Little Bighorn & Isandhlwana: Kindred Fights Kindred Follies

[logan]

This title is a comparative history by Paul Williams.

I wondered if the author was here in order to ask how he came by making this comparison to actually write this book, as the senior officer at Isandhlwana Col. Durnford isn't as well known, but also, I find curiously missing from front covers of all Zulu War 1879 books, or historical paintings of his similar last stand. He was a controversial figure (to some) not to myself however, and much like Custer, blamed for the defeat.

There are very few enthusiasts in the 'Durnford camp', one of whom is myself, the rest are in the other 'Chelmsford camp', etc.

i think there is a reprint of this book called - 'Custer And The Sioux, Durnford And The Zulus' - which is also one of the very few books (2 or 3) who actually add the latter's name on the front cover.

it would be interesting to 'speak' to the author on this matter.

[montrose]

Welcome.

I remember my first introduction to Callwell's Small Wars from fellow SF officers. I regard the book as a brilliant approach to how to fight unconventional enemies. The officer had a solid understanding of his own countries abilities and limitations, and applied that to their many varied enemies.

I would say that at LBH US Strategy and operations were spot on. US operations made the Plains Indian threat trivial by spring 1877. LBH was a tactical failure.

Iswandhlwana had problems across the spectrum of strategy, operations and tactics. I had no idea that Chelmsford supporters existed. He is the original Colonel Blimp.

Have fun here.

Respectfully,

William

books.google.com/books?id=GonbAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_book_other_versions

[battledetective]

Apr 5, 2018 16:03:19 GMT -6 montrose said:

Welcome.

I remember my first introduction to Callwell's Small Wars from fellow SF officers. I regard the book as a brilliant approach to how to fight unconventional enemies. The officer had a solid understanding of his own countries abilities and limitations, and applied that to their many varied enemies.

I would say that at LBH US Strategy and operations were spot on. US operations made the Plains Indian threat trivial by spring 1877. LBH was a tactical failure.

Iswandhlwana had problems across the spectrum of strategy, operations and tactics. I had no idea that Chelmsford supporters existed. He is the original Colonel Blimp.

Have fun here.

Respectfully,

William

books.google.com/books?id=GonbAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_book_other_versions


Hello Montrose!
What are in your opinion the strategic and operational failures of Isandlwana? I always got the impression that the main failures were tactical:
1) The disregard to laager the camp
2) The decision of Chelmsford to proceed with half the command to support Dartnell without knowing the exact whereabouts of the main Zulu force (perhaps this could be considered an operational mistake?).
3) The decision to spread out the companies far from the camp and the ammo wagons instead of keeping them close in a tighter formation.

[crzhrs]

Isandhlwana and the LBH have so much in common. The arrogance of the White Government, racism, bigotry, giving ultimatums they knew couldn't be met, over confidence thinking the "natives" were no match for Western-Style training and combat experience and were inferior in combat and wouldn't fight for for what they believed in.

Overconfidence by whites, failure to heed the warnings of scouts, failure to believe "savages" were no match for "well-trained" modern soldiers led by "capable" officers and a host of other poor decisions/beliefs based on arrogance and racial superiority led to devastating defeat and the blame game that continues till now.