Crow Interpreters

[mcaryf]

I have been wondering why Custer did not send any scouts with Benteen. Whatever his mission was it seems a strange omission. Some posters point out that Benteen had no doctor with him but the absence of scouts seems even stranger to me.

The only theory I have so far is that Custer was very short of interpreters for the Crows who were actually the people that knew the area. Am I right in thinking there were only two interpreters Girard and Bouyer?

Isaiah Dorman is hardly mentioned in any account I have read with the exception of his death and possibly using a corpse as fishing bait earlier in the expedition. He was, however, meant to be an interpreter for the Lakota and there were half a dozen or so Lakotas with Custer. Thus why might Dorman and the Dakotas not have gone with Benteen?

Regards

Mike

[crzhrs]

Ah yes . . . why no scouts/medical personal with Benteen again.

Still no definative answers which I have been looking for.

One answer is that Custer did not expect Benteen to go very far . . . just to the next ridge to see what he could see and report back, thus no scouts/medical personal. But with 125+/- men?

But then he sends two additional messengers telling Benteen to keep going.

Now Benteen could have ended up in no-man's-land without scouts or doctors and if he came across Indians, certainly some fighting would have taken place or Indians captured. Then what? No one to interpret and no medical assistance.

I think it would have been better to send the Crows with a company of soldiers. The Crows would have known where to go to get a view and any campsites or escapes routes rather than soldiers who had no idea of where they were going or where to look.

Another one of those "what were the thinking" moments at the LBH.

[mcaryf]

Hi Crzhrs

Thank you for your answer. I have been thinking more about this and reckon that there were only two Crow interpreters Gerard and Bouyer. Custer probably wanted to keep one of them with Varnum (Bouyer), and the other with himself (Gerard) for interpreting what the messengers from the scouts might be saying. Thus there would be none spare to go with Benteen.

When Benteen meets the Crows later near Reno Hill they can only communicate with sound effects ("pooh-poohing") and odd words like Otoe (many) Sioux. When Curley gets to the Far West he has a similar problem with communication.

Regards

Mike

[crzhrs]

Mike:

Girard went with Reno and Boyer with Custer. Not sure of the other white-mixed/blood scouts with Reno or what their knowledge of Lakota or Crow language was.

[Tony]

why was Bloody knife (Custers favorite scout) with Reno and not Custer?

[mcaryf]

The impression I have is that Custer and Bloody Knife were not on such good terms that particular day. Custer sent them to steal horses. He was an Arikara and the scouts who knew the area were the Crows for whom Bloody Knife could not interpret so the Arikara were just useful as horse thieves by this time. Previously their tracking and spotting skills would have been relevant.

regards

Mike

[crzhrs]

BK said something like he wouldn't see the next sun come up or it would be his last sunset . . . so Custer may have felt he didn't really want any party poopers along with him.

Also Reynolds wasn't exactly thrilled about what was happening and asked someone to give his personal effects to relatives if he didn't make it. Reynolds went with Reno.

After the Officers' meeting Wallace said he thought Custer was going to be killed. Wallace went with Reno.

Varnum had to keep picking up a guidon that blew over several times and had bad feelings about the battle. Varnum went with Reno

And of course Benteen who was a thorn in Custer's side was sent off away from Custer.

And Reno, not a Custer favorite, was ordered to charge running Indians with promised support.

Is it possible Custer only wanted officers/scouts who weren't so pessimistic about the mission or him, and sent the others off to push the Indians to Custer so Custer could get the victory/glory?

[harpskiddie]

crzhrs:

When Custer split the command into battalions, he did so along the lines of the former wing division, and he assigned command of the battalions to the officers by seniority. Custer kept the right wing, and split the left wing between Reno and Benteen. Varnum was in command of the scouts. Wallace, who was the engineer officer on the march, went with Reno after Varnum joshed him about staying with the 'coffee-coolers' and Custer said he could go if he wanted. Reno got the honor of leading the advance because it was his by right of seniority.

Gordie

[crzhrs]

Harps:

Fully aware of by-the-book divisions . . . but it seems Custer had all his "supporters" with him but all his "distractors" were not.

We come back to: how much was nepotism and favoritism a part of Custer's decision?

One would think Custer would want those he trusted off on scouts or attacks, while those he had "doubts" about, under his wing. Just the opposite took place.

PS: Since when did Custer go by seniority? Throughout his career he did what he wanted or went over the heads of his superiors . . . and got away with it or let off the hook . . . until the LBH.

[Realbird]

why was Bloody knife (Custers favorite scout) with Reno and not Custer?


During Indian warfare, it was acceptable procedure for the military to utilize "Indians" to track down an elusive foe consisting of other "Indians." In the Custer's expedition, Crow scouts were specifically selected as they were familiar with the territory believed to occupied by the recalcitrant Sioux and Cheyennes. The Arikara (Ree) scouts were relatively easy to seduce in joining the expedition as they hated the Sioux who had usurped their lands.

However, once the military objective was accomplished, (location of the village) the Commanders relied solely upon their own troops to actually fight the battle. The primary directive of the scouts: to find the village, naturally became obsolete upon doing so. However, a secondary directive (equally imperative) was to deprive the warriors of their mounts.

This point is supported by a supposed statement made by Custer and interpreted to the Ree scouts by F.F. Gerard. Custer said again through Gerard:" My only intention in bringing these people to battle is to have them go into battle and take many horses away from the Sioux." the Arikara narrative, p.81

This philosophy was shared by General Sheridan who stated:"A Sioux on foot is a Sioux warrior no longer." General Cook is reported to have stated: "the Sioux is a cavalry soldier from the time he has intelligence enough to ride a horse or fire a gun."

Reno's point of attack was closest to the village wherein the scouts would have been afforded the best opportunity to spook, scatter, and seize the Indian herds. Hindsight being twenty-twenty, we now know that the mission was a complete failure. However, such failure was not contemplated by Custer at the time these orders were issued.

Thus, Bloody Knife's assignment away from Custer is not such an anomaly when we consider the second, critical function of the scouts. This does not preclude the active engagement of the Sioux by the Ree's and Crows. Some of them chose to fight the Sioux at the Rosebud and, at the Little Big Horn, as well.

[crzhrs]

The Sioux/Cheyenne at the LBH did not rely on horse for fighting . . . they were used to get from one part of the battlefield to the other, but overall their fighting was on foot.

The same could be said for Fetterman, Wagon Box, and Hayfield fights. The horses would be factor if the Indians were without them and were being chased down by soldiers. Without the horses the Indians would have been vulnerable. But as fighters, the Indians did not solely rely on them for fighting.

[fred]

I believe Gordon is correct in his view of the regimental organization and I also agree w/ Realbird in her [an assumption, sorry if I am wrong] depiction of the various Indian scouts. I do think, however, we all have a tendency to make this whole thing a little too complicated.

I think Custer broke down his command the way he did for a specific purpose and I think there was an element of flexibility built into that breakdown: on purpose, as well. He sent Benteen to the left on a limited mission, probably expecting Benteen to find exactly what he did find, nothing. Was that a wasted mission? No; not at all. Custer had to be sure he was not going to be hit from the rear. He sent a full battalion, under his most capable lieutenant for a reason. In the slight event he should run into something, Custer figured Benteen would have the manpower to deal w/ it. The mission was limited-- and therefore required neither scout nor physician-- from the start, both in scope and distance, but the terrain was deceiving and Custer had to modify the distance Benteen was to go just to make sure the captain could see the entire area. Benteen was then to use his discretion as to when and where he would rejoin the main column. You give that kind of discretion to a commander as capable as a Benteen.

Horse, your idea of a single company is valid, but it would not have been enough of a force if trouble was met, and besides, a single company did not fit in w/ the battalion concept and may have been entirely too weak to defend itself if the area was teeming w/ hostiles.

The notion that Custer could have sent 6 men and an officer to do the job simply shows a complete lack of understanding of what had to be done and the situation in general, yet there are a number of people who consistently tout that alternative. I won't even get into the uselessness of such an action in military terms.

Benteen's second mission was to be the regimental reserve, to either follow the main attack down the valley or to be used as a "fire brigade" at the commander's whim. To me, the first major change in the entire situation came when Fred Gerard was informed the Indians in front of Reno were not running, but were coming out to meet the major. This information was relayed back to Custer-- via LT Cooke-- and Custer switched to "Plan B" (for lack of a better phrase). I do believe it was Custer's original intent to follow Reno down the valley and insert himself as a shock wave through Reno while the major was "dueling" w/ the warriors. A one-two punch, if you will. Benteen would have been the knockout blow and it would not have taken written orders to get the good captain down that valley and into the fracas. A run through the village was the thought.

When Custer realized the Sioux were not running, but were coming out to meet Reno, I would have thought they were employing a screening force to cover the getaway of their families. The only way I could prevent that would be to make an "end run" up the bluffs and around to the northern-most part of the camp. The whole campaign was predicated on the fact the Indians were thought to be "scatterers." If that thesis was correct, numbers made no matter. If it was not correct, numbers suddenly became of paramount importance!

And Mike, there is some evidence that a Ree scout did accompany Benteen, though for what purpose, I have no idea (other than maybe as a messenger). According to Hammer, Stab was detailed to scout w/ Benteen. He went some distance, then re-joined Soldier (another Ree). Gray claimed he was a straggler who arrived at Reno Hill, which, if he joined Soldier, was probably true. He then helped guard the pony herd, leaving the battlefield w/ other Rees. If he was not directly assigned to Benteen, then he may have carried some sort of message to him. Soldier claimed to have talked w/ Stab who told him that.

I have been remiss of late and I certainly miss the great discussions we have had on these boards. I know there have been some tough and rather acrimonious times, and for my contribution to that, I am sorry. I wish all of you a very happy, holy, and belated merry Christmas and a New Year that is loaded w/ fun, prosperity, peace, and good health.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[elisabeth]

Fred, nice to see you back again.

So ... is it possible that the news that the Indians weren't running -- which, as you say, would be interpreted by Custer as the usual screening action -- gave him his first definite confirmation that the village was concentrated to the north? Before that, despite what he was told at the Crow's Nest, he couldn't be sure it wasn't strung out along the length of the valley. Once the Indians come out to counter Reno, he can stop worrying about covering his rear and can go straight for the main target. He can also now be confident that there's nothing to impede either Benteen or the packs. So, as far as he can see at this point, it's all good news; and he switches to "Plan B" not just because he must, but because he can ...?

[fred]

Elisabeth--

Thank you. I have missed you. At my own peril, I offer you the following. Edgar Stewart made an interesting assumption. As Reno rode off toward Ford A, Varnum approached Custer w/ the news he had seen a large force of Indians & a large village farther down the valley. This “report was apparently the first intimation—from what Custer considered a responsible source—of the immediate proximity of a large number of hostiles.” [Custer’s Luck, p. 329] Custer is in the flats at this point, following Reno.

As for Benteen, Bruce Liddic wrote that when Custer was on Sharpshooters' Ridge (remember that old argument, Sharpshooters' or Weir?) he probably saw the long dust cloud to the S that was both the packs & Benteen. Apparently Joe Blummer believed Custer could distinguish between the 2 columns & that’s why he dispatched Martin w/ Cooke’s note: “… if Custer had not seen the Benteen column coming, he would not have any way of knowing where Benteen might be.” [Blummer/ Liddic, p.81] Apparently, Benteen never suspected Custer saw him from there. In what could be a very telling comment (after analysis), Benteen said: “When that order was sent to me by Custer, he couldn’t tell within 10 miles of where I might be found from the nature of the order I had received from him.” [Thomas A. Holmes/ Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p.81] If correct, then Custer knew where his entire command was at close to 3:15pm (Gray's timing), & knew that they were mutually supporting.

As for a "Plan B," I do not believe that was what Custer wanted. All along, he was worried about surprise and despite the activity in the valley, Custer was savvy enough to know it would still take some time to move an entire village (the size of which, at this time, he still greatly underestimated). I believe he wanted Reno to charge-- that would draw some warriors away from the "luggage packing," and then Custer would follow, hitting the Indians w/ the second punch and the whole thing would be a helter-skelter charge through the village, Indians bolting all over the place. By the Indians coming out to confront Reno Custer may have thought they were delaying for time and w/ enough warriors between Reno and the tent grounds, it might tie down Reno, jam up the area so that a second wave would not be as effective, and give the families enough time to scatter. I believe it was as simple as that.

Then, to counter the Indians' move, Custer figured he would have to swing to the right to corral the refugees. Once on the bluffs, however, he did realize he had caught them by surprise, but it was now fruitless to turn back, re-cross North Fork, follow Reno's steps across the LBH, & head down the valley, & that he might just as well continue northward along the bluffs, gather up whoever he could, and maybe even charge the village from the north, downriver end. As for Benteen, whether Custer was on Weir or SSR, he could still see the dust plumes-- Blummer felt he could differentiate between the two (and that makes sense)-- so he knew Benteen and the packs were at least in the vicinity.

Liddic makes an extremely strong comment here ("strong" in the sense that it is a defense of Custer's plan), that by knowing where all his units were Custer was still in full control of his regiment. Based on the times (meaning "era") and the difficulties of wide-spread military operations, this was not a bad assessment and not a bad use of his capabilities. Obviously, the situation deteriorated after that.

I do think you are correct when you say up to this point it was all good news, but I do not believe this was precisely what Custer wanted. I think he was too shrewd a commander to be delighted in having to traverse, high, low, difficult terrain w/ a cavalry unit. I think the last bit of delight the man encountered was his belief he had caught the village napping.

Very best wishes, Elisabeth,
Fred.

[AZ Ranger]

Well said Fred. It could have happened in that way. It explains why there was little premonition until to late.

Best Wishes to You and Yours

AZ Ranger