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Post by welshofficer on May 29, 2015 10:09:12 GMT -6
Just as importantly, Benteen in reserve would be the safeguard against any hostile envelopment via the Bluffs (Ford B, for the eastern side?). And potential options against the western pony herd.
A concentrated southern attack is fine. You just need Terry/Gibbon placed to block refugee flight across the Yellowstone.
The crows are to the west and eastwards would only provide temporary respite for any refugees.
WO
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Post by fred on May 29, 2015 10:21:46 GMT -6
Just as importantly, Benteen in reserve would be the safeguard against any hostile envelopment via the Bluffs (Ford B, for the eastern side?). And potential options against the western pony herd. A concentrated southern attack is fine. You just need Terry/Gibbon placed to block refugee flight across the Yellowstone. The Terry Gibbon column was the whole idea, though I am still unsure if Terry's plan called for him to advance beyond the Big Horn-Little Big Horn confluence. The plan was for him to be there in the morning of the 26th. Advancing, however, I am unclear on and need to do some more work. The reason he did advance, however, was primarily because of all the smoke they spotted in the valley. While the pincer business has some validity, it appears to me the whole thing was designed to be more "hammer-and-anvil" than pincer. I think Terry's force was too small and too immobile to be one fork of a pincer, but in place, with Indians driven into it, it could be extremely formidable. Remember... Gatlings are highly immobile. Another thing... fortuitous or not, there was never any plan making Benteen a reserve. If anything, that role should have fallen to McDougall... and he should have led the packs, not trailed. In reality, Mathey's overall train had two companies of cavalry PLUS McDougall's. Best wishes, 3,411
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Post by welshofficer on May 29, 2015 10:31:11 GMT -6
Fred,
I was just commenting upon Colt's specific plan - GAC leading 3 battalions northwards up the valley towards the hostile village.
Benteen in reserve with a 4th battalion makes sense to me. 8 companies should be able to cover that valley width east to west. Benteen then provides insurance against hostiles trying to get behind the assault via the bluffs, provides a flexible option of using that reserve battalion to attack via either flank, or an option to unleash fresh troops to reinvigorate any flagging frontal assault and regain momentum.
WO
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 29, 2015 11:12:27 GMT -6
Colt45: Some preliminary thoughts which are by no means final, and please let me play devils advocate for a moment. When I first read your proposal my immediate reaction was that it was a fine plan if you intended to slaughter indiscriminately and not capture. When I read your response however I see that you plan was for capture, but let me question that conclusion for a moment. Offensive action from the South would have required the troops to enter the village. A full charge could have been mounted after crossing the river but would have had to slow to a trot or at best a canter when entering the village. It is very difficult to aim a pistol from a horse at a trot unless you are standing in the stirrups a very tiresome thing to do for long. At a cantor the horses would be at a speed which would make it difficult to select your targets carefully so I think the soldiers would have just shot the first thing that moved. Now if the Indians chose to flee they could go north and west as you point out. Warriors engaging your force could have disrupted it long enough for many to flee while you picked your way through the village. Havoc would no doubt ensue without any way to cut off the women and children fleeing to the north or west. The reliance on Terrry to interdict them would require great timing and I think only result in a portion of them being captured. In sum, however I think you have raised fair points and an offense that could have worked. Custer was initially concerned when some Indians became aware of his presence that they would scatter in a lot of different directions and that the army would spend the rest of the year tracking them down. Had this occurred would Custer have been faulted by his superiors as Reynolds was for his failure to retain the village and captives on the Powder River?
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Post by welshofficer on May 29, 2015 11:29:43 GMT -6
Colt45: Some preliminary thoughts which are by no means final, and please let me play devils advocate for a moment. When I first read your proposal my immediate reaction was that it was a fine plan if you intended to slaughter indiscriminately and not capture. When I read your response however I see that you plan was for capture, but let me question that conclusion for a moment. Offensive action from the South would have required the troops to enter the village. A full charge could have been mounted after crossing the river but would have had to slow to a trot or at best a canter when entering the village. It is very difficult to aim a pistol from a horse at a trot unless you are standing in the stirrups a very tiresome thing to do for long. At a cantor the horses would be at a speed which would make it difficult to select your targets carefully so I think the soldiers would have just shot the first thing that moved. Now if the Indians chose to flee they could go north and west as you point out. Warriors engaging your force could have disrupted it long enough for many to flee while you picked your way through the village. Havoc would no doubt ensue without any way to cut off the women and children fleeing to the north or west. The reliance on Terrry to interdict them would require great timing and I think only result in a portion of them being captured. In sum, however I think you have raised fair points and an offense that could have worked. Custer was initially concerned when some Indians became aware of his presence that they would scatter in a lot of different directions and that the army would spend the rest of the year tracking them down. Had this occurred would Custer have been faulted by his superiors as Reynolds was for his failure to retain the village and captives on the Powder River? Jaguar,
Forget horse riding and mounted shooting. Start your education with logistics, then link it to the operational objectives in 1876.
WO
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 29, 2015 11:40:45 GMT -6
My point was that you can not simply dismiss what an author writes unless you specify the portions you disagree with. I am not sure I fully agree with this, though there is some truth in it. I have a personal rule that once I start a book, I finish it, period, no matter what, no matter how bad, no matter how long it takes. I broke that rule (the exception proves the rule, right?) with the Philbrick book. I also broke my rule-- with that book-- of buying the book, rather than going to the library. My initial inclination with Philbrick was to leave it alone, especially when all these glad-handing clowns who run the various LBH-Custer organizations fawned all over him, simply because of the Philbrick name. What gave him the CV to write about the LBH? I do not believe I finished the first chapter... then returned the book. Sheer and utter garbage. I have reached the point in all this where I am no longer interested in reading what I call "opinion" books. I also dislike intensely, lopsided writing that clearly has an agenda, that clearly seeks to condemn or blame, rather than seeks the truth. I do not think it is necessary to point out specifically those portions one disagrees with: to me, that indicates "opinion" rather than fact. If, on the other hand, there is sufficient evidence for disagreement, that is fine; that is a basis for discussion, debate, and argument. Reno's drinking is a case in point. My own opinion is that he was drinking-- as were others-- but was not drunk. There is sufficient evidence for a debate, and I accept that as valid. I reject the claim of his drunkenness as fact and therefore basis for his actions and I treat that as "opinion"-- ignorant opinion-- unless it is fully discussed in a "book." I try very hard-- in Strategy-- to present all sides of a debatable issue prior to rendering my own "opinion." Best wishes, Fred. Fred:Let me start by stating that I am not one of those who would call Reno a coward, his CW record speaks for itself, and I am not sure he got drunk more than other officers at that time. A few sips of liquor would not have hurt, the English army used to pass out the gin before a battle. The lynch pin however seems to be if he was drunk as liquor can cause liquid courage or liquid fear depending on the circumstances and ones state of mind. I thought evidence was presented that he did throw up at some point after drinking. While this evidence is not the sine qua non of being drunk it seems to tilt the conclusion in that direction. If we are examining his initial decision not to continue forward into the camp however as opposed to his subsequent actions does it really matter? The question in my mind is whether the decision to stop and dismount was a proper decision even if sober. Wouldn't the Indians have had a harder time massing sufficient warriors to thwart an all out charge and a run by Reno forces through the camp at a cantor? Would the ensuing havoc have forced the women and children to flee? Would the warriors been as effective fighting in the camp?
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Post by tubman13 on May 29, 2015 11:44:11 GMT -6
Colt45: Some preliminary thoughts which are by no means final, and please let me play devils advocate for a moment. When I first read your proposal my immediate reaction was that it was a fine plan if you intended to slaughter indiscriminately and not capture. When I read your response however I see that you plan was for capture, but let me question that conclusion for a moment. Offensive action from the South would have required the troops to enter the village. A full charge could have been mounted after crossing the river but would have had to slow to a trot or at best a canter when entering the village. It is very difficult to aim a pistol from a horse at a trot unless you are standing in the stirrups a very tiresome thing to do for long. At a cantor the horses would be at a speed which would make it difficult to select your targets carefully so I think the soldiers would have just shot the first thing that moved. Now if the Indians chose to flee they could go north and west as you point out. Warriors engaging your force could have disrupted it long enough for many to flee while you picked your way through the village. Havoc would no doubt ensue without any way to cut off the women and children fleeing to the north or west. Crow lands to west, Terry north. The reliance on Terrry to interdict them would require great timing and I think only result in a portion of them being captured. In sum, however I think you have raised fair points and an offense that could have worked. Custer was initially concerned when some Indians became aware of his presence that they would scatter in a lot of different directions and that the army would spend the rest of the year tracking them down. They spent over a year anyway, due to this lost opportunity. Had this occurred would Custer have been faulted by his superiors as Reynolds was for his failure to retain the village and captives on the Powder River? Sorry to pick at post. These facts have already been pointed out.
Regards, Tom
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 29, 2015 11:52:29 GMT -6
Colt45: Some preliminary thoughts which are by no means final, and please let me play devils advocate for a moment. When I first read your proposal my immediate reaction was that it was a fine plan if you intended to slaughter indiscriminately and not capture. When I read your response however I see that you plan was for capture, but let me question that conclusion for a moment. Offensive action from the South would have required the troops to enter the village. A full charge could have been mounted after crossing the river but would have had to slow to a trot or at best a canter when entering the village. It is very difficult to aim a pistol from a horse at a trot unless you are standing in the stirrups a very tiresome thing to do for long. At a cantor the horses would be at a speed which would make it difficult to select your targets carefully so I think the soldiers would have just shot the first thing that moved. Now if the Indians chose to flee they could go north and west as you point out. Warriors engaging your force could have disrupted it long enough for many to flee while you picked your way through the village. Havoc would no doubt ensue without any way to cut off the women and children fleeing to the north or west. The reliance on Terrry to interdict them would require great timing and I think only result in a portion of them being captured. In sum, however I think you have raised fair points and an offense that could have worked. Custer was initially concerned when some Indians became aware of his presence that they would scatter in a lot of different directions and that the army would spend the rest of the year tracking them down. Had this occurred would Custer have been faulted by his superiors as Reynolds was for his failure to retain the village and captives on the Powder River? Jaguar,
Forget horse riding and mounted shooting. Start your education with logistics, then link it to the operational objectives in 1876.
WO
I realize there are some who believe they can employ tactics without understanding the platform used (horses) or the weapons and how the two interrelate. This makes no sense to me whatever. I am not sure I understand what you mean by logistics as it pertains to the issues under examination unless you are referring to the supplies in Benteen's control and I have already discussed the operational objectives in 1876 as it concerned this campaign. To forget horse riding and mounted shooting in a cavalry engagement is like discounting airplanes in the Battle of Britain.
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Post by tubman13 on May 29, 2015 11:57:41 GMT -6
I am not sure I fully agree with this, though there is some truth in it. I have a personal rule that once I start a book, I finish it, period, no matter what, no matter how bad, no matter how long it takes. I broke that rule (the exception proves the rule, right?) with the Philbrick book. I also broke my rule-- with that book-- of buying the book, rather than going to the library. My initial inclination with Philbrick was to leave it alone, especially when all these glad-handing clowns who run the various LBH-Custer organizations fawned all over him, simply because of the Philbrick name. What gave him the CV to write about the LBH? I do not believe I finished the first chapter... then returned the book. Sheer and utter garbage. I have reached the point in all this where I am no longer interested in reading what I call "opinion" books. I also dislike intensely, lopsided writing that clearly has an agenda, that clearly seeks to condemn or blame, rather than seeks the truth. I do not think it is necessary to point out specifically those portions one disagrees with: to me, that indicates "opinion" rather than fact. If, on the other hand, there is sufficient evidence for disagreement, that is fine; that is a basis for discussion, debate, and argument. Reno's drinking is a case in point. My own opinion is that he was drinking-- as were others-- but was not drunk. There is sufficient evidence for a debate, and I accept that as valid. I reject the claim of his drunkenness as fact and therefore basis for his actions and I treat that as "opinion"-- ignorant opinion-- unless it is fully discussed in a "book." I try very hard-- in Strategy-- to present all sides of a debatable issue prior to rendering my own "opinion." Best wishes, Fred. Fred:Let me start by stating that I am not one of those who would call Reno a coward, his CW record speaks for itself, and I am not sure he got drunk more than other officers at that time. A few sips of liquor would not have hurt, the English army used to pass out the gin before a battle. The lynch pin however seems to be if he was drunk as liquor can cause liquid courage or liquid fear depending on the circumstances and ones state of mind. I thought evidence was presented that he did throw up at some point after drinking. While this evidence is not the sine qua non of being drunk it seems to tilt the conclusion in that direction. If we are examining his initial decision not to continue forward into the camp however as opposed to his subsequent actions does it really matter? The question in my mind is whether the decision to stop and dismount was a proper decision even if sober. Wouldn't the Indians have had a harder time massing sufficient warriors to thwart an all out charge and a run by Reno forces through the camp at a cantor? Would the ensuing havoc have forced the women and children to flee? Would the warriors been as effective fighting in the camp? Let's see over 1500 warriors, less than 150 troopers 7 shots without reloading, every shot a hit. Less than 150 unarmed troopers surrounded by 450 men still in good condition. The old men, women who were still around might pitch in. Of course all of this assumes the troopers got across the 4' deep gully already filled with warriors. Would you want to lead that charge, I would not. They would be alive about as long as they were on the skirmish line. I think maybe you should take a small nip and think it through.
Regards, Tom
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Post by welshofficer on May 29, 2015 12:25:22 GMT -6
I realize there are some who believe they can employ tactics without understanding the platform used (horses) or the weapons and how the two interrelate. This makes no sense to me whatever. I am not sure I understand what you mean by logistics as it pertains to the issues under examination unless you are referring to the supplies in Benteen's control and I have already discussed the operational objectives in 1876 as it concerned this campaign. To forget horse riding and mounted shooting in a cavalry engagement is like discounting airplanes in the Battle of Briton. Jaguar,
Forget costume re-enactment nonsense. There is another board called TheLBHA for that sort of nonsense.
You are again rushing way ahead of yourself, into minutae.
What was the military objective of the 1876 Centennial Campaign.....?
What were the logistical consequences for the Plains Indians of the village fleeing/scattering and GAC burning all their worldly possessions to ashes......?
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 29, 2015 12:26:06 GMT -6
Yes I agree, Reno knew it was time to halt, and to anyone who called him a coward, he stood his ground and only yielded when the pressure got too much, the charge, breakout and ride for life came when they knew the game was up.
Reno could have turned tail as soon as he realized that the way ahead was a cavalry killing and with only 140+ any thoughts of riding rough shod through these tepees was null and void, he didn't turn tail so no coward he.
I would also bet that every officer and EM thought the same and certainly didn't relish the prospect of going any further, are all these men cowards too?
Ian.
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jaguar
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Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 29, 2015 12:45:17 GMT -6
Fred:Let me start by stating that I am not one of those who would call Reno a coward, his CW record speaks for itself, and I am not sure he got drunk more than other officers at that time. A few sips of liquor would not have hurt, the English army used to pass out the gin before a battle. The lynch pin however seems to be if he was drunk as liquor can cause liquid courage or liquid fear depending on the circumstances and ones state of mind. I thought evidence was presented that he did throw up at some point after drinking. While this evidence is not the sine qua non of being drunk it seems to tilt the conclusion in that direction. If we are examining his initial decision not to continue forward into the camp however as opposed to his subsequent actions does it really matter? The question in my mind is whether the decision to stop and dismount was a proper decision even if sober. Wouldn't the Indians have had a harder time massing sufficient warriors to thwart an all out charge and a run by Reno forces through the camp at a cantor? Would the ensuing havoc have forced the women and children to flee? Would the warriors been as effective fighting in the camp? Let's see over 1500 warriors, less than 150 troopers 7 shots without reloading, every shot a hit. Less than 150 unarmed troopers surrounded by 450 men still in good condition. The old men, women who were still around might pitch in. Of course all of this assumes the troopers got across the 4' deep gully already filled with warriors. Would you want to lead that charge, I would not. They would be alive about as long as they were on the skirmish line. I think maybe you should take a small nip and think it through.
Regards, Tom
Tom: You position 1,500 warriors between Reno and the village? You sacrifice speed and the ability to maneuver and dismount to a fixed and largely unprotected position with single shot rifles. Placing himself at the top of the ravine and the warriors at the bottom would have been favorable to Reno would it not? If there was a time to dismount that was it. With Reno at the top of what was a 4 or 5 foot deep ravine 10 feet wide the warriors there would have been trapped and found it very difficult to move forward to meet him. This would have been a preferable place to establish a skirmish line would it not. In any event what evidence is there that any significant force of warriors were in the ravine, at the moment Reno chose to dismount? The fact that warriors were "pouring" into it does not provide the numbers. Were the Indians mounted or dismounted? Given its dimensions the ravine could not hold too many mounted warriors. They must not have been mounted if numerous. But let’s assume the ravine was packed with warriors. Can you imagine being a warrior in a ravine being shot down at by mounted cavalry even if a skirmish line was not established at the top? I pose questions for debate none of which I am wedded to.
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jaguar
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Post by jaguar on May 29, 2015 12:55:11 GMT -6
I realize there are some who believe they can employ tactics without understanding the platform used (horses) or the weapons and how the two interrelate. This makes no sense to me whatever. I am not sure I understand what you mean by logistics as it pertains to the issues under examination unless you are referring to the supplies in Benteen's control and I have already discussed the operational objectives in 1876 as it concerned this campaign. To forget horse riding and mounted shooting in a cavalry engagement is like discounting airplanes in the Battle of Briton. Jaguar,
Forget costume re-enactment nonsense. There is another board called TheLBHA for that sort of nonsense.
You are again rushing way ahead of yourself, into minutae.
What was the military objective of the 1876 Centennial Campaign.....?
What were the logistical consequences for the Plains Indians of the village fleeing/scattering and GAC burning all their worldly possessions to ashes......?
WO
Never have re-enacted but I am not sure costume is the proper word to use unless you can't resist the pejorative. Please read back on threads I posted to I don't need to take a quiz every time I receive a reply. The last question you pose really is putting the cart before the horse as it assumes a Custer victory. In the past the Indians were quite adept at packing up fast and fleeing so to have burned a village that size would have been quite a feat indeed. Perhaps I am not understanding the reason for the last question.
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Post by Beth on May 29, 2015 13:41:18 GMT -6
Let's see over 1500 warriors, less than 150 troopers 7 shots without reloading, every shot a hit. Less than 150 unarmed troopers surrounded by 450 men still in good condition. The old men, women who were still around might pitch in. Of course all of this assumes the troopers got across the 4' deep gully already filled with warriors. Would you want to lead that charge, I would not. They would be alive about as long as they were on the skirmish line. I think maybe you should take a small nip and think it through.
Regards, Tom
Tom: You position 1,500 warriors between Reno and the village? You sacrifice speed and the ability to maneuver and dismount to a fixed and largely unprotected position with single shot rifles. Placing himself at the top of the ravine and the warriors at the bottom would have been favorable to Reno would it not? If there was a time to dismount that was it. With Reno at the top of what was a 4 or 5 foot deep ravine 10 feet wide the warriors there would have been trapped and found it very difficult to move forward to meet him. This would have been a preferable place to establish a skirmish line would it not. In any event what evidence is there that any significant force of warriors were in the ravine, at the moment Reno chose to dismount? The fact that warriors were "pouring" into it does not provide the numbers. Were the Indians mounted or dismounted? Given its dimensions the ravine could not hold too many mounted warriors. They must not have been mounted if numerous. But let’s assume the ravine was packed with warriors. Can you imagine being a warrior in a ravine being shot down at by mounted cavalry even if a skirmish line was not established at the top? I pose questions for debate none of which I am wedded to. I may totally misunderstand using a ravine, but it's my impression that besides being a barrier for Reno to cross, it acts like an expressway allowing the NA an easier way around a battlefield (Would it be considered an interior line?), so after Reno and his troops use their 7 bullets each (that's ignoring the ammo already spent getting to the ravine.) Is each trooper going to aim carefully and fire or are they going to be firing rapidly? What are they going to do with the rest of the NA who continue to enter the ravine, or go around and flank Reno?
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Post by tubman13 on May 29, 2015 14:09:04 GMT -6
. Tom: You position 1,500 warriors between Reno and the village? I place them in and around the village. You sacrifice speed and the ability to maneuver and dismount to a fixed and largely unprotected position with single shot rifles. Placing himself at the top of the ravine and the warriors at the bottom would have been favorable to Reno would it not? If there was a time to dismount that was it. Once dismounted there the would probably no have been able to remount. With Reno at the top of what was a 4 or 5 foot deep ravine 10 feet wide the warriors there would have been trapped and found it very difficult to move forward to meet him. How many would have reached the ravine, two horses already broke, one trooper continued into the village. How many horses would become bogged down, in that swale? This would have been a preferable place to establish a skirmish line would it not. It would have been an easier place to bury Reno's command. In any event what evidence is there that any significant force of warriors were in the ravine, at the moment Reno chose to dismount? The fact that warriors were "pouring" into it does not provide the numbers. Were the Indians mounted or dismounted? Given its dimensions the ravine could not hold too many mounted warriors. While engaging the warriors in the ditch, what do you think the rest of the warriors would be doing? They must not have been mounted if numerous. But let’s assume the ravine was packed with warriors. Can you imagine being a warrior in a ravine being shot down at by mounted cavalry even if a skirmish line was not established at the top? I pose questions for debate none of which I am wedded to. This ain't an action flick where the 6 shooters never run out of bullets and the good guys never get killed. I guess if you ask the NA's these weren't the good guys!Regards, Tom
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