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Post by fred on Apr 15, 2019 19:59:43 GMT -6
James McLaughlin, Indian Agent at Standing Rock beginning 1881 tells us that there were more than one group tracking Custer once he mounted the ridge. Aside from Wolf Thooth there were a number of others on the east side of the river tracking GAC, to include the village police. He was spotted before the Reno attack begins as Reno's advance was shielded by woods/timber along the river. Before the Reno attack Gall and others were attempting to mirror Custer's movements on the village side of the river, in the village. Once Reno began firing Gall et el went to interdict him. At this point there was consideration of fleeing. Custer was said to be heading hell bent for the lower end of the village, Ford D. Reno, was blocked rapidly and the majority of the NA's arrayed against him returned to the village to help obviate Custer's command. These NA's got in behind him and others from the North end cut him off in his attempt to attack from the Ford D area., The folks who told McLaughlin this tale were Gall, Crow King, Mrs Spotted Tail Bull, and others. They all agree that they were surprised by Reno and that he could have had a bigger impact on the battle if he had not bailed. I do not buy much-- if any-- of this post-battle posturing by the Indians. To me it was mostly a face-saving exercise to cover their reputations. Wolf Tooth was tracking no one, otherwise he would have sent riders to warn the village and most of those who spotted the column east of the divide were heading back to the agencies and didn't bother to warn anyone but themselves. Deeds and however he was riding with (Brown Back... I am too lazy to check notes) were about the only ones who headed back toward the camp and Deeds got waylaid on the way. Gall played a very small role in the whole affair, probably spending more time grieving than fighting, so he had a reputation to uphold as well. It is self-serving stuff like this that needs to be so carefully vetted before accepting it as fact or truth. This village was caught with its proverbial pants down and too many others had the guts to admit it. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bluedog on Apr 16, 2019 7:17:23 GMT -6
I put tons of credence in what Fred says about this battle because he's proven to have put in the work to be a most competent voice.
Were the Indians completely and totally surprised by Custer? Certainly many Indians said they were. And, the fact that Fred believes they were gives me pause to think otherwise. But, I think this leads to the bigger picture that magnifies the huge advantage the Indians had that day. How much did Custer's actions add to that huge advantage?. I believe a lot.
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Post by herosrest on Apr 16, 2019 10:21:59 GMT -6
That is precisely correct and Custer's tried and tested antics came unglued in the valley attack and unredeemable below Medicine Tail Coulee without the support of the balance of the regiment. Hostiles numbers were such that the five company force with Custer died very quickly in a hail of gunfire, arrows and tomahawks. Local superiority in numbers may have been as great as 40 to 1 against companies fixed in place by the loss of their mounts which were shot down and stampeded. It is my view that regardless of the events in the valley and retreat from it, the five companies below Medicine Tail Coulee could have been salvaged by urgently advising Custer and his HQ, where the seven companies concentrated with Reno, were. The condition of Reno's command could have been conveyed to Custer's from Reno Hill before it was immobilised and unable to save itself by returning across Medicine Tail's creek. The hostiles fought and were allowed to fight a brilliant defensive offense to destroy the 7th Cavalry in detail. On 28th June 1876, the regiment was effectively destroyed and useless. Sitting Bull out-Fetterman'd Red Cloud with a brilliantly opportune strategy. Whilst it is true in sense that 7th Cavalry's attack surprised many of the hostile population, it was known that cavalry were near and the change of tactics in raiding during daytime was a surprise. That aside, the village population were up for the trouble and responded magnificently. The five companies could have been saved with timely messaging but of course the messaging at Little Bighorn was unmitigated shambles. I never thought I would say this on these boards: Hero is right. Field grade officers provide command and control of 2 or more companies. Field grade officers are Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel. They serve in battalions, regiments, brigades as staff or commanders. The ability to manage more than 2 companies seems to be a long term weakness of 7th Cav. AT LBH, seems to be an issue anywhere CPT Benteen is not involved. Still trying to get over Hero being right. Behind you.......!
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 16, 2019 10:40:19 GMT -6
Above is my working map from visits to the battlefield. The blue line was ridden numerous times to NC and then either toward the Real Birds or along east boundary of battlefield to Highway 212. Last summer while riding with my Crow (Marine) friend he turned to the right taking us up to Luce. The Luce shape from the artifacts map (Bonafede) looks like a running W to me. While on Luce would could see the shape is formed by the terrain with a bluff drop off to the west. I believe there were three parties of Indian after Custer. They came from different directions. You see a second Luce site with a smaller number of soldier cases to the northeast and you also see a divergent grouping of cartridges to the west. I think adding Weibert's Indian sites would help. The metal markers are still there. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by herosrest on Apr 16, 2019 11:04:29 GMT -6
I'll give a further opinion which is a development of what Custer was doing. We know that and I disgree strongly that he 'intended' hostage taking as strategy. Done. It would be useful to understand how the guy fought and we know this from 1873 and the 10 company fight on the Yellowstone along the river's north bank opposite the mouths of Tullock's Creek and the Bighorn river.
Custer's report of the fighting exists. He wrote up the earlier three company skirmish in an article which Galaxy Magazine published in the July 1876 issue. Lt. Braden who was seriously injured during the Battle of the Bighorn or Pease Bottom, wrote it up much later in retirement in the ANJ. I link the item and another article. John Lubetkin wrote up both fights in Jay Cooke's Gamble: The Northern Pacific Railroad, the Sioux, ... by M. John Lubetkin
There is of course what is known of tactics used at Washita which led to the surrender of hostages during slaughter of nearly a thousand of Black Kettle's ponies and their tepees and all possessions and food.
The logic. Destroy the camp. The shelter and food. Game over.
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 17, 2019 4:36:39 GMT -6
These actions were detailed in Donohue's "WRRR" released last year. His theory differs. He also details the detaining of a minor Sioux Chief on the Black Hills expedition as a hostage.
Regards, Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 17, 2019 7:54:13 GMT -6
Wolf Tooth was AWOL from camp. He moved to Custer Creek and was going to head off where he thought soldiers were coming from. Custer had moved faster then expected and Wolf Tooth was not in position to head off Custer or slow him. So Wolf Tooth was not tracking anyone but he joined the pursuit of Custer as he moved north.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by herosrest on Apr 17, 2019 12:12:22 GMT -6
These actions were detailed in Donohue's "WRRR" released last year. His theory differs. He also details the detaining of a minor Sioux Chief on the Black Hills expedition as a hostage. Regards, Tom The detention resulted from a disagreement between Custer and his scouts who wished to kill the Sioux captive. If I remenber the gist of this thing the elder remained with his lodge in a deception which allowed the rest of the band or family, to evade and escape. Bloody Knife wanted Sioux scalps because the family were related to Red Cloud.
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Post by Dr Evil on Apr 19, 2019 15:11:13 GMT -6
I agree Custer didn't have a sense of urgency at that point in time. The point of contention for me is when did Custer feel a sense of urgency. Custer's heart-rate skyrocketed at some point. That could be when he realized Reno's desperate situation and retreat. And, that's if he ever did know what happened with Reno. Or, maybe just when some warriors coming from Reno's position starting showing up in Custer's vicinity. I believe that is key to Custer's thoughts and actions. I've read you on Boston Custer's meeting up with George and if I read you right you believe Boston told him only that Reno was in contact with the warriors and nothing further than that. So, no accelerating heart-rate at that point in time. Am I correct? You are correct to a point... Again, this is a timing issue, like almost everything to do with this battle. And the timing determines the context. Boston's meeting with brother George involves several contexts. The first is the observation of Boston passing the Benteen command at the morass. The second is Boston meeting with Martini. The third involves Martini's location when he was given the note: a very contentious issue, especially with Martini's years later nonsense. The fourth is Boston passing over 3,411 and what he had to have seen. There is no getting away from the confluence of events versus time in any of this and it is not even an issue that Boston had to have seen the very beginning of the Reno pull-out/retreat. More issues pop up here, viz., Reno's intentions. It is a fairly basic military tenet that when you retreat or pull back, you do so in the direction you came from or at least over terrain you are familiar with. In this case there were three comments over the years, one by a warrior, one by a former CSA general, and a third by an enlisted man in Reno's command, all saying essentially the same thing: Reno should have/tried to/intended to pull back up the LBH valley toward Ford A. The fact he did not could be attributed to Indian pressure forcing him to the killing grounds of the river. You would do the same thing were you in charge of 900 irate warriors. Because of the timing of all this-- the retreat crossing was more than a mile from Reno's timber-- Boston could have only seen the very beginning of Reno's retreat. That snapshot was of a charging cavalry command heading back in the direction they came. Beyond that Boston could not possibly have known, again, because of several following contexts all involving additional timing issues. So at best, Boston had to have told George Reno was either (a) in some trouble; or (b) heading back up the valley because he could not get into the village. Now remember this: both warriors and Reno's troops claimed when Reno first broke from the timber, the Indians were confused and began to fade away, only rallying and attacking when they realized what was happening.As for Custer's heart rate skyrocketing, it is my opinion that happened only after he reached Cemetery Ridge after departing Ford D. That was when he saw what was happening at the Deep Ravine ford, Indians forcing the gap beyond the head of Deep Ravine, and when he sent Yates into the basin area in an attempt to stem that tide of warriors breaking across Battle Ridge. The noise from the Calhoun Coulee sector and the Keogh sector had to have caused a great deal of perspiration to have broken across Custer's forehead. Best wishes, Fred. Hi Fred, Couple questions. 1. Do u have ur battle timeline marked on a map (maps) on this site to aid in visualizing the sequence of events? 2. Did Reno’s men in the valley do any volley firing? Or was it basically fire at will from the get-go?
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Post by fred on Apr 19, 2019 15:22:40 GMT -6
Couple questions. 1. Do u have ur battle timeline marked on a map (maps) on this site to aid in visualizing the sequence of events? 2. Did Reno’s men in the valley do any volley firing? Or was it basically fire at will from the get-go? 1. No. It is way too large. There are more than timing 500 entires. In The Strategy of Defeat it breaks down into more than sixty pages with twenty-five separate events/situations totaling 800 entries (some duplicated for easier reference with other concurrent events). I have it on a single spreadsheet with 681 entries (again, some duplicated for easier reference when I work with it). 2. Fire at will. The only recorded volley firing was heard by the troops on Reno Hill shortly after Benteen's arrival. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dr Evil on Apr 19, 2019 17:13:48 GMT -6
Regarding the volleys heard on Reno Hill. More than likely they came from the Ford B area. Perhaps Luce Ridge. Regardless, it appears that ur timeline has the heavy fighting beginning at this end of the battlefield around the time these volleys were heard. Correct? Evil
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Post by fred on Apr 19, 2019 18:19:16 GMT -6
Regarding the volleys heard on Reno Hill. More than likely they came from the Ford B area. Perhaps Luce Ridge. Regardless, it appears that ur timeline has the heavy fighting beginning at this end of the battlefield around the time these volleys were heard. Correct? Basically, yes. I choose this as the actual beginning of the Custer fight. I think I had it at 3:07 pm. The end of the Custer fight was 4:40 pm, so the whole thing lasted one hour, thirty-three minutes. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dr Evil on Apr 19, 2019 20:17:01 GMT -6
Do u know of any interesting sources of cavalry training & tactics? (Other than Upton 1874 cavalry tactics manual). I was researching cavalry training during the Indian wars years back. found some interesting information on several sites, but a fraction of what I was looking for. One of the more interesting things turned up discussed company movements into & out of skirmish lines. In particular, falling back under pressure. Which consisted of a series volleys followed by half the company falling back to the horses & reforming into skirmish lines before mounting. The other half volleys again & falls back to the horses & mounts. The remaining soldiers now in skirmish lines in the vicinity of the horses volleys before mounting their horses. From what I recall - that is basically how the maneuver worked.
I think that you can see what I’m getting at. Volleys could signify the beginning of heavy fighting in the Ford B/MTC area, or the end. Ur thoughts.
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Post by herosrest on Apr 20, 2019 4:12:50 GMT -6
Horsemanship at Little Big Horn by Robert Doran gives pretty much anything you wish to know and a unique and interesting treatment of the subject due to the author's focus on cavalry tactics and horsemanship. It isn't everyones cup of sand but is a remarkable work. Well worth the investment.
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Post by noggy on Apr 20, 2019 6:30:21 GMT -6
2. Did Reno’s men in the valley do any volley firing? Or was it basically fire at will from the get-go? The firing in the valley is a prime example of what really makes Montrose itch; poor fire discipline. The soldiers fired at will, seemingly often at nothing else than the tipis ("tipies"?). From the range / beyond the range only the best of the shooters would could regularly make hits. You have other areas of the battlefield (not the Valley) too where soldiers apparently fired at targets about three times further away than the Springfield`s maximum range, I believe. The 7th didn`t have too many crack shots. And the firing was seemingly out of control, as indicated by the tempo of ammo spent. Some younger warriors in the early fases got too close and were hit, but even that was more likely due to individual soldiers shooting (I doubt Reno or the others would have ordered "Stop shooting like idiots, fire now on my command on these guys, then resume the BS!"). I do however not remember any very detailed descriptions of the casualties inflicted by Reno`s men before being chased away. All the best, Noggy
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