kenny
Full Member
Posts: 156
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Post by kenny on Aug 15, 2018 17:23:26 GMT -6
I remember reading a Indian account of the battle of fourty troops on foot being lead by a single officer on horseback. The he said that all the warriors around that officer and the fourty man with, they all disappear in the swarm of warriors. But also remember reading account of fourty troops on foot being lead by four officer on horse back, heading toward the river.
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Post by noggy on Aug 16, 2018 0:36:55 GMT -6
I remember reading a Indian account of the battle of fourty troops on foot being lead by a single officer on horseback. The he said that all the warriors around that officer and the fourty man with, they all disappear in the swarm of warriors. But also remember reading account of fourty troops on foot being lead by four officer on horse back, heading toward the river. That`s from the fighting around Last Stand Hill, not the Keogh sector. As a side note, I found Greg Michno`s (in Lakota Noon) thoughts about the number of soldiers making a run for it towards the end of the battle very interesting. All the best, Noggy
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Post by benteen on Aug 16, 2018 10:50:46 GMT -6
Dan, first how goes it with you? With regard to Mike Donahue, he is a good guy and very knowledgeable, however, I am not making the news, just reporting what I read in his book and from a discussion from last year. Regards, Tom Tom, I am fine my friend thanks for asking. No, I dont bury the messenger As for posting, the main thread was about what route Custer took...Very interesting but I dont have a good enough map (Just a couple in books) so I couldnt place the locations so as to contribute anything. I havent been to the LBH in 30 years so when someone posts that he was so and so distance from the visitors center or north of highway such and such I am completley at a loss. Be Well Dan
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Post by benteen on Aug 16, 2018 10:55:09 GMT -6
Hi Dan Im in agreement with you on the role of a reserve and that Col Keogh was not deployed as such . Where I would disagree with you is in the reason why this is the case. Col Keogh in his private corrispondence was not too optmistic about his chances of surviving this adventure , giving instructions as to his burial. Richard, Whats that saying, that you learn something every day. Well I learned something. I was unaware that Capt Keogh had an omen of his death. Thanks for posting it. Be Well Dan
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Post by benteen on Aug 16, 2018 10:58:16 GMT -6
I remember reading a Indian account of the battle of fourty troops on foot being lead by a single officer on horseback. The he said that all the warriors around that officer and the fourty man with, they all disappear in the swarm of warriors. But also remember reading account of fourty troops on foot being lead by four officer on horse back, heading toward the river. That`s from the fighting around Last Stand Hill, not the Keogh sector. As a side note, I found Greg Michno`s (in Lakota Noon) thoughts about the number of soldiers making a run for it towards the end of the battle very interesting. All the best, Noggy Hi Noggy, Does Michno say what direction he believes they were running, or was it just helter skelter. Be Well Dan
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Post by noggy on Aug 16, 2018 11:58:09 GMT -6
That`s from the fighting around Last Stand Hill, not the Keogh sector. As a side note, I found Greg Michno`s (in Lakota Noon) thoughts about the number of soldiers making a run for it towards the end of the battle very interesting. All the best, Noggy Hi Noggy, Does Michno say what direction he believes they were running, or was it just helter skelter. Be Well Dan Hello, benteen/Dan I`m on a work related trip, as usual, so I can`t quote him word by word. But the main gist (?) of it is that it was a breakout or charge of some sort by a number of soldiers ranging from under 10 to 45 towards Deep Ravine area. The chapter from Lakota Noon regarding this action is if I recall correctly actually called either "Run to the River" or "Run for the River". If i`m not totally off, I think he mentioned that some mounted soldiers at one time attempted to go back South along Battle ridge, but that may be me messing things up. All the best, Geir
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Post by brenda56 on Aug 16, 2018 16:48:11 GMT -6
Is there anything to suggest that Custer's move towards ford d was independent from the ford b affair or was there some form of reuniting of the complete force in the Calhoun area before Custer moved north with his two companies ?
Reason I ask is because a couple of the last posts got me thinking.
Why leave the majority of your force in the Calhoun area ?
At ford b it is usually suggested someone was wounded. Unsurprisingly it is either Custer or Keogh or someone who may be considered as key. If one of them was wounded it would be likely that one or two "others" were also wounded. So how many unsupported wounded cavalrymen does it take to change the plan or indeed to become the critical path ?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 17, 2018 9:17:05 GMT -6
Reason I ask is because a couple of the last posts got me thinking. Why leave the majority of your force in the Calhoun area ? I agree with you Brenda, why indeed. So why would a brazen commander like Custer go from a firebrand to a cautious officer? He had five companies, he was on the move, his goal would have been to get into the battle with everything he had, as his regiment was now committed to battle. So why would he stop and leave a large portion of his battalion on a ridge line plus go off on a mission which probably would need every man he had. By all accounts, Custer did everything that afternoon with speed, the survivors say this in their accounts, so why would he stop his momentum when he had accomplished nothing?
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Post by wild on Aug 17, 2018 10:27:48 GMT -6
The most difficult maneuver to pull off is changing formation while in contact with the enemy. The command attempted to go from mounted line astern into dismounted skirmish line . The markers on the battlefield give testimony to their failure . Reno attempted a similar move with similar results being routed with heavy casualties. Imagine trying to form line while under attack from all sides , trying to return fire while holding a fear maddened horse ,comrades falling around you , dust and smoke , panic everywhere ,terror, an openair charnal house.Benteen was right in his description of the field.
The fact that both Custer and Keogh suffered the same fate indicates that they were hit similtaneously along their entire open flank. The charge made against Lt Col Keogh could be laid against all 5 company commanders and it would be unjust because the blame rests with Custer and him alone for the defeat of the 7th.
Cheers Richard
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Post by brenda56 on Aug 17, 2018 10:52:21 GMT -6
I'm getting the impresssion cavalry units are fine for getting to the battle but as an unsupported fighting unit things can go wrong, quickly, at the speed of a horse ! As for ford B, irrespective of the why and how many, I wouldn't be surprised if there were a couple or more wounded. Add in the noise, dust, confusion and maybe unnecessary gun firing any on scene assessments could have been confused. In other words maybe the five hadn't planned for any form of resistance. That to me is at odds with a controlled reuniting of the five companies at Calhoun area. That being the case it could suggest Custer and Keogh were operating independent to but close to each other but were commonly and simultaneously drawn in to the same melee.
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Post by wild on Aug 17, 2018 16:35:01 GMT -6
56 The 7th were for all practical purposes a terrorist unit and configured as such. Their training, weapons and modus operandi and leader suited them more for black operations rather than a civil war all arms formal battlefield . Think of the battle as nationalist government forces confronting a terrorist force and destroying it.
"The controled reuniting of forces on Calhoun Hill "is part of a complex scenario . Such scenarios can only have credibility if and when the more simplex scenario is discredited and as yet that has not happened. Cheers Richard
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Post by noggy on Aug 18, 2018 2:43:17 GMT -6
So why would he stop and leave a large portion of his battalion on a ridge line plus go off on a mission which probably would need every man he had. By all accounts, Custer did everything that afternoon with speed, the survivors say this in their accounts, so why would he stop his momentum when he had accomplished nothing? Benteen said the something similar that the same day... Reno surely would have agreed too. Indian accounts have Custer waiting 20-30 minutes (Fred has a good article about this) after Ford D. A planned quick reconnaissance while the rest of the regiment, minus the smallest unit which was badly beaten up, reunited and allowed a crossing closer to the refugees doesn`t sound too far fetched. A shame the enemy often seems to have their own thoughts. All the best, Noggy
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Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 18, 2018 4:31:36 GMT -6
Hi Noggy;
What if this wait was down to the battalion [all five companies] regrouping on BRE and cemetery ridge after being shot at from the flats near ford D?
Read the Cheyenne accounts of this action and how they lay in wait in the benches along the river and opened fire on the soldiers.
After this skirmish the whole command may have turned tail and headed back the way they came, only to find that Indian forays had gotten closer to their flanks via the river below cemetery ridge, thus they initiated a fall back leaving E Company [and maybe F too] as a rear guard to allow for the others to pull back south.
I suppose to the Indians that any soldiers on a ridge line trying to deploy or take orders would be a wait.
I suppose that a withdrawal under pressure would be a hard task at the best of times, but doing it with scared and confused soldiers would make it even harder, so the only comparison we have is to look at how Benteen withdrew from Weir point and how companies simply left without little communication or order.
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Post by wild on Aug 18, 2018 9:25:03 GMT -6
Once the command desended into MTC they were in tactical contact with the Indians. From MTC to LSH at no time were they further distant from 2000 Alerted and somewhat discomoded locals than 5 minutes . You do not need an hour of complex fragmention reccies and spirals to produce a greasy stain on Battle Ridge. Cheers Richard
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Post by noggy on Aug 18, 2018 14:07:46 GMT -6
Hi Noggy; What if this wait was down to the battalion [all five companies] regrouping on BRE and cemetery ridge after being shot at from the flats near ford D? Read the Cheyenne accounts of this action and how they lay in wait in the benches along the river and opened fire on the soldiers. Hello Yes, I know about your thoughts about the 5 companies moving South; I read on the Centennial Board now and then (hello, QC!) My post was about the separation of the regiment, and how people have a hard time believing GAC would do so, even if he already had done it twice that day. All the best, Noggy
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