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Post by Dark Cloud on Oct 2, 2006 4:17:35 GMT -6
"....he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank." I suspect the maps were bogus and Terry thought the headwaters much closer than they are. It certainly isn't a command to reach them. They're suggestions heavily caveated. And the name "Crook" does not appear, and I don't sense his inclusion in any of this at all, given he could exercise no command without presence. Since people were willing to give ALL the cavalry to Custer, and some artillery, I don't think it possible to conclude but that he was to be the arrow and everyone else to blunt escapees and deter, most likely at a later date than the main battle.
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Post by blaque on Oct 2, 2006 4:45:37 GMT -6
Fred, thanks for your kindness, and yes, I heartly agree with you –the subject is fascinating! After looking through Bradley and Graham to find the apropriate quotes, I find that all of them (and some more) are reproduced in Centennial Campaign, along with this conclusive (it seems to me) letter by Major Brisbin, dated June 28th, 1876: “The Montana column felt disappointed when they learned that they were not to be present at the final capture of the great village, but General Terry’s reasons for affording the honor of the attack to General Custer were good ones” (CN, p. 145). The Tullock’s Creek affair is a different question, and in any case of little consequence. Even if Herendeen could have gotten through the Indians on the early morning of June 25th, Terry would have been unable either to stop Custer or support his attack. I think Custer was right when he told Herendeen that “it will be of no use to send you down Tullock’s Creek” (Hammer p. 222), thinking perhaps to despatch him later, with news of the victory. As to the actual wording of Terry’s orders or “letter of instructions”, I agree that it might have become a useful prosecution item had Custer being courtmartialled for his defeat, as Fred’s military friends have technically pointed out. But I think we amateur historians and armchair generals should limit ourselves to crucifying Custer for his mismanagement of the battle, not for his actually inexistant disobeyance of orders.
DC, very good point. What better proof of Custer’s real mission that Terry’s proposal to transfer all his cavalry & gatlings to Custer?
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 2, 2006 8:48:24 GMT -6
Blaque -- Here are some of the points brought up for disobedience:
The forced march argument getting Custer there early based upon Benteen’s estimate of 102 miles traveled. In reality it was only 76 miles as Wallace had reported. Custer agreed to a rate of 30 miles per day and 2.5 days is 75 miles, which is where they were at the night of the 24th.
The Indians were located 40 to 50 miles downstream of where Terry thought they were to be found. On the night of the 24th the Indian village was located 22 miles in a straight line from the camp at Busby. This is a closer proximity than anticipated by Terry for Custer to be in on the 24th. Benteen states at RCOI that 8,000 to 10,000 Indians had passed over the trail. It was a fresh trail and there was no need to go where Terry had thought they might be. These facts coupled with the close proximity of the LBH and being much closer to Terry than anticipated could be sufficient reason to deviate from the instructions. Only Custer had the duty to determine sufficient reason using his best military judgment.
Those that argue Custer should have continued on down the Rosebud have no fixed point that Custer should have turned toward the LBH. Why? Because unless you go to the headwaters of the Tongue you need sufficient reason to not follow the instructions. If Custer did not have it at Busby then he would not have it at all. If he continues to follow the instructions against his best military judgment then he adds three or more days to his travel time.
The lack of a Tullocks scout is not an argument for disobeying. Custer intended to do so and Herendeen states so. ( remember Terry believes the Indians are 40 to 50 miles farther up the LBH which would allow Heredeen two more days to scout and deliver message to Terry) From the camp at Busby it may have been as far as 50 miles to Terry’s camp by way of Tullocks. Herendeen would have had to travel at a rate 7 miles per hour if he left the camp at Busby between 5or 6 PM to arrive at Terry’s camp in time for them to cooperate in the battle. If one insists that sending the messenger was necessary then why did Terry use the word endeavor to send one? Edgerly and Godfrey both state it would have been nonsense to send a messenger after the trail was struck.
In order for Custer to disobey he would have had to act contrary to his own judgment. Terry didn’t state sufficient reason for anyone. It was solely Custer’s to make and Terry states that. So the only way for him to disobey is to not pursuit the Indians or go against his own judgment for sufficient reason to deviate.
What Terry wrote was to cover every circumstance. Most that argue he disobeyed it, say it required specific directed action at a specific time. It is just not there. The only directed activity is to pursuit the Indians. Custer did that. There are high ranking officers at that time that did not believe Custer disobeyed orders and military minds do not all agree that he disobeyed anything. We all could pick a military board for his court martial from officers at the time of occurrence that would find the outcome we desire. It does not surprise me that military people today disagree also.
AZ Ranger
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Post by harpskiddie on Oct 2, 2006 11:01:47 GMT -6
Steve:
Perzakly.
Gordie
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Post by blaque on Oct 2, 2006 11:20:54 GMT -6
AZ, I fully subscribe your opinion.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Oct 2, 2006 18:01:14 GMT -6
I'm quoting myself, but I still find it true:
"Terry’s plan suffered from the same serious deficiencies that beset the Japanese Navy during World War II: plans far too complicated to pull off in peacetime, much less war, highly dependent upon timing that was in turn totally reliant on coincidental occurrences; in short, a belief in your forces not bolstered by the abilities of your command and its recent history. Such strategy reflects an assumption of your own intrinsic ability to adapt perfectly to events while your peers, by paranormal means, are to react correctly to your moves of which they otherwise could not be aware. After Gibbon and Terry united, they could not communicate with Crook without having control of the land between, the absence of which was the arguable point of the whole expedition, and the reason for the Seventh Cavalry's presence."
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Post by mcaryf on Oct 2, 2006 23:14:02 GMT -6
I have been studying the layout of the river systems in the region rather more carefully than I have previously done. Can I recommend Google Earth to you all it is an excellent tool for this.
I am now slightly less convinced in my ideas re Custer and Terry's orders than I have previously been. It seems to me that in order to examine the upper parts of Tullock's Creek, Custer has to send some force or person up Davis Creek. Was it Terry's idea that Herendeen should go up Davis creek and down Tullock's Creek on his own? If he had done this on his own and found the Indians where they were, what would he have been expected to do? Go back and tell Custer or go on and tell Terry?
I have also realised better that Goose Creek is part of the headwaters of The Tongue so Custer would in all probability have encountered Crook. Would this accretion of strength in the area have motivated Crook to move again? The What If is then whether the Indian move down the LBH would actually have been a temporary one in pursuit of the plentiful antelope or whether they would have reversed direction and gone up it again as they actually did after the battle?
A combined Custer and Crook force was probably what was needed to defeat the strength the Indians had, so perhaps a continuation to the headwaters of The Tongue was the best option for the campaign although potentially that could have been fatal for Terry and his command if the Indians had continued down the LBH.
Regards
Mike
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Post by fred on Oct 3, 2006 8:23:35 GMT -6
Mike--
I am sorry; I didn't see your post until just now. I have backed off this thread; it did not work out quite the way I had anticipated. Too much discussion & I thought I could get more people voting. That is what I was really interested in. We can beat the reasons to death; no one will change their mind & that was not my objective in the first place.
Anyway, you can reach the Tullock's Creek valley directly from the Rosebud; one needn't go as far as upper Davis Creek.
There are also a couple of thoughts I would like to leave you with, letting you draw your own conclusions. Quite frankly, I think these little blurbs are pregnant with innuendo & subtlety. I would be interested in knowing if might agree.
June 23, 1876—Friday—7:40am—Cross river to R bank, pass 1st Sioux camp. “ ‘Here’s where Reno made the mistake of his life. He had 6 troops of cavalry & rations enough for a number of days. He’d have made a name for himself if he’d pushed on after them.’” Custer remark made to Varnum. [Varnum in Willert, LBH Diary, p. 227] * Benteen said the village was “immense.”
Varnum writes: “We struck not only the trail of the Indians but the entire valley of the Rosebud appeared to have been a camp, where they had moved along as the grass was grazed off.” [Varnum, I, Varnum, p. 85]
Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 259: “The trail in some places was at least 300 yards in width & deeply worn. The scouts said that it had been made by about 1,500 lodges, & since there were doubtless other trails, they agreed that it proved that enormous numbers of Sioux, Cheyennes, & Arapahoes had left the agencies to join Sitting Bull. But the officers, misled by the report that there were only five to 800 warriors in the hostile bands, missed the significance of the trail entirely & persisted in believing that these large camps—they were from 1/3 to 1/2 a mile in diameter—were a succession of camps of a single band, rather than what they were, the single camp of several large bands together.”
June 24, 1876—Saturday—7am ± — Custer tells Herendeen to get ready to take Charlie Reynolds & scout Tullock’s Creek, but Herendeen tells him it’s too early yet, that the gap leading to the creek’s headwaters is still farther ahead.
6:30pm—The command reaches the gap in the western hills that led to the headwaters of Tullock’s Creek. Herendeen told Custer, but the latter only kept moving forward & Herendeen simply remained in the column. No trails went in the direction of Tullock’s Creek. “But Custer—Herendeen recalled—only looked at him, said not a word, and finally the civilian scout reined back to once again take his place in the moving column. Herendeen was unable to fathom Custer’s curious behavior at this junction, but Custer’s reason should have been obvious—the hostiles trail continued up the Rosebud Valley, but where did it lead?” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 241] Question: Does Willert draw the correct conclusion here?
Best wishes, Fred.
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