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Post by George Mabry on Jun 21, 2007 20:23:48 GMT -6
Keogh,
I don’t have a clue as to why McDougall didn’t move cross country if he was instructed to do so and he was capable of it. I’m not familiar with the lay of the land there. Maybe some of our horseback riding posters who are familiar with the backtrail and the route McDougall could have taken can shed some light on matter.
You bring up another interesting proposition. If Reno had held the timber and Benteen had joined him, McDougall (moving cross country) would have arrived in the vicinity of SS Ridge with only a few Indians to greet him. Wonder what he would have done? In my minds eye, he’s in a pickle. Imagine for a second the sight of McDougall pushing those mules down Cedar Coolee, up and across Nye Cartwright Ridge, down Deep Coulee, up Calhoun Hill which by that time might have been getting crowded. Wonder if McDougall had a vocabulary of obscenity extensive enough for the job?
I haven't checked our proposed timelines on this, but by the time McDougall could get to the bluffs (after moving cross country) I doubt that Custer, from either Calhoun Hill or LSH, could have communicated his desires to the train. Deep Coulee and MTC possibly were aswarm with hostiles.
George
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 21, 2007 23:06:36 GMT -6
Good points here George. I pretty much agree with your proposed Benteen movements, however, if we do assume that Kanipe was sent as a messenger to the pack train, the message sent was clear. Cut straight across country as soon as possible. The message was not to continue following the trail (Reno's trail) down into the valley, but rather to follow GAC's trail staying to the high ground. My thought on it is that the pack train would have gone ahead to the vicinity of either Sharpshooter Ridge or Weir Point following the Custer trail and then assess the situation on whether on not to proceed any further. Once there--on either height--they would have been in full view of all the other detachments on the field. It would be up to HQ then to decide what to do about them next.
Without knowing the exact spot to arrive at how do you cut cross country to it. In reality its all cross country travel.
AZ Ranger
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Post by mwkeogh on Jun 22, 2007 0:12:06 GMT -6
Keogh, I don’t have a clue as to why McDougall didn’t move cross country if he was instructed to do so and he was capable of it. I’m not familiar with the lay of the land there. Maybe some of our horseback riding posters who are familiar with the backtrail and the route McDougall could have taken can shed some light on matter. You bring up another interesting proposition. If Reno had held the timber and Benteen had joined him, McDougall (moving cross country) would have arrived in the vicinity of SS Ridge with only a few Indians to greet him. Wonder what he would have done? In my minds eye, he’s in a pickle. Imagine for a second the sight of McDougall pushing those mules down Cedar Coolee, up and across Nye Cartwright Ridge, down Deep Coulee, up Calhoun Hill which by that time might have been getting crowded. Wonder if McDougall had a vocabulary of obscenity extensive enough for the job? I haven't checked our proposed timelines on this, but by the time McDougall could get to the bluffs (after moving cross country) I doubt that Custer, from either Calhoun Hill or LSH, could have communicated his desires to the train. Deep Coulee and MTC possibly were aswarm with hostiles. George George, I believe the earliest that McDougal and Mathey could have cut across country to the high ground was in the close vicinity of where the north fork runs down into Ash (Reno) Creek. Once McDougal got close to SS Ridge or Weir Point, he would have ridden to the top and tried to assess the situation from these peaks. I do not think he could have succeeded in going any further with the packs until support was able to reach him, but the best he could have done was to take the high ground at either of these two points and prepare to defend his position until support arrived. His very appearance would have presented a threat to the hostiles who were otherwise engaged with the other battalians on the field.
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Post by harpskiddie on Jun 22, 2007 0:46:22 GMT -6
George and Keogh:
As Keogh says, it would have been impossible to climb the "white bluffs" [or nearly so]. In the event, McDougall and Mathey did swing right after clearing those bluffs and followed almost exactly on Custer's trail, which was much farther from the edge of the riverside bluffs than is usually assumed. That is why McDougall heard firing off to his right as he approached the hilltop position.
Since the train had only halted briefly after Knipe could have delivered his message [which Mathey said he never got, and McDougall said HE never got, but he thought Mathey did], to get ready for the fight they thought was ahead, it is hard to see how they could have got where they got, very much sooner than when they got there. If you know what I mean.
Gordie, do you know when the bus gets here? Yeah, usually the same time it arrives..........................
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Post by wild on Jun 22, 2007 8:09:30 GMT -6
George et al View the Come On note in the circumstances in which it was received. They were all trying to locate the Indian village and they were going to attack it. A note arrives that says “come on big village…”. Nothing ambigious about it. Benteen has been ordered “to the village” which is essentially, “the fight”. While I'm in agreement with your take on Benteen's motivation or lack there of I view the bloody message in the context of military convention/system/best practice.The system would demand that the forces under Benteen's command be deployed under the direction of HQ.Take the packs for example mentioned twice in the message---the packs are the means by which Custer will prosecute what he now sees as a difficult battle.How could the message possible mean that packs were free to deploy where ever Benteen saw fit? The argument put forward that Benteen fulfilled his orders by reaching the village [which in fact he did not]is facile particularly in regards to the deployment of the packs.
I also agree with you that the meeting of Reno’s command on the bluffs was pure coincidental. I’m 51% sure that had Benteen not seen Reno people on the bluffs, he would have crossed the river at Ford A. Once Benteen crosses, what next? When Benteen sees Reno holding out in the woods with the Indians swarming, what does he do Advancing into enemy territory the risk was always there that Benteen would become involved in the fighting such as arriving at Reno's position in the timber.But the timber and the hill are two different scenarios.Benteen was not attacked on he hill and the Indians had broken off the engagement .Was the deployment of the tactical reserve to offer company and moral support the best use of such assets.
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Post by harpskiddie on Jun 22, 2007 9:24:31 GMT -6
Does anyone wonder why Benteen never asked Martin where Custer was? Even when they supposedly came to the fork in the trails [the horns of a dilemma]. Of course, had he asked Martin, he might have got a Yogi Berra answer [when you come to a fork in the road, take it].
Gordie, gin a body meet a body comin' through the rye; gin a body kiss a body, need a body cry?............
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Post by elisabeth on Jun 22, 2007 9:48:32 GMT -6
Well, according to Martini, Custer was charging through the village ...
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 22, 2007 9:49:03 GMT -6
From Martini's testimony at the COI:
Q: Did you say anything to Capt. Benteen about what you had seen in the bottom? A: Capt. Benteen asked me where General Custer was. I said I supposed that by that time he had made a charge through the village, and that was all I said.
Q: Did you say anything about Major Reno's battalion? A: No sir. Q: Why not? A: He asked no questions about it.
________
From Martini's testimony Benteen did ask where Custer was but didn't really probe. And since Benteen had no idea the command had been divided he wouldn't know about Reno's separation and did not have reason to ask about him.
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Post by wild on Jun 22, 2007 11:51:59 GMT -6
I said I supposed that by that time he had made a charge through the village It may have been his intention to convey this opinion but my guess is that it was too complex for a trooper who had very little English. I feel benteen just could not be bothered trying to decipher what this ranker was trying to mumble.
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 22, 2007 12:39:22 GMT -6
Wild,
You and I are not in as much disagreement as you may think. I still think nothing more was expected of Benteen than that he join the fight, and at the time the note was written Custer believed the fight would be in the village or close proximity. The situation that Benteen rode into on the bluffs does not satisfy this requirement. Now we arrive at a point that I find interesting. What could Benteen have done that would have satisfied his orders?
My take on it is that Benteen could not and should not have just blown past Reno and his disheveled command. I don’t think you or anyone else has ever advocated that. So there Benteen is with a rattled Reno who is not in contact with the hostiles but with the sound of gunfire in the distance? How much time can Benteen give Reno before you would consider him delinquent? I don’t have a hard and fast answer to this question. I do believe that 50-60 minutes (by Gray’s account) was far too much time considering the circumstances.
More variables come in here than I’m comfortable dealing with but here’s my best shot. Shortly after arriving and assessing the situation on Reno Hill, Benteen should have at the least sent out a recon-in-force to Weir Point or vicinity to get a read on the situation and attempt to locate the battalion that was obviously in contact with the hostiles. Benteen’s main body would have followed within 10-15 minutes. Reno and his command would have remained on Reno Hill and awaited the arrival of the train. This would allow Reno a little extra time to get it all together. Once the train arrived, Reno could set them up in a defensive posture and left his wounded with them before following Benteen’s command.
Granted this is just a rough sketch. I can only imagine the scene that greeted Benteen upon his arrival at the bluffs. Another problem I have is with the manner in which Reno/Benteen made their move northward. Lining up and marching almost single file along the bluffs dragging your wounded behind you is not the way to ride into battle. The manner in which this movement was made indicates to me that it was only a half-hearted attempt to “ride to the sound of the guns.”
Now we arrive at the point in this debate that always defeats me. Had Benteen/Reno done exactly what I called for above, would it have made one iota of difference in the outcome? I doubt it. Once Reno started his panicked flight from the woods and Custer chose to move north of MTC, I think the situation was no longer retrievable. However, we wouldn’t be having this discussion about whether or not Benteen dragged his tail and was indifferent to the plight of Custer’s command.
As to your question about the packs. those packs would not have been deployed with Benteen’s command. The train would have done what the train always does and that is hunker down somewhere nearby.
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Post by wild on Jun 23, 2007 3:40:52 GMT -6
You and I are not in as much disagreement as you may think.Yes George just a note here and there but I think it's the same hymn sheet.
Now we arrive at the point in this debate that always defeats me. Had Benteen/Reno done exactly what I called for above, would it have made one iota of difference in the outcomeIt was a double failure from the team from hell ie Custer/Benteen.A Benteen advance was unlikely to succeed because Custer having made the decision to call up the reserve then goes off half cocked and triggers an Indian response prematurely.At the other end of the system Benteen unilateraly decides the battle is lost and grinds to a halt. I judge the actions of these soldiers individualy because the actions of one did not influence the actions of the other. Custer was doing gung ho while Benteen was doing sulk.A lethal mixture . Benteen's actions must be judged in a military context and not as has happened so often on sentimentality.
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 23, 2007 10:04:41 GMT -6
Wild, you’re correct in labeling the outcome a double failure. But as I see it, the two major players in this defeat are Reno and Custer.
Benteen has been roundly criticized for his actions/inactions that day but when all is considered I don’t think his actions played much of a part in the destruction of Custer’s 5 companies. I guess it all boils down to timelines. And although we make our best guesses as to time and space, they are still just guesses. It would be very difficult to say with any degree of certainty that Benteen could have hurried his arrival on the bluffs to any extent that would have altered the outcome of Custer’s crew. And as I ask earlier, once on the bluffs would an earlier movement toward the sound of the guns made any real difference?
George
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Post by blaque on Jun 23, 2007 14:00:39 GMT -6
Curtis seems to be the only one to whom the Crows [or whichever one it was] said that they could actually see the camps and the white tipis. If they could, then they were not where where they were when Reno attacked down the valley, since you can't see that area from the Crow's Nest. You might see smoke rising, and you could certainly see vast horse herds out on the benches to the south and west [directions approximate], depending upon the atmospheric conditions. Assuming it was the location of the Crow's Nest "rediscovered" by Henry Weibert and the subject of the well-known photos. When I was there in 1960, I hadn't known that it was "lost" - I supposed everyone knew where it was [of course, I didn't until taken there, but I didn't know much at all about LBH then]. The description fits, definitely; but that kind of assumption has proven to be a big mistake, when it comes to locations and else. There is not, however, ANY point in the area of the Crow's Nest from which the actual camps location can be seen. Gordie, Thanks for your reply. By having a look at the Google maps, it does seem very doubtful that any observer can trace a line of sight from the CN to the valley floor. However, Curtis was absolutely convinced of the exactness of his assertion, and apparently he took pains not to get wrong about it: “Here we mounted and rode to ‘Crow’s Nest’, a high peak of the Rosebud or Wolf Mountains […] With the unaided eye I could see a rail-road train near Garry Owen station, just fifteen miles away. The Crows said many of the tippis could be seen, and later when in the valley opposite the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee I could see ‘Crow’s Nest’, as I could from Reno’s rifle pits”. (Hutchins’ Papers of E.S. Curtis, p. 102). And a few participant recollections bear out Curtis’ remarks: Benteen’s testimony: “He had been told by the scouts that they could see a village, ponies, tepees and smoke”. (Nichols, 402) Benteen’s Narrative (in Brinnistool’s TWC): “our Crow Indian scouts […] had told him they could see tepee tops, lots of Indian ponies, dust, etc.” Gerard’s testimony: from the CN “We had a good view of the Indians and ponies ”. (Nichols, 137) Godfrey’s Diary, p. 10: “General Custer came around personally and informed us that the Sioux village was in view.” Pvt. Goldin to A. Johnson: “If you have ever climbed to the Crow’s Nest as I have, and have in mind the extent of that village, you will realize that even from this vantage point, the ENTIRE village was not visible…” (Carroll’s B-G Letters, p. 30) When the Crows accompanied General Scott to the Crow’s Nest, he actually was led to two different places, to “the point on the right of the ridge”, and later to “the point on the left, or Custer’s Lookout”. Perhaps Curtis did watch the valley from a point farther to the left than the Crow’s Nest of nowadays?
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Post by harpskiddie on Jun 23, 2007 16:30:50 GMT -6
blaque:
Your last conjecture about where Curtis might have been could be on the money. My notes say the Crow's Nest is at 45 26 45 N and 107 08 23 W . There is a slightly higher ridgetop at 45 26 10 N and 107 08 01 W where he might have gone. I've been there too, but you still can't see where the camps were. There is a big difference between being able to see a train at Garryowen station and tipis nearer the river and farther north.
The horse herds were out on the benches to the west of the village, to the north and some east of the river. Seeing the Crow's Nest from various points is not a big deal. You can see the top of Mount Everest from many places, but can't see those places in any detail from the top of Mount Everest [or the Empire State Building, you know what I mean],
Opposite MTC, you cannot see the CN unless you go far back from the river. It's clearly visible from the Reno/Benteen Defense Site and virtually everywhere on the bluffs or other high ground east of the river; but you lose it when you go "behind" the bluffs on the village side of the river [unless you go back from the stream some distance].
That is why I have no doubt that the scouts saw some of the horse herds, but doubt that they saw the tipis. Custer, of course, didn't see anything [most accounts say], but did believe the scouts when they told him that they saw the smoke of the breakfast fires and the horses.
I imagine that anyone seeing that vast horse herd knew that it meant Indians and a large camp nearby, and was not really stretching the truth too much by saying "there's the village" or "we saw the enemy" or whatever.
And, of course, a lot depends upon the time of day and atmospheric conditions. 15 miles is a long way [or 13.568, or whatever it actually measures]. It doesn't take much morning or heat haze to obscure one's vision. Anyway, we can go round and round on this without coming to any agreement.
I prefer to believe my eyesight and binoculars.
Gordie, into the great wide open, under a sky of blue...........................................................
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Post by wild on Jun 24, 2007 11:24:49 GMT -6
George Benteen has been roundly criticized for his actions/inactions that day but when all is considered I don’t think his actions played much of a part in the destruction of Custer’s 5 companies Agreed but Custer's fatal error allowed Benteen off the hook. Two fatal errors occured simulatneously either one of which doomed the 7th.Taken together they cancell each other out giving rise to two camps each argueing that the other camp was to blame.The weight of history is against Custer because it was his battalion which was obliterated while the survivor Benteen just as guilty is seen as a hero.
I find it very hard to condemn Reno .He on his own confronted the entire village for over an hour and got most of his men out of a situation Benteen would not touch.
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