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Post by mchlwilson on Oct 15, 2015 6:27:51 GMT -6
Hi Fred,
Congratulations on your fine article "Impaled on the Horns of Keogh's Dilemma" in the Fall 2015 Research Review. I read it last night and greatly enjoyed it.
I have a few questions:
(1) Do you believe that the five companies could have survived if they had chosen to defend "Bailey Ridge" to the east? It seems to me a much more defensible area. It was Custer's move north that forced Keogh to defend Custer's rear from Calhoun Hill and Battle Ridge, which as you say is not conducive to a good defense.
(2) You quote Wooden Leg to say that the soldiers of Company C dismounted when the arrived at a "low ridge where the Indians had been". If this quote in fact refers to Calhoun Coulee, then where is the "low ridge"?
I think you have done a great service to the study of LBH by keeping the focus on a military analysis of the terrain. That emphasis appears to have been absent from prior studies. Your work on the "gap" is just what was needed.
In my opinion, Custer's destruction was caused as much by the terrain as the number of Indians. On that terrain he could have been destroyed by even fewer Indians.
Thanks,
Michael
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Post by tubman13 on Oct 15, 2015 6:41:17 GMT -6
Michael, Read it, posted about it elsewhere. Fresh material, not rehashed material. I hope others will read it. Also I hope this kind of analysis draws others to LBHA. The other article was also fairly presented.
Regards, Tom
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Post by fred on Oct 15, 2015 8:10:24 GMT -6
Michael, First of all, thank you for your very kind praise. I appreciate it greatly. Now, your questions... (1) Do you believe that the five companies could have survived if they had chosen to defend "Bailey Ridge" to the east? I do not believe so, Michael. It is long and narrow and presents the same issues as Battle Ridge, minus the gap. And there are near ridges behind it which would allow Indians to pick off anyone on the eastern side. By the way, I believe most people refer to it as "Crazy Horse Ridge." That ravine/coulee is spotted with small, low ridges virtually its entire length. Wooden Leg brought Thomas Marquis into the exact area where he claimed Harrington dismounted his troops. While unclear in anything Marquis wrote, Richard Fox determined it was somewhere between 440 and 500 yards from the rim. My own personal determination was closer to 600 yards (based on bodies found there), but I would defer to the Fox work, not mine. The bodies could just as easily have been men who tried to find the easiest escape route. Again, thanks for your very kind comments. Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by dave on Oct 15, 2015 10:48:22 GMT -6
Fred I found your article to be very helpful in determining what Keogh, Calhoun and Custer were attempting when the found themselves spread out with active hostiles attacking. I enjoy "getting down in the weeds" in studying the terrain at LBH and the effect it had on the battle. I have been to the battlefield one time and it is so different from the wooded hills of North Mississippi that it is difficult to judge the terrain just by maps and pictures. The written word works better describing exactly what they saw and the parts they could not see because of the undulations of the land. Very well done and informative. Regards Dave
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Post by callmeconrad on Oct 16, 2015 9:02:25 GMT -6
That ravine/coulee is spotted with small, low ridges virtually its entire length. Wooden Leg brought Thomas Marquis into the exact area where he claimed Harrington dismounted his troops. While unclear in anything Marquis wrote, Richard Fox determined it was somewhere between 440 and 500 yards from the rim. My own personal determination was closer to 600 yards (based on bodies found there), but I would defer to the Fox work, not mine. The bodies could just as easily have been men who tried to find the easiest escape route. I'll posit something similar but different and take my licks. What can I say, I enjoy my Co. C scenarios. This highlighted feature has always interested me because the north-east side of it should provide a good screen from the firing on Greasy Grass Ridge. A quick “charge” down Calhoun Coulee on Google Earth seems to confirm that the backside of this hill would be a good place to stay out of sight from GGR. What if the charge by C had two components: First, clear out Calhoun Coulee, then try to supress the firing from GGR? The 392.72 metre mark in the coulee is pretty much the final point to stop and leave horse-holders without exposing them to fire from GGR. The position is overlooked by many other points but during the initial charge these may have seemed clear. Coordinates are here if you want to have a look on Google Earth: 45°33'45.10" N 107°25'24.67" W By dismounting and setting a skirmish line on the top of that feature that I highlighted earlier, the troopers could use a reverse-slope situation to start firing against Greasy Grass Ridge. This also ties into the Wooden Leg quote that “After the long time of the slow fighting, about 40 soldiers came galloping from the east part of the ridge down toward the river, toward where most of the Cheyennes and many Oglalas were hidden. The Indians ran back to a deep gulch. The soldiers stopped and got off their horses when they arrived at a low ridge where the Indians had been.”
As Fred pointed out in his book, it’s very probable that the warriors that had been “cleared” from Calhoun Coulee weren’t really gone after all. A reasonable assumption is that the warriors in the coulee had bows and arrows to fire at Calhoun Hill, and when the cavalry rushed past they then moved in and started firing at the horses being held in the lee of the hill. Which brings up this possibility: It’s about 80 yards for the troopers to move from the location they left their horses to a good firing position against GGR. When they top the ridge and start shooting they don’t realize that their horse-holders are already in serious trouble behind them because the damage is being done silently with arrows. At this point the soldiers left holding the horses try to get up to the skirmish line that’s barely had time to start firing against NA positions on Greasy Grass Ridge. Mass confusion exists as the horses are brought up the ridge. Firing from GGR and the coulee below hits men and horses. Some horses escape down the coulee with troopers chasing them, knowing that their extra ammo and mobility are running away. Some troopers find themselves exposed while trying to catch and mount their horses and are hit in the area around the skirmish line. One or two riders can’t control their mounts when the horses are hit, which then bolt to the top of Greasy Grass, leading to the .45 pistol cartridges and bullets found on the crest of Greasy Grass Ridge. Scott, D.D. (2010). Uncovering history: The legacy of archeological investigations at the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, Montana. Retrieved from: www.nps.gov/mwac/publications/pdf/tech124.pdfSome soldiers never get a hand on a horse and start running, leading to the warriors’ description of a mix of men mounted and on foot. In my opinion it’s a plausible scenario that could lead to the mix of markers and artefacts that are currently seen on the battlefield, but knowledge is the most important thing, so what am I missing? Cheers, conrad
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Post by mchlwilson on Oct 18, 2015 18:12:04 GMT -6
Conrad,
I like the way you are thinking about this, but I wonder if your 2-part rationale for the charge is giving Harrington credit for much more tactical insight than is warranted.
I would think that (if the charge really happened) that there was only one motive: drive the Indians out of the coulee. Perhaps the decision to dismount was made on the spot?
Michael
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Post by wild on Oct 19, 2015 1:45:47 GMT -6
I would think that (if the charge really happened) that there was only one motive: drive the Indians out of the coulee. Perhaps the decision to dismount was made on the spot? There were two options to the developing situation ;get out or concentrate . You don't take a horse to a fire fight . Unsupported Cavalry are useless when stopped . Clearing individual terrain features is a joke ....like trying to plug the titanic . Are there any f**k**g soldiers on this board ?
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Post by montrose on Oct 19, 2015 7:16:59 GMT -6
I believe C Company was conducting a clearing attack. Push the enemy away from your perimeter, and return to your defensive positions. Benteen led two of these actions the next day.
C Company went too far, and then stopped and dismounted. I believe the reason they stopped was to recover a casualty. No way to prove or disprove the hypothesis. But stopping led to the units annihilation. Because they went too far, they bypassed large enemy elements on their right flank, and rar. This is why they did not fall back to their attack position, They were forced to head to their left, deeper into enemy territory, because of the blunder of going too far.
I have been trying to line up Indian casualties by sector. The Indians took minimal casualties in this area. The American force made bad tactical decisions that led to one of the worst casualty ratios of any fight at LBH.
CPT Keogh had no idea what happened with this attack, nor the defense of Calhoun Hill. He was on the other side of Battle Ridge with no line of sight to the actions here. This is not an excuse. As a commander he placed himself where he had no idea what was going on, so he did nothing to nfluence the battle.
He is like a sport coach running a game from the parking lot, rather than inside the stadium.
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Post by callmeconrad on Oct 19, 2015 7:42:01 GMT -6
Conrad, I like the way you are thinking about this, but I wonder if your 2-part rationale for the charge is giving Harrington credit for much more tactical insight than is warranted. I would think that (if the charge really happened) that there was only one motive: drive the Indians out of the coulee. Perhaps the decision to dismount was made on the spot? Michael Hi Michael, Look at how many .45/55 carbine bullets are on Greasy Grass Ridge or just below (presumably washed out of the hillside over the years). That position has been fired at for a while. So even before the move GGR is known to be a threat. Scott, D.D. (2010). Uncovering history: The legacy of archeological investigations at the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, Montana. Retrieved from: www.nps.gov/mwac/publications/pdf/tech124.pdfIf the only task is to clear the coulee Harrington could stop in the lee of the lower ridge I highlighted in the first post, approx. 390 metres down the coulee, reform out of sight from GGR, then take another sweep back up the coulee back to the starting point. There's no markers in the coulee between Calhoun Hill and that point so presumably the charge didn't have many casualties. It might have worked to ride down, regroup in that blind spot, and get back without much trouble. But that didn't happen. For some reason Harrington went over the ridge. Fred thinks he charged farther down the coulee, tried to form a thin skirmish line or defend with small pockets of soldiers and got shot up quick trying to hold both sides of the coulee. My suggestion is that the blind spot and reverse slope would have been tempting to use to try to suppress fire from Greasy Grass, which had a known concentration of hostiles. In your opinion, what would have compelled Harrington to make an on-the-spot decision to dismount? Cheers, conrad
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Post by wild on Oct 19, 2015 10:40:10 GMT -6
I believe C Company was conducting a clearing attack. Push the enemy away from your perimeter, and return to your defensive positions. Benteen led two of these actions the next day Indeed Will that is correct but Benteen was operating out of a defensive position of 7 companies. Out of what defensive perimeter was C company operating ?
In order to support the favoured scenario of Custer's demise, three blunders are conjured up ; two by Custer one by Keogh . It pushes the bounds of credability to accept that Custer [and HQ officers] and his 2i/c seperately produced catastrophic tactical blunders. You don't need blunders to produce the disaster, Cheers
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Post by tubman13 on Oct 19, 2015 13:04:46 GMT -6
I believe C Company was conducting a clearing attack. Push the enemy away from your perimeter, and return to your defensive positions. Benteen led two of these actions the next dayIndeed Will that is correct but Benteen was operating out of a defensive position of 7 companies. Out of what defensive perimeter was C company operating ? In order to support the favoured scenario of Custer's demise, three blunders are conjured up ; two by Custer one by Keogh . It pushes the bounds of credability to accept that Custer [and HQ officers] and his 2i/c seperately produced catastrophic tactical blunders. You don't need blunders to produce the disaster, Cheers Richard,
You are correct, you don't need blunders to produce a disaster, but it helps. We could call a number of things that happened that day comedy of errors, I think it is more akin to a "Shakespearian Tragedy." I believe things began to go sideways late the previous afternoon, beginning with a change in the commanders thought process.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Colt45 on Oct 19, 2015 15:36:25 GMT -6
Just finished reading Fred's article, and it prompted some thoughts on what happened to the Keogh battalion.
I believe it was Wooden Leg who said that after about an hour and a half, 40 soldiers came down into Calhoun Coulee, this was the C company charge. This indicates that the battalion was not wiped out in a short period of time, say 15-30 minutes, but rather there was time for Keogh to evaluate the situation. C company charged after the Indians got close enough to use indirect fire (arrows), which proved effective. If Keogh had been in the area of C company and L company, he would have been able to see that remaining and waiting for Benteen was futile, as there were too many Indians between him and Benteen. Benteen would never have been able to get through because he had about the same number of men as Keogh, and Keogh would have known that. Clustering the battalion around Calhoun Hill also would have shown itself to not be viable due to the effective indirect fire of the Indians. So only option 2, a mobile defense, was the only viable option. If Keogh was able to observe all this, and if he ordered the C company charge, then the destruction of his battalion is squarely on his shoulders. This is assuming that Keogh was in the area and able to observe events, and that he chose to stay in place.
What if he had been wounded prior to the C company charge? We know his body was found in the I company area, so if we assume he was wounded in that approximate area and unhorsed there, he would have been unable to observe the deteriorating situation and would have been unable to effectively communicate to the battalion that it was time to mount up and head north toward Custer. Would the 2IC have known the commander was incapacitated, and who was 2IC? Where was the 2IC? With the large distances that had to be covered and defended, communications would have required a mounted rider, and if Keogh was down and out, who in the immediate area would have assumed command, and would that officer or NCO have known the situation overall and been able to communicate to the three companies, which were out of mutual supporting range, that they needed to bug out and bug out quickly. With Keogh unable to command, the 3 companies would have acted independently, for the most part. With no other orders than to defend their areas, I doubt if any of the lieutenants in C or L companies would have realized the need or taken the initiative to evacuate north. And the officers in I company were too far away from Calhoun hill to see that action, and by then Crazy Horse was probably in the gap.
With Keogh wounded prior to C company's charge, the action would have followed exactly as it did. The Keogh battalion was the boy with his finger in the dam, which was going to crumble regardless. When C company charged, the finger in the dam was removed and the dam failed. From that point, it was probably 15 minutes or so before it was all over for the Keogh battalion.
We have know way of knowing if Keogh was wounded before the C charge, or if he was wounded at the end of the action. If he was wounded before, it takes away some of the blame for his battalion's destruction. If he was wounded afterwards, he bears the blunt of the blame, even if he didn't order the charge because he should have seen the hopelessness of trying to defend in place, and acted to save his command, regardless of what Custer would have said or thought afterwards.
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Post by wild on Oct 19, 2015 15:39:03 GMT -6
Hi Tom You are correct, you don't need blunders to produce a disaster, but it helps. We could call a number of things that happened that day comedy of errors, I think it is more akin to a "Shakespearian Tragedy." I believe things began to go sideways late the previous afternoon, beginning with a change in the commanders thought process You see the "blunders" are provided by our friends . They are a "man made" artifical solution. But the dynamic,the reality of thousands of warriors that destroyed Custer is a fact ,it is not conjured up. And unless that dynamic is shown to be inadequate then the favoured scenarios have issues. That is from where I'm coming. Cheers Richard
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Post by wild on Oct 19, 2015 15:51:09 GMT -6
So only option 2, a mobile defense, You cant fire carbines while mounted and revolvers are for shooting terrified women and children at close range. You can't drag horses around a fire fight.
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Post by Colt45 on Oct 19, 2015 19:29:21 GMT -6
So only option 2, a mobile defense,You cant fire carbines while mounted and revolvers are for shooting terrified women and children at close range. You can't drag horses around a fire fight. So I guess you think the option he selected was the right one? How did that work out? And you can fire carbines from the saddle, and pistols are not for shooting women and children. A mobile defense was the only possibility the Keogh battalion had for survival, and even then the odds were still against them. Survivability odds were zero with staying in place, and zero for defending enmass around Calhoun Hill.
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