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Post by tubman13 on May 7, 2016 18:01:31 GMT -6
Speaking of lies and 1/4 truths, you do have experience.
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Post by dave on May 7, 2016 18:49:38 GMT -6
HR I fail to see your logic or reasoning as to how Reno was the cause of Custer's death and defeat of the 7th Cavalry. Your continual assertions, none proven, that Reno was inebriated and could not perform his duties get tiring. If you have some proof (no pun intended) to buttress your belief produce it.
I am reminded of the examples below with your determined efforts to protect Custer from being responsible for the outcome on June 25, 1876.
1) Beauregard credited with the South's loss at Shiloh for allegedly failing to follow Johnston's plans and attack on Grant's lines. Johnston failed to properly scout the Federal's lines prior to the attack. 2) Longstreet blamed for the defeat of the Confederacy at Gettysburg for failing to command the mythical early morning assault of the Union left flank. Lee never ordered the dawn/early AM attack it was a canard by Lee's worshipers to deflect the responsibility from Lee.
Custer alone was responsible for the defeat and deaths of 250 plus officers and men and despite many attempts to allay his guilt. montrose has often mentioned the poor quality of the 7th compared to sister regiments and the miserable performance of the LT Colonel commanding and his reasoning far surpasses mine. Many of his past posts address the failings of the man and the unit providing more insight into his comments and thoughts. Regards Dave
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Theories
May 7, 2016 20:33:21 GMT -6
via mobile
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Post by edavids on May 7, 2016 20:33:21 GMT -6
HR I fail to see your logic or reasoning as to how Reno was the cause of Custer's death and defeat of the 7th Cavalry. You continual assertions, none proven, that Reno was inebriated and could not perform his duties get tiring. If you have some proof (no pun intended) to buttress your belief produce it. I am reminded of the examples below with your determined efforts to protect Custer from being responsible for the outcome on June 25, 1876. 1) Beauregard credited with the South's loss at Shiloh for allegedly failing to follow Johnston's plans and attack on Grant's lines. Johnston failed to properly scout the Federal's lines prior to the attack. 2) Longstreet blamed for the defeat of the Confederacy at Gettysburg for failing to command the mythical early morning assault of the Union left flank. Lee never ordered the dawn/early AM attack it was a canard by Lee's worshipers to deflect the responsibility from Lee. Custer alone was responsible for the defeat and deaths of 250 plus officers and men and despite many attempts to allay his guilt. montrose has often mentioned the poor quality of the 7th compared to sister regiments and the miserable performance of the LT Colonel commanding and his reasoning far surpasses mine. Many of his past posts address the failings of the man and the unit providing more insight into his comments and thoughts. Regards Dave Careful with the use of the word "buttress"
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Post by montrose on May 7, 2016 22:01:18 GMT -6
I support reasonable discussions on LBH. I am not a fan of diatribes. Too often Custer supporters sound like Kathy Bates in Waterboy. Reno is the devil, Benteen is the devil, tactics is the devil, leadership is the devil, functions of command is the devil; etc. www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8wVF8sHipUI will not respond to such arguments. I will respond to fact based discussions. Sincerely, William
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Post by chardvc on May 8, 2016 7:50:47 GMT -6
DucemusObviously Custer made some very serious mistakes and was killed in consequence. That left Marcus Reno in command and responsibility and his little tail should be nailed to a tree and scalped. He ran before Custer's command could involve in the fight and before Benteen could toodle on down at his leisure to join in.... let me see... a regimental attack by .... oh yes, cavalry. Cavalry making a regimental attack, by the book. That Custer attacked was foolish but that does not excuse the idiots he put his faith in. They got him killed. Anyone who imagines that Terry, Gibbon and Brisbin with 380 men would have made a blind bit of difference should research sunflower oil. It was all Reno's fault and he began lying the minute Terry arrived. I think I can honestly say I'm disappointed that you're back.
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Post by jodak on May 9, 2016 7:42:23 GMT -6
Post by montrose on May 6, 2016 at 11:25am
1. Purpose. Start a thread to develop topics for discussion.
2. Potential topics. I will state various hypotheses, deferring discussion based on response. Topics I propose may be mutually exclusive. (meaning one theory may, by definition, prove another theory false).
a. Tactics matter. Tactical decisions at LBH were decisive in outcome. This means the battle was winnable (or could have had better outcome). There are counter arguments that no other officer or unit in the US Army could have had a better outcome at LBH. My theory is that no other officer or unit in the US Army could have performed as badly as LTC Custer or the badly trained and badly led 7th Cav. By the way, this is one of my most serious disagreements with my friend from Georgetown.
Although "winnable" can have different meanings, I choose to interpret it as not necessarily achieving a decisive victory but accomplishing a desired objective. The objective of the campaign was to force the Indians to the agencies, so, in that sense, I believe that the battle was very winnable but only by committing the entire force to the valley attack. Others argue that would have only resulted in driving the Indians in the opposite direction, without achieving a decisive victory, but I would contend "So what?", as, when viewed in the context of forcing the Indians to the agencies, there is a high likelihood that would have been accomplished or greatly facilitated. Even if a large proportion of the Indians themselves were able to escape they would have been driven away from their resources to live freely, that being their lodges, camp accouterments and other possessions, and horses. In my view Custer's big mistake was in not being satisfied in accomplishing this but in wanting to decisively defeat the Indians and kill as many as possible. Even if he had managed to corral and capture a large proportion of them, I question whether he had sufficient forces to adequately control them afterwards.
b. Use of indigenous forces. LTC Custer was among the worst users of indig elements to support tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. The contrast between Crook and Custer n this area is mind boggling.
I agree with this but with the difference that I question whether this was a failure on the part of Custer, Terry or just circumstances. It is often stated that Crook made more effective use of his Indian "scouts", but I believe that is a misapplication of terms and that Crook's indigenous elements should more properly be viewed as "auxiliaries". The difference is that the few Indians accompanying Custer were expected to scout and nothing else, whereas the large number of Indians with Crook (200+) were expected to be, and were, an actual combat force in line with what we normally term auxiliaries. The question then becomes, "why the difference or why did Custer not have Indian auxiliaries as well?", and there are several possible answers. One may be that there were simply not any available or, said differently, due to the differences of Indian demographics near Fort Abraham Lincoln (Custer/Terry) and Fort Feterman (Crook), Crook had greater access to friendly Indians willing to serve against the Sioux and Cheyenne. On the other hand, if it was a command decision, was the decision Custer's or Terry's? Terry was the departmental commander, so was the decision to not include Indian auxiliaries, assuming that would have been possible, not his? On the other hand, Terry had been ordered to take field command of the expedition at sort of the last minute, with Custer having originally been slated for that, so it could be argued that, as Custer would have been serving as the overall column commander, rather than of just his regiment, he would have had a greater hand in determining its composition.
c. Logistic support. The 7th Cav logistic support plan is one of the worst ever used by the US Army, in any era. Custer should have been relieved for cause for his plan, before leaving FAL. No other commander of this era, (out of 150ish) showed this level of incompetence. SInce Terry approved this plan, he also reveals himself as grossly incompetent. This means Feb 76, not his incompetence sharply revealed when he worked with Crook summer 76.
Much of what I alluded to in regard to the use of native forces can also be said of the differences in the use of civilian packers and pack mules by Crook vs. Terry/Custer. What was the real reason and who was truly responsible?
d. Decision tree. The reason this battle was lost was the decision by LTC Custer to not support his advance guard in the valley. The battle was lost by this decision, and by no other cause.
LTC Custer could have mitigated this incompetent decision by informing his subordinates that he would not follow his own orders, but he did not. I have been waiting for several years for someone to explain LTC Custer's decision tree. No one has, because they can not.
I have always wondered how much Custer's recent problems with his superiors influenced his decision tree and if he felt a need to achieve some sort of grand victory to redeem himself, causing him to attempt more than was within the capabilities of his force.
e. Offensive. LTC Custer committed 3 companies to attack the enemy, out of 12. Until the moment he died, that was his maximum offensive effort. Anyone want to explain why? {Come on Rinni, try me}. (By the way, I do not agree with Bill, but I like his efforts to work the discussion; we do not have to agree}.
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Post by tubman13 on May 9, 2016 10:04:06 GMT -6
jodak,
I like what you say above. As to your b. above, Crook drew his Crow "auxiliaries" from a main Crow village in the north, near the current MT/WY border. They were recruited by his chief of scouts. They were more than willing to fight, as the Sioux were not only their traditional enemies, but the Sioux/Cheyenne had spent the last number of years pushing the Crow from what they considered their lands.
Regards, Tom
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Post by dave on May 9, 2016 13:45:10 GMT -6
I am curious as the number of Crow warriors in the Montana and Wyoming Territories in the summer of 1876. I have read various accounts and estimates as to the number of Sioux warriors in the Little Big Horn area in June and that Crook had 200 Crow and Shoshone warriors at Rosebud.
Was Custer unable to secure additional Crow warriors due to low numbers or did complacency rear its ugly head? Regards Dave
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Post by tubman13 on May 9, 2016 14:04:32 GMT -6
Dave,
This can not be laid at the feet of GAC, Gibbon probably have gotten more, Custer was coming from eastern ND. Terry probably had no clue. There was little interaction between Crook, Terry, Gibbon and Custer. Terry was not an Indian fighter, Crook was. Crook actually had to delay his march waiting for his Crow, and it was a good thing he did.
You may not know this but Crook wanted nothing to do with Terry after the LBH.
Regards, Tom
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Post by crzhrs on May 9, 2016 14:10:08 GMT -6
I believe Crow Warriors may have had it with the military after the Rosebud Fight when they had to confront the Sioux while the military was having coffee. That's probably why so few went with Custer while a good number of Arikara went.
From accounts Crow leaders said it was up to each individual warrior if they wanted to fight for the Army. Some leaders said no, others said yes.
Apparently the Crow were right about the military's ability to fight . . . thus the Custer Debacle.
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Post by dave on May 9, 2016 15:49:42 GMT -6
Tom I realize that Custer was late for the Ball but he needed the knowledge the Crows had of the area. With only 6 warriors--- Half Yellow Face, Whiteman Runs Him (also spelled White Man Runs Him), White Swan, Hairy Moccasin, Goes Ahead and Curley---secured from Gibbon's 20 or so Crows, Custer was short handed.
I still come back to my original question as to how many Crow warriors would have been available? I realize the tribe had been exposed to small pox and were under constant harassment and occasional attacks by the Sioux which had to reduce their numbers. Could Gibbon have had a better relationship with the Crow ala Crook's? Was Cook more attuned to the sentiments of the Crow than Gibbon? Looking for answers. Regards Dave
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Post by tubman13 on May 9, 2016 16:01:47 GMT -6
I believe Crow Warriors may have had it with the military after the Rosebud Fight when they had to confront the Sioux while the military was having coffee. That's probably why so few went with Custer while a good number of Arikara went. From accounts Crow leaders said it was up to each individual warrior if they wanted to fight for the Army. Some leaders said no, others said yes. Apparently the Crow were right about the military's ability to fight . . . thus the Custer Debacle. crzhs,
The Crow with Custer were already with Gibbon, when Crook got it handed to him. They probably/doubtfully knew nothing about the Rosebud. You are better than that.
Regards, Tom
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Post by tubman13 on May 9, 2016 16:04:58 GMT -6
Tom I realize that Custer was late for the Ball but he needed the knowledge the Crows had of the area. With only 6 warriors--- Half Yellow Face, Whiteman Runs Him (also spelled White Man Runs Him), White Swan, Hairy Moccasin, Goes Ahead and Curley---secured from Gibbon's 20 or so Crows, Custer was short handed. I still come back to my original question as to how many Crow warriors would have been available? I realize the tribe had been exposed to small pox and were under constant harassment and occasional attacks by the Sioux which had to reduce their numbers. Could Gibbon have had a better relationship with the Crow ala Crook's? Was Cook more attuned to the sentiments of the Crow than Gibbon? Looking for answers. Regards Dave Crook's head scout was the ticket, not Gibbon. I have no earthly idea how many Crow were in the land of the living in 1876.
Regards, Tom
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Post by fred on May 9, 2016 21:25:51 GMT -6
I still come back to my original question as to how many Crow warriors would have been available? I realize the tribe had been exposed to small pox and were under constant harassment and occasional attacks by the Sioux which had to reduce their numbers. Could Gibbon have had a better relationship with the Crow ala Crook's? Was Cook more attuned to the sentiments of the Crow than Gibbon? Looking for answers. When Gibbon reached the New Crow Agency he held a council with the head Crows. Pierre Shane (aka, Chane, Chene, Chienne), a French-Canadian and the agency interpreter, stood by to translate. LT Bradley wrote, the Crow chiefs in attendance were Blackfoot, Tin Belly, Iron Bull, Bull That Goes Hunting, Show His Face, Medicine Wolf, Old Onion, Mountain Pocket, Crane In The Sky, Sees All Over The Land, One Feather, Spotted Horse, Long Snake, Frog, Small Beard, Curly, Shot In The Jaw, White Forehead, Old Crow, Old Dog, White Mouth, Crazy Head. There was another named Adada A Hush. Bull That Goes Hunting had the largest following, but Blackfoot seems to have the most influence. When they were finished, the tribe eventually gave Gibbon 23 Crow Scouts: 1. Buffalo Calf 2. Curley (or, Curly-Head, Curley Hair)—Eventually detached and assigned to Custer’s column; 17 or 18 years old. 3. Dirty Faced Coyote 4. Elk 5. Goes Ahead—Eventually detached and assigned to Custer’s column. 6. Grandmother’s Knife—The youngest of the group joining Gibbon: 16 years old. 7. Hairy Moccasin—Eventually detached and assigned to Custer’s column. 8. Half Yellow Face (aka, Big Belly)—Eventually detached and assigned to Custer’s column. 9. Heart Horse 10. Jack Rabbit Bull (aka, Bull Rabbit; also seen as Bull Jack Rabbit)—One of the two Crows who swam the Yellowstone to deliver Gibbon’s note to Terry (Reno), June 18, 1876. 11. Little Face (Small Face)—An elder of the tribe, also over 60—Bradley thought he was about sixty-five years old. Helped guide Terry and Gibbon’s column toward the LBH on the night of June 25, 1876. 12. Long Crow 13. Mountain Coyote 14. Old Crow—He was considered a guide and was not an enlisted scout. He may or may not have been carried as one of the 23 Crows. 15. Push 16. Shows His Face (Ee-suh-seé-ush; also known as “The Senator” because he resembled a politician from Pennsylvania)—An old man, known to be an inveterate coffee-cooler, or as Gibbon referred to him, a “loafer Indian.” An elder of the tribe, supposedly more than sixty years old. 17. Spotted White Bird 18. Throws His Ears 19. Two Whistles 20. White Man Runs Him—Eventually detached and assigned to Custer’s column. 21. White Swan—Eventually detached and assigned to Custer’s column. 22. Young Yellow Wolf A number of sources say twenty-five scouts were enlisted during Gibbon and Bradley’s visit to the Crow Agency. The two extra, however, were Barney Bravo and Tom LeForgé, interpreters. I am missing one name. As for George Crook, he had considerably more Crow scouts: 175 or 176, and I only know the names of a few: Along The Hillside Bull Snake—Wounded in the Rosebud fight, June 17, 1876. His thigh was shattered. Fox Just Coming Over Hill (also, Old Coyote)—Wounded in the Rosebud fight, June 17, 1876. Good Heart—One of the leaders. Humpy—A Shoshone by birth, but adopted by the Crow. Saved 1SG Van Moll. Medicine Crow—One of the leaders. Old Crow—One of the leaders. Plenty Coups White Flower (also, White Face; White Forehead)—Crow leader; an old man. Crook also had a number of Shoshone scouts: 86 initially—June 14, 1876—then 213 on July 11, 1876. Again, I only have a handful of names: Le Clair, Edmo—Shoshone, related to Washakie by marriage. His father was a French trapper and his mother either a Flathead or Eastern Shoshone. Limpy Luisant (or Luishaw)—A French-Canadian-Shoshone mixed-blood, arriving on June 11 (date is doubtful), with Tom Cosgrove and the Shoshone scouts. One source claims they arrived on the 14th, and this is probably correct. Naaki Tigee Washakie—A celebrated chief of the Snakes. In his late-sixties or older at this time. About 6' tall, and powerfully built. He did not, however, arrive with additional Indians until well after the Battle of the Rosebud, probably on that July 11, 1876 date, above. Part French, part Flathead. Wisha—One of the leaders of the initial band of Shoshone scouts. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by dave on May 10, 2016 10:04:45 GMT -6
Fred I appreciate the information on the Crow warriors. Regards Dave
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