entered effective range, US forces would be low on ammo. In addition, there is a rhythm in managing fires that NCOs and platoon leaders know. You want a slow rhythm out of effective range, and a fast rhythm when in range.
The whole concept of Final Protective Fire (FPF< google it) proves this. The idea is that at range you shoot a few rounds by your best shooters to get one or two, leaders especially. But encourage them to get closer. Once in effective range you dramatically increase both rate of fire and actual hits. You want them well into effective range, so when they break you get free shots into their backs as they withdraw, to maximize casualties. Given the 1873 carbine, open heavy fire at 150 meters, nail the buggers as they run back to 250-300 then cease fire.
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Post by Dr Evil on Apr 23, 2019 8:43:02 GMT -6
1. Valley data. AN immense number of shells and bullets were recovered in the valley. Not by trained archeologists, so exact numbers and places do not exist. L/C/N ridge (really all are the same terrain feature) was not recognized as being part of the battle for decades, so the folks who searched the area kept better records. 2. L/C/N debris indicate long range fire at small Indian groups. They may have hit a horse, but certainly zero Indian killed or wounded. (Horse bones found decades later could have been any horse, no links to this battle). Controlled long range fire means a command was given at company level to open fire. This could cause an illusion of volley fire, which did not happen at LBH. 3. Look at the debris shown on Ian's map (Weibert?). Firing shows not individual fire but company and battalion fire. (A battalion in 1876 was any grouping of two or more companies, today we would call this a task force or detachment). Look at range fans from the shells. I can see why they didn't hit anything. 4. Mounted fire. Because of distances between shell piles, there is a chance that US forces were conducted skirmish fire mounted. US doctrine was for skirmish fire dismounted only, this was not a tactic of this Army, and totally unsuited for the 1873 Carbine. If it happened, it shows gross ignorance of the officer and NCO chain of command. 5. Magic. The Indians were very skittish about long range fires. They learned that their rush tactics were useless against repeating weapons in the wagon box and Beech Island fight. They used a unique tactic of individual rushes to test accuracy of US fire. They would lay low if under effective fire, and be encouraged under ineffective fire. This doesn't mean just hits, anyone shot at knows the difference between fires not near you, and ones close. It is not just seeing bullets hit near you, there is a distinct difference in sound. So here we have a situation where long range ineffective fire is very, very bad for US forces. Many Indians would sit out the fight at the slightest excuse, especially if they only a melee weapon or a bow. I can make an argument that properly trained officers, NCOs and enlisted folks would have kept hundreds on Indians (maybe more than a thousand) out of the fight. If you fight like an idiot, even the cowards come after you. The L/C/N debris show US forces wasting an enormous amount of ammunition, with zero hits. This set the condition for the disaster that followed. The US inability to control fires encouraged the Indians and depleted ammo. When Indians actually entered effective range, US forces would be low on ammo. In addition, there is a rhythm in managing fires that NCOs and platoon leaders know. You want a slow rhythm out of effective range, and a fast rhythm when in range. The whole concept of Final Protective Fire (FPF< google it) proves this. The idea is that at range you shoot a few rounds by your best shooters to get one or two, leaders especially. But encourage them to get closer. Once in effective range you dramatically increase both rate of fire and actual hits. You want them well into effective range, so when they break you get free shots into their backs as they withdraw, to maximize casualties. Given the 1873 carbine, open heavy fire at 150 meters, nail the buggers as they run back to 250-300 then cease fire. Good stuff Montrose. Regarding the Scott, Fox, Melissa Connor, & Dick Harmon archaeology finds of shells and bullets found in the 1980s. Did they work the valley area? Evil
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 23, 2019 11:46:17 GMT -6
Most of the work has been done on NPS property rather than the private land in the valley. Also there has been lots of agricultural practices applied to the land .The site for the Big Indians Village is privately own and a lot of it is by the Real Bird family. Some run bucking horses for the rodeo use. They are a fine family and I consider them my friends. The last time we rode with them Will Hutchison, myself, and a female Australian police officer rode with James Real Bird . It was just around 3 hours and the cost was just under $100 per person. That is a great price just for horse rental then through in the location. You cross the LBH twice. Ride the edge of the bluffs with a great view of the valley to Weir. Then continue on until you hit the NPS boundary fence. You go back down Cedar Coulée until you hit MTC then turn west and down MTC until about equal with Middle Coulée. From there you cross MTC climb out and end on NC turning just before the artifact site and toward Butler Marker. From there a short ride to the river and cross.
Some would charge four times that much to make that ride.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on Apr 23, 2019 18:24:28 GMT -6
I don't know Melissa Connor, guess I have some research to do.
Jason Pitsch did a lot of valley work. He also illegally sold artifacts and is in prison as we speak, but I think most of his work is valid.
I remember seeing many little flags in the valley and signs of archeology. Fred will know who did what. I assume you have his book Strategy of Defeat. If not, get it now. He is very meticulous on citing his sources. Even if you don't agree with him, you will know exactly what evidence he relies on. I have a particular antipathy towards authors who make extreme opinions, and their citations in no way has anything to do with their opinions. Basically, fake citations. Nathaniel Philbrick is notorious for this. Plus paragraph after paragraph of words taken from other works, with no citation whatsoever.
LBH is popular, so many scoundrels write drivel, and make money. This makes true research a challenge. Looking at you Philbrick and Ambrose(every piece of writing Am).brose did was unsourced plagiarism, going back to his college and grad school papers).
This means secondary sources are not reliable. You have to develop a feel for this. Fred places his focus on first hand accounts. Note nearly all Indian evidence is translated, making them secondary accounts: hearsay. Bias in interpreters clearly effects Indian testimony.
This means many specific hypotheses on LBH will rest on conflicted data. You may notice a few thousand threads and tens of thousands of posts on this subject, on the LBH forums.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by fred on Apr 24, 2019 5:28:40 GMT -6
Will,
Melissa Connor is an archaeologist who has worked with Doug Scott and Richard Fox. Her work should be taken seriously. She is listed as one of the co-authors of the book Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn, along with Scott, Fox, and Dick Harmon.
You are also quite correct about Jason Pitsch, both about his findings and his shenanigans. And you are correct as well that he is in prison, though for quite different and unrelated reasons.
I agree with you as well about Philbrick and Ambrose, though much more so with Ambrose.
As for Indian accounts, you have an extremely valid point: they need to be vetted in the extreme. I rely on them a lot, but before I do I look for corroboration. Corroboration takes several forms, both with the accounts of others taken from different times, using different interpreters, and recorded in different places. I also rely-- or use-- their references to terrain, times, and specific events and the order in which they relate those events. Indian accounts are notoriously ego-specific so they have a clearly delineated beginning and end. Once that end is arrived at any further comments are clearly hearsay and if cited, need to be explained as such.
Once again, Will, thanks for your kind words. I hope you are doing well.
Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 24, 2019 7:52:30 GMT -6
Fred/William; That is why I think that the JSIT account is the more solid out of them all as he was actually shown parts of the battle on the field itself by Wolftooth, WT with being a relation of JSIT, didn't need a translator so things would not get lost in the mix and I guess that these two would talk openly to each other too with nothing being left out. These two men walked the field together like me and either of you would, but having the added bonus of one of us being a battle vet who fought on the same field on the day of the battle and they drew a map too. I reckon that you will have to search hard to find a more purer account.
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Post by fred on Apr 24, 2019 10:03:18 GMT -6
Fred/William; That is why I think that the JSIT account is the more solid out of them all as he was actually shown parts of the battle on the field itself by Wolftooth.... Ian, I agree with you. John Stands In Timber's accounts hold up quite well, as do his drawings. I can think of very little-- nothing, off the top of my head-- that he told Margot Liberty that I disagree with. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 24, 2019 11:50:33 GMT -6
I don't know Melissa Connor, guess I have some research to do. Jason Pitsch did a lot of valley work. He also illegally sold artifacts and is in prison as we speak, but I think most of his work is valid. I remember seeing many little flags in the valley and signs of archeology. Fred will know who did what. I assume you have his book Strategy of Defeat. If not, get it now. He is very meticulous on citing his sources. Even if you don't agree with him, you will know exactly what evidence he relies on. I have a particular antipathy towards authors who make extreme opinions, and their citations in no way has anything to do with their opinions. Basically, fake citations. Nathaniel Philbrick is notorious for this. Plus paragraph after paragraph of words taken from other works, with no citation whatsoever. LBH is popular, so many scoundrels write drivel, and make money. This makes true research a challenge. Looking at you Philbrick and Ambrose(every piece of writing Am).brose did was unsourced plagiarism, going back to his college and grad school papers). This means secondary sources are not reliable. You have to develop a feel for this. Fred places his focus on first hand accounts. Note nearly all Indian evidence is translated, making them secondary accounts: hearsay. Bias in interpreters clearly effects Indian testimony. This means many specific hypotheses on LBH will rest on conflicted data. You may notice a few thousand threads and tens of thousands of posts on this subject, on the LBH forums. Respectfully, William Hi William Jason is not in Prison for selling artifacts. He is there for what he did on his computer. "The United States Attorney’s Office announced that during a federal court session in Billings on May 9, 2012 before Senior U.S. District Judge Jack D. Shanstrom, Jason Dean Pitsch, a 41-year-old resident of Garryowen, appeared for sentencing. Pitsch was sentenced to a term of: ◾Prison: 120 months ◾Special assessment: $100 ◾Supervised release: lifetime Pitsch was sentenced in connection with his guilty plea to viewing child pornography." I took a class on the Archeological use of a metal detector. The lead instructor was Dr Douglas Scott. He knew Jason and he believes the timber site is on Jason's property. The current owner of the museum at Garryowen was served a search warrant and lots of articles were seized. He wrote a book about his experience. Regards Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 24, 2019 12:01:42 GMT -6
I agree with William that Fred's book is a must have with those looking into what happened.
I think the selling of artifacts depends upon where they are found. If on private property it is legal. The issue I see is that some persons obtain artifacts lawfully but claim they were found on the battlefield. That is fraud and unlawful. Sometimes we see persons claiming to find cartridge cases in a location that they were not found. Sometimes they fool some of our best resource persons. what is worse is that their credibility for other finds is tarnished.
Regards
Steve
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Post by dre859 on Apr 24, 2019 14:07:32 GMT -6
I'm sorry to bust in here with a noob question - and I've seen it answered, just not recently. I've seen so many references to the Bonafede map that I've developed an almost lustful desire for it. Is there any place I can actually purchase one? I've checked Amazon, E-Bay, Half-Price Books, even called the NPS LBH Gift Shop.
Regards,
Dwayne
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Post by herosrest on Apr 24, 2019 17:43:57 GMT -6
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