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Post by benteen on Dec 15, 2010 16:36:04 GMT -6
. Sending Benteen on the oblique was a most likely some sort of containment movement.
clw,
I believe that rather than a containment movement, Custer remembered the Washita.After he had slaughtered the women and children in Black kettles camp, the warriors from other camps came up river to challenge him. He wanted to make sure that it couldn't happen again and there were no more warriors that could attack him from another direction. So he sent Benteen to pitch into them if they were there.
Be Well Dan
PS The Will Rogers subscript you have is the best I have seen.Nice work , well done.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 15, 2010 18:11:51 GMT -6
Here is an example of what we are discussing. Some state that Benteen lied when he stated Custer stated that he did not believe there were Indians. When you read Benteen's answer(below) it would appear some leave out the "there" which is a location and not the existence of Indians. Custer's action of sending Benteen to the left is consistent with believing there were Indians down along the LBH just not sure of the "there". If someone wants to make the argument that Benteen lied and Custer believed the Scouts could see a village, ponies, tepees and smoke at a particular location "there" it would make Custer's decision to send Benteen a very poor decision. A. They were made probably 4 hours after we marched* I think at the first halt, an orderly came to me with instructions for the officers to assemble at a point where he was, for an officers call. No bugle was sounded for officers' call: an orderly was sent to get them together. General Custer told us that he had Just come down from the mountain; that he had been told by the Scouts that they could see a village, ponies, tepees and smoke. He gave it to us as his belief that they were mistaken; that there were no Indians there; that he had looked through his glass and could not see any, and did not think there were any there.AZ Ranger I do not know where the extract you have quoted comes from. Certainly not his RCOI testimony or either of his two narratives as far as I can see. Nor is it evident when he used those words, before or after the RCOI. I would appreciate the source if you have it as that would be helpful. What he said at the RCOI however, is unequivocal. "In General Custer's mind there were no Indians nor any village." Once again, your belief that knowledge of the village location made the sending of Benteen to the left by Custer a poor decision needs expansion. Sincerely, "Hunk" Papa Sorry but I believe the error is yours it is from RCOI. Here is the link to the page: digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=turn&entity=History.Reno.p0380&id=History.Reno&isize=MIt certainly change the meaning from what others state that Benteen stated. We all know Godfrey had hearing problems maybe that is his source of error when he writes as HP presented. 'That Custer expressed a disbelief in the near proximity of any village whatever at that time.' Regards AZ Ranger PS I also checked Graham since it is abbreviated and found it on page 135. So I checked Nichols same words page 402.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 15, 2010 18:53:37 GMT -6
Once again, your belief that knowledge of the village location made the sending of Benteen to the left by Custer a poor decision needs expansion.
HP If I didn't make my current theory clear then I am sorry. I believe that Custer did not believe the intel and did not believe he knew the location of the village precisely. Therefore sending Benteen to left makes perfect sense to me.
It would only not make sense if he knew there was no chance for Benteen to see the village with it being located 2 miles north of Reno Creek along the LBH.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 15, 2010 19:04:11 GMT -6
Assuming Custer knew where the village was, and I think he did, there was no way he could have known this. Sending Benteen on the oblique was a most likely some sort of containment movement. Custer thought he'd been discovered (by a non existant village?), so he would be expecting the people to be on the move. They wouldn't head downstream, they were right on the edge of Crow country. They obviously wouldn't head toward the soldiers. If indeed they felt threatened, they would have headed upstream. As they did when it was all over. So why not send Benteen in that direction to be sure there were no leakers? You can get there quicker down Reno Creek and go either direction if needed. The scouts should know that unless the country was so rough that no Indians would travel it as Benteen stated. I don't think Custer or Benteen could tell the terrain in the direction Benteen traveled. It is deceiving but matches the accounts and testimonies as far as I am concerned. I think you're right that it was a containment effort using a recon in force action. AZ Ranger
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Post by crzhrs on Dec 16, 2010 8:41:12 GMT -6
If it was a containment then Custer expected Benteen to either stop fleeing Indians or attack them. Either way he was without medical personnel. If Custer expected a battle one would think some medical people would be along.
In addition, still not quite sure why no scouts were with Benteen. They would be more valuable in a scouting mission than following along with Custer/Reno who hadn't even found any Indians when Benteen was ordered out.
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Post by crzhrs on Dec 16, 2010 9:01:25 GMT -6
Hunk:
It's obvious Benteen felt Custer was to blame for the disaster.
As of Dec. 16, 2011 . . . we are still debating whether that was the case.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Dec 16, 2010 9:38:22 GMT -6
This will be good.
Hunkpapa tries to contradict AZ. "I do not know where the extract you have quoted comes from. Certainly not his RCOI testimony or either of his two narratives as far as I can see. Nor is it evident when he used those words, before or after the RCOI."
Note, Hunkpapa does not cite his RCOI source for those sweeping statements. However, what he claims about Benteen's reply is briskly proven wrong. What he - just too perfect - imperiously claims Benteen 'certainly did not' do, Benteen certainly did. This means Hunkpapa either hasn't read the RCOI, takes lousy notes if he did, or just fabricates like conz and keogh.
Not content with that major fail, he continues: I would appreciate the source if you have it as that would be helpful. What he said at the RCOI however, is unequivocal. "In General Custer's mind there were no Indians nor any village." Note that his uncited source for the RCOI is totally wrong, but he feels free to demand AZ's which, to great amusement, AZ provides. And it turns out Benteen's quote WAS equivocal, because Hunkpapa deliberately or incompetently gives an incomplete quote.
Then, the condescending and hideously embarrassing "Once again, your belief that knowledge of the village location made the sending of Benteen to the left by Custer a poor decision needs expansion." But no, it does not. AZ's opinion is based upon fact, Hunk's upon his own incompetence.
Hunkpapa has been proven wrong, that he misquotes from either malice or incompetence, that his repeated opinion on this issue without adjusting to demonstrated fact bespeaks his prejudice against Benteen or, far more likely, his need to nuzzle up to Custerphiles. What he accuses AZ of is baseless and, ironically, is an illustrative example that he himself is guilty of that which he accuses another to have.
This is almost an exact repeat of my hash with him over the words honor and semantic. He admits to none of his obvious errors, he does not apologize, but fortunately he has yet to accuse AZ of something sleazy to deflect attention from his own fail as he does with me, but perhaps being called on it before hand will preclude that.
This is my, not AZ's, opinion and observation. But I defy anyone to say this is not SOP for Hunkpapa and others. Because oops, he did it again, and will continue to do so unremarked.
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Post by clw on Dec 16, 2010 10:55:51 GMT -6
A word on semantics, no pun intended, because things are getting muddled in my mind. I heard that.
First of all, is this an accurate definition? A recon in force is a military term for sending out a recon force that is strong enough to fight a small battle, but is fast enough to withdraw if it encounters something too big to handle.
If so, I think it could broadly be defined as 'containment', so let's not get hung up on the difference between the two. Containment can be with or without force.
Second, was this 'recon in force' a recognized maneuver in 1876?
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Post by benteen on Dec 16, 2010 15:50:18 GMT -6
First of all, is this an accurate definition? A recon in force is a military term for sending out a recon force that is strong enough to fight a small battle, but is fast enough to withdraw if it encounters something too big to handle.
clw,
Yes that is an accurate definition of a recon in force, and I agree with AZ that that is exactly what it was.Its primary mission is to gain Intel, but be large enough to engage or as Custer stated "pitch into the enemy"It can be used as a blocking force but normally a blocking force is just that, a force to block or contain the enemy .It really isn't a matter of semantics.
That is what is causing my doubts.You and AZ and many others believe it was a blocking force,but if it was, then why would Custer recall it at the time it would serve its purpose. Which is when Reno attacked. It is then that the warriors would supposedly scatter, so why withdraw the blocking force if that's in fact what it was
Be Well Dan
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Post by clw on Dec 16, 2010 16:54:39 GMT -6
Well thanks, Benteen! Now we've added a new term --- blocking force. I'm getting as confused as Benteen was about what he was out there to do.
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Post by montrose on Dec 16, 2010 19:10:44 GMT -6
1. Movement to Contact. Benteen was conducting what we currently call a movement to contact. This tactic is used where enemy contact is possible/probable, but you are unsure of enemy location and disposition. As opposed to a true reconnaissance mission, you plan to engage any enemy found.
2. Recon in force is an older term, but still after the Plains War. For discussion terms, machts nichts. Same as MTC.
3. Blocking Force. This doesn't make sense. Custer and Benteen did not know the size, location, disposition and intent of enemy forces in the valley. A blocking mission implies some type of regimental attack plan, which did not exist at the time Benteen was launched.
A blocking mission implies some type of key terrain where 3 companies could block 10,000 Indians (whole Indian village, not just warriors). I see this as extremely unlikely in Montana.
4. Benteen's Mission. I believe Benteen was launched out of pre combat jitters from Custer. Custer was eager to attack. Sending three companies on an attack in that terrain makes little sense.
The mission does provide insight into Custer's estimate of the situation.
He sent three companies on an attack mission, and then moved the Regiment out of supporting distance. This indicates three companies could handle whatever they ran into. This further implies that he expected a Washita situation; where Indians had many small villages out of supporting distance of each other.
5. Reno's attack. The decision to send Reno in on another three company attack is consistent with haste. The logical thing to do is to immediately recall Benteen and wait for McDougall. Custer didn't think to recall his detached elements until later, on the bluffs.
It is interesting that in April Custer/Terry/Sheridan requested that the 3 companies of the 7th in the South be returned. The justification was that 9 companies was too small a force to face the expected Indian force. So here we see Custer going in with 8 companies, minus the pack train details. (DC, I will find you an exact quote, I believe I saw a citation in one of Grey's books).
6. Custer's dawdle. If Benteen had found Indians early in his scout, there was the possibility to get help from the Regiment, or have the Regiment act in concert further down the valley with Benteen's force. This means Benteen's mission was viable in a window of opportunity. This window is a function of Benteen's movement into his scout zone, and Custer's further progress down the valley.
This window closed long before Custer recalled Benteen.
7. So what? Custer shows a weird decision making paradox. On the one hand, he committed forces too early. He showed haste since he acted before he knew where the village was (before 3411, in my opinion).
On the other hand, he was slow in realizing he needed to bring up the rest of his regiment.
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Post by montrose on Dec 16, 2010 19:18:25 GMT -6
I don't think I was clear earlier. The decision to launch Benteen was a hastily thought out move.
The move was exactly what Benteen said it was. Scout the designated sector and attack any hostiles in zone.
There were no secondary missions. No blocking, containing, support Reno's attack, setting up a signal station to send smoke signals to ford D, nothing.
Custer send two members of his personal staff to send additional orders to Benteen. This clearly reflects his thinking. He was focused on finding and attacking enemy village as soon as possible. GAC was not a deep military thinker. Simplicity is a mainstay of his actions throughout his career. Simplicity is not a bad thing in military operations.
The lack of simplicity after leaving Reno is a, if not the, reason for the disaster that followed.
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Post by fred on Dec 16, 2010 19:20:52 GMT -6
You and AZ and many others believe it was a blocking force,but if it was, then why would Custer recall it at the time it would serve its purpose. Which is when Reno attacked. It is then that the warriors would supposedly scatter, so why withdraw the blocking force if that's in fact what it was. Many, many... many years ago, I ran two types of patrols, both in Germany as a young second and first lieutenant and platoon leader, and in Vietnam as a more seasoned captain and company commander. One was a reconnaissance patrol, usually consisting of about a dozen men, lightly armed, with the sole purpose of gathering intelligence of one nature or another. The second was a combat patrol, never consisting of less than two dozen men, more heavily armed, i. e., M-60 machine guns, but nothing like shoulder-fired recoilless rifles or small mortars, with a double objective: gathering intelligence and/or setting up an ambush. In a recon patrol, we were to avoid enemy contact; in a combat patrol we were not to shirk it. I always believe a reconnaissance in force was the heavier end of a combat patrol and would involve considerably larger and better equipped forces and is used primarily to test enemy strength, provoking an attack or a response to measure points of weakness, to force him to make some sort of commitment. I have always viewed Benteen's mission as more of a combat patrol than a reconnaissance in force, because I believe his mission was to (1) find out if any Indians inhabited the upper reaches of the LBH valley, and (2) if there were, he was to engage them, i. e., surprise/ambush, and at the same time inform Custer. Nothing more, nothing less. Benteen's mission-- like Reno's-- was to engage and destroy, but to gather intel as well, generally however, for his own use. His was an end-game operation, not hit-and-run. He did not need to test enemy strength, to draw them out and see what their intentions were. Everyone knew what the Indians' intentions would be. Maybe even a better description of Benteen's job would be "search-and-destroy." And he was given the forces to do it. I also believe that whether GAC told him or not, it was understood that if Benteen's "patrol" saw no "intelligence" in the southern reaches of the valley, he was to return to the main trail. At that point, Benteen's orders ended and he was simply to follow the shod trail. It is also my belief that barring further orders, Benteen, as a seasoned combat officer, would have chosen to do the necessary thing... whatever that may have been. Whether Custer said it or not, Benteen alluded to it... Custer trusted Benteen to do the right thing, regardless of their differences. Based on everything that is known about Benteen-- both before the LBH and after-- it is utterly preposterous for me to believe he would have shirked his duty and risked a single life because he disliked George Custer. Custer was not alone-- and I tend to doubt he was even at the top of the list-- of those Benteen had no use for. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Dec 16, 2010 19:52:28 GMT -6
1. Movement to Contact. Benteen was conducting what we currently call a movement to contact. This tactic is used where enemy contact is possible/probable, but you are unsure of enemy location and disposition. As opposed to a true reconnaissance mission, you plan to engage any enemy found.... 3. Blocking Force. This doesn't make sense. Custer and Benteen did not know the size, location, disposition and intent of enemy forces in the valley. A blocking mission implies some type of regimental attack plan, which did not exist at the time Benteen was launched. I agree completely with this assessment. Also agree. Nice to see you here, Will. Please clean up any of my out-dated concepts or terms. It has been a long time... even longer than Camp's first interview of Martini and almost as long as Curley's final fairytale. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteen on Dec 16, 2010 22:21:03 GMT -6
Fred, Montrose,
Capt, William, thats what I was trying to convey in my post, but you both did it far better than I could. Thanks.
Be Well Dan
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