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Post by wild on Oct 20, 2015 0:41:14 GMT -6
Colt45
So I guess you think the option he selected was the right one? How did that work out? I think Custer's 5 companys were counter attacked in and around MTC , that Custer tried to break contact but was run to ground ,stopped ,fragmented and destroyed. The markers indicate that his companies had no time to form for defense and were chopped up individually.
And you can fire carbines from the saddle, You need both hands to fire a carbine . Hitting a moving target while moving yourself is a circus act and probably a con at that.
Survivability odds were zero with staying in place, and zero for defending enmass around Calhoun Hill If you can return effective controlled fire your chances increase at least beyond the negative. A "mobile defence" if conducted ala Reno had some hope of providing a few survivors Cheers
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Post by callmeconrad on Oct 20, 2015 3:28:24 GMT -6
Colt45
So I guess you think the option he selected was the right one? How did that work out?I think Custer's 5 companys were counter attacked in and around MTC , that Custer tried to break contact but was run to ground ,stopped ,fragmented and destroyed. The markers indicate that his companies had no time to form for defense and were chopped up individually. Wild, I'm curious how you'd explain all the Springfield carbine bullets around Greasy Grass Ridge? That feature had to be under fire by the cavalry for a while. If Custer's command was broken and looking to run, who was firing those bullets? Cheers, conrad
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Post by wild on Oct 20, 2015 11:23:23 GMT -6
Hi Conrad
Wild, I'm curious how you'd explain all the Springfield carbine bullets around Greasy Grass Ridge? The answer lies 1000 yards to the East of Reno hill . Hundreds of rounds found there, thus are we to believe the Indians engaged Reno at a 1000 yards? Cheers
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 21, 2015 4:20:28 GMT -6
Colt45
So I guess you think the option he selected was the right one? How did that work out?I think Custer's 5 companys were counter attacked in and around MTC , that Custer tried to break contact but was run to ground ,stopped ,fragmented and destroyed. The markers indicate that his companies had no time to form for defense and were chopped up individually. And you can fire carbines from the saddle,You need both hands to fire a carbine . Hitting a moving target while moving yourself is a circus act and probably a con at that. Survivability odds were zero with staying in place, and zero for defending enmass around Calhoun HillIf you can return effective controlled fire your chances increase at least beyond the negative. A "mobile defence" if conducted ala Reno had some hope of providing a few survivors Cheers Richard You can fire a carbine from a horse. That has been one of my issues with horsemanship of the 7th Cavalry. The Indians were fully capable of firing from horseback. That accuracy is better from other positions is true but I believe that even in the manual of arms it gives commands for firing mounted. Advance Carbine , Load, Fire The manual states how to hold the reins with the left hand while firing. Regards Steve
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Post by magpie on Oct 21, 2015 7:07:22 GMT -6
Just finished reading Fred's article, and it prompted some thoughts on what happened to the Keogh battalion. I believe it was Wooden Leg who said that after about an hour and a half, 40 soldiers came down into Calhoun Coulee, this was the C company charge. This indicates that the battalion was not wiped out in a short period of time, say 15-30 minutes, but rather there was time for Keogh to evaluate the situation. C company charged after the Indians got close enough to use indirect fire (arrows), which proved effective. If Keogh had been in the area of C company and L company, he would have been able to see that remaining and waiting for Benteen was futile, as there were too many Indians between him and Benteen. Benteen would never have been able to get through because he had about the same number of men as Keogh, and Keogh would have known that. Clustering the battalion around Calhoun Hill also would have shown itself to not be viable due to the effective indirect fire of the Indians. So only option 2, a mobile defense, was the only viable option. If Keogh was able to observe all this, and if he ordered the C company charge, then the destruction of his battalion is squarely on his shoulders. This is assuming that Keogh was in the area and able to observe events, and that he chose to stay in place. What if he had been wounded prior to the C company charge? We know his body was found in the I company area, so if we assume he was wounded in that approximate area and unhorsed there, he would have been unable to observe the deteriorating situation and would have been unable to effectively communicate to the battalion that it was time to mount up and head north toward Custer. Would the 2IC have known the commander was incapacitated, and who was 2IC? Where was the 2IC? With the large distances that had to be covered and defended, communications would have required a mounted rider, and if Keogh was down and out, who in the immediate area would have assumed command, and would that officer or NCO have known the situation overall and been able to communicate to the three companies, which were out of mutual supporting range, that they needed to bug out and bug out quickly. With Keogh unable to command, the 3 companies would have acted independently, for the most part. With no other orders than to defend their areas, I doubt if any of the lieutenants in C or L companies would have realized the need or taken the initiative to evacuate north. And the officers in I company were too far away from Calhoun hill to see that action, and by then Crazy Horse was probably in the gap. With Keogh wounded prior to C company's charge, the action would have followed exactly as it did. The Keogh battalion was the boy with his finger in the dam, which was going to crumble regardless. When C company charged, the finger in the dam was removed and the dam failed. From that point, it was probably 15 minutes or so before it was all over for the Keogh battalion. We have know way of knowing if Keogh was wounded before the C charge, or if he was wounded at the end of the action. If he was wounded before, it takes away some of the blame for his battalion's destruction. If he was wounded afterwards, he bears the blunt of the blame, even if he didn't order the charge because he should have seen the hopelessness of trying to defend in place, and acted to save his command, regardless of what Custer would have said or thought afterwards. At the RCOI a Sergeant testified a scout (probably a crow) said Keogh was wounded early in the fight. Keogh had a wound to a knee that matched a wound on Comanche his horse. The Sergeants testimony was apparently dismissed as heresay but obviously the rumor made an impression on that Sergeant. I don't remember where I read of the knee wound but there was something about the description that implied a lot of blood to my mind. I wish I had the full sized maps and drawings you all are working from and the Indian accounts that are so specific as to location. I was looking at the one of bullets and cartridges posted here (nps.gov) and comparing it with Fox's and having difficulty matching the two. I tried the nps.gov PDF put the overlays are hard to see and don't magnify. I think it's interesting that the theories advanced bear no similarity to how Custer fought in 1873 when facing almost the exact same predicament. Initially he dismounted 15 men as a rear guard some on their bellies he then managed to get his troop ( aprox 100 men) together. He then fought dismounted in a box and moved that box to the river and formed a horseshoe. He eventually put 8 horses to a holder. Horses being useless (exception being a counter attack force, Custer sending Varnum to the rear to counter attack an Indian walking around to the horses but frankly I don't recall if Varnum's unit was mounted). Custer as Wild has stated said firing from horse to a horse was useless. I hate to agree with Wild in this but I do except for his desire to concentrate his fire on open ground.
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Post by wild on Oct 21, 2015 8:37:42 GMT -6
Hi Steve You can fire a carbine from a horse. That has been one of my issues with horsemanship of the 7th Cavalry. The Indians were fully capable of firing from horseback. That accuracy is better from other positions is true but I believe that even in the manual of arms it gives commands for firing mounted. Advance Carbine , Load, Fire The manual states how to hold the reins with the left hand while firing. Horses can't read manuals. [sorry] You might be able to get off a single snap shot but you won't reload and as for aiming...forget it. And as for a melee the revolver is your only hope. Cheers
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Post by wild on Oct 21, 2015 8:57:03 GMT -6
Magpie I hate to agree with Wild in this but I do except for his desire to concentrate his fire on open ground. Why would you hate to agree with me ? Do you want to begin your stay with us by getting in with a bad lot of villians like Dan and Steve ,and Fred and Will ?
Here's the thing about massing your muskets. If you are outnumbered as Custer was 10 to 1 ; each one of the Indians had a 1 in 10 chance of being hit . On the other hand each one of Custer's soldiers had a one in 10 chance of surviving . Now if you mass your muskets you can gain local superiority and alter the odds from negative to positive. But don't check this out without supervision. Cheers
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Post by callmeconrad on Oct 21, 2015 9:33:22 GMT -6
Hi Conrad Wild, I'm curious how you'd explain all the Springfield carbine bullets around Greasy Grass Ridge?The answer lies 1000 yards to the East of Reno hill . Hundreds of rounds found there, thus are we to believe the Indians engaged Reno at a 1000 yards? Cheers Hi Wild, I see what you're getting at. I see this as an Occam's Razor situation. Is it more likely that one of the major warrior firing positions on the battlefield at GGR took a lot of return fire from soldiers on that day; or that same spot with a major warrior concentration just happened to be a favoured spot for target practice by troopers in later years among all the other ridges and hills they could be shooting at? As for that ridge east of Reno Hill, the closer reaches are more like 780 yards away, pretty similar to Sharpshooter Ridge. I will admit that the artifacts that Rickey says were found at the southern end about 1670 yards away are more problematic. Unfortunately I can't find a copy of Rickey's 1956 report on exactly what he found on that eastern ridge, but maybe someone can roughly state the mix of cartridges, bullets, etc. Cheers, conrad
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Post by magpie on Oct 21, 2015 9:40:32 GMT -6
Magpie I hate to agree with Wild in this but I do except for his desire to concentrate his fire on open ground.Why would you hate to agree with me ? Do you want to begin your stay with us by getting in with a bad lot of villians like Dan and Steve ,and Fred and Will ? Here's the thing about massing your muskets. If you are outnumbered as Custer was 10 to 1 ; each one of the Indians had a 1 in 10 chance of being hit . On the other hand each one of Custer's soldiers had a one in 10 chance of surviving . Now if you mass your muskets you can gain local superiority and alter the odds from negative to positive. But don't check this out without supervision. Cheers What you needed is some hits. Custer himself saying you won't get any horse to horse. Indians didn't like dying, they'd soon wait for an advantage. Montrose emphasizing you can't let them in close as engage hand to hand as you'll loose. I don't think you can let their archers within 200 feet of you or they'll just lob arrows till you look like a porccupine. I'm not sure putting your fish in a barrel will allow you advantage unless you can get behind something or dig in. Maybe Bailey's ridge is the ticket: I can't tell from here. I think the biggest missing component is the vast majority of the Indian pictographs show mounted victims with back's turned and there is far too much movement in these theories. We really need a complete and organized grid survey of the mouth of Medicine Tail and adjacent area to set the stage.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 22, 2015 19:28:33 GMT -6
DucemusJust reminding one and all (great name for a torpedo) that Doug D. Scott hunted out some data related to Philetus W. Norris, who visited Custer's Hill in 1877 and he was extremely, very, very, naughty by todays standards. In fact, the Park Rangers would have get very politically correct with him, today, doing what he did. Superintendent of Yellowstone National Park or not you simply cannot walk off with hundreds of battlefield artifacts any more. Same would go for William A. Allen who was only a week or so later than Norris. Naughty, naughty, naughty. Now, for a considerable length of time, Marquis and his historicals have led to very lazy contemplation of self harming cavalrymen, overcome by the mid-day sun and sheer panic. However, the Cheyenne history upon which he relied was poorly understood and presented in worse fashion. A certain area of the Custer fight terrain was and remains associated with Company C because several of its nco's were found lying there. The first sergeant was elsewhere but we won't let that bother us will we. We all know which part of the marching column a first sergeant held, right? Here's a picture for you. It is straight forward comparison and straight forwardly debunks some rubbish that is used to support cavalry deployed much further north in the cemetery ridge area. That is a different issue but in consequence of the Boston College (no.... it isn't in Boston) male rising chicken in (Where Custer Fell), the reality of data given to D.F. Barry by Gall in 1886, continues to elude. At right is a 1932 image taken from Calhoun Hill and compared with it, that taken by Barry. The skirmish line facing north was upon the rising western flanks of Deep Coulee. There ya go. Therefore, upon next visit to CH, be sure to carry a decent camera and eventually, someone, will make a discovery of significance when they make the exact match with Barry's image. Fame will follow! www.stoneponyonline.com Check out the photo gallery. www.stoneponyonline.com/photos/2005/lmp/04.jpg www.stoneponyonline.com/photos/2014/0919slf/index.html
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 23, 2015 6:25:38 GMT -6
Hi Steve You can fire a carbine from a horse. That has been one of my issues with horsemanship of the 7th Cavalry. The Indians were fully capable of firing from horseback. That accuracy is better from other positions is true but I believe that even in the manual of arms it gives commands for firing mounted. Advance Carbine , Load, Fire The manual states how to hold the reins with the left hand while firing.Horses can't read manuals. [sorry] You might be able to get off a single snap shot but you won't reload and as for aiming...forget it. And as for a melee the revolver is your only hope. Cheers Richard I think there is a difference between what can be done and any individual circumstance due to riders ability, horse training, and weapon system used. The single shot carbine was a choice and it lends itself to firing from a stationary position . That doesn't mean that the cavalry could not fire while mounted. A repeating firearm system would not have the same reloading issue. Just look at what a roper does and it obvious that you can use both hands and ride at the same time. There are competitions that use lever action repeating rifles from horseback while moving. In order to be successful you can not afford to miss even one shot. Aiming is related to distance. At sufficient distance from a standing horse you can take an aimed shot. Increase that distance and you have time to dismount and take a shot. At close quarters you only need to index the weapon and don't have to use the sights. Regards Steve
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Post by magpie on Oct 23, 2015 11:03:44 GMT -6
your skilled AZ and there is no indications these men of 7th were. Horses were not trained with firearms. They didn't have 22 penny amunition or bb's to train with or even proper targets and someone highly skilled to teach the secretes of the trade. An old man that was once a pistol champ taught me the simple secrete of training my finger tip to move without moving the finger and suddenly I was a crack shot, but all that's probabley on the net and on utube for anyone to learn now (but not then). Also we are talking moving horse to moving horse with perhaps an obstacal course of sage. In one pictograph all the indians using firearms were touching the end of the muzzle to the soldier and firing. I wonder the balance of the carbine. Yes you need not hold your reins.
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Post by magpie on Oct 23, 2015 11:06:08 GMT -6
DucemusJust reminding one and all (great name for a torpedo) that Doug D. Scott hunted out some data related to Philetus W. Norris, who visited Custer's Hill in 1877 and he was extremely, very, very, naughty by todays standards. In fact, the Park Rangers would have get very politically correct with him, today, doing what he did. Superintendent of Yellowstone National Park or not you simply cannot walk off with hundreds of battlefield artifacts any more. Same would go for William A. Allen who was only a week or so later than Norris. Naughty, naughty, naughty. Now, for a considerable length of time, Marquis and his historicals have led to very lazy contemplation of self harming cavalrymen, overcome by the mid-day sun and sheer panic. However, the Cheyenne history upon which he relied was poorly understood and presented in worse fashion. A certain area of the Custer fight terrain was and remains associated with Company C because several of its nco's were found lying there. The first sergeant was elsewhere but we won't let that bother us will we. We all know which part of the marching column a first sergeant held, right? Here's a picture for you. It is straight forward comparison and straight forwardly debunks some rubbish that is used to support cavalry deployed much further north in the cemetery ridge area. That is a different issue but in consequence of the Boston College (no.... it isn't in Boston) male rising chicken in (Where Custer Fell), the reality of data given to D.F. Barry by Gall in 1886, continues to elude. At right is a 1932 image taken from Calhoun Hill and compared with it, that taken by Barry. The skirmish line facing north was upon the rising western flanks of Deep Coulee. There ya go. Therefore, upon next visit to CH, be sure to carry a decent camera and eventually, someone, will make a discovery of significance when they make the exact match with Barry's image. Fame will follow! www.stoneponyonline.com Check out the photo gallery. www.stoneponyonline.com/photos/2005/lmp/04.jpg www.stoneponyonline.com/photos/2014/0919slf/index.html I am a dozen clicks South of your last photo. Thanks for the view off Phil Sheridans idea of a key position. That wedge of land between LBH and Deep Coulee.
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Post by magpie on Oct 30, 2015 15:52:59 GMT -6
Anbody ever figured out how far these bullets are going to skip? In the bad old days when prairie dogs were our high powered rifle fodder I seem to remember the bullets skipping at least a quarter mile behind the target. I think one needs to consider elevation of target, elevation of target off the ground, backstop elevation and elevation of shooters muzzle. I really think almost all of Fox's battlefield bullets came from the corpses and corpse shooting by Indians and were not "battle bullets". I think they skipped out of town unless a body trapped them.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 30, 2015 20:27:07 GMT -6
Ducemus It's a difficult one when so much effort has gone into the study. An interesting illustration of two things, Little Bighorn's answers to questions simply manifold questions. No-one can pull all the skills together and if you are theory driven, squiggles become number one.
Answering this query will generate the second thing.
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