The panic run theory

[elisabeth]

Now that's credible. Custer Shot, Mission Changes sounds a lot more realistic than Custer Shot, Everyone Panics.

[blaque]

But if Custer was mortally wounded near MT (shot in the temple, as eyewitnesses said his chest wound was probably post-mortem), why was he carried to the top of the knoll on LSH? A very unsafe place for Dr. Lord and his illustrious patient, being as it was exposed to incoming fire from every direction, N, S, E & W of battleridge.

[norseman]

Put yourself in the shoes of lots of those men at the Custer battle. For the past few days you had had almost no sleep, you were tired, your horses were probably exhausted . It was darn hot and the ground was hard to travel on. You very well could have been a new recruit with little training . All it would have taken is for a couple of the good old non coms in a unit to go down along with an officer or two , and you would have had all the ingredients for a rout.

We visited the custer battlefield in August about noon and I have to tell you it was darn hot with no wind whatsoever. I stood on lsh and wondered what it had to be like for those exhausted , scared troopers as they tried to stay alive. It is one thing to wonder about all this while we sit in an cool house or office safe and sound but stand out on that hill in the hot sun after about 2 days with no sleep with all kinds of folks shooting at you and men dieing all around while you tried to pry a spent shell casing out of your breech loading rifle and my guess is that your mindset would change a great deal. My guess that there was not a lot of organized thought or action on that hill near the end.

[Tricia]

blaque said:

But if Custer was mortally wounded near MT (shot in the temple, as eyewitnesses said his chest wound was probably post-mortem), why was he carried to the top of the knoll on LSH? A very unsafe place for Dr. Lord and his illustrious patient, being as it was exposed to incoming fire from every direction, N, S, E & W of battleridge.

Interesting point. But Lord's body was never found, correct? There was--what--just a button from a doctor's uni? I wonder if the place Lord went down could point to where GAC actually fell. But I've always thought dragging a body about on a battlefield would be rather inconvenient, even if it was that of the Boy General.

[rch]

If Custer was in retreat, why not form a perimeter defence on Calhoun Hill? As I recall the high ground around Calhoun Hill is large enough to accommodate all five of Custer's companies. Custer Hill is by comparison a salient.

rch

[blaque]

Leyton,
It seems that Lord was not identified by any member of the 7th Cavalry, but it was by Captain Michaelis, of Terry’s staff, and Lt. Thompson, 6th Infantry. The former wrote about his recognizing Lord in a letter dated 29 September ‘76; the latter did likewise in a letter to Lord’s brother, dated 14 August ‘76, indicating that he was lying 20 feet from Custer, on side hill and close to Cooke.

[elisabeth]

Yes. Not only large enough, but some who've been there say that the area offers an excellent field of fire over all the Indian approaches. And if Custer was wounded, this and/or with the Keogh ridge would surely be the sensible place to set up a field hospital.

[norseman]

I have a question for you folks that keep wondering why Custers troops did not form up on Calhoun Hill when the came back from the ford . Can you not accept the idea that by that time , going to Calhoun hill was not an option. If they could not hold the ford, that would indicate that the indians were there in too much strengh and it might even and probably did indicate that they were being flanked by the indians coming out of the ford area. All acounts also indicate that for a time much of the indian activity ceased on Reno hill as many of those indians saw the threat Custer posed and left to go after Custer.

Is there some reason that you cannot buy into the concept that the custer units when forced to pull back from the ford were pushed north and east and thus going to Calhoun hill was not an option .By the time that they were going to lsh, Calhouns unit was probably already heavily engaged and fighting for its life.

[George Mabry]

If you are receiving fire from at least three directions, setting up a defensive position on a ridge, any ridge, is not a good idea.

Norseman: I’m confused on your last post. You said “By the time that they (the unit that attacked the village at MTC) were going to lsh, Calhouns unit was probably already heavily engaged and fighting for its life.” Is it your opinion that Calhoun was setting up a defensive position on Calhoun Ridge at or about the time that another company(s) were attacking down MTC?

Philly, it’s nice to see that someone else is as confused as to Keogh’s positioning as I am. It seems that most postings I’ve read brush past Keogh by saying that he was there in support of C and L companies. That may be true, but in his final resting place, he couldn’t support anyone. If you have a theory on how or why he got down in that hole, I’d like to hear it.

Thanks to all. Good thread

George

[norseman]

On the accts that I have seen, for whatever reason , when the custer unit attacked the ford area, Calhouns unit was left behind probably as a rear guard. Every acct seems to state that whatever happened to Custers unit did not take long. The indians attacking Reno, for the most part left to go after Custer when he became a threat to the village. For some reason , Calhoun s unit did not follow the rest to lsh. I maintain that they did not probably because they no longer could both from being heavily engaged from the south and west and probably because the indians driving Custers unit toward lsh had probably already cut off any option that Calhoun had to retreat.

When I looked at the battle ground from lsh , those little clumps of markers appeared to me to indicate that the movement of the troop following custer was moving north and east with no apparent order. Calhouns unit by all accts was maybe the only unit in the direct custer command that appeared to have been in a formation that indicated a command structure and leadership by that command structure . They died in a structured defensive deployment

[PhillyBlair]

Great stuff here everyone. We had a power outage and lost electricity for 9 hours -- cable and internet for 22 hours. 22 hours with no baseball (my beloved Sox won two 1-0 games in that span) and no chance to check in on this post -- what an ordeal! How did people ever live without these things

Now, to get back in the game......yes, Elisabeth, there are holes in this panic run theory. But it's also important to question what we think we know when examining the holes. I alluded to my uncertainty regarding Keogh's role in the battle, and I think this is a key to unlocking the mystery. Most of us agree that Calhoun was supposed to be the defensive key to hold back the attack(s) from MTF and the Reno battle participants. There is very solid evidence for this. But for those who have been to the battlefield, can you imagine Keogh being placed in a less opportune place? I have always questioned the "in reserve" theory for Keogh. In reserve in a gully surrounded by hills? There's more to that story. Indian accounts say that Calhoun and Keogh were separated by the same charge. But I still have to believe that Keogh's company had another issue they were dealing with. What happened to the band of 75-100 warriors that Custer followed into the hills? It makes perfect sense to me for Custer to send one company to MTF, Keogh and a company to the north to take care of the band of 100, and then Custer would proceed further along -- possibly to a Ford D crossing, or to a command center on what was to become LSH. I also believe that things were, as the Indians recalled, stable for some time (30 minutes or so). BUT (and this is the crux) Custer was NEVER on the offensive at any point. He entered the battle already besieged from three directions. His move to LSH was the only direction from which he was not besieged.

This still does not resolve why Keogh was in such a poor defensive position -- perhaps someone smarter than me can answer this -- but it all sounds more probable to me then the "reserve" theory, which asks me to believe that a commanding officer who was being attacked from three sides decided to put a company in reserve. I don't think so.

At any rate, I could be totally wrong, but that's why this is all fun. Great stuff everyone. Thanks again, Elisabeth for starting this one.

[PhillyBlair]

A quick addition.....I said earlier that it's always assumed that the Indians who left Reno in the valley moved down river and through the village to attack Custer. I knew there was a quote somewhere to prove that they went toward Custer in more than one direction and here it is, from DeRudio at the RCOI:

"Soon after Maj. Reno left the timber firing commenced on the other side of the village. I heard immense volleys and more than half of the Indians left. Part went on the high bluffs and part down the river......."

Here's an eye and ear witness who heard heavy resistance at MTF and saw hundreds of warriors heading for Custer from two different directions.

[sonofacavalryman]

Well, might as well throw my chicken inta this fight. Here's my take on this.

1. There was a skirmish/fight at MTC Ford. An officer, possibly two were killed/wounded there. Most likely Algernon Smith was badly wounded and evacuated when the left wing left the ford. Lt. Sturgis was likely killed outright and his body dragged into the village. Company E now has no officers and may have reeled back in confusion until Captain Yates led them up Deep Coulee to Calhoun Hill vicinity.

2. Company L and I were aligned to meet warriors coming from the east (Wolf Tooth's band) from the south (from Reno's Hill) and increasingly warriors coming up MTC. In fact I believe the bulk of the warriors came up this way and up Deep Coulee.

3. Without a doubt panic set in at some point. But I believe that Co L and Co C put up a determined and tactically sound defense until there simply was no option but to retire. Co C was more successful in doing that than either Co I or Co L. That is why most horses on LSH belonged to Co C. I think Co I was caught up in the disentegration of Co L.

Son of a Cavalryman

[AZ Ranger]

My thought is that the Custer battalion knew there was overwhelming odds and they were not in good terrain to defend themselves. They were trying to remove themselves from the area. L company could have been set as skirmishers to check the Indians. The Indians never quit attacking L Company therefore they were never allowed to remount. Instead they died in place.

As the remainder of battalion moved out they strung out. There were still more Indians and they took on the strung out battalion. The battalion reached LSH before being finished off.

[elisabeth]

Blair, I do agree with you about Keogh's position, and that there's a story there that we're missing. From the markers, it looks like a company responding to a crisis of some sort. An attack on Calhoun's horseholders, perhaps? Or the collapse of L? Once Keogh's shot down, it then becomes a defensive position -- but was never chosen as such. What do you think?