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Post by fred on Oct 2, 2015 16:01:18 GMT -6
Magpie,
The problem with your line is that the terrain stinks. You are stuck on all these ridges with easily accessible coulees, i. e., avenues, into the rear of all your positions. And you don't have enough men for the frontage. Your concept is right, but this terrain was awful. Everybody screams about how crappy Reno Hill was, but it was the most easily defended terrain in the whole area. There was no way to assault it except from the front: you couldn't get behind any of the troops and Benteen had no flanks... so the only thing left was a frontal assault... and the Indians weren't about to do that. The troops had pretty decent fields of fire (something lacking totally in Reno's timber) and essentially, with no flanks, you couldn't surround them. Remember, the river bluffs shut off that avenue... and that was proven by Benteen's first charge. Then the warriors tried a frontal assault and that didn't work either.
So you see, high ground is not always the solution. You need a way out... and if you do not have that, then you need to be able to make your enemy pay a price he may not want to pay.
You think Reno was stupid getting out of that timber? First of all, it was too large to defend with his meager force and second, he was in the process of getting shut-in with limited ammo. There were no fields of fire and virtually no ability for command and control. Again, the "brow" was a great defensive position, but you will also notice the Indians never attacked the brow up close. They preferred to infiltrate from the brow's right and shut in the troops from the left. With the river in the rear, that left became the only escape route... and Reno was losing it quickly.
Best wishes,
Fred.
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Post by fred on Oct 2, 2015 16:02:41 GMT -6
The position is located on the lower part of Crook's ridge, and the skirmish line heads NW towards the upper reaches of the Ridge, and towards Indian positions on the right flank, too. Both regions are within areas given by a viewshed analysis. Best, Pete Hey, Pete, let me see if I can find it on the University of Texas maps posted here earlier. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by fred on Oct 2, 2015 16:17:44 GMT -6
The position is located on the lower part of Crook's ridge, and the skirmish line heads NW towards the upper reaches of the Ridge, and towards Indian positions on the right flank, too. Both regions are within areas given by a viewshed analysis. I am assuming these are the D/4I (CPT Avery Cain), F/4I (CPT Gerhard Luhn), and C/9I (CPT Samuel Munson) positions, correct? If so, unless the map exaggerates, it appears they had 6 cavalry companies-- 3 on either flank-- and some auxiliaries in front of them. That seems to me to be a reasonably safe position and if they formed into an arced skirmish line atop a ridge with flank protection, that was a good decision. Now you have me reading about the Rosebud!!!! to see what happened to these guys and how well they did. From the looks of that map, they did pretty well. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by mchlwilson on Oct 2, 2015 17:22:06 GMT -6
I'm speculating that when Indians were on GGR and in its vicinity they were being shot at by Custer's men (E and F) who were on the western slope of LSH (the basin). This was in addition to being fired at by C-I-L on Battle Ridge. In other words, I am speculating that the Indians that were on GGR and emerging from Calhoun Coulee were confronted with flanking fire from LSH and frontal fire from Battle Ridge. Perhaps a better way to say it is that Custer's defense had some depth to it. (I am not saying soldiers were on GGR) If I have not answered your question satisfactorily, I am going to try to post a map here that was in the book... try to point out the specific areas you are talking about and I will try to answer as best I can. Let's see if this works... Hi Fred, Yes, I am a member of LBHA and am looking forward to the next issue of Research Review! I also have your book so I am familiar with your excellent maps. Here's what I think: 1. Indians were massing in the Calhoun coulee region. That's why C company charged. I am sure that if troops were on the western slope of LSH they would have had a line of sight over Harrington Ridge, and could have fired on the Indians. They also had a line of sight to some parts of GGR. The elevations on your map support this. Also, see the photo I posted earlier in the thread. This confirms the line of sight. Now, I'm not saying it did happen; rather that it could have. 2. I agree with you that FInley-Finkle ridge is a death trap. But that doesn't mean they didn't try to hold it. I think they blundered into trying to hold it. An inexperienced officer may have thought it was key terrain. I still think that some troops were there, and that the charge downhill was to relieve pressure on them and pull them back. 3. I appreciate all your help and comments! Michael |
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Post by magpie on Oct 2, 2015 18:22:11 GMT -6
Magpie, The problem with your line is that the terrain stinks. You are stuck on all these ridges with easily accessible coulees, i. e., avenues, into the rear of all your positions. And you don't have enough men for the frontage. Your concept is right, but this terrain was awful. Everybody screams about how crappy Reno Hill was, but it was the most easily defended terrain in the whole area. There was no way to assault it except from the front: you couldn't get behind any of the troops and Benteen had no flanks... so the only thing left was a frontal assault... and the Indians weren't about to do that. The troops had pretty decent fields of fire (something lacking totally in Reno's timber) and essentially, with no flanks, you couldn't surround them. Remember, the river bluffs shut off that avenue... and that was proven by Benteen's first charge. Then the warriors tried a frontal assault and that didn't work either. So you see, high ground is not always the solution. You need a way out... and if you do not have that, then you need to be able to make your enemy pay a price he may not want to pay. You think Reno was stupid getting out of that timber? First of all, it was too large to defend with his meager force and second, he was in the process of getting shut-in with limited ammo. There were no fields of fire and virtually no ability for command and control. Again, the "brow" was a great defensive position, but you will also notice the Indians never attacked the brow up close. They preferred to infiltrate from the brow's right and shut in the troops from the left. With the river in the rear, that left became the only escape route... and Reno was losing it quickly. Best wishes, Fred. Fred: I'm not that guy wanting Reno to stay in the Timber. My proof on that note is simple as Indian accounts claim that just as they were about to launch their assualt on Reno's Timber position Reno withdrew. Assume Indians would not make afrontal assualt on anything unless they were sure of an easy victory { = Indians agreed with Reno: Timber could not be held}. In their continuous state of warfare their mantra was to" live to fight another day " as apposed to ours "A War to end All Wars". On the other 1.) This is the ground you have. 2.) This is the men you have. 3.) You must make it work you have no choice. I think many are too worried about infiltration. Yes a worry in the savana, tall grass prairie, the Timber, a rice paddy or with sage brush. This ridge doesn't appear to be this. I will see you at 200 yards and I will kill you at 100 yards my cousin will see you at 1-2 miles he will kill you sooner. We hunt mule deer this way from 2-3 miles away, we then send one man as a flusher the other to ambush our pincher is two miles across. You may however go one ridglet over and hide just below the brow, you may also distract me and make it to a small depression and lie in it to hide like Reno's one coward tried. You can now harass me from these positions mostly 300 yards and all lower in elevation. or more away: happy shooting. I hope only to expose my head and have my men lie prone so they can hit a target, they can lay on their pistols for chance of close in combat. Remember there's more cover in the Reno sector and he had one coup counting infiltrator who died trying. I am excluding Benteen's countercharge section. Most of Reno's harassing fire came from above (higher elevation). I think the effective distance for arrows is less than 200 feet. Nice weapons though, not to be discounted. This is big country, much bigger than a football field and a 15 yard cover zone in football is doable right? We would find it plumb cramped to see guys within 15 yards of each other. We herd things here with riders hundreds of yards apart. So where are my weaknesses: 1.) enemy can infiltrate up Deep Ravine from 40 feet above I will rain bullets down on you in a cross fire from the "tails" of the South Skirmish Line ridge (Western terminus) and from the ridge from Calhoun Hill to Deep ravine. Your Forces may chose to attack these Western Terminus ends ( Last Stand to Deep Ravine Ridge and Calhoun Hill to Deep Ravine Ridge). On the Southern Ridge (Calhoun-Deep) you will have to run up a 20% grade the other (LSH-Deep) is only a ten percent ( ten percent means if you're Crazy Horse sitting in your saddle 100 feet away I, Tom laying on my belly my carbine is still 3 feet higher in elevation than yours. You present a target 9 feet tall by 2-10 feet. I present a Target 1 foot in diameter. THERE IS NO ONE FIRING INTO MY REAR because I have a box defense on the highest ground. I keep my platoon leaders moving standing exposing only their heads to be spotters for my riflemen. I have two castle keeps over looking your Deep Ravine 300 yards apart so please enter the Kill Zone. You can tactically overcome my position but you will pay dearly. Someone thought they could attack and roll up the line. The other two ridge line skirmishers can fire onto the third line creating a cross fire and probably some friendly losses but you will pay a price for your valor. The other advantage to my proposal is 2 of my ridge lines are manned by George A. Custer in 1876. The 3rd and the strongest position is not because some fool put my men on the wrong ridge extending my lines and spreading my Terminuses, spreading my Castle Keeps from 300 yards apart to 800 yards and so I die at high noon June 25th 1876. |
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Post by fred on Oct 2, 2015 19:10:43 GMT -6
Magpie,
You have multiple issues here.
First of all, you don't have the men to maintain such positions, especially if you are boxing them... and the terrain is such that you can get closer than your figures show. Next, you are out-numbered 8-to-1. At least. Next, to do what you are suggesting, you need to give up your mobility and where are you going to put your horses. Once you start to lose those animals, you are cooked because you have no escape routes.
Next, such a position doesn't achieve your mission: at best, you reach a stalemate-- which I believe is highly improbable-- and that means you lose, simply because that isn't your mission. Custer's mission was to kill, capture, and herd.
You are also limited in your armament: single-shot carbines... and you cannot do it all on your belly.
When I was in the army, we-- my unit-- did away with skirmish lines and we resorted to the fire-and-maneuver concepts. As a platoon leader I had three rifle squads, each consisting of two fire teams. That gave me six maneuver elements I could control by moving one or multiples, while the static teams provided covering fire. That is not a lot different than how the Indians fought, though I am sure they only conceptualized it and never conceived it as doctrinal. Your defenses are going to take casualties and without the weaponry, i. e., repeating weapons, there is no way you can equalize the odds.
Best wishes,
Fred.
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Post by montrose on Oct 3, 2015 8:09:43 GMT -6
Magpie,
If you can hit animals at 1-2 miles, that's pretty good shooting. But you are not using the 1873 Springfield Carbine with iron sights.
The weapon system had been fielded to the 7th only in the last 1-2 years, with minimal training. The training that did take place was collective training, shooting at a sheet 4 feet high and fifty feet long. Not the way to train individual marksmanship.
Skirmish lines had men separated 4-5 meters, not 15. Fire control and management was very clearly a problem at LBH. The carbine had an effective range of 300 meters, but the poor state of training within the 7th meant that their effective range was less, 200 meters. There have been posts showing the elevation and windage performance of the 1873 carbine. If you are a trained shooter you can look at the tables and see the challenge this weapon possesses shooting at range. It requires more training than modern rifles.
Just curious, do civilian rifle ranges include pop up and moving targets? Snap shooting and instinctive fire?
One of the immediate measures the Army took after LBH was to mandate marksmanship training. Those directives started being issued in July 1876. It took them until the 1880s to develop tasks, conditions and standards for such training, and to resource the ammunition and ranges required to support it.
Tactics is the art of the possible, where weapon performance data intersects individual and collective training.
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Post by magpie on Oct 3, 2015 8:25:10 GMT -6
Magpie, You have multiple issues here. First of all, you don't have the men to maintain such positions, especially if you are boxing them... and the terrain is such that you can get closer than your figures show. Next, you are out-numbered 8-to-1. At least. Next, to do what you are suggesting, you need to give up your mobility and where are you going to put your horses. Once you start to lose those animals, you are cooked because you have no escape routes. Next, such a position doesn't achieve your mission: at best, you reach a stalemate-- which I believe is highly improbable-- and that means you lose, simply because that isn't your mission. Custer's mission was to kill, capture, and herd. You are also limited in your armament: single-shot carbines... and you cannot do it all on your belly. When I was in the army, we-- my unit-- did away with skirmish lines and we resorted to the fire-and-maneuver concepts. As a platoon leader I had three rifle squads, each consisting of two fire teams. That gave me six maneuver elements I could control by moving one or multiples, while the static teams provided covering fire. That is not a lot different than how the Indians fought, though I am sure they only conceptualized it and never conceived it as doctrinal. Your defenses are going to take casualties and without the weaponry, i. e., repeating weapons, there is no way you can equalize the odds. Best wishes, Fred. Errata: my perimeter is 1.5 miles not 1,500 yards. Distance between men still 15 yards. Essential problem with your thesis is this is the only realestate you can buy. You had enough but you spent it throwing a party for Reno, Benteen and the packtrain. No bottomland or waterfront realestate for you just high and dry. You lost your offensive capablites as soon as you found you are outnumbered and then the possibility fell to negative numbers when you were cut off from reinforcement and supply. This idea that so many have that your wondering around looking for a way into the fight is ludicrous. This except for minor adjustments using small counter attack's (like Benteen's 15 minute action in 48 hours of static combat). You cannot engauge in offense or in a fire fight do to limited ammunition you need them to come to you. You need water. You do not need horses. You can tie them down inside the triangle of ridges at the most advantagous spot. Take the horse holders and make a reserve unit for counter attack. If you hit Ford D I'll court marshal you as you are doing the exact opposite of my orders and driving Indians West and South. If Sherman established a need for 2 to 1 superiority to go on the offense and your 1 to 8 it just shows how ludicrous these ideas are. Even if you allow 1 to 6 as Agincourt your trying to surpass that by 3 times. So sorry your on the static defensive and as you say you are trying to extract a price and you are no longer an immediate threat to the Indian Village. This is your only chance for survival. Indians don't like high prices as they are in a constant state of warfare. As Julius Caesar told his men as long as you don't turn your backs or bunch up I will guarantee you we will almost always survive but he fought with 3 lines and a reserve. Modern tactics are further away from Indian war tactics then Caesar is. Neither had to worry about machine guns, neither had to worry about being zero'd in for artillery, air to ground all raining schrapnel and projectiles from above. They didn't have to face grenades, grenade launchers, effective snipers, claymores and IED. All the above favoring very mobile infantry of today. Don't stand still and no one can make plans to kill you.The new methods were necessary but as we have to retake hard won pieces of realestate again and again their advantages are not so large. This Indian War is showing the beginings of the fire fight which is today dominant. Fire fights take a lot of ammunition. Reno engauged in one with the ditch but could sustain it for only ten minutes and the Indians closed in 90-120 seconds. You however were trained in the age of the fire fight. An age were you don't even see the guy you hit and for the most part you just scare him away and they kill him from the sky as soon as you force him to mass and you push him away from your fellow friendlies. If we are to believe the pictographs the soldiers didn't head Caesar's advice and they turned their backs. Also I repeat as I have asked many before: This is the only ground you have how are you going to fight it? This will probably answer how Custer fought it. |
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Post by magpie on Oct 3, 2015 9:44:55 GMT -6
Magpie, If you can hit animals at 1-2 miles, that's pretty good shooting. But you are not using the 1873 Springfield Carbine with iron sights. The weapon system had been fielded to the 7th only in the last 1-2 years, with minimal training. The training that did take place was collective training, shooting at a sheet 4 feet high and fifty feet long. Not the way to train individual marksmanship. Skirmish lines had men separated 4-5 meters, not 15. Fire control and management was very clearly a problem at LBH. The carbine had an effective range of 300 meters, but the poor state of training within the 7th meant that their effective range was less, 200 meters. There have been posts showing the elevation and windage performance of the 1873 carbine. If you are a trained shooter you can look at the tables and see the challenge this weapon possesses shooting at range. It requires more training than modern rifles. Just curious, do civilian rifle ranges include pop up and moving targets? Snap shooting and instinctive fire? One of the immediate measures the Army took after LBH was to mandate marksmanship training. Those directives started being issued in July 1876. It took them until the 1880s to develop tasks, conditions and standards for such training, and to resource the ammunition and ranges required to support it. Tactics is the art of the possible, where weapon performance data intersects individual and collective training. No fair, Time out, instant replay: I said he would see them at 1-2 miles and kill them before I could (me needing 100 yards or less for a mounted warrior and probaly 100 feet for one on foot probabley ten for one who's found a low spot to creep up on. Agreed I don't have any promarksmen. One third are green as the grass. I was pissed when the Army handed me a weapon with a front sight designed for Volkswagen hunting. Yes I agree not a flat shooting WW1 gun. I am thinking whites of the eyes. I am also aware and this is a quote from a aquaitence of mine from years ago who was a WW2 recon soldier: "All I saw was men scared out of their minds firing at nothing, I wanted no part of them, I clung the German lines where it was safe because they would not fire unless a target could be hit". So I am just trying to extract a price. I have no allusions of bagging many. My girl friend was an amazing shot at rabbits, me I used a shot gun or crept with stealth and a scope. About 7 years ago I collected some Jack rabbit's for my study. My cousin handed me a 20?? something with high powered ammunition probaly costing $2 a piece so I tried my best found tame jacks and I was a little over 2 rounds a rabbit. Not proud of that, so a rusty promarksmen I am at best. Again guys this is the Battle: fight it or die, these people don't take Prisoners. I am very much aware ACW 600 rounds to a KIA. I hope to kill their lead men in any advance and hope they fall back try again and repeat. I would also point out the army chose their Springfield over the Winchester in part because it could sustain higher firing rates than the semiauto. Been too long since I loaded or saw loaded a winchester but apparently filling the magazine is just slow enough. It also appears if I fire 15 rounds rapid my gun will start to heat up and jam. I really don't want rapid firing rates. The Springfield also had impressive range, like I said the beginings of a fire fight age (you won't hit much but just scare the s#$& out of the opposition. Again fight the ground with the men you have not the ones you wish for. Pick a spot and tell me how your going to fend of Crazy Horse from the North and Gall from the South. If you have a better idea lets hear it. As the marble markers or the ballistics show Custer's square perimeter is 2.5 miles. I found a Triangle of all high ground by straightening his Calhoun line and moving it 300-500 some odd yards North to one of the best ridges to defend in Custer's sector. My only change to Custer's armies remains. |
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Post by fred on Oct 3, 2015 11:08:27 GMT -6
If Sherman established a need for 2 to 1 superiority to go on the offense... I believe this was 3-to-1, not 2-to-1... but I could be wrong. We always used 3-to-1. Magpie, I think you are mis-reading here. I am not defending Custer's actions at all; I am merely stating what he did... or what I believe he did. And why he did it: his reasons. I certainly do not defend what he did. His mistakes began when he turned to the right as Reno was crossing at Ford A. And things-- mistakes-- became compounded from there: his departure north from 3,411; his departure north from Ford B... and on and on. Having said that, I still do not agree with your defensive set-up. Too many holes; too many assumptions; too many difficulties, not the least of which is defending at 15-yard intervals. That is bad enough, but when the bullets begin to fly, bunching begins, and bunching soon becomes mass, and mass is easy to assault... at least in that terrain and those conditions. If you read my book, I point out clearly these mistakes. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by magpie on Oct 3, 2015 11:50:17 GMT -6
I will read it. However in my scienario it still comes down to the Indians are closing from the NorthEast (Crazy Horse Inc) and the South (Gall Inc) on this spot and you have to fight it. I do realize that by making your timing pivot on 3411 and not the Weir Point peak/hill you have different timing. There are just too many Custer lasted 20 minutes Narratives for me to buy in being around longer, all that said I am not wanting to widen the debate but want to see how this exact spot is can be defended. What I keep seeing is from everyone is dancing in front of a D-9 cat and it's not plausible. So given all my weakness on this exact topography tell me how you can make it better.
I lack the computer skills you guy's have but I have marked over your topo and will try to load as there seem's to be confusion or too much work to what I am asking about. Hope it works.
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Post by wild on Oct 3, 2015 13:02:42 GMT -6
Magpie
When Custer's troopers dismounted to fight on foot they knew they were dead men .
There weapon and horses militated against defensive action.
Units do not disintregate slowely .The process accelerates rapidly with each casualty with the enemy growing in confidence in inverse proportion.
Your 15 yard intervals has troopers fighting as individuals with a weapon capable of firing 3 aimed rounds a minute.
Within minutes of contact it will become obvious that the opposing numbers are too great and cannot be held.
Men fighting at 15 yard intervals will not be able to see their comrades and officers . Fire control would not be possible.Overall control would not be possible .
On the opposite side the morale will be sky high . They have seen off Crook and many will be arriving from the Reno fight.
Bragging rights are at stake among the tribes ;who will be the first into the fray ? who will have the best loot, who will have the best stories.
The markers for me do not support a controlled managed defence.For me they suggest a command being run to ground , fragmented and destroyed in less time than it takes a hungry man to eat his dinner.
Cheers
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Post by fred on Oct 3, 2015 13:30:08 GMT -6
Wild,
I must tell you: that was a good post. I agree with you virtually 100%.
Best wishes,
Fred.
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Post by magpie on Oct 3, 2015 13:31:55 GMT -6
Magpie When Custer's troopers dismounted to fight on foot they knew they were dead men . There weapon and horses militated against defensive action. Units do not disintregate slowely .The process accelerates rapidly with each casualty with the enemy growing in confidence in inverse proportion. Your 15 yard intervals has troopers fighting as individuals with a weapon capable of firing 3 aimed rounds a minute. Within minutes of contact it will become obvious that the opposing numbers are too great and cannot be held. Men fighting at 15 yard intervals will not be able to see their comrades and officers . Fire control would not be possible.Overall control would not be possible . On the opposite side the morale will be sky high . They have seen off Crook and many will be arriving from the Reno fight. Bragging rights are at stake among the tribes ;who will be the first into the fray ? who will have the best loot, who will have the best stories. The markers for me do not support a controlled managed defence.For me they suggest a command being run to ground , fragmented and destroyed in less time than it takes a hungry man to eat his dinner. Cheers Hi and thanks: Just a secret: I agree with you. I am looking move counter move so I as Custer leading the retreat get there first and have to make a plan. We know Custer is not the best soldier but we know he may be the quickest. Speed may have been his crutch, he had dominated by speed alone and lazily didn't learn the fundamentals. I want the best defense that is available on this exact topography. Anyway I see this Calhoun line thrown out sometime across Galls advance and Custer running the Custer Ridge top up LSH and maybe initially as personal recon to deep ravine along the "South Skirmish line". As I see it this is the only defense. He never got the chance as the mounted warriors tor into his rear end and as described in the RCOI they put flankers 50 feet out with Winchesters level across their pomel and fire down your line. Warriors coup counting from behind. They rolled up his line before he could set it up. I disagree in that this is wide open country and you would not have trouble seeing your fellows along that barron ridge. The Calhoun "line" must have had 30 feet or more between. The psychological effect is hard for me to know. "Resolute" men could  |
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Post by magpie on Oct 3, 2015 14:40:11 GMT -6
Wild, I must tell you: that was a good post. I agree with you virtually 100%. Best wishes, Fred. So anyway this is what I see there as the only defensive plan possible with 500 Indians to your North and 500 to your South. Custer was a very ruthless commander It wouldn't surprise me if he'd shoot an enlisted man refusing an order in such a desperate situation. Sure everything you say is true a very thin blue line everyman fighting almost alone but in this open country it's very possible for five riflemen to fire at the same target. The Indians and the Gauls also did fight alone by individual valor. I think you'd need very competent squad leaders because a prone rifleman is likely to become myopic and I'm not sure he could hear you. Indians often withdraw if it gets expensive. Two other things Rainfall that May was 4 inches and with June there was 2 Inches. Our lands 100 miles South get saturated by water by the Spring melt, the grass grows in May and June and it takes the land till July and August in the typical year to Dry out. Except drought years, many as late. I very much doubt any visibility problems from dust off trail and off road given May's rainfall. According to Windolph only 1/2 the Indians had rifles. So visibility isn't an issue. Shock, Awe and the lack of water. Again besides shooting holes in my defense you've got to come up with an alternative one with the same men in the same square mile. Turn your back and run was tried. Attachments:
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