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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 17, 2010 6:08:13 GMT -6
Hunk: It's obvious Benteen felt Custer was to blame for the disaster. As of Dec. 16, 2011 . . . we are still debating whether that was the case. Absolutely
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 17, 2010 6:14:19 GMT -6
If it was a containment then Custer expected Benteen to either stop fleeing Indians or attack them. Either way he was without medical personnel. If Custer expected a battle one would think some medical people would be along. In addition, still not quite sure why no scouts were with Benteen. They would be more valuable in a scouting mission than following along with Custer/Reno who hadn't even found any Indians when Benteen was ordered out. The medical staff was with the entire regiment when Benteen was sent. If Reno was told he would be supported then one could assume that the medical staff again would end up in the same location. If not were they planning to have two different field hospitals? Were the majority of medical supplies with the pack train? AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 17, 2010 6:30:11 GMT -6
A word on semantics, no pun intended, because things are getting muddled in my mind. I heard that. First of all, is this an accurate definition? A recon in force is a military term for sending out a recon force that is strong enough to fight a small battle, but is fast enough to withdraw if it encounters something too big to handle. If so, I think it could broadly be defined as 'containment', so let's not get hung up on the difference between the two. Containment can be with or without force. Second, was this 'recon in force' a recognized maneuver in 1876? clw the term reconnaissance in force was used during the CW. On trying to find the origin reconnaissance was used as scouting and the force related to troops. Interesting is that force also indicated they would be looking for a force of the enemy rather than terrain scouting. I saw a diary note in the 1860s where recon. in force is recorded. My concern was back to an older discussion that Benteen was simply a second flank guard (Reno was on the left flank of Custer as they moved down Reno Creek)and required to maintain speed and location to the main body. AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 17, 2010 6:47:39 GMT -6
That is what is causing my doubts.You and AZ and many others believe it was a blocking force,but if it was, then why would Custer recall it at the time it would serve its purpose. Which is when Reno attacked. It is then that the warriors would supposedly scatter, so why withdraw the blocking force if that's in fact what it was
Be Well Dan
Dan
I think this was in response to Terry's direct order not to allow the Indians escape to the south. The order didn't state any other direction to worry about. Combine that with Montrose's statement regarding it being a hasty decision and it seems a good theory to me.
As far as recalling Benteen, my belief is unchanged. Everyone knew there were lots of Indians ahead just not the distribution of warriors or locations. Once the "big village" is found it was determined to have enough warriors at that location to require the whole regiment.
This has always seemed simple to me. Maybe because I am limited on my military terms for action. The whole action was recon in force in my opinion. The closer you get to contact and gather intel the more likely to change to movement to contact.
That is why I appreciate those that bring in these military terms with more understanding of there use.
Semper Fi
Steve
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Post by montrose on Dec 17, 2010 7:05:58 GMT -6
1. Terry's justification for 3 additional companies.
On 16 Feb 1876 Terry sent a request to Sheridan asking for the 3 absent 7th Cav companies.
"The orders which have been given recently render indispensably necessary a larger mounted force than the nine companies presently in the Department. These nine companies comprise about 620 men all told, and of these 550 could be put in the field for active operations. This number is not sufficient for the end in view. For if the Indians who pass the winter in the Yellowstone and Powder River country should be found in one camp (and they usually are so gathered) they could not be attacked without grave risk of defeat."
I find it interesting that Custer attacked with only 8 companies available, given Terry's letter. His force was less than 400.
2. Movement. One of the main issues discussing LBH is the speed with which various elements should move. One of my own painful memories of the officer basic course involved march tables.
March tables involves complicated measures for determining how long it would take a column of troops to move from point A to B. You used calipers to check distances, and worked in factors like curves in roads, and going up and down heights.
These procedures were very common in the 1800s Army. Officers were aware of time and space.
This means that Custer was well aware when he ordered Reno to attack that Benteen and McDougall were out of supporting distance. He also knew that his move north further delayed the time in which these forces would reach the fight.
3. Benteen's scout. I agree that this was a combat patrol and a reconnaissance in force. His mission was to scout a certain are, making this a zone recon, vice a point recon. I believe Custer trusted Benteen's ability to act on his own initiative. I also believe Custer trusted Benteen more than some of his other officers. (Trust doesn't mean like).
Benteen got a mission in line with his abilities. He made a sound call to cancel the mission and return to main body. Custer picked the right man for the job.
4. Blocking Indian retreat to the south. Reno's attack down the valley blocked any village retreat south. It would have been far more effective if Reno and Benteen were sent together down the valley.
Of course, in my view the optimal attack would be a regimental attack down the valley. Restrictive terrain works both ways. The hills on the west and bluffs on the east would help protect US flanks. I do not believe US had the means to capture the village.
But a Rosebud type stalemate would force the village to break up. Indians would likely have to abandon supplies and equipment near US forces.
I am not intending to open a discussion on what other options US forces had available on this thread. I just want to explain my opinion so you understand my own thoughts and prejudices as it relays to ongoing discussions.
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Post by clw on Dec 17, 2010 7:14:45 GMT -6
I don't think I was clear earlier. The decision to launch Benteen was a hastily thought out move. The move was exactly what Benteen said it was. Scout the designated sector and attack any hostiles in zone. There were no secondary missions. No blocking, containing, support Reno's attack, setting up a signal station to send smoke signals to ford D, nothing. Custer send two members of his personal staff to send additional orders to Benteen. This clearly reflects his thinking. He was focused on finding and attacking enemy village as soon as possible. GAC was not a deep military thinker. Simplicity is a mainstay of his actions throughout his career. Simplicity is not a bad thing in military operations. The lack of simplicity after leaving Reno is a, if not the, reason for the disaster that followed. I like this view. It makes perfect sense and I concur with this assessment of Custer. Kick the ant hill and sort it out as things develop. Again, not necessarily a bad thing as he proved time and again in the CW.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 17, 2010 7:24:25 GMT -6
So for my understanding my current view of recon in force has an assumption there is not a known contact location. It can be also called a scouting in force since reconnaissance is scouting. Likewise in my current view moving to contact has a known location that you are moving toward.
Fred throws in a third combat patrol which is half way between between how I view both terms and should be familiar to Viet Nam era veterans. Visions of a PRC-25
In looking for the use of recon in force or reconnaissance in force I found it used during the CW. One of those discoveries is a daily diary where it is recorded i
The Civil War day by day: an almanac, 1861-1865
Jan 9 (1862) prepares recon. in force toward Columbus
So its seems to me it is Custer's mindset that determines when it switches from finding Indians to attacking Indians.
So how am I doing Montrose and Fred in my current view of these the terms recon in force and moving to contact? I value your opinions.
Thanks
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 17, 2010 7:28:16 GMT -6
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Post by clw on Dec 17, 2010 7:37:58 GMT -6
Yes. As much as Benteen rankles me, especially for his behavior after the fact, he was a military asset I'm sure Custer justifiably recognized. In fact the only explanation I've ever come up for his lack of enthusiasm, purpose, urgency -- call it what you will -- in returning to the command is that he just didn't grasp how badly he was needed. If so, maybe that had a lot to do his attitude later.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 17, 2010 7:42:27 GMT -6
Montrose We must have been working on our posts at the same time. Great post.
In my view Custer does not have a known location north or south of the Reno Creek and LBH junction and it is possible that substantial Indians would be located south of the junction making Benteen's mission a little more understandable. Once the location is definitely north Benteen's mission is over.
It would also make more sense why a Martin type note was not sent when Custer sent Reno forward. If they turned south then Benteen might be in the right location. Once Custer knows it is north he sends Martin.
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Post by clw on Dec 17, 2010 7:54:21 GMT -6
1. Terry's justification for 3 additional companies. On 16 Feb 1876 Terry sent a request to Sheridan asking for the 3 absent 7th Cav companies. "The orders which have been given recently render indispensably necessary a larger mounted force than the nine companies presently in the Department. These nine companies comprise about 620 men all told, and of these 550 could be put in the field for active operations. This number is not sufficient for the end in view. For if the Indians who pass the winter in the Yellowstone and Powder River country should be found in one camp (and they usually are so gathered) they could not be attacked without grave risk of defeat." I find it interesting that Custer attacked with only 8 companies available, given Terry's letter. His force was less than 400. I hadn't seen that source doc before. How ironic considering all we have to say about the army doctrine of the time being based on the 'scatteration' theory.
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Post by clw on Dec 17, 2010 7:57:29 GMT -6
Montrose We must have been working on our posts at the same time. Great post. In my view Custer does not have a known location north or south of the Reno Creek and LBH junction and it is possible that substantial Indians would be located south of the junction making Benteen's mission a little more understandable. Once the location is definitely north Benteen's mission is over. It would also make more sense why a Martin type note was not sent when Custer sent Reno forward. If they turned south then Benteen might be in the right location. Once Custer knows it is north he sends Martin. I just had one of those rare moments of clarity. It will pass of course, but still..........
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Post by fred on Dec 17, 2010 10:08:22 GMT -6
It takes a leap of faith to understand fully Benteen's actions once returning to the trail on Reno Creek. I have always believed one must set aside personal prejudices, i. e., less than charming personality traits, and look at the facts or the preponderance of evidence. If we are stuck on Benteen arriving on Reno Hill at 4:20 in the afternoon, then there is reason for condemnation. The problem with that, however, is the fact-- as I have posted, somewhere-- that with a single exception, everyone claimed Benteen arrived within minutes of Reno's arrival and at some time in mid-afternoon. Once we have gotten by the "leap of faith," then we need to tackle the "dirty" work and that is long, time-consuming, difficult, and extremely tedious. It means going through every shred of testimony left to us by people in six companies-- Benteen's and Reno's-- and setting the appropriate statements side by side to seek relevance. Having a boring enough personality to be up to that task, the conclusions are very revealing. I find it, as well, a very clever observation... and rather open-minded, which I like... that you wrote, "... he just didn't grasp how badly he was needed." When you consider what was being heard on the approach once beyond the lone tepee, and you add to that the comments by Kanipe and Martini, it is easy to understand an understated lack of immediacy, not only in Benteen, but in the men with him. For example, if Tom Weir was in such an all-fired sweat, why wasn't he still out front and ahead of Benteen? Once at the river, however, Benteen began to question what was going on: what he saw was not what he had been told. He got the full picture, obviously, once atop Reno Hill. Going backwards a little bit, we must also consider the time Benteen came off his scout and relate that to the time he arrived on Reno Hill. And this is what bugs me so much about John Gray's work. When you refuse to believe the only two comments regarding the time standard and insert your own theory based on ephemeral assumptions, you can insert any time or any speed you want; but when you take the testimonies from various areas on the conflict and you try to bring them together, you arrive at a much less-contrived set of circumstances. You can then try to fit all that within the context of other comments to see if they work. A perfect example-- again-- is Custer's movements down Reno Creek. Gray shows part of those movements at 4 MPH and other parts at 3.9 MPH. Yet that "study" or those "conclusions" do not jive with the comments from people who were there. Benteen's actions to Reno Hill are similar and if you put the pencil to the paper one discovers that Benteen's overall speed from the morass to the top of Reno Hill was in the vicinity of 7.5 MPH, not the 4.6 MPH Gray would have us believe. At between 7 and 8 MPH, I see no shirking, no dawdling, no pouting, no "I'm gonna get ya, George!" Of course, by adding another hour and 23 minutes to the equation-- regardless of how tenuous the evidence or the grasping at straws-- I can bring down that rate of speed to a crawl, thereby justifying my dislike of a man. The debate about Fred Benteen should begin from the time he showed the note to Reno, not about his movements before. Of course I would still support the man because of the intervening circumstances he found himself in... but it is still food for debate. Steve, Montrose is today's pro, much more so than I am. I am out of touch with the lingo. Hell, I am still fuming about changing the uniforms to the dress blues... with combat boots and that stupid beret! Plus, they have stuck more crap on that suit... it took me four years and a war before I got a ribbon; today, you get two rows just for enlisting. You and I are of a different era, my friend. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteen on Dec 17, 2010 10:38:12 GMT -6
Well thanks, Benteen! Now we've added a new term --- blocking force. I'm getting as confused as Benteen was about what he was out there to do. clw, Don't worry about being confused by anything I say, I confuse everyone including myself. I didn't mean to imply that "blocking force" was a military term, I have no idea if it is or isn't. What I meant to convey was that I don't believe that Benteen was sent for that purpose. Be Well Dan
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Post by benteen on Dec 17, 2010 10:44:42 GMT -6
. Maybe because I am limited on my military terms for action. That is why I appreciate those that bring in these military terms with more understanding of there use.
Semper Fi
Steve[/quote]
Steve,
You think your limited on military terms, I'm still trying to figure out where the hell OOORAH came from. <G>
Semper Fi Be Well Dan
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