shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on May 18, 2015 23:26:06 GMT -6
Apologies, I was referring to deep ravine.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 19, 2015 2:58:35 GMT -6
Good points Montrose.
Fred, when you said that E Company reached LSH (probably the apron or the slope), and remained until the break out then the area must have contained not only E, but F and the RHQ, plus elements of Keogh's battalion, so we are looking at around 100 men here, and after the battle only one man from E company was identified on LSH (Smith).
So maybe the Indians had them surrounded but were lousy shots, and this was a planned move to try and salvage what was left before it was too late, which would suggest some command system still in place.
If this was a controlled move to gap the Indian lines then did Boston, Reed and Bouyer take part in this foray? as some accounts have their remains along the SSL about 100 yards from LSH.
Now I am not trying to be a smart ass here but little things like these need addressing, so I am not trying to find errors or pick holes, as you know me better than that and if anyone can shed light on these points its you.
Ian.
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Post by mac on May 19, 2015 6:34:43 GMT -6
Same here Ian! I find this discussion fascinating and certainly am not trying to be smart and hopefully not dumb, just exploring as many ideas as possible. The notion of the 6 on cemmetery as horse holders and perhaps a move to recover horses makes a good rationale for a movement. Thanks to all for the contributions so far! Still thinking. Cheers
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Post by montrose on May 19, 2015 7:01:52 GMT -6
I do not think that recovering horses had any impact on decisions made.
LSH is a bad place to defend. The ravines offered cover and concealment.
With the horses gone, your decision tree become limited. You are forced to start looking for a DIP location. DIP means Die In Place. When you fight enemies who do not take prisoners, you must think about this. Basically a hidden issue in the military, like leaving wounded behind. We don't like to talk about it.
But if you are going to go down, take as many enemies as you can with you. F Company and I company fought poorly, and took few Indians out. In fact, Indians probably had more friendly fire casualties than US. C and L died hard, as far as evidence showed. E Company died trying, in a hopeless situation.
The company clusters showed that the noncommissioned officers and soldiers did their duty, and did not panic until late in the death of their units. The problem in the north was the piss poor performance of the officers.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 19, 2015 7:12:54 GMT -6
Mac, yes it is helpful to try and work out who could have been where etc. if E Company had dismounted and fought on foot then they would probably require about nine horse holders (one in four), so if these six were a part of that detachment then we could be looking at three more that could have ran along SSL before getting killed.
If we are looking at cemetery ravine as a possible place, then markers 48 (marked for Sturgis, but who knows) 40 and 41 would give us three individuals, but this is just a complete guess on my part.
Ian.
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Post by dave on May 19, 2015 8:53:15 GMT -6
Even if Sturgis was senior officer, which I think he was,.... I believe the First Sergeant initiated this movement. Officers were doing the deer in the headlights, it was time for a decision. Kinda hard to explain the culture here. Senior sergeants may have 10-20 years more experience than some young buck officer, like Fred. In general, they try to implement decisions, even if officer younger than their own children. But there is a breaking point. There is a point where senior NCOs are more qualified to make decisions than junior officers, and I mean across the board O1-O3, sometimes O4. Hell, sometimes commander in chief. Custer screwed the pooch at LBH. We can get into the whys and hows. But at what point do his subordinates become responsible for making better decisions? The disaster in the north led to total USA casualties, with minimum enemy KIA/WIA. The subordinate officers and NCOs are responsible and accountable for agreeing to this failure. Will You piqued my interest with your mentioning the role the senior NCOs played not only with E company but the whole regiment. My father was a CPO and I would appreciate hearing more about the role the NCOs in regard to the battle. I have not read much about this subject except for Steve posting about his experience as an NCO. Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on May 19, 2015 12:00:47 GMT -6
Even if Sturgis was senior officer, which I think he was,.... I believe the First Sergeant initiated this movement. Officers were doing the deer in the headlights, it was time for a decision. Kinda hard to explain the culture here. Senior sergeants may have 10-20 years more experience than some young buck officer, like Fred. In general, they try to implement decisions, even if officer younger than their own children. But there is a breaking point. There is a point where senior NCOs are more qualified to make decisions than junior officers, and I mean across the board O1-O3, sometimes O4. Hell, sometimes commander in chief. Custer screwed the pooch at LBH. We can get into the whys and hows. But at what point do his subordinates become responsible for making better decisions? The disaster in the north led to total USA casualties, with minimum enemy KIA/WIA. The subordinate officers and NCOs are responsible and accountable for agreeing to this failure. Will You piqued my interest with your mentioning the role the senior NCOs played not only with E company but the whole regiment. My father was a CPO and I would appreciate hearing more about the role the NCOs in regard to the battle. I have not read much about this subject except for Steve posting about his experience as an NCO. Regards Dave Are their statistics to compare the age and experience of the NCOs at LBH to the age and experience of the officers? How does it compare to other conflicts? Beth
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 20, 2015 7:03:51 GMT -6
Not sure which new area. Scott stated it would cost $100,000 to dig in Deep Ravine. He gave a presentation on what he thinks happened to the artifacts in the Ford Ds area. They were moved with the earth to build the new entrance road.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by jdhoffman on Aug 4, 2016 6:20:14 GMT -6
Michno wrote a very good book The Mystery of E Troop. He has done extensive research on the battle. I was at the LBH recently and I think they have the wrong ravine. Men on foot wouldn't of made it that far. I'm sure that a lot of remains were lost also they simply pushed dirt on top of the men in the ravine due to the fact they were badly decomposed. Wolves dug them up rains washed them away. I'm sure one day someone will discover bones in a place unexpected.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 4, 2016 22:15:07 GMT -6
Michno received mixed reviews on his work. I am not going to re-litigate that. The fact is I enjoyed it, although I disagreed with some of his conclusions.
You on the other hand are in the here and now.
If you think they have the wrong ravine, what in your opinion is the right ravine?
Why do you think that? What evidence can you offer to support your opinion?
I have no well defined opinion on the matter one way or the other. In other words one damned hole in the ground is as good as any other, so convince me by making a well reason argument.
I will say though that as you enter this land of LBH, your use of the words "I am sure" will become less frequent. At least if you are honest with yourself it will be so.
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 5, 2016 3:33:30 GMT -6
jdhoffman, As you enter the land of LBH, quincannon's words will become less frequent... Pequod Again nothing added, ugh. jdh, may be speaking of this, with all of your reading, I am very surprised you missed it!
www.digitaljournal.com/pr/2835067
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Post by dave on Aug 5, 2016 8:50:31 GMT -6
QC Very perceptive remark! "I will say though that as you enter this land of LBH, your use of the words "I am sure" will become less frequent. At least if you are honest with yourself it will be so."
The study of the Little Big Horn and its participants is a morass (pun intended) that entices and then grabs hold of student. As Alice said “Curiouser and curiouser!” which accurately describes this journey.
I have learned much from reading and studying this battle but quickly realize how little I know. I become thirsty for more but am unable able to quench my thirst despite how much I study. The circumstances, the causes, the plans, the interaction of the participants, the quirks of nature, the terrain and the unpredictable behavior of man have caused a hellish mixture of light and shadows that conceal the actuality of what happened. Now that is an appetizer! Regards Dave
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