phil
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Post by phil on Oct 7, 2015 9:01:11 GMT -6
Hello everyone. One aspect of this battle that I find most interesting is the strategic objective behind C Co's charge into Calhoun coulee. I appreciate that it has been discussed numerous times and of course we have the benefit of knowing what would follow. I have difficulty with it though. Not in the sense that I don't believe it happened, I believe it did happen, but rather from a military perspective what the strategic objective would be. As someone who has never served and has no military experience the notion that C Co would charge unsupported into Calhoun Coulee is rather difficult to grasp. Assuming that indirect fire from Calhoun coulee was coming down on Keogh Bn positions. This would've been untenable to Keogh. Casualties would've restricted his mobility, and with L Co on a skirmish line his mobility was restricted anyway. He has no reserve Company. I Co are covering the gap on Battle Ridge. Keogh, if indeed it was Keogh who ordered the charge had to have taken a desperate gamble. That C Co could charge, unsupported, clear out the Coulee and return to the ridgeline intact. Keogh had to have anticipated casualties amongst C Co that would change the nature of the battle and potentially restrict C Co's mobility. Was Keogh damned if he did and damned if he didn't? I'd love to read your thoughts on the strategic nature of this aspect of the battle? |
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Post by benteen on Oct 7, 2015 15:11:26 GMT -6
Hello everyone. One aspect of this battle that I find most interesting is the strategic objective behind C Co's charge into Calhoun coulee. I appreciate that it has been discussed numerous times and of course we have the benefit of knowing what would follow. I have difficulty with it though. Not in the sense that I don't believe it happened, I believe it did happen, but rather from a military perspective what the strategic objective would be. As someone who has never served and has no military experience the notion that C Co would charge unsupported into Calhoun Coulee is rather difficult to grasp. Assuming that indirect fire from Calhoun coulee was coming down on Keogh Bn positions. This would've been untenable to Keogh. Casualties would've restricted his mobility, and with L Co on a skirmish line his mobility was restricted anyway. He has no reserve Company. I Co are covering the gap on Battle Ridge. Keogh, if indeed it was Keogh who ordered the charge had to have taken a desperate gamble. That C Co could charge, unsupported, clear out the Coulee and return to the ridgeline intact. Keogh had to have anticipated casualties amongst C Co that would change the nature of the battle and potentially restrict C Co's mobility. Was Keogh damned if he did and damned if he didn't? I'd love to read your thoughts on the strategic nature of this aspect of the battle? Phil, Welcome aboard. My own opinion is that L company formed a skirmish line on Calhoun Hill. Warriors were coming from the village that would threaten L companies flank. Either Harrington himself or Keogh ordered it, but C company charged down to check their advance. Unfortunatley it didnt work, and in my opinion was the begining of the rout of Keoghs battalion. Be Well Dan |
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Post by wild on Oct 7, 2015 15:53:39 GMT -6
Phil
You will notice that all Custer's companys were fulfilling some fanciful tactical mission when the roof crashed in.
It's so much more sexy than what the markers and Indians numbers would suggest.
What you see on Battle Ridge and environs is the same as would have befallen Reno but for the arrival Benteen.
And if Reon had suffered such a fate we would be pontificating on the tactical missions of his companys.
And welcome
Cheers
Regards Dan hope you are full of the joys of life.
Richard
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Post by benteen on Oct 7, 2015 16:29:16 GMT -6
Regards Dan hope you are full of the joys of life. Richard Richard, Yes everything is fine with me, thank you for asking, I appreciate it very much. But, of course at my age not spilling my drink in my bat cave is now the joy of my life  Hope all is fine with you as well my friend. Be Well Dan |
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phil
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Post by phil on Oct 7, 2015 18:18:01 GMT -6
Hi Dan and Richard. thank you for the welcome.
It may well be that I'm over thinking this portion of the battle. Keogh could've simply been responding to an increasingly intolerable threat, which inadvertently went wrong leading to collapse, rout and defeat.
We don't know for certain what Keoghs mission was. I am going to assume (dangerous I know) that Keogh wanted to retain his battalions Mobility and did not want to become decisively engaged. No easy thing with L Co dismounted on a skirmish line.
Putting it this way. How does C Co charging into Calhoun Coulee help Keogh?
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Post by mac on Oct 7, 2015 20:27:40 GMT -6
Hello everyone. One aspect of this battle that I find most interesting is the strategic objective behind C Co's charge into Calhoun coulee. I appreciate that it has been discussed numerous times and of course we have the benefit of knowing what would follow. I have difficulty with it though. Not in the sense that I don't believe it happened, I believe it did happen, but rather from a military perspective what the strategic objective would be. As someone who has never served and has no military experience the notion that C Co would charge unsupported into Calhoun Coulee is rather difficult to grasp. Assuming that indirect fire from Calhoun coulee was coming down on Keogh Bn positions. This would've been untenable to Keogh. Casualties would've restricted his mobility, and with L Co on a skirmish line his mobility was restricted anyway. He has no reserve Company. I Co are covering the gap on Battle Ridge. Keogh, if indeed it was Keogh who ordered the charge had to have taken a desperate gamble. That C Co could charge, unsupported, clear out the Coulee and return to the ridgeline intact. Keogh had to have anticipated casualties amongst C Co that would change the nature of the battle and potentially restrict C Co's mobility. Was Keogh damned if he did and damned if he didn't? I'd love to read your thoughts on the strategic nature of this aspect of the battle? Having recently stood on Calhoun Hill I too am troubled by this. I will say the key here is the highlighted portion. Unsupported...and when they do they leave Company L unsupported so you can see why the whole thing will quickly fall apart. I understand why that area may need to have the warriors pushed back but I would think the best method would be on foot rather than mounted and the real trap is to go too far because then you are close to GG ridge and as you say unsupported. Cheers |
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phil
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Post by phil on Oct 8, 2015 5:47:22 GMT -6
Phil You will notice that all Custer's companys were fulfilling some fanciful tactical mission when the roof crashed in. It's so much more sexy than what the markers and Indians numbers would suggest. What you see on Battle Ridge and environs is the same as would have befallen Reno but for the arrival Benteen. And if Reon had suffered such a fate we would be pontificating on the tactical missions of his companys. And welcome Cheers Hello WildI don't want to misunderstand your post. Are you suggesting that there was no tactical attempt made by Keogh or his officers in response to the NA threat? |
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phil
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Post by phil on Oct 8, 2015 6:29:42 GMT -6
Hello Mac
It appears that the use of the quote function is beyond my limited IT skills at the moment.
I've never had the opportunity to visit the LBH battlefield. Which of course make's it a lot harder to visualise the terrain.
It appears to me that at a certain point Keogh (whether he knew it or not) was faced with numerous bad options and no good ones. Perhaps C Cos attempt to remove the threat from Calhoun Coulee was the best of the bad options available.
Even so assuming Keogh ordered the move or even witnessed it. One thinks it would've been deeply troubling. Each step C co takes towards Calhoun Coulee creates more distant between I, C and L Companies. Each step creates more chance for a decisive engagement, decreases Keogh Battalion mobility. With the added problem that if C Co get into trouble Keogh has no way to extricate them.
Allowing for few Keogh Battalion casualties at this stage of the engagement and possibly the flawed thinking that they still control the outcome the C Co move seems very risky.
What other options did Keogh have? Would they have made any difference?
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Post by fred on Oct 8, 2015 9:17:13 GMT -6
Having recently stood on Calhoun Hill I too am troubled by this. I will say the key here is the highlighted portion. Unsupported... The real question should be, Considering the circumstances, what was the alternative? And with Calhoun's skirmish lines, was it really unsupported given the terrain, the dispositions, and the circumstances? I find those questions would be more interesting to debate and discuss than the simply, Why did he charge? Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by mac on Oct 8, 2015 15:23:23 GMT -6
Fred
I see the alternative as to attack on foot rather than mounted.
Once you go far enough you are so close to GG ridge that any attack from the warriors is too fast to counter. Remembering too that L is presumably under some pressure as they have already been forced to relocate.
Gotta go
Cheers
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Post by wild on Oct 8, 2015 16:09:34 GMT -6
Hi Phil
Hello WildI don't want to misunderstand your post. Are you suggesting that there was no tactical attempt made by Keogh or his officers in response to the NA threat?
First off it was not a threat it was a tsunami.
The markers suggest neither Custer nor Keogh had time to organise a defence .
We have two battalions neither of which can manage even the most rudimentry defence.
If Keogh and Custer had had the time, ordering single troop actions against thousands of advancing Indians is so tactically cretinous that I just dismiss it out of hand .
No defence by the two battalions either together or seperately to me suggests they were overwhelmed while trying to break contact.
Custer had taken them into the maw of death and paid the price.
I think it was all over in at the most 20 minutes . And I think the Indians advanced on Reno/Benteen on Weir Point after they had looted the battlefield.
I think there is a reluctance to accept that Custer went down without hardly a fight thus tactical monstrosities are conjured up so as to explain the positions of the markers.
Cheers
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phil
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Post by phil on Oct 9, 2015 6:56:21 GMT -6
Hi Wild
You could be right and obviously there came a point when they were forced onto the defensive or were trying to break contact or both and overwhelmed. At what point do you think they were trying to break contact?
The markers could also suggest single troop actions that were either offensively reactive (C Co) or desperate (E Co).
Ordering single troop actions against thousands of NA's does seem cretinous unless desperate. That was why I was struggling with the C Co charge, I was visualising Keogh sending these guys into a hornets nest and wondering why. However ordering single troop actions against what you think are a few dozen NA's when in actuality there are many more hidden by the terrain is another matter.
With respect to the Keogh sector I think that Keogh was always going to struggle to break contact once L Co were on a skirmish line and NA's were in Calhoun Coulee. Add the possibility of casualties from indirect fire and his problems are compounded.
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Post by mchlwilson on Oct 11, 2015 7:34:54 GMT -6
Phil,
I believe elements of C Company took up position on Finley-Finkle Ridge in order to help cover the withdrawal from the ford.
Not long thereafter, the remaining elements of C Company charged down into Calhoun Coulee to relieve the C Company troops who had by then become trapped and beleaguered on Finley-Finkle Ridge.
The real mistake was not immediately withdrawing the C Company troops from Finley-Finkle once Keogh's battalion had arrived on Calhoun Hill.
Michael
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phil
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Post by phil on Oct 11, 2015 10:43:38 GMT -6
Phil, I believe elements of C Company took up position on Finley-Finkle Ridge in order to help cover the withdrawal from the ford. Not long thereafter, the remaining elements of C Company charged down into Calhoun Coulee to relieve the C Company troops who had by then become trapped and beleaguered on Finley-Finkle Ridge. The real mistake was not immediately withdrawing the C Company troops from Finley-Finkle once Keogh's battalion had arrived on Calhoun Hill. Michael Hi Michael.
Just to be certain, when you say Ford, presumably that's Ford B?
Do you mind elaborating on your theory please? Specifically with respect to HQ and Yates Bn movements post Ford B, How long elements of C co were on FFR? and approximate time scale of movements and Keogh Bn collapse?
Thank's
Just to add. I'm off to Cornwall for a few days in the morning and will be without internet. So may not be unable to reply till next Friday evening. |
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Post by mac on Oct 12, 2015 4:09:20 GMT -6
Phil, I believe elements of C Company took up position on Finley-Finkle Ridge in order to help cover the withdrawal from the ford. Not long thereafter, the remaining elements of C Company charged down into Calhoun Coulee to relieve the C Company troops who had by then become trapped and beleaguered on Finley-Finkle Ridge. The real mistake was not immediately withdrawing the C Company troops from Finley-Finkle once Keogh's battalion had arrived on Calhoun Hill. Michael Hi Michael.
Just to be certain, when you say Ford, presumably that's Ford B?
Do you mind elaborating on your theory please? Specifically with respect to HQ and Yates Bn movements post Ford B, How long elements of C co were on FFR? and approximate time scale of movements and Keogh Bn collapse?
Thank's
Just to add. I'm off to Cornwall for a few days in the morning and will be without internet. So may not be unable to reply till next Friday evening. This is an interesting point of view. I wonder why only some of C would be positioned on the ridge and why they would remain. Interested to hear further arguments. Cheers |
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