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Post by Banned on Jun 19, 2007 7:04:21 GMT -6
Benteen's betrayal unmasked In a letter to , historian Charles Kuhlman outlined his interpretation of the intent of Custer’s last message, an interpretation that appeared in his book Legend into History. He had also corresponded with Battlefield Supt. Edward S. Luce and noted Custer scholar Col. William A. Graham on this subject. What follows are excerpts from this important letter - source : CBHMA - emphasis added by www.custerwest.org " Custer meant, in that order, that he wanted the ammunition taken from the [pack] train and rushed ahead as fast as possible. I am sure myself that that is what he wanted done because otherwise the order made no sense. Here is a short analysis of the situation as I see it. Custer had already sent [Sgt. Daniel] Kanipe to hurry along the packtrain—and note that Kanipe’s order said “If any packs come loose, cut them.” That means that Custer was prepared to sacrifice property in the interest of speed. This suggests something in regard to the second order carried by Martin. Note that if Benteen was hogtied to the packtrain he was out of the fight. In thinking about the speed of the packtrain[,] it covered the distance from the divide to Reno hill, less than 15 miles in a little less than 5 hours. They therefore travelled [sic] at the rate of about 3 miles an hour. It is absurd to imagine that Custer did not know in a general way what time the train could make. To order Benteen to escort the packtrain was sheer opera bouffe in view of the fact that when he went down stream after seeing Reno go into action Custer staked everything on the effectiveness of his demonstration at the lower end of the village. My point is that as far as the packs are concerned, Custer saw that they could not be defended while on the march if attacked by any considerable number of warriors. He must do something to prevent the Indians in large numbers from going to attack the train—give them something to worry about elsewhere. But he wanted to make absolutely sure about the reserve ammunition, in case his guess did not work out with complete success. Note that if Benteen [had] escorted the packtrain only about half of the regiment could get into the fight until hours after it began. Benteen tacitly admits [at the Reno Court of Inquiry] that the order required him to bring the packtrain and in part gives the same reason for not going after it that Edgerly gives, namely that McDougall was there and would bring it. Edgerly says: “Custer could not possibly want us to go for the packs as Captain McDougall was there and would bring them up.” Was the fact that McDougall “was there” the real reason for their not going after the packs? This kind of answer was made because it was the only one that would sound plausible to the court, but that the real reason was that when the order was received it did not make sense. They did not know what Custer wanted, but they saw that if Benteen escorted the packtrain nearly half the regiment would be there and the other half fighting. The order sounded as if things were extremely hot down the trail, and no one would imagine that the packs were wanted just then. If the packs were wanted as badly as the order seemed to say it must be for the ammunition. That was an easy deduction, though the order did not specifically say “bring ammunition packs.”
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 19, 2007 7:08:39 GMT -6
Changing your post name is not going to change what happened. Indians Won . . . Soldiers Lost.
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Banned
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Don't try to kick the dead lion
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Post by Banned on Jun 19, 2007 7:36:45 GMT -6
A really useful post, crzhrs. You're adding so much to the inquiry !
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Post by mcaryf on Jun 19, 2007 7:54:55 GMT -6
Hi CSS
I will offer you two completely different possible interpretations to that of Kuhlman. First one from from Benteen's perspective.
Everything is going very well, Custer has charged the village and the Indians are skeddaddling. The only risk is that some stray warrior bands may scatter in the direction of the pack train and as the escort is at the rear there is some risk that warriors may capture some of the train. Therefore Benteen, who has previously raised the idea of putting escorts in front and back of the train, can be used to provide a guard at the front.
Here is another possible interpretation of Custer's order now from Custer's perspective.
The village seems to be largely empty of warriors so they must be off campaigning somewhere. There may be a danger of them returning and capturing the train whilst I have their village. I had better get Benteen to increase the escort on the train.
Now you can put those alongside Kuhlman's idea and perhaps you will start to admit that Custer's style of command had some weaknesses in terms of letting his subordinates know what he meant. We have the benefit of knowing in retrospect what was happening and we still do not know what Custer intended!!!
Regards
Mike
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 19, 2007 7:57:36 GMT -6
CSS I think that is a reasonable evalution and theory. Especially the part about Benteen not knowing what Custer wanted. Do you think Custer was heavily engaged when he sent Martin with the meassage?
AZ Ranger
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 19, 2007 8:28:51 GMT -6
Benteen stated (at the COI?) that he felt Custer didn't have a plan. That could be correct in a way.
Custer did not know where the village was. He did believe Indians were running and ordered Reno to chase after them.
Benteen was ordered to scout to the left and pitch into anything he came across.
Custer's "plans" seemed vague and in a manner of speaking Benteen may have been right when he stated Custer didn't have a plan. Three widely separated commands trying to find Indians. Custer went off still not quite sure where the village was or if it was still standing. When he did see it and it's size and supposedly "sleeping" he knew he had to have a plan.
Unfortunately he did not send any more info to Reno and his "come quick" message was vague and did not state where to come quick to.
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Post by harpskiddie on Jun 19, 2007 9:25:39 GMT -6
Kuhlman was just another guy with an opinion on what the order meant, and his opinion is no more valid than most of those posted on this board on the subject, which, it seems to me, has had enough shelf life already.
Unless you want to debate on whether or not Cooke actually wrote the message, or if he did indeed leave out a letter in the second "packs." In which case, have at it, old chaps!!!
Gordie, in the American League, it was Boston 5 and the Yankees 2; Philadelphia over St. Louis 1-0 in a real nail-biter, and here's a partial, Indians 265......................................................
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 19, 2007 13:22:38 GMT -6
I don’t believe that Benteen was in a quandary as to exactly what Custer expected with his “Come on….Be quick” note. We’re being entirely too pedantic in arguing the note’s lack of specificity.
Contrary to what Benteen said later, Custer knew that McDougall was in command of the train and that he was hurrying the packs along as fast as he could. Custer’s order to McDougall was meant to emphasis the need to hurry specifically telling him to cut packs loose if need be. Custer’s note to Benteen was essentially ordering him to come quick and check on the paks. Benteen’s note does not state or imply as some suggest that Benteen physically bring the train forward. However he is obligated, after having been ordered, to personally ensure that the train is coming along as quickly as possible. McDougall is pushing the train. Benteen should have sent a detail to McDougall to ensure that McDougall had received the order to hurry up and offer McDougall any assistance if need be. If McDougall has the train in hand and needs no assistance, Benteen is free to advance. Otherwise he does what needs to be done to get the train moving as rapidly as possible and then advances.
Did Benteen make any effort to determine if McDougall was coming along as rapidly as possible? He dismissed that part of his orders by reasoning “McDougall is handling it.” Benteen’s lack of obedience opens a window into his mindset. Benteen, being in a pique, was no longer a team player. He was going to do only the bare minimum necessary to CYA. His subsequent actions prove that out.
Some on this board suggest that Benteen would have liked nothing better than to be the one to pull Custer’s bacon out of the fire. This being the case, they argue that Benteen would have done anything in his power to relieve Custer. I don’t believe this is true. Much too often in the case of military victories as well as civilian life, the credit for victories is stolen by others or miss-assigned. However, failure would land on only one person’s lap. Of course Benteen didn’t anticipate the total destruction of 5 companies.
I’m not saying that Benteen desired mission failure but he was determined to do as little as possible in furtherance of its success. I’m also not saying that Benteen’s actions caused Custer’s defeat. Had Benteen obeyed the intent of his orders (make sure the train is coming as rapidly as possible and get here ASAP) that any actions he could have taken would have made a difference for Custer’s 5 companies. Maybe, maybe not. It’s anybodies guess. What I am saying is that Benteen, at that time, saw no ambiguity in “Come on, Big Village, Be Quick, Bring paks.”
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 19, 2007 14:33:43 GMT -6
Apparently the Custerphiles are re-establishing their bona fides of adoration before the hallowed date.
First, Benteen never contended Custer did not know McDougall was in charge of the train. He said he didn't know why the note, concerning the train, came to him, and this after Kanipe's message.
Second, the details of Kanipe's orders appeared much later. There was nothing at the RCOI, including Kanipe, that suggests Custer ordered the train to come overland as quickly as possible dropping packs, and a look at the map tells us why: the fastest way to Custer was by the way he went, not up and down the steep gullies if a straight line was drawn. Of course, this would assume Custer hadn't moved and Kanipe could retrace and hadn't made it all up.
Further, Kanipe only says that TWC gave him the order, but he did not hear the order from Custer himself, I don't think, or hear Custer give it to his brother. This was added later, too.
Third, dropping ammo packs and leaving them - in essence giving them to the enemy - defies prolonged comment. Kanipe's story is adorned by later knowledge. In any case, he seems to have told everyone, like Martin did, that a cake walk was in progress at the time.
"However he is obligated, after having been ordered, to personally ensure that the train is coming along as quickly as possible." So he should send back and ensure the train is going well? Fine. Time it out. Tell us how long should be invested in that. In the entirely unlikely event the train was doing well (and it was not), Benteen is told to bring it. Apparently with him. How long till he arrives in an area where it would do any good to Custer or Reno?
"McDougall is pushing the train." Better said, McDougall was pushing a rope. Benteen knows this, anyone who'd dealt with the train knew it, or they'd be idiots. Benteen feels he is between the train and its most likely danger, so he rides.
"Otherwise he does what needs to be done to get the train moving as rapidly as possible and then advances." But both you and Custer already supposedly know McDougall is pushing the train as fast as possible, for so you've said. Why not grant Benteen that assumption as well?
"Some on this board" - pretty much me alone - "suggest that Benteen would have liked nothing better than to be the one to pull Custer’s bacon out of the fire. This being the case, they argue that Benteen would have done anything in his power to relieve Custer." I've never said that or anything like it and haven't read anyone else saying it. I only say that rescuing Custer grants all the supposed satisfaction of watching him go down with none of the risks, like being shot in the field as he should have been if anyone actually thought that. Further, anything capable of polishing off Custer would do the same to smaller groups like his or Reno's. He didn't know where Reno was at that point.
It was a half-assed plan poorly executed even so when Custer ordered contact based on assumed ability to support without knowing the size of the village or enough about the land. It was the sort of audacious, hit them now and hard attitude, that often worked, so it can't be called stupid, but it can't be called much of a plan, either. That day it didn't work.
Custer is known to have dallied, waited, arranged saddles, before heading down MTC an hour after Reno'd made his advance. He did not support Reno's advance, and had Reno actually kept going into the village proper, Custer wouldn't have known till after Reno was dead. He did not 'ride to the sound of firing.'
Absent arriving with exhausted horses on a hot day, Benteen came at a prudent pace with animals fit for action. Custer's plan of hurrying up to wait lost him men and mounts. The train arrived as best as that fiasco was going to arrive.
There was no need for things to have to mesh so perfectly (with no preparation) for an attack to be made. The most obvious thing to us now is that the 7th's best chance was to attack north as a unit in the LBH valley at dawn on the 26th. But Custer couldn't know that. He took a reasonable risk and lost.
I think there was a lot of guilt about all this among all the officers and Benteen felt his share. But I would contend this isn't that uncommon after a losing battle, and I'd wager there are former officers here who cannot but say they could have done better or different to possible better result. Of course, if they were granted that rewrite, the enemy has to be granted that, and it could have been worse result as well. I don't think that this is unusual, and as the fifty year mark on Vietnam comes up and records are opened, we'll see there are many, many more Renos and Custers and Benteens who've served us as best they knew how undeserving of the condemnation these three have received.
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 19, 2007 15:32:58 GMT -6
I don't believe Kanipe ever said he was to report back to Custer, like Martini did. And Kanipe left earlier than Martini when it would have been much safer. Still issues about Kanipe's story.
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 19, 2007 17:04:24 GMT -6
DC: “First, Benteen never contended Custer did not know McDougall was in charge of the train. He said he didn't know why the note, concerning the train, came to him, and this after Kanipe's message.”
Mabry: Benteen did contend just that. The implication in Benteen’s statement is that Custer must have been mistaken as to who was in charge of the train since he didn’t know why that note came to him. Benteen thus avoids any possible censure with his “it wasn’t my job man.” My contention is that the note made it his job to, at the very least, check out the progress of the train and assist if assistance is needed.
DC: “Second, the details of Kanipe's orders appeared much later. There was nothing at the RCOI, including Kanipe, that suggests Custer ordered the train to come overland as quickly as possible dropping packs, and a look at the…”
Mabry: You’ve missed the point and the point is that Knipe told Benteen he was ordered back to the train to hurry it up. Whether or not you want to believe Knipe’s elaboration of those orders is up to you. We’ve already had a thread as to whether Knipe was a messenger or a slackard. Take your pick. Benteen believed him to be a messenger as do I. Knipe, at various times, has given more detail as to his orders and I don’t have any trouble with that either. I also don’t have any trouble with the route that McDougall took across the valley.
DC: “Further, Kanipe only says that TWC gave him the order, but he did not hear the order from Custer himself, I don't think, or hear Custer give it to his brother. This was added later, too.”
Mabry: How does this apply to my post or to the Benteen’s interpretation of the note?
DC: “Third, dropping ammo packs and leaving them - in essence giving them to the enemy - defies prolonged comment. Kanipe's story is adorned by later knowledge. In any case, he seems to have told everyone, like Martin did, that a cake walk was in progress at the time”
Mabry: You’re still missing my point of my post and that is that Benteen was not confused by the wording of the Come On note. Drop packs, don’t drop packs have nothing to do with Benteen’s analysis of the Come On note.
DC: “So he should send back and ensure the train is going well? Fine. Time it out. Tell us how long should be invested in that. In the entirely unlikely event the train was doing well (and it was not), Benteen is told to bring it. Apparently with him. How long till he arrives in an area where it would do any good to Custer or Reno?”
Mabry: Benteen would be expected to invest as much time as it took to get that train moving if it was bogged down. Those were his orders. However it stands to reason that whatever assistance McDougall might need, if any, would not have required Benteen’s entire command to resolve.
DC: “Better said, McDougall was pushing a rope. Benteen knows this, anyone who'd dealt with the train knew it, or they'd be idiots. Benteen feels he is between the train and its most likely danger, so he rides.”
Mabry: That may be true but he wasn’t ordered to place himself between the village and the train. Benteen, as far as I can determine, made no effort to see if he could be of assistance to McDougall or to judge for himself if McDougall was getting the job done.
DC: “But both you and Custer already supposedly know McDougall is pushing the train as fast as possible, for so you've said. Why not grant Benteen that assumption as well?”
Mabry: Doesn’t matter what I grant Benteen, Custer didn’t grant him that assumption. Thus, the note.
DC: “…I've never said that or anything like it and haven't read anyone else saying it. I only say that rescuing Custer grants all the supposed satisfaction of watching him go down with none of the risks, like being shot in the field as he should have been if anyone actually thought that. Further, anything capable of polishing off Custer would do the same to smaller groups like his or Reno's. He didn't know where Reno was at that point. “
Mabry: I didn’t attribute that comment to you and it wasn’t important enough for me to go back and find out who did say it. But the comment was made and discussed on one of the threads. I simply disagree with the belief that Benteen would have done all in his power to salvage the mission and become Custer’s savior so to speak. As to the rest of your paragraph, I have no idea of what you’re trying to say.
DC: “I think there was a lot of guilt about all this among all the officers and Benteen felt his share. But I would contend this isn't that uncommon after a losing battle, and I'd wager there are former officers here who cannot but say they could have done better or different to possible better result. Of course, if they were granted that rewrite, the enemy has to be granted that, and it could have been worse result as well. I don't think that this is unusual, and as the fifty year mark on Vietnam comes up and records are opened, we'll see there are many, many more Renos and Custers and Benteens who've served us as best they knew how undeserving of the condemnation these three have received. “
Mabry: I skipped the four preceding paragraphs of your post because they didn’t apply to any statements that I made. The only issue I have with your last paragraph is the last sentence “…Renos and Custers and Benteens who’ve served us as best they knew how…” I don’t believe that Benteen did serve the best that he knew how on that day. Reno possibly did do the best he was capable of. And as I said in my post, had Benteen’s heart been in it, had he been focused on doing all he could to defeat the Indians, I’m not sure it would have made a difference. But as it was, Benteen did just enough to get by and only stepped up to take a dominant role when the survival of his contingent was in doubt. Otherwise he stayed in the background as much as possible.
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Post by wild on Jun 20, 2007 2:30:45 GMT -6
George Am in full agreement with you. Kanipe is a smoke screen from A.N.Other also interesting he pleads for assumptions to be made and this from a man who has kicked philes up and down threads with their assumptions.
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Post by blaque on Jun 20, 2007 3:22:36 GMT -6
Benteen stated (at the COI?) that he felt Custer didn't have a plan. That could be correct in a way. Custer did not know where the village was. He did believe Indians were running and ordered Reno to chase after them. Benteen was ordered to scout to the left and pitch into anything he came across. Custer's "plans" seemed vague and in a manner of speaking Benteen may have been right when he stated Custer didn't have a plan. Three widely separated commands trying to find Indians. Custer went off still not quite sure where the village was or if it was still standing. When he did see it and it's size and supposedly "sleeping" he knew he had to have a plan. Could any fortunate visitor of the Crow’s Nest confirm whether this is a valid reply to CH’s post above? This statement was written by E.S. Curtis on 1908: “This outlook, which affords a splendid view of the entire region, is about fifteen miles from the encampment site and is at the head of Davis creek, which flows into the Rosebud, and Middle Reno creek, which empties into the LBH. The creek flowing down to the LBH stretches clearly before one, and much of the Sioux encampment was plainly in sight. The writer’s party visited this point in mid-afternoon when considerable haze hovered over the valley, yet even the small cabins now on the camp site could be discerned with the naked eye, and with the aid of a glass smaller objects could be readily identified. While the party stood on this point two railway trains were seen to pass along the valley. These details are mentioned because it has been asserted that Custer was not able to see the valley clearly from this outlook. The scouts say that the white tipis were pitched so thickly in the valley that it had the appearance of being covered with a sheet, and that the hills beyond were brown with horses. The outlook afforded such a perfect prospect that with the assistance of the scouts, who were throughly familiar with the ground, a commander could easily have formulated a plan of attack and have found no reason for materially changing it. Custer discussed with his scouts the situation, the nature of the ground, and the best route to follow, and then rode back to his command […] (Hutchins’ Papers of E.S. Curtis, p. 128). And you all know that, far from being a Custer apologist, Curtis believed GAC had betrayed Reno to reap all the glory for himself!
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 20, 2007 4:58:21 GMT -6
1. I point again to the fact that any 'order' subject to interpretation is a failed order, reflective of the officer making it. No doubt Benteen liked to underline Custer's slapdash and insufficient command style (as Benteen and others - many others - saw it), at the RCOI, but he's not making it up. As an order, it's quite bad given it comes from the adjutant and written down. He wasn't in charge of the packs and the order says bring them. Not make sure everything's okay and leave them to their devices, bring them. That didn't make any sense, because it would hobble him. He made a reasonable decision based on what he assumed would be Custer's preference, and in this he was probably correct.
2. The point is what Kanipe initially told people and how his story changed over the years. His supposed orders became more dramatic as the years passed. I didn't miss the point that Kanipe told Benteen what he was to do.
3. It replies to your post that Kanipe's story isn't necessarily based on anything Custer said at all, and it reflects on the note because it allows the supposition that whoever originated Kanipe's trek and Martin's weren't the same people, and Custer didn't know Kanipe had been sent by his brother. Martin did not, and he rode close to Custer.
4. I don't think anyone has missed the point of your post. But your point is baseless. Not only could Benteen be confused, everyone is till this day. We have actual combat vets through the years who've made totally different interpretations about what, exactly, the note (it's now not an order, but a note?) was to mean.
5. The train was moving, and was only going to make the time it could make, stopping and solidifying, moving and falling apart. By what criteria would Benteen decide how many men to apply to that job, how many to take with him? You don't provide the timeline I requested.
6. That is correct, and I don't think - and other's don't think - he was required to do as you suppose.
7. You previously said McDougall was coming as fast as he could and Custer would know this. So, if they know this why would they want to lose Benteen's men for this task?
8. I don't think anyone ever made that comment, you invented it for a convenient straw dog. Easy enough to find if it exists.
9. Really? Because they address the motivation for both your post and the reasoning behind it. It's a rather serious charge against Benteen, and there is no evidence for it being held among members of the 7th who survived. It's just wishful thinking for the Harump set.
The problem Custerphiles have is that ALL the accusations against Reno and Benteen find their counterpoint with Custer's actions, but they judge them differently. Custer didn't ride to the sound of firing; he did not support as he promised; he apparently was rebuffed, headed for high ground, fought delaying actions, and was quickly overrun. Reno is damned for not doing that and surviving. Benteen is damned for not riding to Custer's aid, and if you make that a cause, you have to explain why Custer sat on his butt for much of Reno's engagement, and ended up the furthest officer from the village, at the point of a blunted arrow shape of dead.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 20, 2007 6:11:31 GMT -6
CSS I think that is a reasonable evaluation and theory. Especially the part about Benteen not knowing what Custer wanted. Do you think Custer was heavily engaged when he sent Martin with the message? AZ Ranger "This kind of answer was made because it was the only one that would sound plausible to the court, but that the real reason was that when the order was received it did not make sense. They did not know what Custer wanted, but they saw that if Benteen escorted the packtrain nearly half the regiment would be there and the other half fighting. The order sounded as if things were extremely hot down the trail, and no one would imagine that the packs were wanted just then. If the packs were wanted as badly as the order seemed to say it must be for the ammunition. That was an easy deduction, though the order did not specifically say “bring ammunition packs." This is the important part of what Kuhlman states. It only makes sense for his interpretation " bring ammunition" if there is hot fighting going on. I don't believe there was at the time of the writing of the message. Without the hot fighting his conclusion would be that Benteen would think the message does not make sense. AZ Ranger
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