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Post by jodak on Jan 25, 2016 12:10:07 GMT -6
Since this year will mark the 75th anniversary of the attack on Pearl harbor, a particular interest of mine, I thought that I would begin a thread to reflect the events leading up to it on a real time basis throughout the year to hopefully enhance our understanding of the entire sequence of events. We recently had some discussion around this in the World War 2 in the Pacific thread, and one of the things that I attempted to convey there was that the attack was not nearly as unexpected, or at least should not have been, as is commonly thought. Hopefully this will spawn additional discussion. The events directly leading up to the attack spanned roughly the entire previous year, with a few preliminaries taking place in late 1940. The first event of particular importance took place “yesterday”, January 24, 1941 with the transmittal of the following letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War addressing the threats to Pearl Harbor. In particular it states the following: The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack. (2) Air torpedo plane attack. (3) Sabotage. (4) Submarine attack. (5) Mining. (6) Bombardment by gun fire.
Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactory.
The full text can be found here - www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410124awar.html.
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Post by jodak on Jan 25, 2016 12:22:02 GMT -6
The following day, January 25, Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark issued a memorandum that was to become known as “Plan Dog” and be the basis for further U.S. plans and actions. Among other things it includes the following: 4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U.S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:
• (a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy. • (b) War with Japan is imminent. (c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown. (d) At least three German Raiders are in the Pacific. (e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form -- even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian. (f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible. (g) Local sabotage is possible.
5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U.S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks will be included. (1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port. In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment both of Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail later, but are mention here in order that certain measures listed below may be more clearly understood. At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task: (a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, re-enforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One. (b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as necessary. (c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes. (d) Augment Army A.A. defenses with A.A. batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor. (2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service. (3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.
Full text - www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410125acno.html
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Post by dave on Jan 25, 2016 12:34:08 GMT -6
jodak Wonderful thread! I am really looking forward to learning more this whole year. I do wonder if we are not seeing some of the same dangers today regarding the size, content and shape of the ships in today's navy? Regards Dave
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Post by chardvc on Jan 26, 2016 0:35:10 GMT -6
Yes, some interesting stuff here. As a Brit, the detail of Pearl Harbour is a bit of a mystery as we focus on the battles of Britain and of the Atlantic. Pearl Harbour (and the reaction to it) was one of the great turning points of the Second World War and I look forward to dipping into this thread as it develops.
In terms of fleet size and shape, history always corrects us Dave. I guess that's because when we get it right, it matters not because no situation develops.
Best Wishes
Mark
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Post by dave on Jan 26, 2016 9:25:47 GMT -6
chardvc Delighted to see you posting on this board and welcome to the new congregation. The details of Pearl Harbor are very interesting and should be vaguely familiar to you. The British attack on Taranto in November of 1940. Not only was it the first air attack on naval shipping but certainly influenced the Imperial Japanese Military junta.
Churchill after receiving the news of the Pearl Harbor attack wrote in his diary "I knew the United States was in the War now up to the neck, so we had won after all." Very perceptive observation from a very intelligent man.
America has had the habit of being poorly prepared for War and I fear we are in the same situation again. The shortage of naval vessels, especially carriers, army man power, problems with the F-35 and other issues concern me greatly. The expenditure of men and monies after 911 has left this nation weary and reluctant to get involved further against terrorists and participate in foreign affairs. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Jan 26, 2016 12:57:50 GMT -6
Preliminary information – the Fleet Problems Between 1923 and 1940 the U.S. Navy, sometimes with Army participation, conducted a series of “Fleet Problems” that simulated various scenarios and practiced the tactics they entailed. Several of these involved carrier strikes that either directly or indirectly related to the later Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Three of these that took place early on, while naval aviation was in its infancy, were very rudimentary and the conclusions highly subjective in nature, but, none the less, led to important advances in naval technology and tactics, as well as serving as forewarnings of future potential threats. 1) Fleet Problem I, in 1923, simulated a carrier born attack on the Gatun Lock of the Panama Canal. Battleships were used to simulate carriers, and one battleship launched plane simulated an air group. It dropped a few practice bombs and was ruled to have destroyed the lock. 2) Fleet Problem V, in 1925, simulated an attack on Hawaii by planes from the Navy’s only carrier, the Langley, and two seaplane tenders. Again the results were deemed to have been favorable. 3) Fleet Problem VII, in 1927, again simulated an attack on the Panama Canal, this time by planes from the Langley, and was again ruled to have been successful.
Fleet Problem IX, in 1929, was a major step forward, including as it did the Navy’s first two first line carriers Lexington and Saratoga. As such, the results were not as subjective but more a true reflection of carrier capabilities. It again simulated an attack on the Panama Canal and pitted the attacking force composed of the Saratoga and battleships against a defending force of the Lexington, cruisers, submarines, and army land based defenses. Rear Admiral Joseph Reeves, commander of the attack force, sent the Saratoga, separated from the battleships, on a high speed end run and was able to again launch a successful attack, although the Saratoga itself was ruled to have been sunk in the process. Years later one of Reeve’s staff officers, Cmdr. Eugene Wilson, wrote, “The most important conclusion drawn from the Saratoga’s raid was the impossibility of stopping a determined air attack once it was launched. Unfortunately, in the years to come, this lesson would be forgotten, by certain members of the so-called Gun Club—the battleship men who were unwavering in their faith in the supremacy of the big gun. Their preoccupation with refighting the Battle of Jutland instead of ensuring the security of the fleet contributed greatly to the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Evident to Reeves and to the carrier commanders who followed in his footsteps, was the reality that in any future engagement involving aircraft carriers at sea, the first carrier to locate and bomb the other would determine the outcome.”
The scenario enacted by Fleet Problem XIII, in 1932, was that a foreign power (i.e., Japan) had captured Hawaii and the U.S. Navy was to take it back. A task force built around Lexington and Saratoga and commanded by Captain John Towers, who was to become the chief of Naval Aviation in WW2, made a high speed run to launch position during the night and launched an attack at dawn on a Sunday morning, catching the army defenders completely by surprise. A Japanese admiral was to later say that, in regard to their own attack on Hawaii, they “had simply taken a page out of the U.S.’s own book” [Note: I am reminded of a statement made about armored warfare in the early days of WW2 to the effect that Britain had written the book on armored warfare and then shelved it, while Germany “read the book”. It seems that the same can be said about carrier born attacks, that “The U.S. wrote the book, but Japan read it”.]
Fleet Problem XIV (1933) was even more prescient. It simulated war in the Pacific initiated by carrier operations. Anticipating that Japan would attack before formally declaring war (as she had done against Russia in 1904), the scenario envisioned the sortie of the Japanese fleet eastward across the Pacific. This fleet’s orders were “To inflict maximum damage on the Pearl Harbor naval Base in order to destroy or reduce its effectiveness.” The Army, (defending Blue force) had put their forces on full alert, and 24 hour air patrols were initiated out to 150 miles. Avoiding Blue air patrols the attacking carriers and their escorts arrived at a position north of Molakai around midnight. The strike force arrived over Pearl Harbor around dawn and was ruled to have inflicted serious damage.
Fleet Problem XIX (1935) was not specifically intended as another attack on Hawaii but as a simulated overall war in the Eastern Pacific. However, in order to neutralize the opposing fleet, Admiral Ernest King decided to affect a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor. He directed Saratoga to the northwest of Hawaii, using a convenient weather front for cover. At 5 AM King launched an attack from 100 miles out that hit the Army’s Hickam and Wheeler airfields and Pearl Harbor Naval Air Station with “devastating effect.” In addition, Saratoga and Lexington also launched successful attacks against several west coast targets.
Fleet Problem XXI, in April 1940, dealt primarily with fleet operations at sea in the Hawaiian-Pacific Theater. However, a minor component, Fleet Joint Air Exercise 114A, underscored the need for greater cooperation between the Army and Navy in affecting the defense of the Hawaiian area. More importantly, at the conclusion of these exercises President Roosevelt instructed the fleet to remain at Pearl Harbor rather than returning to its regular bases on the West Coast. This was intended to serve as a warning and deterrent to Japan, but many contend that it had the exact opposite effect, pushing Japan more toward war.
I believe that all of the above lays bare the falsehood that the Army/Navy and particularly the Hawaiian commanders could not have been expected to anticipate a surprise attack on Hawaii, as the navy itself had successfully simulated just such an attack on numerous occasions over the preceding years, both as it specifically applied to Pearl Harbor and in a more general sense to all targets, such as the Panama Canal.
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Post by fred on Jan 26, 2016 12:58:53 GMT -6
Yes, some interesting stuff here. There is a lot of really good stuff here, indeed, and you will not find the "models" and the distortions as prevalent here as elsewhere... models, yes; distortions, no. I have been on this board since 2005 and on and off the other since it began in 2008 (I think it was), and this one is a lot more "intellectual." That may not be quite how I should phrase it, but this board is considerably more self-purging than next door. You cannot get away with some of the silliness here. There was a time when battles-royal would break out, but those days seem over with a more serious discussion taking their place. The moderator here does not express opinions, nor does she move things around, change posts, or delete posts. That is not always the case elsewhere. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by jodak on Jan 26, 2016 15:23:22 GMT -6
.... America has had the habit of being poorly prepared for War and I fear we are in the same situation again. The shortage of naval vessels, especially carriers, army man power, problems with the F-35 and other issues concern me greatly. The expenditure of men and monies after 911 has left this nation weary and reluctant to get involved further against terrorists and participate in foreign affairs. Regards Dave That is the normal situation for democratic, non-militaristic nations. Where the U.S. has traditionally differed from most such countries is that, where the others, largely of necessity, have been forced to jump in immediately with whatever assets were available, the U.S., by virtue of being somewhat isolated and protected, has been able to take the time to adequately prepare before becoming committed. The two world wars serve as good examples of that, where some countries, such as Britain and France, were forced into war while ill prepared with largely poorly trained and equipped troops, but the U.S. troops were superbly trained and equipped prior to being committed. As an example of that, the 1st Cavalry Division, that contained our own 7th Cavalry Regiment, was a standing regular army division prior to WW2. As such, it was one of the most combat ready divisions available at the beginning of the war, but, even so, it was not deployed to the Pacific until late 1943, after two additional years of intense training. However, the world has changed, and we must now be in a more heightened constant state of readiness, and I share you concerns in many regards.
Let me preface the following by saying that I am talking about something that I really know nothing about, but a particular concern of mine relates to the F-35 that you mention above as well as numerous other air and naval assets. It seems to me that the Navy and even more so the Air Force have become infatuated with stealth technology, making it the be all and end all of future weapon systems. As a result, they devote tremendous resources toward developing and deploying stealth technology, with little apparent real utility (i.e., how many likely opponents have the capability of effectively countering one of our planes or ships even if they do know it is there), when other systems would be "good enough", at much lower cost and with greater availability and reliability. I'm not sure that I agree on the shortage of aircraft carriers and wonder if we really need as many as we have. This is especially true when it is considered that, in addition to the current 10 Nimitz class fleet carriers that you are thinking of, we also have the recently decommissioned Kitty Hawk in reserve, if needed, and the 9 Wasp class Amphibious Assault Ships, which carry a potent aerial punch of their own that can be further augmented if necessary. Numerous other ships have, in some cases significant, helicopter capabilities, and, with the advent of drones, all ships have effectively become aircraft carriers to a limited degree.
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Post by dave on Jan 26, 2016 17:03:49 GMT -6
jodak The history of “Fleet Problems” is fascinating and very informative. I appreciate you sharing this data with us. I am amazed at how history repeats itself over and over. The lack of preparations after war gaming the very scenarios is evident of man's folly.
As to the plight of the F 35 and the advance of stealth aircraft over existing planes seem somewhat reminiscent of the old gun vs missile debate. I believe that carriers are some what like pickup trucks in that "when you need a pickup nothing else works."
I appreciate your scholarship and look forward to more. Regards Dave
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Post by benteen on Jan 26, 2016 17:32:50 GMT -6
"I fear all we have done is awaken a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible resolve"
Admiral Yamamoto when he was told the attack did not get the carriers.
Be Well Dan
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Post by montrose on Jan 26, 2016 18:03:29 GMT -6
The US has a tendency for tech arrogance. We assume away enemy countermeasures. www.mintpressnews.com/the-story-you-arent-being-told-about-iran-capturing-two-american-vessels/212937/Iran took over a US drone, flew it into their territory, and landed it. Iran, China, Pakistan and Syria all have GPS spoofers. The Air Force is pushing a strategy where they claim they can win unconventional wars purely through air power, with no ground troops required. The current US President has embraced this strategy. Look at a map of ISIS/terrorist territory from the height of the surge to today. On the scale of a 2000% increase that has gone from 2 countries to dozens. Our enemies are learning to counter our technology. Our answer so far is to keep pushing what we have, not what we need. Imagine the impact on the world if we lose a carrier? The Iranians conduct annual exercises developing tactics to do just that. Taking a carrier out at sea is hard, but they have conducted exercises attacking one in a port, or surprise attacks from commercial ships. Another Pearl Harbor surprise is not out of the question. Our enemies show more creativity than we do.
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Post by jodak on Jan 27, 2016 7:24:24 GMT -6
"I fear all we have done is awaken a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible resolve" Admiral Yamamoto when he was told the attack did not get the carriers. Be Well Dan Hi Dan,
Actually it was the fact that the attack occurred prior to a declaration of war that precipitated Yamamoto's above comment. Also, I'm not sure that either navy initially placed the importance on carriers that we now seem to think that they did but, rather, viewed them almost as auxiliaries to and with the primarily responsibility of scouting for the battle force. Some of the Pearl Harbor conspiracy theories point to the fact that none of the carriers were in port at the time of the attack as evidence that we knew that the attack was coming and sent the carriers elsewhere for safety. However, inherent in that is the idea that the carriers were deemed to be the most valuable assets that most needed to be saved, but I would argue that no such supposition existed and that the battleships were still viewed as being the primary naval asset, and, if special measures were to be taken to protect anything, it would have been them.
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Post by jodak on Jan 27, 2016 10:45:21 GMT -6
January 27, 1941 The U.S. and Britain began secret high level military talks that resulted in the ABC (American, British, Canadian)-1 plan. It essentially signified that the U.S. was preparing to enter the war and laid out the basic principles for the war's prosecution thereafter. As it relates to this thread it signified that, should Japan enter the war, Europe was to be the "decisive theater" and would be the primary focus of US military efforts, while the strategy in the Pacific was to be defensive. The immediate effect of this, prior to the U.S. entering the war, was that priority was given to sending U.S. production of critical assets, such as anti-aircraft guns, to Britain and contributed to the shortage of those things in Hawaii and the other U.S. Pacific possessions.
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Post by jodak on Jan 27, 2016 11:43:36 GMT -6
In January 1941, newly designated Commander in Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, initiated a radical break with traditional Japanese doctrine for the conduct of a war with the U.S. and proposed a preemptive strike on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. It would seem that this soon leaked out, and on January 27 U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, cabled Secretary of State Cordell Hull as follows:
There is a lot of talk around town to the effect that the Japanese, in case of a break with the United States, are planning to go all out in a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor. My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned in the event of trouble with the united states, to attempt a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass the information. Grew
Hull passed the information on to Army Intelligence and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum was directed to provide the ONI's analysis. McCollum discounted Grew's information as "rumor." On February 1, 1941, he sent the following analysis to the newly appointed commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel:
The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and armed forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.
However, before we condemn McCollum's findings we must define what "the foreseeable future" was. If we so define it as anything less than 10 months in the future, McCollum was correct. Even so, a seed of doubt and concern should have at least been planted in everyone's minds.
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Post by benteen on Jan 27, 2016 17:06:44 GMT -6
[/p]
Actually it was the fact that the attack occurred prior to a declaration of war that precipitated Yamamoto's above comment.
[/quote] Hi Jodak, Thats not fair. You got your facts from a particular interest in the event, study and research. I got mine from "Tora" Tora" "Tora"... Be Well Dan
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