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Post by Tony on Dec 29, 2006 14:16:38 GMT -6
Hi Wild--no you are not alone--I just think that after the enemy left Reno and Benteen's front (as we know now to attack Custer), there was no reason for Benteen to casually "hang around" Reno. There was no threat of attack, and the firing heard down stream would have to indicate that Custer was in some sort of engagement. Benteen should have left immediately after seeing the warriors disappear from his front, and realizing that Reno was in no further danger of attack--at least send someone ahead to connect or take a look at what was going on downstream----and that is exactly what Weir did. I cannot find fault in Weir's advance or agree that he put the regement in any additional danger!
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Post by fred on Dec 29, 2006 15:00:51 GMT -6
We now appear to be doubting whether Benteen should have paid any heed to Kanipe (a possible liar) and Martini (not terribly fluent in English, though I think fear or the lack thereof might be more universal than we give it credit for). So, we have a sequence of events. Note the final entry:
2:57pm—Benteen leaves morass just as the pack train arrives [Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 251]. Willert has this about 27 minutes earlier. [LBH Diary, p. 296] * Benteen claimed this halt was less than 15 minutes, bringing the time to somewhere between 2:50 and 2:52pm. [Overfield, The LBH, 1876, p. 40] • Godfrey claimed the delay at the morass was between 20 & 30 minutes. • Edgerly testified they were there only 8 to 10 minutes. * Smalley says CPT Weir led out from the morass. [LBH Mysteries, p. 7-9] Benteen—with his orderly—raced ahead & retook the lead. He would now be a few hundred yards ahead of his battalion. * If Gray’s times are correct, Benteen’s march from the morass to Reno Hill took the following form:
2:57-3:12 .75 miles morass to “lone tepee”
• If Gray’s times are wrong, this morass-time & distance is probably the bad one; Darling’s work seems more accurate here.
3:12-3:40 1.42 miles meets Rees driving ponies 3:40-3:42 .08 miles meets Kanipe w/ Custer’s message 3:42-3:58 1.25 miles meets Martin w/ Cook’s note
• this is 3.5 miles in 1 hour
3:58-4:02 .5 miles reaches N.Fork & takes Custer’s trail 4:02-4:06 .5 miles reaches knoll, spots Reno’s retreat; halts 4:10-4:20 1 mile reaches Reno Hill
• Gray estimates an overall speed of 4.5 mph (w/ the halt-time subtracted) for Benteen. * Firing was heard in the valley. * Windolph (H) heard firing before they left the morass. PVT Morris (M) said PVT Moller (H) told him they heard heavy firing as they were watering the horses. [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 51; citing Hammer/ Camp, Custer in 76, p. 75, & Brady, Indian Fights & Fighters, p. 404] * Godfrey: “After we watered we continued our march very leisurely.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 51] * PVT Windolph: Godfrey’s statement is not supported by comments from PVT Windolph, who, after hearing firing in the valley, said, “We all knew we’d be in a fight before long.” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 296] “We were trotting briskly now, & there was a good deal of excitement. Horses seem to know when they are heading into trouble the same as men do & some of the mounts were anxious to run away, tired as they were.” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 298] * Benteen: “I pushed rapidly on, soon getting out of sight of the advance of the train, until reaching a morass, I halted to water the animals, who had been without water since about 8pm of the day before. This watering did not occasion the loss of 15 minutes, & when I was moving out, the advance of the train commenced watering from that morass. I went at a slow trot until I came to a burning tepee…. We did not stop.” [Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 263] * The order of march was now D, H, K. * Godfrey: “We heard occasional shots & I concluded the fight was over—that [we] had nothing to do but go up & congratulate the others & help destroy the plunder.” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 298]
A final word from me. I was an ROTC-trained officer and was accepted into the Regular Army. That meant my commission was the same as a West Pointer's & I was assumed to be a career officer. ROTC-trained USAR officers had a 2-year obligation (this is all back in the sixties) and they were done. When I was a platoon leader in an infantry battalion in Germany, my boss -- the company commander-- was a West Pointer who eventually got 4 stars and retired after his tenure as NATO commander and after leading NATO troops into Bosnia. His boss eventually got 4 stars, commanded the 1st Inf. Div. in Vietnam (we all served under him there, as well [talk about military nepotism!]), and went on to establish TRADOC. One of the things I learned under these men was that you, as an officer, are to take the initiative whenever necessary. You are given a mission and you are expected to fulfill that mission. At times, circumstances dictate too many things for any officer to strictly adhere to orders and there are times when a different set of tactics may be required to fulfill your duty toward that mission. We are taught to think; we teach our men the same thing. We are taught to communicate, to let the men know as much as possible; we teach the men the same thing. There was no specific mission assigned to Benteen; there was no requirement for Benteen to do a specific thing other than to bring the packs. He came quick... then what? He ran into a defeated, demoralized, "whipped"-- in the words of Charlie Varnum-- command, and he did what any well-trained officer would have done under similar circumstances.
I will tell you something... and then I will excuse myself from this debate. You guys are all my friends here & I respect your opinions, but if I had sent that note & you were Benteen and you abandoned Reno in similar circumstances, I would have had you court-martialed. Custer's mistakes put everyone under almost unmanageable duress and for anyone to sit here and strictly, by the book, claim everyone else should have adhered to the [which?] letter of the order while Custer went gleefully hunting too many Indians, is wrong. Dead wrong! It doesn't make any difference what the outcome was. When Custer sent that note, he still had several more miles to traipse away from Benteen and Reno. When Custer sent that note, it wasn't Custer who was battling for his life, and when Benteen arrived on Reno Hill, Custer still had 2 hours to go, so where was he? What was he doing? He would never have moved away had he been under duress, so whether it was fortuitous or not, Benteen's actions were the right ones.
If you feel Benteen should have donned blinders and ignored a dying command, then you must certainly feel Custer never should have been there in the first place.
I wish you all a very happy New Year (have we done this before?), especially those I have not wished it to before.
Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by crzhrs on Dec 29, 2006 15:29:00 GMT -6
Fred:
While I was in the military, not an officer, I will accept your theory.
True . . . officers are taught by-the-book tacitcs . . . however, when things don't go by the book one has to have the ability to THINK, ADAPT, MAKE SPLIT SECOND DECISIONS that affect the lives of their men.
Once Benteen arrived at Reno Hill, Reno's command was in shambles, with many dead, wounded, and missing. Reno then decides to take off and look for Hogdson, leaving an already demoralized command in who's hands? BENTEEN. Benteen now has to pick up the pieces of an dangerous situation and threatened command, even if Indians have stopped their attack. Who knows if there are more Indians ready to come out of nowhere?
It was Benteen's responsibility by DEFAULT . . . Reno is gone and Benteen has to get the command back on its feet. Custer is off one his own and that was HIS decision. Custer apparently felt no concern that other parts of the command may have been in a fight or slowed down, or who knows what. Yet Custer expects Benteen to come immediately to HIM even if circumstances elsewhere are not honky-dory.
I guess it's the old Custer-first-and-everybody-else-second that had been his philosophy for most of his life. This time the "everybody else" was Benteen and he would not abandon fellow soldiers who were in more need of assistance than Custer.
HAPPY NEW YEAR everyone if I don't get back to the forum by Jan. 1 2007 . . . where has the time gone!
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Post by wild on Dec 29, 2006 16:56:00 GMT -6
The same result would have happened as per the RCOIThis cannot be used to defend Benteen
Benteen was never charged with any wrong doing and many of his own officers supported his actions at Reno Hill. The main witness for the prosecution was dead.
Not going back for either the ammo packs or the whole train let Benteen 'come quick,' as it would have taken more time to get them. He did 'come quick' and put 'being quick' as more important than 'bringing packs.' He did not in anyway attempt to but the "bring packs"order into effect.He in fact ignored the packs order knowing that it had been advised to cut across country which would placed it on a course 1/2 mile distant from Reno hill.
He did not know about the division of command until Reno told him, and was entitled to think he was joining Custer. Sure let's cut the man a little slack but to suggest he thought he was joining Custer???Ya gotta be kidding.
says that once he reports to Reno he is technically off the hook.By placing his forces at the disposal of another officer he is guilty of mutiny.
I do not believe Benteen or anyone else could come upon such a scene and size up the situation accurately in just a couple minutes. Sizing up the situation was Custer's job.
All Benteen (and possibly others) can think about is the mutilated bodies of Elliott and his men and Benteen will be damned if he will allow that to happen to the rest of the commandHe was in the wrong business then because fighting Indians had a tendency to result in mutilated bodies.You're not suggesting Benteen got his abandoning in first?
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 29, 2006 17:11:35 GMT -6
Wild How do you know that come quick didn't mean to help Reno? If Custer was to keep his promise of support then it could have meant for Benteen to support Reno.
AZ Ranger
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Post by wild on Dec 29, 2006 17:36:36 GMT -6
I will tell you something... and then I will excuse myself from this debate. Fred your posts on this subject are some of the best I'v read and I hope you continue to assist us in this debate.
You guys are all my friends here & I respect your opinions, but if I had sent that note & you were Benteen and you abandoned Reno in similar circumstances, I would have had you court-martialed. Your defence of Benteen is based on the circumstances facing him on his arrival at Reno's position.He has a choice of rendering confort and that's all that is required to Reno and jepordizing the whole mission or following his orders and advancing into the unknown.If these two things are equal then it is his oath as an officer would determine his actions. Slan
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Post by wild on Dec 29, 2006 17:40:35 GMT -6
AZ Wild How do you know that come quick didn't mean to help Reno? If Custer was to keep his promise of support then it could have meant for Benteen to support Reno. Because Custer ordered the packs to cut across country which would have taken them clear of Reno and because the messengers never mentioned Reno.
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Post by fred on Dec 29, 2006 17:53:28 GMT -6
Hey, "wild," my boy!
I appreciate that; it is kind of you! It is just that I think we are now beginning to beat the dead horse. I clearly respect your opinion and it is certainly as valid as mine. There just comes a time when we sort of reach an impasse and I think this is about it. I'm fresh out of ideas and new arguing points and even your stuff is beginning to sound a little like the previous page. I believe we have exhausted it.
What is so interesting about much of this is that it will invariably pop up again in a different format, on a different thread. And then we take off again. I got involved in this whole thing a little over a year ago and after a while I began wondering how long it can last. There were times when it kind of petered out and there were other times when the animosity became so bad, guys just stayed away because I think they just didn't want to get involved in all the falderol. I have to admit, I was a big part of all that, though I never felt I was the initial instigator; maybe I am wrong. It then became a waste of my time.
What keeps bringing me back is new names-- yours for example-- w/ new viewpoints and intelligent commentary. I only wish we would have even more input from some. "Realbird," for example. "Gumby"; there's a guy, "d o harris," who is very knowledgable. Great stuff, including baseball. The list is endless: crzhrs, Elisabeth, Leyton, rch, Tony, AZRanger, Billy Markland... God, tons!
So, no; I'm not going anywhere and I really do appreciate your comments. You are sharp & incisive and you hold your fort very well. You bring a lot to these boards without being snide and nasty. That's the key and sometimes I wind up getting a little too carried away. So, to me, we have reached the handshake part of this particular point. Now, my question is, What the hell was the original intent of the thread?
I guess I'll have to go back to page 1!!!!
Best wishes, wild, Fred.
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Post by fred on Dec 29, 2006 18:01:45 GMT -6
Because Custer ordered the packs to cut across country which would have taken them clear of Reno and because the messengers never mentioned Reno. Oh, wild... one last thing. We really do not know that for sure. That is Kanipe talking and I am hesitant to believe anything the man said. He was not assigned as an orderly; he was not w/ the HQ contingent... suddenly Kanipe reports back w/ all these instructions? The only reason Custer used Sharrow & Voss to get messages to Benteen was because he knew they would return. Cooke told Martin to return if he could. And Kanipe? From Co. C? A sergeant? The writer, Vern Smalley, is extremely skeptical of anything Kanipe said & I tend to agree. Also, McDougall and Mathey both said no one-- certainly no sergeant-- reported back to them w/ instructions from Custer. (And forget what McDougall wrote for Kanipe 15 or so years after the battle; that was hogwash!) Also, no one reported seeing Kanipe w/ the packs and a number of people claim he sort of hung back behind Benteen's command for safety. I am ready to believe Kanipe was an opportunist and scared out of his wits. Smalley's article in Diane's "Newsletter" is well worth reading. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Dec 29, 2006 18:13:10 GMT -6
Hi Fred Getting a little late here and I agree I'v made all the substantive points I can and am in danger of repeating myself ad nauseam.I have enjoyed the exchange and hope we can cross swords again. Slan agus beannacht Risteard
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Post by wild on Dec 29, 2006 18:18:23 GMT -6
Oh, wild... one last thing. Sure sure Fred in the morning the last post has sounded here.Good night.
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Gumby
Full Member
Posts: 202
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Post by Gumby on Dec 29, 2006 19:33:11 GMT -6
I am not at all sure that Kanipe informed anyone that the pack train was to cut straight across to GAC. No attempt was made to cut across country to GAC. Kanipe, the only man who knew the general direction GAC went, was allowed to join his friends from Co. C rather than point the way to GAC.
To figure out how long Benteen remained at the morass is not that difficult. Figure the distance from the point where Benteen rejoined the trail to the morass. He stated he pulled onto the trail almost immediately in front of the pack train. He traveled the same distance to the morass as the pack train from that point. He then left the morass just as the pack train arrived. If he was taking his time as Godfrey claimed, then he wouldn't have been traveling that much faster than the packs. Ten to fifteen minutes would have been the most time that he could have been there. Godfrey and Weir were impatient which would have made them believe it took them longer to water their horses. Windolph stated that they had to water their horses in groups because there wasn't room to water them all at once.
Custer should have specified where he wanted Benteen. It obviously made a difference that he was non-specific. No one even hinted at the RCOI that Benteen disobeyed orders. So much for common knowledge as to what the orders meant.
The plain fact is that GAC overextended his forces and paid the ultimate price for his decisions. Trying to place blame on others for his mistakes is rediculous. GAC's mistakes can be justified and he could not know they were mistakes when he made them but they were still mistakes.
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Post by fred on Dec 29, 2006 20:38:49 GMT -6
wild, Gumby, Tony, Horse, AZ Ranger--
Here's some interesting stuff we can chew on for a bit:
• Bruce Liddic considers McDougall’s & Mathey’s claim [that Kanipe never approached them, much less gave them a message from Custer] to be a lie, sworn to at the Reno Court of Inquiry [Vanishing Victory, p. 71] & in a footnote, cites Jack Pennington. He also quotes a testimonial McDougall wrote for Kanipe when the latter was seeking a job w/ the U.S. Revenue Service (McDougall was living in Wellsville, NY; 9Jan1897): “On the afternoon of June 25th, 1876 when the entire country was full of Indians, SGT Knipe brought to me an order from General Custer ‘to bring the pack train across the way’ where I found Major Reno… I take great pleasure in giving him this small certificate of merit.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 72] • There are, however, authors who agree w/ McDougall & Mathey & claim Kanipe, worried about meeting hostiles while riding between the two commands, simply lagged Benteen’s battalion & never did deliver the message to McDougall. One of them is Vern Smalley & another was Jim Willert, who quoted Kanipe: “ ‘McDougall & his outfit rode on to the top of the hill & reinforced MAJ Reno as he retired from the bottom of the bluffs. The Indians were following close at their heels, shooting & yelling, & the men were dropping here & there. They, the Indians, would hop on them & scalp them before we could rescue them!’ … McDougall & the pack train did not arrive upon the hill until some considerable time after the hostiles facing Reno’s command had already gone downriver….” [LBH Diary, p. 335]
* Willert then quotes Kanipe saying that after he delivered the message to McDougall, he went on to Benteen to tell him as well. Yet he had already passed Benteen & told him. “If Kanipe had departed McDougall as soon as he had delivered his message, how could he have ridden w/ him to the bluffs to observe the attack upon Reno’s command?” [LBH Diary, p. 335]
Liddic makes an interesting point here [p. 91]. Cooke’s note emphasized bringing the packs & a former cavalryman, General Hawkins, told Kuhlman that “packs” always referred to the pack train & not specifically ammunition, as some students of the battle assume. Benteen thought this & so did Edgerly, when shown the note. Liddic, however, feels Benteen missed the primary intent of the message: that Custer wanted the additional troops the 2 units, i.e., Benteen’s battalion & McDougall & the packs, represented. This would have added 269 men to Custer’s battalions (Liddic says “nearly 250”). There is clearly an element of truth to this, but if it is correct, Cooke sealed his own fate by not being more specific, coupled w/ Martin’s rather euphoric assessment of how the battle was going.
4:27pm—Pack train halts at flats (2 3/4 miles from “lone tepee,” having traveled @ 3 mph) to close up; LT Mathey spots smoke. [Liddic has this occurring at the “lone tepee,” but according to Vern Smalley, there were two "lone tepee" sites, one much closer to the LBH!] * As McDougall reached the van & ordered Mathey to halt so the train could close up, he mounted the small butte (there was a small butte in the "flats") & spotted the men on Reno Hill. At first, he though they were Indians, so he ordered the train to close up even tighter & put some of his troops in front & at the rear of the train. * Overall, McDougall’s actions were exemplary, for he organized the defense of the pack train in case of an attack, instructing the men to circle the mules, shoot them, & hold off the attackers that way. He made sure all the ammo mules were together so if trouble arose, the men would have plenty of ammo.
What is so interesting about this last item-- the timing sequence at 4:27 p.m.-- is that it is clear McDougall and Mathey did not cut cross country as Kanipe claimed he had told them. If Kanipe told them to do so, why didn't they? If they lied at the RCOI about meeting Kanipe, then why did they go nearly to the river, supposedly ignoring Kanipe's plea to cut cross-country? (Am I making myself clear here? Let me try again.) If McDougall and Mathey are lying about Kanipe, they would only have agreed to do so after the battle, correct? But if Kanipe actually did deliver a message from Custer to cut cross country, then why wouldn't they have done so? Yet they continued straight on, following the trail toward the LBH. That is one of the major things making me doubt Kanipe's veracity in all of this. Kanipe makes no sense!
Smalley's business about the 2nd "lone tepee" is beguiling and there is plenty of evidence supporting his theory. Other than Kanipe's say-so (here we go again w/ Kanipe!), I know of no one else who made any claim the packs "cut cross country."
Just for your information, Smalley makes several very interesting claims that bear further scrutiny: (1) "Varnum's Lookout" on the divide rather than what we all believe to be the Crow's Nest; (2) the 2nd "lone tepee" business; (3) this Kanipe situation; and, (4) the so-called Weir advance. All great stuff. Boy, you want discussion? We should go over some of that stuff!
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by elisabeth on Dec 30, 2006 8:14:12 GMT -6
Interesting stuff, Fred. I'm coming round to your view about Kanipe. Too many question-marks by far. Yet another is his failure to give Benteen the "if you see Benteen" message he claims to have been given. If there was any substance to it, why didn't he give the message when he met Benteen instead of (supposedly) zipping back and forth between the two columns? Inefficient at best ...
Re Benteen: maybe it's just an excuse, but Benteen surely had some right to claim that he couldn't fulfil the "come on" part of Custer's order until the packs were safely up on Reno Hill? After all, while he might -- as he said -- have been confident when he got the order that nothing could get to the packs while he was ahead of them on the trail, by the time he joined Reno he'd had a taste of the numbers and temper of the enemy. He might very well feel that he'd be derelict in his duty, now, not to wait until the packs were united with the rest of the command. What he'd have done after that if Weir hadn't precipitated the move out, we can only guess. Left McDougall to hold Reno's hand, and led an organised move towards Custer? Reconnoitred the state of affairs to the north? Mounted a second valley attack? Or just forted up, as he eventually did? Any of these is possible. But I'm not sure how far we can judge his intentions by what actually happened, given the way his hand was forced.
Willert makes the point that when Benteen followed Weir, he assumed command not only of his own companies -- but of French's M as well. (That had never struck me before, dumb as I am.) Despite the "demoralisation" of the rest, Co. M was clearly in good enough shape to be prepared to go into action again. It's tempting to imagine how things might have turned out if Benteen's plan, absent Weir's "fit of bravado", had been to leave McDougall to glue Reno's remnants together, and take those four companies into the valley. There was no force of warriors in front to stop him; he could have done serious damage to the Sioux village, at least -- and, just possibly, created enough of a diversion to distract the Indians from Custer. Brings us up against the timing question again, obviously; it might have been too late to do any good ... but it's conceivable that it just might have given some of Custer's battalion a sporting chance? (Imagine, for instance, that he'd entered the fray before Lame White Man's charge. Could have been very different.)
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Post by harpskiddie on Dec 30, 2006 12:38:59 GMT -6
Elisabeth:
Benteen testified that when Martin brought him the message, he believed that Custer and his command were already dead. Why, thinking they were already dead, or maybe watering their horses in the Big Horn, or Custer having left them in the lurch a la Elliot, would Benteen have contemplated taking any companies into the valley?
If Weir had not gone ahead, do you think that Benteen, who seems to have lost track of Weir's company during Reno's absence on the Benny Hodgson sidetrip [when he was left in charge] would have moved in that direction? crzhrs always finds fault with Weir for going ahead and then beetling back when the warriors started in his direction. Has anyone bothered to check as to which company stayed there the shortest period of time, and which retreated first? Why did French go? He was not under Benteen's orders. Did Reno order him to go, or release him to Benteen? Maybe he sailed out in a fit of bravado too!!
Fred:
Vern Smalley, the writer Vern Smalley, that is, has a lot of interesting theories. There is another thread featuring his thoughts on 'Varnum's Lookout' which is worth reading all the way through. Glad to see you back, young fella. Best wishes to you and yours for the coming year, and years and years.....
Gordie
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