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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 22, 2015 13:24:37 GMT -6
Justin here are the strengths;
Dakota column (Gen. A Terry) 7th Cavalry. (12 Companies) Lt. Col. Custer (650) 17th Infantry (Companies C & G) Capt. Sanger 6th Infantry (Companies B, D & I) Capt. Baker Gatling Detachment / 20th Inf. 2nd Lt. Low (3 x Guns) 45 Indian Scouts & Interpreters
Montana column (Col. J Gibbon) 7th Infantry (6 Companies) Col. Gibbon 2nd Cavalry (Companies F, G, H & L)
Wyoming column (Gen. G Crook) 15 Companies from the 2nd (5 x Troops) and 3rd Cavalry (10 x Troops) 5 Companies from the 4th and 9th Infantry,
Ian.
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 22, 2015 14:49:25 GMT -6
Justin here are the strengths; Dakota column (Gen. A Terry) 7th Cavalry. (12 Companies) Lt. Col. Custer (650) 17th Infantry (Companies C & G) Capt. Sanger 6th Infantry (Companies B, D & I) Capt. Baker Gatling Detachment / 20th Inf. 2nd Lt. Low (3 x Guns) 45 Indian Scouts & Interpreters Montana column (Col. J Gibbon) 7th Infantry (6 Companies) Col. Gibbon 2nd Cavalry (Companies F, G, H & L) Wyoming column (Gen. G Crook) 15 Companies from the 2nd (5 x Troops) and 3rd Cavalry (10 x Troops) 5 Companies from the 4th and 9th Infantry, Ian. Ian,
It's not as simple as that, as Terry was using the Yellowstone as his supply route and not just as his northern barrier.
So the 17I and 6I companies (minus the one company on board the Far West) were at the Powder River depot with GAC's dismounts. One company of the 7I was also left at the Yellowstone, I recall, but further west near the mouth of TC or the BH (Fred will correct me if I am mistaken). So Terry was proceeding southwards with 4 companies of the 2C and 5 companies of the 7I. And the infantry numbers were even lower, equivalent to a cavalry company at 75% skirmish line strength.
I think Montrose's point about how the 7C was so short of mounts is a very good one. They left behind at the Powder River depot the equivalent of about 4 companies at the strength they later fought with at the LBH. That strikes me as a pre-campaign logistical blunder of the first order.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 22, 2015 14:51:44 GMT -6
WO: I would have to think long and hard before I would cut Custer loose to go out in the woods to relieve himself, fearing that he would not have the common sense to take paper along with him. Brisbin commanding is a bit too much for me but I do see your point. We take the need to split all too much for granted. Was it actually necessary to split? Was it the wise thing to do under the circumstances? You maneuver and fight your force within its capabilities, and those capabilities include the quality of leadership necessary to operate the force in independent and semi-independent groupings. I will put it to you all. Were you the best thing that ever happened to the military, the equivalent to sliced bread, and your three principal subordinates were an infirm but highly competent Roadrunner, an overweight and infirm in his own right Yosemite Sam, and Daffy Duck, faced with Terry's operational problem, what would you do? QC,
With hindsight, it would have been better for Terry to head south up the Rosebud with all 16 cavalry companies and mount some sort of 8/8 attack from the north and south at dawn on the 26th. But were the officers in their fatal "touch and go" mind set for hostile warfare.... Just leave the infantry to head to the mouth of the BH?
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jun 22, 2015 20:19:55 GMT -6
I do not get warm fuzzies by leaving 30 percent of my combat power and three automatic weapons in a parking lot doing nothing while the horse crappers go prancing about the countryside.
Why put them at the mouth of the Big Horn, or the junction of the Big Horn and Little Big Horn sitting on their fat butts if you are going to propose an attack from both north and south. What is the Infantry blocking if you are successful? That violates a Principle of War - Economy of Force - which states maximum use of all available forces.
Just how to go about this is another issue, not resolved. My suggestion, knowing we have organic reconnaissance now in the field, as I just received a picture of that southwest high ground I have often spoken about, is to wait for an after action de-brief from Tom and Steve, who this very moment are seeing, skulking and evaluating all of the terrain, to include Tullocks, and intend to look at the Highway 212 corridor as well and note the changes from 76.
Let's not make the same mistake that Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dumber did back many score years ago.
We either approach what Terry could have done differently like Terry did or like we were trained to do.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 23, 2015 2:49:25 GMT -6
So in reality this campaign should have been an all cavalry affair with the infantry just acting in a security role to protect individuals and supply bases. The whole thing looks like it was cooked up after dinner whilst enjoying brandy and cigars and formulated on a napkin.
They couldn't supply three full regiments of cavalry because of the lack of horses and various companies were on other duties, the 7th did however field twelve understrength companies, the 2nd had three missing and these were all at various points in Wyoming;
C: garrisoning Ft. Stambaugh D: remained at Goose Creek M: stationed at Camp Brown
The 3rd were missing seven; B: ? C: ? G: ? H: guarding the Platte River Bridge I: ? K: encamped at Wind River. L: ?
They were lucky that the Indians were not a fully organised and led force as these columns could have been attacked piecemeal, thus being either defeated or forced to halted and withdraw. Crook had the largest force and was knocked out the Frey, Custer had the second largest and they got cut up, the other two would have stood no chance.
This all sounds rather unrealistic and improbable, as even though the Indians could I suppose field more men then each of the individual columns and as we saw with Custer, they armed themselves with war booty (plenty of carbines and pistols w/ammo + horses) they would have grew stronger. But they never fought like that or even had the knowledge to compose such a strategy.
Just think of it, three columns in three different places, with no communications with each other, Hmmm….what would you military men call it “defeat in detail”?
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 23, 2015 8:24:55 GMT -6
I think it very interesting, don't know why I should as all battles, at all times, are somehow related, that I am coming across similarities between the LBH Campaign and the III Corps attack into the Seventh Army flank at the Bulge.
There were unity of command issues early on. Middleton the VIII Corp commander ordered a task force (from 4th AD) to establish contact with Bastogne. A small force (One tank-one armored Infantry company) drove into Bastogne unopposed, and the commander of that force was actually in conference with Colonel Roberts the armor commander in Bastogne, when he was ordered out and to return to 4th Armored control. Milliken at III Corp had a fit that Middleton had overstepped his bounds. (4th AD belonged to III Corps). The mission Patton gave them was to crush the flank, not relieve Bastogne. Crushing the flank would relieve Bastogne.
If you take heed to myth and legend, or watch a certain movie, you are led to believe that Patton turned a corps around on a dime, saddled up and moved north. Well he did that but it was a fairly large dime of time he turned on taking a heck of a lot more time than legend has it. He positioned his units in attack positions very carefully, and while that was taking place he had reconnaissance out for days defining the battle space he was to attack into. Combat Command A, 4th AD for instance had Troop A, 25th CRS out noting the locations of two Germans here, five there, a squad in this place, a platoon in that place, while the remainder of the combat command was maintaining, feeding fueling and organizing and preparing for battle confident in the intelligence of enemy and terrain they were being fed by Troop A (the dedicated recon asset of CCA).
CCA intended to attack from two separated columns running parallel to each other. Each of those battalion sized task forces were supported by a SP howitzer battalion dedicated to fire only for them, a full battalion mind you, a battalion, 18 guns. Those of you wondering why I emphasize that, a battalion is normally in support of a unit three times the size of a maneuver battalion task force.
Both combat commands of 4th AD were very much understrength. To compensate for their shortfalls they organized around those shortfalls to maximize the combat efficiency they had.
MG Gaffey (4th AD) and BG Ernest (CCA, 4th AD) took their mission seriously.
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 23, 2015 11:59:16 GMT -6
I do not get warm fuzzies by leaving 30 percent of my combat power and three automatic weapons in a parking lot doing nothing while the horse crappers go prancing about the countryside. QC,
If that was the price of bringing another 4 cavalry companies into play...
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jun 23, 2015 12:35:08 GMT -6
I don't think it was the price, or at least it did not have to be the price.
Those Indians had banded together for mutual protection, and I think they intended to stay that way until the threat was no longer present, or they were forced to split as a result of engagement. With adequate recon their movements could have been anticipated, and the forces arrayed against them could have maneuvered accordingly. The world was not going to stop if they were not brought to battle between the 25 and 27 of June.
I can think of ten ways, and /or positions I could have employed that Infantry and those guns to advantage in concert with a mounted action, just off the top of my head. I am sure others can think of many more. When you have a combined arms force - use it, as a combined arms force.
When you contemplate hitting, you don't pull punches.
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Post by dave on Jun 23, 2015 12:46:32 GMT -6
Gentlemen Who was responsible for not having enough mounts available for the 7th at FAL or the Powder River depot? Great discussion thread! Regards Dave
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 23, 2015 13:48:17 GMT -6
I don't think it was the price, or at least it did not have to be the price. Those Indians had banded together for mutual protection, and I think they intended to stay that way until the threat was no longer present, or they were forced to split as a result of engagement. With adequate recon their movements could have been anticipated, and the forces arrayed against them could have maneuvered accordingly. The world was not going to stop if they were not brought to battle between the 25 and 27 of June. I can think of ten ways, and /or positions I could have employed that Infantry and those guns to advantage in concert with a mounted action, just off the top of my head. I am sure others can think of many more. When you have a combined arms force - use it, as a combined arms force. When you contemplate hitting, you don't pull punches. QC,
You are preaching to the converted, but we are dealing with the 1876 mentality. If I am frank, Godfrey's quote about "touch and go" in Fred's book made quite an impression upon me. It seemed to encapsulate what I had been thinking independently. Were those officers in the mind set for co-ordination, given the communication options of the era...?
WO
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Post by Beth on Jun 23, 2015 15:33:57 GMT -6
Personally I feel that the mindset of 1876 inadvertently discouraged co-ordination. Officers were followed by the press and public like some follow celebrities today so there seems to have been more of a sense of personal glory than what was the common good for the campaign.
Custer gained nothing personally by just being a part of the campaign. He only gained personal cachet (providing he wont) by acting solo.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 23, 2015 16:23:10 GMT -6
WO I suspected I was doing just that, but while you are part of the target, the remainder surrounds you here.
Professionalism is professionalism both in 1876 and 2015. If I was talking about something that was just dreamed up yesterday, time period would be a plausible argument. If they had a touch and go mentality they were not professional then or now. These people were lazy of mind. That's what they will scatter, they will run, touch and go, Godfrey's excuse making, and all the imagined reasons why something could not be done the right way is --- JUST PLAIN LAZY.
None of these people, none of them, remotely resembled the picture we paint in our minds after overdosing on John Ford.
Soldiers find a way to adapt to conditions and overcome even the most adverse situations. That's why they draw pay. If they can not, will not, or do not they have no right to be labeled such.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 24, 2015 5:19:09 GMT -6
How many times would a regiment of US cavalry actually take to the field as a whole unit? From what I have gleaned from this site, is that they were usually distributed like “penny packets” to various outposts and forts in a constabulary role.
So in a way the company commander would be used to operating his company as a single entity and not as part of a lager body. The fort or outpost may well have infantry, artillery and engineers attached as well as cavalry, but the cavalry commander would probably be responsible for his command only.
So assembling a regiment after months or years, with all these company commanders who up till then had been used to flying solo, it must have been a big step up, plus the same could be said about the regimental staff, there could have been years of inactivity, and based around a regimental cadre containing one or maybe no companies to command.
So throwing all these ingredients together and taking to the field must have caused a catalogue of errors for all in command.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 24, 2015 8:41:31 GMT -6
Ian: As the American West was settled, numerous small posts sprung up all over the place used mainly to guard gateways, or critical points in pioneer travel. Most were one or two company sized affairs, where a single arm battalion (the 19th century definition) or a composite multi arm battalion would be stationed. You find this during a period I term as the first phase of westward expansion 1800-1870.
One that I am familiar with is Fort Garland, here in Colorado. It is well south of me, and if you care to look at a map of my State it is due west of Walsenburg and guards the pass over into the San Luis Valley. It consists of 8 to 10 buildings all of adobe construction that surround a small parade ground. I think all the original buildings are still there, the only thing gone are the stables which were across the modern road from the cantonment itself. The term stables is used loosely, more like a basic shelter and pen for livestock perhaps as big as a football or soccer field. The post could accommodate about a hundred personnel, and I believe for most of its existence it was manned by two companies of one of the Black cavalry regiments, either the 9th or 10th I think the 9th but not sure. It was closed as the need passed. Places like Fort Concho Texas, and Camp Verde, Arizona (which Steve is probably very familiar with) and a whole slew of others crop up either as a few very old buildings, or an historical highway marker all over the place from Saint Louis to California.
Starting post ACW, but really getting going in the 1870s, you find larger posts replacing these smaller ones, post like Fort Lincoln, ND, Fort Mackenzie, WY, and Fort Whipple, Arizona. These posts were typical of the second phase expansion, and many lasted until the end of World War I. Typically they would hold a greater number of companies, and as they evolved you would find one or two modern definition battalions stationed there. Fort Mackenzie in Sheridan WY had the capacity to hold two such modern battalions, and up to WWI two battalions of the 18th Infantry Regiment constituted the garrison.
There are a few from the first era around. Fort Bliss, Texas comes to mind as does Fort Riley, and Fort Leavenworth, both in Kansas which have expanded greatly from very humble roots. Most are like old Fort Wallace, also in Kansas, just a small cluster of worn grave stones out on the prairie.
The are several more still around from the second era Fort Sam Houston, Fort Sill, Francis Warren AFB, WY (originally Fort D A Russell then Fort Francis Warren), Offutt AFB, NB (originally Fort Crook), but they owe their continued existence to room to expand taken advantage of before population encroachment.
Most of what we have today are, or were, one division sized posts, like Fort Hood, or Fort Carson. Riley houses a division, but that division is for the most part out in the Custer Hill area, a fair distance from the old fort of cavalry days.
All this preamble is to put these things contained in your post above in its proper perspective. Deployment was mission oriented, and as the mission changed so did the method of deployment, a gathering in of the small into a larger facility.
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Post by tubman13 on Jun 28, 2015 15:35:50 GMT -6
Chuck, The above post is very to the point. I wish I could have done so well.
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