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Post by jodak on Nov 21, 2016 8:05:12 GMT -6
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Post by jodak on Nov 21, 2016 8:11:19 GMT -6
Navy "Directive" No. 5
21 November 1941 Directive to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will immediately assemble and call back the operational units if the Japanese-American negotiation is successful.
2. The exercise of military authority cited in the Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 5 will be effected in the event the American, British, or Dutch naval forces invade our territorial waters and carry out reconnaissance, or approach our territorial waters and their move is recognized to be threatening, or an aggressive act is taken to endanger us even beyond our territorial waters.
Chief of the Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami
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Post by jodak on Nov 21, 2016 8:12:13 GMT -6
Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 1941 Mandates and Fourth Fleet.-The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and 5 Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non- Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao.
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Post by jodak on Nov 21, 2016 8:14:56 GMT -6
Top Secret 21 November 1941 From: OPNAV Action: CINC AF (Asiatic Fleet - Hart) CINC PAC (Pacific Fleet - Kimmel)
Info: 211833
Have been informed by Dutch Legation that they have received a despatch as follows quote according to information received by the Governor General of The Netherlands East Indies a Japanese expeditionary force has arrived in the vicinity of Palau X should this force comma strong enough to form a threat for The Netherlands Indies or Portuguese Timor comma move beyond a line between the following points Davao Waigeo Equator the Governor General will regard this as an act of aggression and will under those circumstances consider the hostilities opened and act accordingly unquote inform Army authorities of foregoing X request any information you may have concerning development of this Japanese threat against the Dutch East Indies and your evaluation of foregoing information
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Post by jodak on Nov 21, 2016 8:17:41 GMT -6
From: Tokyo To: Berlin 21 November 1941 (Purple) #969
At present, the possibility of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union seems remote. However, it may be that Germany would prefer to avoid being faced with a long term resistance by the U. S. S. R., so that she-Germany-may transfer her entire fighting forces to some other part. On the Soviet side, it seems possible that sentiment for peace may develop when she views the situation from the standpoint of reconstruction.
Our relations with the United States may have considerable effect on our southward program, depending, of course, on what turns those relations take. In other words, our relationship with Great Britain and the United States has a great bearing on the future of our national greatness.
For this reason, we would like to avoid the rise of any violence at this time. At the same time, we would like to break up the policy of British-U. S.-U. S. S. R. joint action. We would, therefore, welcome, if anything, peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. For the purpose of enhancing our position, we would not be opposed to mediating in a peace, if such a course is possible.
Will you, therefore, bearing the above in mind, keep an eye on developments _ _ _ _ (message unfinished).
25171 JD-1: 6731 (D) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (C-NR)
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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 8:53:50 GMT -6
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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 9:02:07 GMT -6
From: Tokyo To: Washington November 22, 1941 Purple (CA) #815
The Anti-Comintern (Communist) Agreement runs out on the 24th, and for some time we have been conferring with the signatories. It has been decided that this agreement shall be in effect for five more years and that on the 25th in Berlin, Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchukuo, Hungary, and Spain will all six sign the protocol.
Germany, fighting Russia as she is, seems to be thinking about the propagandistic effect of this signing. However, we, for several considerations, intend to handle the matter circumspectly. You know we have Japanese-American relations to think about. This is for your information.
Army 25140 Trans. 11/22/41 (S)
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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 9:04:39 GMT -6
2 November 1941 From: Panama (Akiyama) To: Tokyo #321 "I suppose you are already acquainted with these facts but the manner of defending the canal is now as follows:" See Document
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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 9:05:58 GMT -6
From: Manila (Nihro) To: Tokyo November 22, 1941Purple #785 1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown. On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and materiel. 2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were : Manila-Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isobel; Heron; Wohotosu ; Pisu ; one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines.
Cavite-Houston (?); Canopus. ARMY 25471 Trans. 11/29/41 (6)
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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 9:11:21 GMT -6
22 November 1941 From: Cmdr. Layton To: Ad. Kimmel
Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 1941 Mandates and Fourth Fleet.-The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and 5 Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non- Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao.
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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 9:14:52 GMT -6
Top Secret 22 November 1941 From: Spenavo London (Special Naval Observer - Admiral Ghormley) Action: OPNAV Info 221122
By Vice Admiral Furstner, Minister for Marine in the Dutch Government in England and CINC of all Dutch naval forces, I have been asked informally to present the following to you and request your informal reply. Dutch Government has received reports to the effect that Japan is concentrating an expeditionary force in Palau. Dutch state it is difficult to ascertain veracity of this information but they consider that this point does not absolve them from considering what should be done by the Dutch in case this reported concentration leads to an expedition crossing the Davao-Waigeo line or the Equator east of that line (see PARA 26ADB April 1941). Dutch Government are inclined to consider that any such expedition could only be regarded as a direct menace to Netherlands East Indies and thereby as a non direct threat to the territories and interest of the United States and Great Britain and that therefore it would have to be immediately countered by force. Dutch state that before definitely making up their minds in this respect, they would like to have the views of our C. N. O. The possibility of an individual Japanese commander acting against the intentions of the Japanese Government should be taken into account and also the fact that in case of that nature, the Japanese Government has the tendency to back up the commander in question considering that otherwise the Japanese would lose face. Dutch have received information that 4,000 laborers have left Japan for Palau.
I suggested the possibility of confusion between the movement of laborers with the reported movements of expeditionary force.
Biddle requests this be passed to State for information.
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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 20:23:02 GMT -6
Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 1 [6]
23 November 1941 To: Carrier Striking Task Force
1. The Carrier Striking Task Force will proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day. Upon completion of the air attacks, the Task Force will immediately withdraw and return to Japan and, after taking on new supplies, take its position for Second Period Operations. In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.
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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 20:28:19 GMT -6
Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3 [7]
23 November 1941 To: Carrier Striking Task Force
The Hawaiian operations air attack plan has been decided as follows:
1. The Operation of the Air Attack Forces
The force will be 700 nautical miles due north of point Z (set at the western extremity of the Island of Lanai) at 0600 hours X-1 Day and advance on a course of 180 degrees from 0700 hours X-1 Day at an increased speed of 24 knots.
Air attacks will be carried out by launching the first attack units 230 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0130 hours X Day, and the second attack unit at 200 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0245 hours.
After the launching of the second attack units is completed, the task force will withdraw northward at a speed of about 24 knots. The first attack units are scheduled to return between 0530 and 0600 hours and the second attack units are scheduled to return between 0645 and 0715 hours.
Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.
If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progresses favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will be achieved.
In the event that a powerful enemy surface fleet appears, it will be attacked.
2. Organization of the Air Attack Units
(see Chart 2)
3. Targets
a. The First Attack Units
The targets for the first group will be limited to about four battleships and four aircraft carriers; the order of targets will be battleships and then aircraft carriers.
The second group will attack the enemy land-based air strength according to the following assignment:
The 15 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Ford Island
The 16 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Wheeler Field
The targets of Fighter Combat Units will be enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.
b. The Second Attack Units
The first group will attack the enemy air bases according to the following assignment:
The 5 Attack Unit: Aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island and Barbers Point.
The 6 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field.
The targets for the second group will be limited to four or five enemy aircraft carriers. If the number of targets is insufficient, they will select targets in the order of cruisers and battleships.
The Fighter Combat Units will attack the enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.
4. Attack Procedure
a. The First Attack Units
(1) With the element of surprise as the principle, attacks will be carried out by the torpedo unit and bomber unit of the First Group, and then the Second Group.
(2) During the initial phase of the attack, the Fighter Combat Units will, in one formation, storm the enemy skies about the same time as the First Group, and contact and destroy chiefly the enemy interceptor planes.
In the event that no enemy aircraft are encountered in the air, the units will immediately shift to the strafing of parked aircraft as follows:
1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units: Ford Island and Hickam Field.
3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units: Wheeler Field and Barbers Point.
5th and 6th Fighter Combat Units: Kaneohe
(3) In the event that the advantage of surprise attack cannot be expected due to strict enemy security, the approach and attack will be made in the order of the Fighter Combat Units, Dive Bombing Units, Horizontal Bombing Units and the Torpedo Attacking Units.
b. The Second Attack Units
All units will storm the enemy skies almost simultaneously and launch the attacks.
Although the general outline of the operations of the Fighter Combat Units corresponds to that of the First Attack Units, the strafing will be carried out according to the following in case there are no enemy aircraft in the air.
1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units: Ford Island and Hickam Field
3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units: Wheeler Field and Kaneohe
c. The general outline of attack in the event that enemy aircraft carriers and the main body of the U.S. Fleet are in anchorages outside Pearl Harbor are:
(1) The organization and targets are the same as mentioned above. The First Attack Units of the First Group, however, will increase the number of torpedo bombers as much as possible.
(2) Escorted by the Fighter Combat Units, the Air Attack Units will proceed in a group and attack the designated targets in the order of the enemy fleet anchorages and the Island of Oahu. If attacks on the enemy fleet anchorages progress favorably, however, the Fighter Combat Units and the 2nd Group of the First Air Attack Unit will immediately proceed to the Island of Oahu. Upon completion of the attacks, the anchorage attack unit will return directly to the carriers.
d. Rendezvous for Return to Carriers
(1) The rendezvous point will be 20 nautical miles at 340 degrees from the western extremity (Kaena Point) of the Island of Oahu. The rendezvous altitude will be 1,000 meters. (If this vicinity is covered with clouds, it will be below the cloud ceiling.)
(2) The Attack Units will wait at the rendezvous point for about 30 minutes and return to their carriers, after being joined by the Fighter Combat Units.
(3) While returning to carriers, the Fighter Combat Unit will become the rear guards for the whole unit and intercept any enemy pursuit.
5. Reconnaissance
a. Pre-operation Reconnaissance
Pre-operation reconnaissance will not be carried out unless otherwise ordered.
b. Immediate Pre-attack Reconnaissance
Two reconnaissance seaplanes of the 8th Cruiser Division will take off at 0030 hours, X Day, secretly reconnoiter Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage and report the presence of the enemy fleet (chiefly carriers and the main body of the fleet).
c. Scouting Patrol
The reconnaissance seaplanes of the 8th Cruiser Division will take off at 0300 hours and will carry out an extensive search of the waters between the enemy and the friendly forces and the waters adjacent to the two channels situated to the east and west of the Island of Oahu. They will observe and report the presence and activities of the enemy sortie force and enemy aircraft on counter-attack missions.
d. Before returning to its carrier, after the attack, an element of fighters designated by the Fighter Combat Unit Commander will fly as low and as fast as circumstances permit and observe and determine the extent of damage inflicted upon the enemy aircraft and ships.
Air Security Disposition No. 1 Method B will be followed from one hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset on the day of the air attack. [8]
Commander
Carrier Striking Task Force
Nagumo, Chuichi
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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 20:32:25 GMT -6
23 November 1941 From: Cmdr. Layton To: Ad. Kimmel
...Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the Palao area.
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Post by jodak on Nov 22, 2016 20:34:59 GMT -6
Top Secret 23 November 1941 From: CNO (Chief of Naval Operations - Stark) Action: SPENAVO (Special Naval Observer London - Ghormley)
Info:
222040
Your 221122 introduces political questions upon which the CNO is not in a position to offer advice but you may express my views concerning the importance of the Pelews for the defense of the mandates and for offensive operations against either the Philippines or Nei. OPNAV questions accuracy of information concerning an expeditionary force near the Pelews but is aware that land and air forces and facilities there are in process of expansion. CINCPAC and CINCAF are checking on recent Japanese movements. Will advise you further.
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