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Korea
May 14, 2015 6:53:24 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on May 14, 2015 6:53:24 GMT -6
Yes Chuck the US army did follow the concept of tanks being the best way to counter enemy tanks. which is all well and good but then infantry would need tanks attached to every battalion or even company to give them some protection, plus on the defensive note a tank is harder to conceal then a AT gun. I suppose when the infantry started to receive the longer ranged bazookas and the larger calibre recoilless rifles then this filled in this void.
But in WW2 the infantry had only the 2.36in bazooka to defend them from tank attack, the 37mm was withdrawn because it was useless, the 57mm was ok but no good against Panthers and Tigers (except at very close range), the 3in was disliked by the tank destroyer units because it was so heavy, so the infantry needed the M10s. M18s and M36s to take on these German heavies, then in 1946 they disbanded the tank destroyer battalions.
The thing I do find perplexing is that after 1945 the Russians developed huge tank armies and the US army got rid of every AT and TD, I suppose the idea behind this was to just use tanks, and I think the development of anti-armour missiles was the way forward, but these were still in the pipeline.
Whoops sorry Montrose I posted this before I saw your reply, if I had read yours first I would have written it differently, my apologies sir.
Ian.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 7:13:38 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on May 14, 2015 7:13:38 GMT -6
Adding to what both of us said, the heavier a division is the harder it is to get to the fight. That is very important to the U S Army in that we do not expect to wage war in Kileen, Texas. Our divisions must have strategic mobility, which it the antithesis of being mobile operationally and tactically. Had the 2nd Infantry Division that we deployed from Fort Lewis to Korea in the summer of 1950, been the 2nd Armored Division, they would not have been operational in Korea until Christmas.
General Wickham realized this in the early 1980's and issued his Light Division White Paper, and Will is exactly correct, it was the hussars and cavalry minded dweebs that drug their feet, and resisted every step of the way. In the mid-80's we lacked the man portable anti-armor weapon. We now have it along with the versatility of the helicopter to move both further and faster than the horseshit peddlers every dreamed of, and have the wherewithal to deal with just about anything that confronts us.
Do you think it is an accident that there has been no rush for a newer better tank to replace the M-1?
There is a thing that the dweebs and pretenders refer to as cavalry mindedness. It is real, but it is much better termed mobility mindedness, and that has penetrated throughout the entire force, especially in the Infantry, and the Special Operations and Aviation communities, and the ironic part is that it has left the horseshit peddlers far behind.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 7:24:57 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on May 14, 2015 7:24:57 GMT -6
The best way to fight a tank Ian is not fight they way they want to but rather the way you want to.
Tanks alone are useless. It is the Infantry that accompanies them, and therefore the combined arms team that makes the tank a formidable weapon. Alone they are not worth the money spent on them.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 7:52:34 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on May 14, 2015 7:52:34 GMT -6
I agree just look a Villers-Bocage 1944, the British could have sent in their infantry before they entered the town, as these tigers had little in the way of infantry support, instead by were caught in line with their pants down, and a few commanders lost their jobs as a result.
Ian.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 7:53:09 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on May 14, 2015 7:53:09 GMT -6
Well Chuck it’s hard for me to try and say what a US BCT or armoured division should contain, both you and Montrose know at first-hand what the best set up would be, but I would throw a few ideas in the ring just to see what you think;
Having one Stryker Armoured BCT to every two Armoured BCT sounds right, but if you look an Arm BCT it contains a cavalry regiment, now I would suppose that this cavalry reg. was used in a reconnaissance role giving each BTC its own organic recce unit. So why the need for a Stryker BTC, just arm each Armoured BTC cavalry regiment with Skrykers.
Just looking at these SBTCs they do seem like a mini corps but without the heavy armour, as you know they have one cavalry reg. to three inf reg. plus artillery and engineers. So I would guess that the SBTCs acted as independent units and dare I say it an advanced guard to the division.
What would you say about splitting these Stryker BCTs into three regiments each containing a cavalry squadron and an infantry regiment (all mounted in different versions of the Stryker), then add one of these regiments to each of the Armoured BTCs, that way they can call on the groups heavy armour if things get too hot for their own vehicles.
Ian.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 8:18:54 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on May 14, 2015 8:18:54 GMT -6
Chuck, take no notice of my last post, its crap, I am in two minds weather or not to delete it.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 8:27:36 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on May 14, 2015 8:27:36 GMT -6
If I had my way Ian there would only be one type of division, and we would call it a division, and not armored, infantry, cavalry, airborne or airmobile. These titles are obsolete, and are only a sop to the good old days that never were, in a modern army.
Rather a division would be a headquarters, which under the BCT concept all it is, much like the corps headquarters of days gone by, to which brigades of various types could be attached as the situation dictates.
You confuse regiments with squadrons and battalions, and use the terms in the British manner, which considering where you live is quite natural. To give you a primer on CARS and its replacement USARS would entail writing another of those Gone With The Wind size tomes. Let it be sufficient to say that we call our stuff what we do to placate the "cavalry minded" and they have little if anything to do with reality.
Each brigade must contain reconnaissance, maneuver, fires, and enablers for it to function properly as a combat entity, meaning unsupported in its combat function by outside sources (within limits). It is the ratios of these functions that are subject to question and change, and that is a healthy thing because the battlefield and the capabilities that must be present on the battlefield are constantly changing.
Right now, not ten years from now , because my crystal ball is a little foggy this morning, I believe that the optimum for these functions would be a very strong reconnaissance company (200 plus), three maneuver battalions (8-900), a fires battalion (three batteries - 12 guns), a very strong engineer company (200 plus), plus a very large headquarters company, that included signal and MI assets, and the normal service support found in the support battalion. The strength totals would vary somewhat because of the means of mobility and scale of equipment of the organization.
Structuring a force ( based on the current target of 33 brigades) would be 4-5 armored or as we now term them heavy, 3 Stryker, 3 airborne, and the remainder infantry, remembering always that forces must be constructed based upon current and anticipated most likely threat, and not the Villers Bocage.
If there is one great issue in the U S Army it is those who want to fight the Villers Bocage rather than the threat of today and tomorrow, not unlike the battleship admiral of 1945 or that idiot Herr who thought the horse cavalry division was just the ticket for 1955.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 8:28:54 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on May 14, 2015 8:28:54 GMT -6
Never delete what you think Ian. For one thing it becomes food for discussion, and that is a good thing.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 8:40:04 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on May 14, 2015 8:40:04 GMT -6
Chuck, yours points are duly noted, yes I would rather have a brigade strength unit with all the capabilities to be able to be sent anywhere and have enough troops, firepower and vehicles (even aircraft) to get the job done.
Having all these assets organic to the division and be able to form a force tailor made for that particular job is a very flexible way of fighting a war.
Ian.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 8:47:05 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on May 14, 2015 8:47:05 GMT -6
You are missing the point Ian. These forces are no longer organic to a division they are organic to the brigade, and the division when structured for combat is tailored with brigades according to the requirements of the mission. The brigade is yesterday's division and the division is yesterday's corps.
Always remember the Infantry is the Queen for a reason. Like in chess it is the most flexible of maneuver pieces, up or down, sideways, left or right.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 8:58:18 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on May 14, 2015 8:58:18 GMT -6
So you assemble your division from already structured brigades.
I would have thought that you assembled each brigade for the job in hand, a division is a big unit especially with logistics and rear echelon stuff, what if you needed to get a force out within days, you would have to commit each brigade piecemeal, and that is what I mean about assembling a brigade size unit to be able to be sent and contain units relevant to that mission, the big stuff can arrive days or even a week later but the platform would be laid by your initial vanguard.
Ian.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 9:12:21 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on May 14, 2015 9:12:21 GMT -6
I, and the current United States Army. That is how we now do it, and for the last ten years. When you look at what Wiki and Google present in contemporary division structure, the only thing that binds them together is the patch they wear and their home station. They deploy as brigades and they are designed to fit in with any division headquarters that happens to be in theater. Under the 1st ID (in theater) you might find three to five combat brigades from three to five different division none of which happen to be the 1st ID.
If you need to get a force within days you start with an already structured BCT whose structure is the most consistent with the situation, and a sustainment brigade to establish a base, then as time goes on build upon that. The ready brigade of the 82nd can move in 18 hours or less. The target for getting a full (all be it lighter) force of multi brigade size into theater is one week, not yet attained to my knowledge.
Easy stuff Ian. The brigade is the division of yesterday. The division the corps of yesterday. Think of this structure in those terms and only those terms and forget the Villers Bocage. It has no relevance. You must remember that today's brigade has the same or greater battle space dominance today that at least a corps or perhaps even a field army did in 1944.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 9:14:36 GMT -6
Post by montrose on May 14, 2015 9:14:36 GMT -6
Division was our basic building bock ACW to Cold War. This is an American view, I can't speak for other countries. The US Army has changed to using brigades as our base building block, finally recognizing that modern war bears no resemblance to WW2. We are still sorting out how to make it work.
The real problem is that the concept of division and corp as a single service entity is obsolete. But politically the US military lacks the leadership and competence to design organizations for war above brigade level. GWOT has shown serious limitations of our division and corps HQ. Far too many of our senior leaders were like Odierno, far too few like Petreus. For the Koreanw ar, the Army was still division focused.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 9:24:02 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on May 14, 2015 9:24:02 GMT -6
I could go that way easily Will. Disband divisions and make them into joint (multi service) field force headquarters, adaptable to control what is allotted to them. Same with the corps at a higher level, a joint headquarters controlling a number of field forces in theater.
The first question the Army and Marines would ask is what do you call them. I used to think that way as well, until I figured out painfully that historical connection was getting in the way of getting the job done. Those bound by tradition are unlikely to find solutions for tomorrows problems. I used to fight with Doug Macgregor over this, nearly to the death. Macgregor was not all right in his approach, but neither was he all wrong in calling for joint headquarters at present division and corps strata nearly twenty years ago and the Odiarnos of this world, not him but those just like him, saw to it he was retired.
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Korea
May 14, 2015 9:29:36 GMT -6
Post by Yan Taylor on May 14, 2015 9:29:36 GMT -6
That is a very flexible way of fighting a war, divisional HQ getting to know all the different commands under its belt can have its pitfalls but the US army have been doing this since 1941, with adding battalions like AA and AT to the divisions that need them, later they did attached these units on a semi-permanent basis, but it looks like they have gone back to assembling units not ad-hoc but placing them at a moments notice under the command of a general who has never worked with them before, but these days thestructure would be in place with the various command systems so the General in charge does not even need to shake the hand of his supporing officers.
Ah well what ever happened to Esprit De Corps.
Ian.
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