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Post by Beth on Jun 19, 2015 14:08:54 GMT -6
What could General Terry have done different? Should he have been riding with Custer? Does or what is his culpablitiy for events?
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shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Jun 19, 2015 18:13:08 GMT -6
This is a trick question, right? Actually a good question that I believe has been discussed before, but always bears looking at. Terry never should have let Custer operate independently. He should have kept him close. It's management 101. More than likely would have changed the find and approach the village strategy but that's for further discussion. Terry knew he had an issue (IMHO) but took the easy way out and let Custer have his independent command. Easier to feed the beast than to stick a collar around its neck and try to restrain it. What could General Terry have done different? Should he have been riding with Custer? Does or what is his culpablitiy for events?
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Post by quincannon on Jun 19, 2015 21:22:25 GMT -6
Agreed. He had the moral courage of a worm, and the spine of a jellyfish. It is like opening the door for a bull and then wondering why all the China in the shop was broken. He knew what Custer was, and instead of doing his job he took the easy way out. Terry is every bit as much to blame and responsible for what happened as Custer was. Different levels of course, operational vice tactical, but both kick the can.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 20, 2015 5:15:03 GMT -6
Just allowing a man like Custer loose with a regiment of cavalry was just asking for trouble, with a full 12 companies at his disposal wouldn’t it make this mission combat rather than reconnaissance? To me a recce or scout means a small detachment that keeps out of trouble and remains undetected by their foe.
Custer should (in my mind) be attached to Terry’s column like Royall was with Crook, and any scout or recce (because the column does need eyes) should be led by Reno and be battalion strength, Reno could have placed one company up ahead and kept the other two back, this would provide a screen for the main column and reconnoitre the trail.
Getting back to Custer, Terry must have had some idea that GAC would commit his full regiment to the attack if he found any village, thus attacking without the support of the rest of the column.
Ian.
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Post by Beth on Jun 20, 2015 16:02:30 GMT -6
I often wonder if Terry saw that nice comfortable cabin and dining room on the Far West and thought of another long ride in the saddle and thought "Hell No"
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Post by quincannon on Jun 20, 2015 16:13:15 GMT -6
I somewhat disagree Ian. Custer attacking without Terry was not the real issue. Given the same instructions, as sparse as they were, and hot on the trail, I believe I would have either attacked or maneuvered to a place where I would have forced them into undesirable (from their standpoint) maneuver, or the optional attack on me. I would willingly give them the temporary initiative if in so doing I could inflict more damage on them, then they on me.
It was not the attack. It was the manner and method.
It was a loose ball (Custer) rolling around the gun deck, and the deck without a monkey (Terry).
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Post by Beth on Jun 20, 2015 16:51:11 GMT -6
I somewhat disagree Ian. Custer attacking without Terry was not the real issue. Given the same instructions, as sparse as they were, and hot on the trail, I believe I would have either attacked or maneuvered to a place where I would have forced them into undesirable (from their standpoint) maneuver, or the optional attack on me. I would willingly give them the temporary initiative if in so doing I could inflict more damage on them, then they on me. It was not the attack. It was the manner and method. It was a loose ball (Custer) rolling around the gun deck, and the deck without a monkey (Terry). Can you elaborate? Please?
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Post by quincannon on Jun 20, 2015 18:35:24 GMT -6
I assume you understand the first two paragraphs, and they require no elaboration. THEREFORE.
In the age of fighting sail, a cannon ball, either solid shot or exploding shots were quite heavy. One getting loose and rolling around the gun deck of a ship already at the mercy of the whims of the sea, could in fact destroy a ship, or cause a great amount of casualties. It was the job of the powder monkey or more commonly monkey to assure that both shot and powder were handled correctly, and that there were no such occasions.
Custer, the loose ball rolling around the gun deck of the Dakota/Montana column, was the responsibility of Terry to control. He failed. Why he failed does not matter. Him failing is all that matters.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 21, 2015 5:57:29 GMT -6
Chuck, I would have thought that Custer going it alone made Terry’s column just a mop up unit, they were mainly an Infantry force without Custer and given the huge expanse between the two groups (Terry & Custer) they could not hope to keep up with a mobile force such as the 7th.
If the 6th and 17th Infantry were to make their presence felt and contribute to any battle then the two groups would have to work together, this could be something as simple as moving into a blocking position, and making this position known to Custer. Custer would have to know that this force was in place before he made his attack, which would require communication, something as far as I know didn’t happen during the later stages of the whole campaign.
It looks to me that we have four columns in this Campagne, Gibbon, Crook, Terry and Custer, as it looks like Custer never gave a thought to Terry, and if Gibbon could class his own 377 man force as a column they why couldn’t Custer with over 600.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 21, 2015 7:42:22 GMT -6
I don't think I was as clear as I should have been in what I said Ian.
To split or not to split (borrowing from the Bard) is Terry's decision alone.
No matter what one thinks of that decision, and I think it a bad one, diluting the forces available, once it was done, many fault Custer attacking without support. I don't. I fault the WAY he attacked not the attack itself.
Out on the Northern Plains at that time, once decisions were made, such as this split, it was very hard, and sometimes counterproductive to try and un-ring a bell.
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 22, 2015 10:32:01 GMT -6
Chuck, I would have thought that Custer going it alone made Terry’s column just a mop up unit, they were mainly an Infantry force without Custer and given the huge expanse between the two groups (Terry & Custer) they could not hope to keep up with a mobile force such as the 7th. If the 6th and 17th Infantry were to make their presence felt and contribute to any battle then the two groups would have to work together, this could be something as simple as moving into a blocking position, and making this position known to Custer. Custer would have to know that this force was in place before he made his attack, which would require communication, something as far as I know didn’t happen during the later stages of the whole campaign. It looks to me that we have four columns in this Campagne, Gibbon, Crook, Terry and Custer, as it looks like Custer never gave a thought to Terry, and if Gibbon could class his own 377 man force as a column they why couldn’t Custer with over 600. Ian. Ian,
The 6th and 17th Inf Regt companies were not really used as a combat force, were they?
They were simply guarding for Terry the supply lines along the Yellowstone?
Only the 16 companies of the 7th and 2nd Cav Regts and 5 companies of the 7th Inf were committed to the final thrust towards the LBH valley?
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 22, 2015 10:43:44 GMT -6
I think the problem with this scenario is hindsight, imputing knowledge to the participants.
I think my views on what the Centennial Campaign should have looked like are well known. I started what turned into a very lengthy thread on the very subject. But there was nothing inherently wrong with the basic premise of Terry in the LBH, 12 cavalry companies to the south of the hostiles and a mixed force of 9 companies to the north. There was simply tactical ineptitude on the 24th/25th, most of which I lay at the foot of George Armstrong Custer irrespective of his performances elsewhere post-West Point.
It's the same mistake in imputing hindsight upon Benteen and Reno when they converge at Reno Hill. They had no contemporaneous idea that GAC was being massacred on Battle Ridge. He could have been winning at the northern end of the village, he certainly drew hostiles from the south of the camp. If the opposing hostiles were too numerous, GAC would withdraw towards the BH or towards TC. Or he could dig in, just as Reno/Benteen elected to do. All Benteen knew for sure was that Reno's battalion was in distress.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jun 22, 2015 12:25:42 GMT -6
I agree. We do a lot of Monday morning quarterbacking here, and we have the outcome foremost in our minds, and not what should be foremost - the knowledge the decision maker had available when the decision was made.
I still would not have split as soon as Terry did, but then I am heavily influenced by a combined arms mentality.
I would never have turned Custer loose. That is not tactical or operational, that is a decision based upon known personality and past performance when acting independently. In that role he stunk. I would have no problem letting another loose though as a purely operational decision as long as I had the necessary confidence in that person.
We as a group, perhaps as a nation watch all too many John Ford westerns, and equate the sturdy regular, that ex Confederate, that hard bitten immigrant NCO, that our minds eye tells us is a veteran of other wars in other places, leaders competent to lead like Alshard, Brittles, Cohill, and even the fresh faced, but competent, Pennell, with the image of Custer and the 7th that passes before us. That is fiction folks, but a fiction we have absorbed to such an extent that it has become a false measurement of capability.
I am currently reading a book about the 5th Fallshirmjager Division facing the 4th Armored on the road to Bastogne. Despite the tough reputation of the fallshirmjager, these were a largely untrained incompetent bunch of airfield mechanics and ground support personnel, led for the most part by the equally incompetent, seasoned only by a few real paratroopers but not nearly enough. They fought bravely, but not well, and were slaughtered, not because they were not brave, but because they were not competent to fight
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Post by welshofficer on Jun 22, 2015 12:48:47 GMT -6
QC,
I don't like any tactical leeway for GAC, and Terry should have gone with the 7C and even if Gibbon's subsequent health might have resulted in Brisbin commanding the 2C/7I blocking force.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jun 22, 2015 12:58:08 GMT -6
WO: I would have to think long and hard before I would cut Custer loose to go out in the woods to relieve himself, fearing that he would not have the common sense to take paper along with him.
Brisbin commanding is a bit too much for me but I do see your point.
We take the need to split all too much for granted. Was it actually necessary to split? Was it the wise thing to do under the circumstances? You maneuver and fight your force within its capabilities, and those capabilities include the quality of leadership necessary to operate the force in independent and semi-independent groupings.
I will put it to you all. Were you the best thing that ever happened to the military, the equivalent to sliced bread, and your three principal subordinates were an infirm but highly competent Roadrunner, an overweight and infirm in his own right Yosemite Sam, and Daffy Duck, faced with Terry's operational problem, what would you do?
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