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Post by jodak on May 26, 2016 6:53:54 GMT -6
May 26, 1941 The U.S. intercepts another ships in harbor report from the Japanese Honolulu consulate to Tokyo. However, had I been an intelligence analyst, it would have struck me as just routine reporting and nothing to elicit concern or to heighten awareness of Pearl Harbor as a potential target.
www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410526ax2.html
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Post by dave on May 26, 2016 8:55:14 GMT -6
jodak It is evident that Henry Stimson had changed his opinion from 1929 when he famously stated: "Gentlemen don't read each other's mail." during his service as Secretary of State for President Hoover.
He served admirably as Secretary of War during WW II and even into Truman's administration. Regards Davr
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Post by jodak on Jun 3, 2016 11:13:28 GMT -6
June 4, 1941
[Air Mail] June 4th, 1941. The honorable the ATTORNEY GENERAL, Washington, D. C. (Attention: Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General)
SIR: Reference is made to your letter dated May 22, 1941 in which you asked my opinion concerning the prosecution of the several Japanese Sub-Consular Agents in Hawaii and also my radiogram of May 31, 1941 relative to the same matter.
Immediately after receiving your letter, I contacted Mr. R. L. Shivers, Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Agent F. G. Tillman, who has been assigned to Japanese matters exclusively. Although I have been aware of this general situation for some time, no reports concerning these matters have been submitted to this office. Mr. Shivers brought with him, at my request, a copy of the investigative report of Special Agent F. G. Tillman, dated at Honolulu, March 10, 1941, in reference to ITSUO HAMADA, concerning a violation of the Registration Act. From my conversation with Mr. Shivers and Mr. Tillman and from the information set out in the report, I think that a successful prosecution could be had against this individual and other Japanese Sub-Consular Agents in the Territory if the facts are substantially the same in all of these cases. Mr. Shivers advises me that about forty of these cases have been investigated completely and would be ready for immediate prosecution and that the facts in the remaining two hundred or so are approximately the same and they could be brought up to date with very little notice.
In a conference with representatives of the Army and Navy in which Captain I. H. Mayfield represented the Admiral of the 14th Naval District and Colonel M. W. Marsden represented the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Captain Mayfield stated that it was the opinion of the Admiral that prosecution should be instituted immediately against these Japanese Sub-Consular Agents and that it should be handled in a routine manner so as to cause as little disturbance as possible. Colonel Marsden stated that it was the opinion of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department who is charged with the internal security of the Islands, that prosecution at this time would be detrimental to the general plans of the Army and would probably have a bad effect on work already done. It is also the Commanding General's opinion that the majority of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry will be loyal to the United States and that prosecution at this time of the Sub-Consular Agents would only tend to aggravate the situation and probably materially effect the loyalty of these individuals. The Army has conveyed the opinion to the Japanese population as a whole that they will be taken care of and given full protection of the law if they are loyal to the United States.
It is my opinion that these prosecutions should be instituted at the earliest possible time if they do not conflict with any policy of the State Department or other Departments of the Government. I think it has been clearly developed from investigation that these Sub-Consular Agents exercise an enormous influence on the Japanese population in the Territory and all evidence indicates the fact that they are the sources of information for the Consul and the Agents through whom he delivers his instructions to the Japanese in the Territory.
I think that if we ever hope to divorce the influence of the Consul and Tokyo from the Japanese people in the Territory of Hawaii, it should be begun immediately and that this would be one of the best steps in that direction.
During the conference with the Army and Navy and other conferences that I have had with individuals in Honolulu in reference to this situation, it is impossible to predict just what reaction the Japanese population as a whole in the Territory would have to such step, but it is my opinion that the good that would be done would far outweigh any evil that might result.
No further action will be taken on this matter until advice is received from you. ANGUS M. TAYLOR, Jr., United States Attorney, District of Hawaii.
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Post by tubman13 on Jun 3, 2016 15:20:34 GMT -6
I would not prosecute, I would attempt to develop deeper sources. Let me know how it worked out!
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Post by dave on Jun 3, 2016 18:19:42 GMT -6
I find it to be amazing how things really work in the government/military behind the scenes. Very interesting post. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Jun 4, 2016 10:20:40 GMT -6
The main thing that I had hoped to accomplish when I started this thread was to convey that things did "work", to a degree, both behind the scenes and in the open. I think history has portrayed, and most people believe, that the attack on Pearl Harbor was totally unexpected out of the blue. However, as I hope the things that I have already posted demonstrate, we had been anticipating and preparing for such an attack and war for years, which makes all the more inexcusable that we were actually surprised as we were. You often see things saying that it was a surprise because we were at peace with Japan at the time. Well, yeah, so what? I would say that our relationship with Japan was similar to what we have with Russia or China today - peaceful but extremely strained. I wouldn't go so far as to say that it was similar to today's relationship with North Korea or Iran, as we were at least talking to Japan, but only barely. That relationship became increasingly strained as 1941 progressed, largely due to actions on the part of the U.S., and that is something else that I hope becomes evident - that the U.S. was not a total innocent in the run up to war.
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Post by jodak on Jun 5, 2016 11:39:12 GMT -6
june 5, 1941
The US Army Bill for 1942 is introduced into Congress. It calls for appropriations amounting to $10,400,000,000 - an extraordinary amount for the time.
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Post by jodak on Jun 13, 2016 6:58:19 GMT -6
June 11, 1941 The Naval War Plans Division issues the following memorandum. It contains nothing new, and the attachments referred to are messages that we have already viewed. However, it serves as an indication that the matter was receiving attention.
Op-12B-2-McC (SC)A7 - 2(2)/FF1 Serial 067712 D-30798 Secret-Memorandum June 11, 1941. From: The Director, War Plans Division. To: The Director, Naval Districts Division Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor Enclosure: (A) Com14 secret letter (0410) S-A16-3/A7-3(3) ND14 of May 1, 1941, with enclosures.
1. Enclosure (A) should have been routed direct to the Director, Naval Districts Division for action.
2. It is recommended that copies of enclosure (A) be forwarded to all Commandants of Naval Districts, to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, for use in the preparation of similar plans, and in the holding of joint exercises. It will be noted that copies have been furnished the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. R. K. TURNER
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Post by jodak on Jun 13, 2016 7:16:21 GMT -6
June 13, 1941 The Chief of Naval Operations issues the following message. It is very important in that it asserts that the conventional thinking that torpedoes required fairly deep water to make effective runs was no longer considered valid.
NAVY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, Washington, June 13, 1941, Op-30C1-AJ (SC)N20-12 Serial 055730 Confidential From: The Chief of Naval Operations To: The Commandant, First Naval District. The Commandant, Third Naval District. The Commandant, Fourth Naval District. The Commandant, Fifth Naval District. The Commandant, Sixth Naval District. The Commandant, Seventh Naval District. The Commandant, Eighth Naval District. The Commandant, Ninth Naval District. The Commandant, Tenth Naval District. The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District. The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District. The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District. The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District. Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks. Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.
1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:
"A minimum depth of water of 76 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."
2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes way be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.
3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.
4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms. R. E. INGERSOLL.
Copy to CinCpac. CinClant. CinCaf. C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon. C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport. Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo. Comdt. NavSta, Samoa. Buord. Op-12.
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Post by jodak on Jun 20, 2016 5:55:35 GMT -6
June 20.1941
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A. S-A16-3/A7-3(3)/ND14 (0410) Secret From: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District To: Chief of Naval Operations. Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor. Reference. (a) Correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy on this subject dated 24 January 1941 and 7 February 1941. Inclosures: (A) Copies of two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941,. (B) Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (JCD-42). (C) Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.
1. In connection with reference (a) there are enclosed herewith for your information copies of the principal directives issued in cooperation with the local Army authorities in accordance with which operation plans have been prepared, put into effect, and are in process of test and improvement, to provide for the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters against surprise raids or air attacks.
2. Inclosure (A), two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941, initiated study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint problems of the defense which were mentioned in reference (a), and also included study of additional problems which were raised by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
3. Inclosure (B), Annex No. VII of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, is a new joint agreement with the local Army authorities which pertains to joint security measures. Section II in particular relates to joint air operations.
4. Inclosure (C), Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, serves as the basis of joint air operation orders which have been issued, placed in effect, and are in process of test, with a view to improvement in their effectiveness.
5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.
6. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States. C. C. Bloch C. C. BLOCH Copy to: CinCPac(less inclosures) NAVY DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS Washington, June 20, 1941. Op-30B2-BP (SC)A7-2(2)/FF1 Serial 059230 Secret From: The Chief of Naval Operations. To: The Commandants, All Naval Districts. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet. Subject: Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base. Enclosure: (A) Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District.
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Attention is invited to the importance of the problems presented in the subject matter.
2. Transmission by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized. /s/ H. R. STARK Copy to: Op-12
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Post by jodak on Jun 21, 2016 6:04:10 GMT -6
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Post by dave on Jun 21, 2016 14:45:37 GMT -6
jodak Good stuff! I am enjoying the fruits of your labor and I am learning so much beyond what I thought I knew. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Jun 22, 2016 7:04:37 GMT -6
June 22, 1941
Germany launches Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. This catches Japan by surprise and causes a quandary at high levels as to what Japan's future course of action should be. Foreign Minister Matsuoka, the foremost cabinet hawk, strongly advocates taking advantage of the opportunity to attack Siberia and informs the Soviet ambassador that the Tripartite Act; between Japan, Germany, and Italy; takes precedence over the Japanese/Soviet Neutrality Pact (*). However, in high level conferences the Japanese government reaffirms its commitment to "the Southern Strategy", and the more moderate Prime Minister, Prince Konoe, resigns his government and reforms it without including Matsuoka and assures the Soviets that Japan was committed tot he Neutrality Agreement.
* The Tripartite Act called for the signatories to come to each other's aid should one or more of them be attacked by a currently neutral party. Since Germany was the one that did the attacking, the Act did not place Japan under an obligation to enter into hostilities against the Soviets. If the Soviets had initiated hostilities with Germany, then perhaps the Tripartite Act would have taken precedence over the Neutrality Pact and caused Japan to enter the conflict on the side of Germany. A similar situation was to later occur when Japan attacked the United States. Since Japan was the aggressor Germany was not obligated to come to her aid but did so anyway by declaring war on the U.S. It is important to bear that in mind in light of the conspiracy theories that contend that the U.S. allowed Japan to attack Pearl Harbor as a "back door" way to get into the war in Europe, as it would not have brought the U.S. into the European war at all had not Germany declared war on the U.S., which it was not obligated to do.
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Post by jodak on Jun 23, 2016 6:23:58 GMT -6
June 23, 1941
The following message from the Japanese foreign minister to his Mexico City consulate was transmitted/intercepted today and processed/translated 6/24. It is the first concrete thing we have seen that might appear to indicate Japanese possible intentions and probably served to reinforce the U.S.'s already high level of concern about the security of the Panama Canal and deflect attention from other locations, such as Pearl Harbor.
From: Tokyo (Jap Foreign Minister) To: Mexico (Koshi) 23 June 1941 (Purple) #106
Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, please have career attaché Kihara make an official trip to Panama. (It might be well to have secretary Yoshimizu accompany him. ) Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have Sato, the Naval Attaché, bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns. Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their #62* from Panama to me, mentioned the question of a trip, get in touch with them regarding date and time of arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.**) 18581 JD-1:3198 Navy trans. 6-24-41 (S) *Available not yet translated-dated 17 June. **i. e. "Kantan"-may also mean "Brief, short"; hence cryptographically secure, or may infer that they should be in plain language but innocuous in appearance
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Post by jodak on Jun 26, 2016 5:25:44 GMT -6
June 26, 1941
AG 380.3 (6-25-41) MC
21 WTJ
AE
620P
Received at the War Department, June 26 1941 8:00 AM.
From: Manila
To: TAG
No. 1225, June 25th.
Following is paraphrase of cable from Brink. For G-2. On 19th and 20th of June British Commander in Chief Far East and the Director of Operations of Chinese Air Force (General Mow) discussed plans for cooperation in the event of Japanese operations against the British. British plan to use following Chinese airfields as bases from which to attack Japanese sea communications land troops and Japanese bases on Hainan Island and in French Indo China in the event of Japanese attack against Malaya or Hongkong: Nanning 23 degrees zero minutes north 108 degrees 30 minutes east: Liuchow 24 degrees 20 minutes north 109 degrees 20 minutes east: Kweilin 25 degrees 20 minutes north 110 degrees 10 minutes east: Chihkiang 27 degrees 30 minutes north 109 degrees 40 minutes east: Hemagyang 27 degrees zero minutes north 112 degrees 30 minutes east. Chinese agree to stock these airfields now with gasoline and bombs. Chinese suggest that the British use airfields in the following area from which to make direct raids on Formosa and the Japanese mainland: Wenchow-Chuchowfu-Kienowhs.
British intend to encourage Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the following general areas: Ichang-Kingchow-Hanhu; Siagtanhs-Changsha-Yowchow; Nanchang-Haohcow-Kiukiang; Soochow-Changshow-Taiping; Canton-Kongmoon-China Sea-Shamchung. Agreements for mutual cooperation will be arranged the 1st week in July at a meeting between British and Chinese staffs in Burma. Signed Orear.
GRUNERT
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