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Post by Deleted on Jan 10, 2015 9:40:59 GMT -6
One of the joys of this site is that you can always learn from other posters. You claim that because the Indians had captured some babies, that the Indians at Washita gave up. Provide an Indian primary source that supports your claim. There were thousands of Indians at Washita, all I ask is a single testimony. Just one. Ever. You will not, because you can not. When did I say the Indians gave up? I made no claim other than I watched a documentary and that taking hostages had worked for GAC at Washita. Tell me where I said the Indians gave up at Washita.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 10, 2015 9:55:15 GMT -6
Scarface,
Take a step backwards.
Something caused GAC to have a (uncommunicated) "change of plan" and to unexpectedly ascend the eastern bluffs and head northwards around the village.
What would you say was more likely to trigger this unexpected action?
(1) GAC suddenly thought about hostage taking?
(2) The hostiles coming out to face Reno might be a screen to facilitate a dispersal (or at least a scattering - another concept) of the village and which GAC suddenly decided he wished or needed to block with his 5 companies?
WO
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Post by Deleted on Jan 10, 2015 10:20:50 GMT -6
Scarface, Take a step backwards. Something caused GAC to have a (uncommunicated) "change of plan" and to unexpectedly ascend the eastern bluffs and head northwards around the village. What would you say was more likely to trigger this unexpected action? (1) GAC suddenly thought about hostage taking? (2) The hostiles coming out to face Reno might be a screen to facilitate a dispersal (or at least a scattering - another concept) of the village and which GAC suddenly decided he wished or needed to block with his 5 companies? WO Hostage taking was probably in his mind, although I doubt it was his primary thought. He saw Reno's attack, saw the village and probably thought he honestly had caught them napping. His first thought was most likely personal glory, I've got them!! Let's get down there!! I think hostage taking was more an exit strategy.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 10, 2015 10:28:47 GMT -6
Montrose, you mention decision points, what about planning or communication points? I have to go to the dump and get chicken feed, I look forward to your response when I return. The bigger issue is decisions having to be made post-Crow's Nest with incomplete intelligence.
And "incomplete" is being very generous...
WO, I love you, well maybe that's a bit over the top. You have been saying that since you came on the board, so have I. I am not the sharpest knife in the drawer, but that is very close the starting point for this folly.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Jan 10, 2015 10:38:12 GMT -6
Scarface: Going in from Ford A to where he stopped the expectation Reno had was that Custer would come in from the rear, just as Fred said, then probably implement his support by deploying on Reno's left and executing an assault into the right front and flank of the Indians arrayed before Reno. There was no room to come up on Reno's right in the valley. Reno's right, just as the Indian's left was refused by river and bluffs.
The object of a flank attack is to roll up that flank and unhinge a position. Had that been done from the left there is a decent probability that the Indians facing Reno would have been rolled and pinned against that river and those bluffs.
Fred did not say it, but I will, Ford B was a reconnaissance, a reconnaissance that discovered the information Custer sought, and was repulsed, but with little damage to the reconnoitering force, and withdrew in fairly good order.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 10, 2015 11:30:10 GMT -6
Scarface: You asked a legitimate question - If it was not a flank attack, and Custer was not supporting Reno, what was he doing. Actually that is what this thread is trying to determine.
Fred gave you an answer dealing with the circumstances surrounding Custer's on the fly decision to go up onto the bluffs. As far as I know what he said was both complete and factual. What Fred said does not complete the answer though. Custer moved along those bluffs until he reached the vicinity of (modern) Bench Mark 3411, where he viewed both Reno in the valley and obtained his first view of the village, including the size of the village. It is my belief that 3411 is the departure point for discussion of what was he doing.
I might tell you that I have spent a considerable part of my life in the study of tractics, tactical procedures, and military organizations, and while Custer's further adventures may look similar to this or that, none of them quite fit, so from my poor perspective I have not a clue, but I don't think he was after hostages, I don't think he was after a nights female companionship, I don't think, no I know he did not conduct an attack on Ford B, I know he scattered his combat power hither and yon, I know he had no situational awareness, I know he suffered from target fixation. I know he continued lookin when he should have been fightin, and that fightin nowhere near where he was, and I know he did not have a death burger at the trading post for lunch.. Other than that I have no clue whatsoever..
Now, had he done just what Fred said, and he because the size of the village was small, gotten around them and put one up the pooper, he would in fact be the hero and tactical genius some think he is. 3411 changed all that. He could not by sheer size of the village alone gotten around them to effect support of Reno or anyone else. So that point, 3411, is the departure point for actions taken. I fully agree with Montrose that Custer thought the village to be in the vicinity of Ford A, and gave Reno his direction based upon that. These assumptions cost him the battle.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 10, 2015 11:33:27 GMT -6
QC,
Indeed. Reno found his left flank dangling in the air, where he would reasonably have expected to see an assault from GAC or at least more companies added by GAC to his skirmish line.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 10, 2015 11:36:17 GMT -6
The bigger issue is decisions having to be made post-Crow's Nest with incomplete intelligence.
And "incomplete" is being very generous...
WO, I love you, well maybe that's a bit over the top. You have been saying that since you came on the board, so have I. I am not the sharpest knife in the drawer, but that is very close the starting point for this folly.
Regards, Tom
Tom,
Steady on fella!
Look at most of the spectacular military defeats in history, and you will almost invariably find poor reconnaissance/intelligence in the mix.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jan 10, 2015 11:49:51 GMT -6
WO: Assuming you are speaking of a valley only scenario, an (left) end around , and cross over. The need was to smack them good and proper, and not fiddlefart around thickening an all ready existent skirmish line.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 10, 2015 11:52:43 GMT -6
WO, I have never fired a shot in anger or self-defense, but I was in Panama, just before Manny was bagged, on a support gig. I asked some dumb questions that had to do with what are we doing here. The answer I got was, "If we don't know we don't go". There is more to the story, but the quote had to do with intelligence, recon, and fact finding.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 10, 2015 12:21:15 GMT -6
When GAC had his first good look at the village from 3411 (although he never saw the full extent from there), he must have knew that it was huge, thus containing many warriors, but this never fazed him in trying to get behind the place, in fact it looks like it spurred him, even when he arrived on the ridge line after travelling down cedar and MTC, it still looks like the size of the place never put him off his goal, as he continued to divide his force, so even after he left Keogh behind he still must have thought that this battle was winnable.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 10, 2015 12:36:26 GMT -6
Ian: You have hit upon the incomprehensible part of this whole thing.
It is highly probable that Custer up on those eastern ridges could not determine if the area of Ford B was the end of the village or not. He needed to look closer, and therefore took Yates to Ford B, while Keogh provided deep cover. The two things he learned from this foray was that indeed the village did extend beyond, and it still contained plenty and that plenty was willing to fight. He then proceeded to make the worst and final tactical decision of his life.
He sent for Benteen when he discovered the partial size at 3411. I do not believe he had any idea of how big it was, but he knew it was bigger than he expected, and I think the note to Benteen, which is pure schlock, betrays that. Given that this is absolute truth and just not my poor assumptive powers at work, he did the right thing, send for Benteen, hope that Reno could hold, and then move forward toward B in an attempt to cross with what he had plus Benteen. When he gets to B he sees that scheme of maneuver is swirling around the bottom of the toilet bowl.
Two things here HOPE is no substitution for KNOW, and never compound a known error by making yet another one.
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Post by Deleted on Jan 10, 2015 12:40:15 GMT -6
Ian: You have hit upon the incomprehensible part of this whole thing. It is highly probable that Custer up on those eastern ridges could not determine if the area of Ford B was the end of the village or not. He needed to look closer, and therefore took Yates to Ford B, while Keogh provided deep cover. The two things he learned from this foray was that indeed the village did extend beyond, and it still contained plenty and that plenty was willing to fight. He then proceeded to make the worst and final tactical decision of his life. He sent for Benteen when he discovered the partial size at 3411. I do not believe he had any idea of how big it was, but he knew it was bigger than he expected, and I think the note to Benteen, which is pure schlock, betrays that. Given that this is absolute truth and just not my poor assumptive powers at work, he did the right thing, send for Benteen, hope that Reno could hold, and then move forward toward B in an attempt to cross with what he had plus Benteen. When he gets to B he sees that scheme of maneuver is swirling around the bottom of the toilet bowl. Two things here HOPE is no substitution for KNOW, and never compound a known error by making yet another one. What was the "worst and final tactical decision" that he made?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 10, 2015 12:54:03 GMT -6
Well Chuck you could say that the terrain beat him, as it blocked all views of his target until near the end when it was too late, so if he could have seen the whole extent from 3411, the message to Benteen would be more immediate.
Ian.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 10, 2015 12:57:57 GMT -6
"What was the "worst and final tactical decision" that he made?"
Separating then separating again and then separating yet again (I know that's three but you get the gist).
Ian.
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