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Post by welshofficer on Jun 11, 2015 9:37:16 GMT -6
Ian,
Subject only to the precise orders given by GAC to Keogh, it is really a question of Keogh's obligations to GAC...?
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jun 11, 2015 9:41:56 GMT -6
Not so sure about that. Might be, but even when you give someone specific orders and they get in trouble following those orders obligatory responsibilities attach.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 11, 2015 9:51:19 GMT -6
You could say that if Custer and his two companies lined up to shoot it out then they probably faced the river, this would have left their rear totally exposed and vulnerable, this could mean that they hadn’t a clue to what was going on over the crest of battle ridge, so you could say that this could be said of the Indians, they were so busy fighting Keogh that they failed to notice themselves what was happening over the ridge line, and that the only Indians who engaged Custer were the late comers trying to get involved with the Keogh fight.
Justin, desperate times need desperate measures, both battalions should have stay active instead of digging their heels in and fighting it out, not keeping mobile played into the hands of the foot slogging Indians who just moved around their flanks.
Back to my original question; did Custer think he was being a good officer in covering Keogh’s back?
Ian.
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Post by dave on Jun 11, 2015 10:03:35 GMT -6
Ian Montrose one time wrote to the effect that once GAC crossed the LBH river whatever else he did was futile. He defended the area around cemetery hill simply because he had no where else to go. Being surrounded by the enemy made his world very, very small. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Jun 11, 2015 10:43:11 GMT -6
Ian it may be the mark of a "good officer" to try and close the barn door after the horse is gone, but the horse is still gone, and had that officer been as good as he thought he was, he would have not left the barn door open in the first place.
Custer comes around that corner from Ford D. He sees Indians coming over at Ford C and up Deep Ravine toward Keogh. He says ---- Yates, dismount E and cover E with a mounted F. He has no earthly idea that the Indians that did Keogh in were already well across and up toward Keogh, and the people he saw were the late arrivals.
As much as all of us supposed tacticians would love to be considered as a real life Austin Powers, international men of mystery, that just is not so nor are the things we do or did of a mysterious nature. To understand tactics and in particular tactical decision making you first must understand human, for they are all human. It does not take a good tactician to make a good tactical decision. It does however take a good decision maker to be a good tactician.
If you all keep looking in the weeds for answers you will not find them. You must stand above the weeds to see all.
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Post by Beth on Jun 11, 2015 11:25:28 GMT -6
Simple. He did not see them. He only saw Indians going toward Keogh and made the wrong decision on how to address the issue. Keogh was in all probability toast, by his own hand, by the time Custer detected the flow in Deep Ravine. I am oblivious to what is happening a mile away from my workshop where I type this. Hearing firing in the distance gives Custer no indication that Keogh is in trouble, only that firing was being herd, and Custer probably expected that. Seeing Indians coming across the river out of Ford C/Deep Ravine did not tell him Keogh's situation either. It only told Custer that if he did not do something Keogh would be in trouble. He made a bad decision based upon incomplete knowledge, and putting himself in a place to not have complete knowledge was a bad decision in and of itself. People see and hear what they expect to see and hear. You do, I do, all God's children do, UNLESS, they are drawn somehow to the fact that what they are seeing or hearing is not what they expect. Sitting in my workshop with the window open I expect to hear the occasional dog bark, traffic out on the boulevard, and perhaps being summer vacation from school the sound of children playing. If I saw heavy smoke in the distance, or the sound of gunfire nearby, that would not be expected and it would quickly draw my attention. Things done and left undone, actions taken and actions not taken, knowledge and lack of knowledge, all have consequences Ian. A lot of food for thought there. Custer saw and heard what he expected so he continued on with his plans with no sense of alarm. Perhaps though he expected to see Indians and hear gunfire, he just never got a good feel for the amount of fighting and where it was. Ironically that could have a lot to do with the lay of the land at LBH.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 11, 2015 11:53:20 GMT -6
Then if he did not take into consideration the lay of the land, that too was a bad decision.
You cannot concentrate on only one factor in decision making. You must concentrate on all relevant factors. It does not matter if there is a stop light at the end of your street. If there are kids playing in that street, and they are not paying attention, they are in danger, and all the stop lights in the world will not stop those who by intention or inattention run it. Now the fact that the ice cream man comes down that street at 7:00 PM and it is now only 4:00 is irrelevant to the problem at hand, and therefore not under consideration.
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Post by Beth on Jun 11, 2015 12:02:40 GMT -6
Then if he did not take into consideration the lay of the land, that too was a bad decision. You cannot concentrate on only one factor in decision making. You must concentrate on all relevant factors. It does not matter if there is a stop light at the end of your street. If there are kids playing in that street, and they are not paying attention, they are in danger, and all the stop lights in the world will not stop those who by intention or inattention run it. Now the fact that the ice cream man comes down that street at 7:00 PM and it is now only 4:00 is irrelevant to the problem at hand, and therefore not under consideration. You'll get no argument from me on that. Situational awareness is a life skill everyone needs just in day to day life, I imagine on a battlefield your awareness better be pegged on acute. Beth
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 11, 2015 12:08:54 GMT -6
If he did manage to creep around the east side of battle ridge unnoticed and reach ford D, then he should have gone back the way as he came, as this would have took him directly to the Keogh fight without being distracted by events along the river, if he was forced to go along the west side in full view of the village, then he should have known he was in real trouble.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Jun 11, 2015 13:14:52 GMT -6
Then if he did not take into consideration the lay of the land, that too was a bad decision. You cannot concentrate on only one factor in decision making. You must concentrate on all relevant factors. It does not matter if there is a stop light at the end of your street. If there are kids playing in that street, and they are not paying attention, they are in danger, and all the stop lights in the world will not stop those who by intention or inattention run it. Now the fact that the ice cream man comes down that street at 7:00 PM and it is now only 4:00 is irrelevant to the problem at hand, and therefore not under consideration. The ice cream man was hung up on Reno Hill, with out enough Dreamsicles to go around.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Jun 11, 2015 14:08:25 GMT -6
In April of 1912 the RMS Titanic hit an iceberg BECAUSE the ship was traveling at excessive speed for the sea conditions present. Changing lookouts for one more keen eyed. Having the Marconi in the receive mode and not send, the fact that there were more deck chairs to starboard than port. the orchestra being slightly out of tune during their dinner concert, the card sharp in the salon fleecing some easy pickings at the poker table, the overall construction quality of the ship, the fact it was painted black and white, or the fact that the deck hands sandwiches were made with white bread, had that all been changed it would not alter the fact that the ship was proceeding at a speed unsafe for sea conditions, and that was the primary cause of the disaster. You then look at who made that root cause decision, and ignore all of the potential band aids you might want to apply. Unless you change the root cause decision you will not change the outcome
Custer had an obligation to Keogh as his commander. His obligation to that man and the other 208 started to rapidly go south when he turned onto the bluffs and at the very same time he divorced himself from his obligation to the rest of his command. No matter what band aid you wish to apply it is a band aid application to a sucking chest wound and it will not save the patient. The patient will die. Unless you change the root cause decision you will not change the outcome.
Everyone is talking about things that might have mitigated the eventual outcome. Mitigation is not change. It is mitigation.
CHANGE OUTCOMES, that is where the answers lie.
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Post by Beth on Jun 11, 2015 15:59:08 GMT -6
I suspect that the only thing that would changed outcomes would have worked for Custer and ironically the Titanic was to slow things down. Both Captain Smith and GAC had faulty intelligence and were operating under an assumption that didn't exist. Smith thought he had calm seas and no ice and GAC thought he had a lot few warriors and they were scattering. In Smith's case they would have stood a chance to see the iceberg in time to react. The ice would have been a non issue, the Titanic would have had pleasant maiden voyage and would have sailed back and forward between the US and Europe for a few more years until the start of WWI.
However in Custer's case it's harder for me at least to foresee the outcome. Perhaps the tribes scattering and the rest of the summer spent trying to chase them back to the reservation with little effect until the exhausted Armies returned to their home forts in the fall. The next summer there would have been a new administration in the White House and perhaps new ideas how to handle the 'Indian problem.'
In that scenario the one who comes out worse would probably be Custer but it would mostly be because of his own fault for traveling with an embedded journalist who was reporting to the American public about Custer's campaign against "the red devil." Readers would not be happy with an "and they all got away." end to the story.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 11, 2015 16:18:32 GMT -6
Not exactly what I am getting at Beth. Smith slowing down was the solution, but he didn't most probably due to the pressure not to. Custer succumbed to pressure as well, different but similar.
Changing outcomes is more directed at looking at band aid solutions to sucking chest wound sized problems.
For instance Ian is suggesting things might have been different if, or things would have been better if. These are deck chair rearrangement proposals, but very useful in this particular discussion. We also all ask questions of why didn't he do this, or what did he see there.
None of these things is really pertinent, because all of them are the wrong questions or are pointing out the wrong issues.
Everything was caused by a Custer turn to the right and becoming separated from the rest by great distance. The reason he did it does not matter. He methodology in doing it does not matter. Substituting one company or one place for another, none of it matters, because reason, methodology, substatution of company or place, none of them change outcomes, The outcome of that turn to the right was loss. Unless you can change loss into win or draw, you have not changed outcomes.
Sometimes we get so far down in the weeds that we cannot see the grass much less the trees beyond. Sometimes I become so frustrated that it would seem we are all collectively saying that had Custer moved Private Snuffy three meters to the right in Company X's skirmish line the day was won. Ain't that simple.
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Post by Beth on Jun 11, 2015 16:43:58 GMT -6
Not exactly what I am getting at Beth. Smith slowing down was the solution, but he didn't most probably due to the pressure not to. Custer succumbed to pressure as well, different but similar. Changing outcomes is more directed at looking at band aid solutions to sucking chest wound sized problems. For instance Ian is suggesting things might have been different if, or things would have been better if. These are deck chair rearrangement proposals, but very useful in this particular discussion. We also all ask questions of why didn't he do this, or what did he see there. None of these things is really pertinent, because all of them are the wrong questions or are pointing out the wrong issues. Everything was caused by a Custer turn to the right and becoming separated from the rest by great distance. The reason he did it does not matter. He methodology in doing it does not matter. Substituting one company or one place for another, none of it matters, because reason, methodology, substatution of company or place, none of them change outcomes, The outcome of that turn to the right was loss. Unless you can change loss into win or draw, you have not changed outcomes. Sometimes we get so far down in the weeds that we cannot see the grass much less the trees beyond. Sometimes I become so frustrated that it would seem we are all collectively saying that had Custer moved Private Snuffy three meters to the right in Company X's skirmish line the day was won. Ain't that simple. Do we even know what a 'win' would have looked like in Little Bighorn, let alone what could have been done to get there? I also suspect the American public and the military might have held different opinions on what a successful campaign would have looked like and even with the American public people had different views about what to do with the 'Indian problem." The only thing that everyone seems to agree with was the Battle of Little Big Horn was not a win for Custer. Beth
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Post by quincannon on Jun 11, 2015 18:16:39 GMT -6
A win is a complete or partial achievement of the tactical objective, and or a furtherance of the operational objective.
Now don't ask me what the former was because I do not know.
The bottom line is that this is really simple stuff made complicated by one man's incompetent performance.
Mother Teresa and 12 convents of the Little Sisters of the Poor, could have done a better job than twelve companies of the United States Cavalry badly led
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