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Post by callmeconrad on May 29, 2015 7:36:48 GMT -6
I am not sure how Cooke could communicate Conrad, perhaps by some prearranged, and very simple signals, but a battlefield OP is a first rate idea. Completely unsure of the distances involved though. My plan would be to use the troopers in the detachment as couriers, maybe a dozen or so men coming and going with the scouts farther north along the bluffs screening and harassing. I understand what you mean about distances; the timeliness of any information would be an issue but I'd rather have late information than none, and maybe I'd get lucky (Custer's Luck!) and I'd be informed how quick Benteen was coming up or about a build-up that I couldn't see from the valley. It should be easier for one rider to ford the river closer than Ford A and save a little bit of time. Cheers, conrad
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 29, 2015 7:38:28 GMT -6
What I am trying to prove Jaguar is the you need to look at what lies beneath, what is not said in anyone's writing. I thought you were superficial, and you did not disappoint... quincannon: I am not yet at the stage that I am able to conduct a Freudian analysis of your underlying intent. You used your comment about shooting at cavalry at 300 yrds. during the Civil War how am I supposed to know you had some undisclosed philosophical argument other than simply that you can get killed on a horse or in a tank.
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 29, 2015 7:45:37 GMT -6
Van Taylor:Let me refer you to the book The Rifled Musket in Civil War Combat Reality and Myth. A detailed and exhaustive research on the subject with so much data and contemporary info on the subject it will make your head spin, but well written and easy reading. You can refer any books you like "Jugular" as long as you get my name right. Ian. Sorry Yan (aka Ian) I will remember that typos are prohibited here. Jagular
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Post by quincannon on May 29, 2015 7:54:01 GMT -6
A typo is permitted. Two such actions are a mistake. Take responsibility for your actions.
Did I say anything about the Civil War. I said I could. I am old, but I am not that old, old enough to have participated. You read that in as you read into tinker belle.
If you do not understand the ability to determine intent, you can never understand tactics.
These examples are not meant to put you down, or even dispute your solid beliefs. They are intended to make you think through, and be better at what we are about here. You require more personal attention than most, and as WO cautioned you are attempting to sprint, before your are qualified, not to crawl, but say gaga, and cry for your baby formula
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Post by tubman13 on May 29, 2015 7:54:56 GMT -6
Forget typos as issues as we would be closed down if we were only allowed two.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on May 29, 2015 7:56:19 GMT -6
Conrad: Timeliness is next to Godliness. Minutes and seconds make a difference. I would think signals, backed up by couriers, and I do agree that a single rider, could negotiate bad terrain faster than the many, but is it fast enough.
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Post by tubman13 on May 29, 2015 8:16:20 GMT -6
A type is permitted. Two such actions are a mistake. Take responsibility for your actions. Did I say anything about the Civil War. I said I could. I am old, but I am not that old, old enough to have participated. You read that in as you read into tinker belle. If you do not understand the ability to determine intent, you can never understand tactics. These examples are not meant to put you down, or even dispute your solid beliefs. They are intended to make you think through, and be better at what we are about here. You require more personal attention than most, and as WO cautioned you are attempting to sprint, before your are qualified, not to crawl, but say gaga, and cry for your baby formula Jesus, Chuck, I am still not sure CH did not traverse the entire village to attack across in Ford D area. So, I guess I am too in the crawling stage. I agree Thom is shallow and agenda driven, but you have to start somewhere. Thom did a good job with Bios. in "The Custer Companion", he sucks at analysis. I knew which Springfield you referred to in your post, as I fully read it and was not in ACW mindset(darn I love that word). The things I would ask of Jaguar is to ask direct questions, answer direct questions, when you do not know a term, statement, or have an answer say so. There are no dumb questions, I for one am not here to change your mind, just to help you arrive where you want to go as well informed as you can be.
www.bing.com/images/search?q=little+bighorn+battle+maps&view=detailv2&&&id=25F2205E4123389043A38B9A9681D2E93BCDF5AC&selectedIndex=17&ccid=57eZlWut&simid=608016350049471979&thid=JN.ZrrZsn40VpgW5X958pk7%2fA&ajaxhist=0
Could not resist!
Regards, Tom
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 29, 2015 8:23:25 GMT -6
Colt45: I meant no disrespect by attributing your proposal to Fred but I read the thread on my phone and his appeared and took up the full screen. Now I have read that Custer early on was aware that there were about 1,500 warriors. The dust kicked up by 20k ponies and his scouts would have alerted him to the fact that this was a large group even though it's actual size may have been unknown. I have one question. Your proposal is a good plan but could it have achieved its offensive objective? Perhaps I am mistaken but your plan would roll the Indians up from the South but not prevented their retreat. Are you relying on Terry coming from the North to interdict them? Jaguar,
With respect, you are trying to run before you have learnt to crawl. Rewind a little, please.
What did GAC know about the numbers, their concentration and the terrain from his own reconnaissance when he crossed the divide and started down towards the LBH valley? How did his state of knowledge develop throughout the 25th until his demise later that day?
WO
welshofficer: I do not want to get bogged down with this issue which is most likely in dispute. I will address however what Custer knew before he split his forces as this decision is pivotal in most of the analysis I have read. One author and I don't recall who states that Custer told several of his men that there were 1,500 warriors. Charlie Renonlds claimed he said it was the "biggest bunch of Indians he had ever seen" and Boyer is claimed to have repeated this warning to Custer stating"I have been with these Indians for thirty years and this is the largest village I have ever known." Source A Terrible Glory. Custer apparently was concerned that his troops had been spotted and he was correct. I think he was generally aware of the type of terrain he was dealing with but had no knowledge of the specific terrain because his scouts did get close enough to learn this. I will let others let me know what hazards a scout might endure to have mapped the typography. Varnum along with Arikaras Hare and the Crows were assigned to scout ahead. Custer was reportedly warned by Half Yellow Face speaking through Boyer "Do not divide your men... there are too many of the enemy for us, even if we stay together. If you must fight keep us all together." So I think that Custer by this point was aware that he was facing a much larger force than he had ever seen before. In the future when you are condescending always start "with respect" as you did here it makes me feel better about it.
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Post by quincannon on May 29, 2015 8:38:21 GMT -6
Tom I am not sure that CH did that either. Don't think he did, but I keep the possibility open, and that is healthy.
Yes I too think he did a pretty fair job in the Custer Companion, but as I said earlier he is a complier of lists not a writer.
I thought you knew, as I believe I had mentioned it to you and others on the private line. Had Jaguar been astute he would have been drawn to the cover the "peep" sight with tape comment, and then puffing my chest saying I could make the kill shot. I was good, I think, but not that good, so he should have smelled a snake in the woodpile, and he didn't, which was the object lesson.
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Post by Colt45 on May 29, 2015 8:49:09 GMT -6
Colt45: I meant no disrespect by attributing your proposal to Fred but I read the thread on my phone and his appeared and took up the full screen. Now I have read that Custer early on was aware that there were about 1,500 warriors. The dust kicked up by 20k ponies and his scouts would have alerted him to the fact that this was a large group even though it's actual size may have been unknown. I have one question. Your proposal is a good plan but could it have achieved its offensive objective? Perhaps I am mistaken but your plan would roll the Indians up from the South but not prevented their retreat. Are you relying on Terry coming from the North to interdict them? No problem confusing me with Fred. I take that as a compliment since Fred is far and away more knowledgeable than I about LBH. He is the guru. The original intent of the campaign was to return the Indians to the reservations, not completely annihilate them. By taking the action I listed in the previous post, the 7th would have prevented escape to the south and the Bighorn mountains. I also believe that action would have kept them in the area long enough to give Terry time to reach the village from the north. Remember, a large cavalry presence only a couple of miles from the village represented a large threat, and the hostiles would have been inclined to stay in battle long enough to allow the village to begin packing up and moving north, which also would have put them in contact with Terry. So either way, the army mission would have been accomplished. Even if some escaped to the west, their strength in numbers would have been reduced, and pursuit by both Custer and Terry would have either apprehended them or forced them to travel at a speed that didn't allow for time to hunt, resupply, rest, etc. Again, that would have accomplished the army objective of forcing return to the reservations.
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Post by welshofficer on May 29, 2015 9:01:36 GMT -6
Jaguar,
With respect, the patronising bit (if any) was the blue ink. Focus upon that highlighting.
You start analysing the 25 June 1876 by looking at the battle in the terms that GAC (unwittingly?) made it, a battle of river crossings:
(1) Reno crossing at Ford A, in the belief that GAC's right wing would be directly supporting him and without much knowledge of what he would be encountering (village size, one village or a series of satellite villages) or the combat power to achieve his mission objective (Reno does not have Benteen's battalion, because he is sweeping a previously unreconnoitred rear where there were no hostiles). Reno wisely avoids getting his battalion wiped out by entering the village, and he avoids his skirmish line being left flanked to destruction, and he avoids being trapped/massacred in the timber.
(2) But Reno's flight across the river to the bluffs and Reno Hill has the effect of placing his defeated battalion directly between Benteen and the GAC right wing of the regiment. That had severe consequences, if GAC ever required extraction assistance from Benteen. The latter was never abandoning a distressed battalion to locate other battalions that might be winning, short of urgent "battle through" distress orders from GAC.
(3) GAC abandons Ford B to the hostiles and moves northwards, and that puts his right wing beyond support from the left wing. GAC can no longer communicate with Reno/Benteen via couriers. That battle space has been ceded to the hostiles. Ford B is used by the hostiles to attack the Keogh battalion from the south west.
(4) GAC does not secure Ford C/Deep Ravine, and the hostiles use that river crossing to attack the Keogh battalion from the north west.
(5) GAC does not have the combat power with only the Yates battalion to take control of Ford D, even if he so wishes. Ford D is also ceded to the hostiles, at least temporarily in intent, and GAC returns to the cemetery area, where the Yates battalion appears to be seeking to limit the infiltration via Ford C against the Keogh battalion. Unsuccessfully, if so, and all 5 companies are wiped out piecemeal.
You should quickly appreciate that a reliance upon Boyer's memory of the terrain would be unsatisfactory given the criticality of potential river crossing points on a given date. And GAC's own knowledge of the hostiles was non-existent beyond seemingly ignored general warnings from his scouts. In GAC's defence, he was unaware of the Rosebud battle and that the estimates of summer roamers were ludicrously low. But he had no corroboration of his own of anything, before attacking. That is the very definition of imprudence. Winging it, relying upon "Custer's luck".
When you appreciate these basic concepts, you are tactically ready to walk.
WO
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Post by quincannon on May 29, 2015 9:03:50 GMT -6
Colt: What is your time estimate for the Indians to maintain a covering action? Where would you anticipate this covering action to be centered, which is just another way of asking how far do you estimate your own assault would take you before it ran out of steam?
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Post by quincannon on May 29, 2015 9:11:04 GMT -6
There is guiding, and scouting, and scouting that produces information of military value, that requires knowledge of specific essential elements of information. Confusing the three is a huge mistake.
How many of those assigned to guiding and scouting had the capability to perform the third of the three?
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Post by Colt45 on May 29, 2015 9:20:52 GMT -6
Chuck, If we assume Custer followed Reno across ford A, and covered his left flank, and assaulted from that position, we could be looking at maybe 1.5 to 2.0 hours of battle. I would envision the bulk of the hostiles would be between the timber and the pony herds, now facing Reno on their left and Custer to the front and possibly right flank. If Custer halted his charge, like Reno did, and deployed skirmish lines, you would have a period of time where very little advancement occurs. If the regimental firepower proves tough enough the hostiles probably begin to move back north slowly. This would allow Custer and Reno to both remount and advance, then deploy skirmishers again. This is all hypothetical, but the army advance would probably run out of steam about the time they reached the southern end of the village. Ammo would probably be getting low at that point. This is where Benteen's battalion could come into play (the assumption here is that he is now across ford A and only a short distance behind Custer and has not yet fired a shot). Benteen could now move to the front and continue the assault, while ammo mules are being brought forward to refresh the Reno and Custer battalions. Beyond that point it gets a little tough to estimate how the battle goes in terms of the army continuing the advance, or the hostile action too strong to continue, forcing a withdrawal back to the ford A area, etc.
In any event, if you or I were commanding in that scenario, neither of us would have been at the front of the action. We would have been behind the advance, directing each battalion through fire and movement, controlling each element, and bringing Benteen into action at the right place and time, and making sure the pack train got into the valley so ammo was available to continue the assault, or to resupply everyone in the event a retrograde back toward ford A was necessary.
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Post by quincannon on May 29, 2015 9:53:38 GMT -6
Colt: Doable. I very much like the idea of holding Benteen back, but close, engaging only on order. Seeing him coming up will put the scare into them, not knowing how many are behind. Nothing wrong with a mind game.
Don't think there would be a forced retrograde in your scenario, but you are prepared for it.
Have to give some thought on the location of the complete pack train though. As you know I am an advocate of getting that millstone well away from my neck, BUT, some reduced "combat Trains" containing only battle essential items close at hand would not be a bad idea if an extended length battle is anticipated.
I think that dismounted advance could have been pressed more than you do, but the push pull does funny things, and the success of your plan does not depend upon any deep penetration.
I would have no qualms fighting your plan. It is flexible. and that is all any commander can ask for, alternate options.
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