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Post by Deleted on Jan 10, 2015 7:43:26 GMT -6
So if Custer wasn't attempting a flank attack, and he wasn't supporting Reno from the rear, what was he attempting to do?
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 10, 2015 7:47:48 GMT -6
Probably attempting to get hostages. But he depleted his unit strength as he went along, to the point he no longer had an effective fighting force.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 10, 2015 7:50:18 GMT -6
Scarface,
Welcome.
Before plotting the precise movements of the 7th cavalry, think about the "math" as you would call it west of the pond.
The hostile village probably had 1500-2000 warriors (Fred will correct me, if I am wrong). The US Cavalry had about 650 troopers. About 200 troopers were detached to the rear with the mule train, including McDougall's company as the weak combat escort. Benteen's 3 companies (circa 115 men) were detached to the left. Reno attacked the village with 3 companies (140 troopers, plus various civilians/scouts). GAC climbed the eastern bluffs with the remaining 5 companies (circa 210-220 troopers, I believe).
The only assault ever made on that village was by Reno (140 troopers). To have continued and ridden into that village would have been a wipe out. He was outnumbered a minimum 10 to 1, ignoring thousands of women and children. He deployed in skirmish line, utilising his 3rd company in the line before retreating to the timber before his own dangling left flank led to his destruction. Benteen/McDougall were to his rear, and GAC never assaulted. GAC was overwhelmed once Reno's battalion was broken, and fled to higher ground where it was joined by Benteen and later McDougall, and the hostiles Reno was fighting were released to join the hunt of GAC on the eastern bluffs.
Reno believed that he was the advance, with GAC's 5 companies in close support BEHIND him. So out of 650 troopers, only 140 troopers ever got round to actually assaulting the village and they believed/were told they would be closely supported by another 200 troopers. They fought alone during the critical offensive period, before they were broken and GAC became the hunted.
Of GAC's 5 companies on the eastern bluffs, their corpses were broadly found in 5 clusters and dying in widely dispersed overrun company formations. Work out the distance from Calhoun Hill to Deep Ravine.
Once you are ready to take this on board, you are ready to plot the movements and to start making judgements on the prudence of each step made by the 7th cavalry that day. Take a look at the "Did Custer have a plan?" thread.
Once again, welcome aboard.
WO
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Post by montrose on Jan 10, 2015 8:07:12 GMT -6
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Post by Deleted on Jan 10, 2015 8:26:11 GMT -6
Watched a documentary last night that suggested the same Tom. Actually claimed that Custer was minutes away from an historic victory if he had been able to capture some hostages but he was unable to find a crossing.
But staying on topic, if we go with the assumption he was going after hostages having deployed Reno as advance guard and then proceeded along the ridge with the intent of dropping into the village, wouldn't this be a flanking attack?
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Post by fred on Jan 10, 2015 8:28:43 GMT -6
So if Custer wasn't attempting a flank attack, and he wasn't supporting Reno from the rear, what was he attempting to do? Scarface, Here is what happened... As the columns got closer to the river, they came across a (lone) tepee and another, partially broken down. Those tepees were near the base of a knoll. Here is the first misconception people have perpetrated for 130+ years: the real lone tepee was only 1.7 miles from the river, not 5 miles away as the Benteen detractors would like you to believe. That distance changes everything regarding the battle. As they approached the tepee, Custer called Reno over to his side of the creek and several people howled down from the top of the knoll that the Indians were running away: some warriors were about a half-mile away in Reno Creek valley, and dust was seen in the LBH valley. This is when Custer told Reno to attack and Custer would support him. So... Reno heads to the ford, Cooke (the adjutant) accompanies him and Keogh also checks out the river. Suddenly, Ree scouts tell Gerard the Indians are not running, but are coming up the valley to meet Reno's advance. Gerard tells Reno; Gerard tells Cooke; Cooke tells Custer. Custer-- a smart commander-- realizes what is happening: the Indians are setting a screen to delay the troops to give time for the village and the families to run. The only way Custer can prevent this from happening is now to get around the village as quickly as possible and try to head off the scattering by going north. That is why he mounted the bluffs: he needed to get ahead of them and drive them back toward Reno. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Jan 10, 2015 8:34:37 GMT -6
Hmmmmm, so you believe in the papoose theory? That if LTC Custer had captured a few squaws and babies, the Indians would have surrendered. In the post ACW Indian wars when and where did this ever occur. There were numerous US attacks on villages and moving Indian parties that resulted in captured women and children. But the papoose theory never went into action.
Too many people look at LBH in isolation, with no consideration of the decades of conflict and hundreds of other actions. The papoose theory is an LBH thing, no one discusses it in the broader study of the Indian wars.
So is the theory that Indians always run away. This one is just crazy, contradicted by hundreds of actions and a complete contradiction of Indian culture.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 10, 2015 8:35:46 GMT -6
So back to the flank nonsense and Will's comment regarding a serious discussion. We are privileged to have so many officers here that can shed some light and we should take advantage of it. Chuck had mentioned a understanding of basic tactics. What I think would be most helpful is a discussion on the sources of theses definitions and doctrines. We need to be on the same page and someone new needs to know where to find it.
I also realize you are never going to find in books everything that an officer learns over their career but we have the advantage of having them here to facilitate the discussion. What was clear to Will just by looking at it is this was not a flank attack by Custer. That probably is not in a book rather from a lifetime of experience.
The building blocks still have to come from somewhere and it seems to me that terms such as tactics, doctrine, attack , mission, task have definite military meanings some of which are intuitive and some are narrowed by military context.
Also definition may change over time. I look at a book called cavalry tactics and it looks like drills and how to take care of your horse to me.
So I come from a starting background as an enlisted man and that had a lot more to do with action rather than planning or tasking . Life was simple then. If I were with Reno I could comment later on what I thought went right or wrong but certainly was not involved in any significant decision making or even privileged to the discussion. If I were with Custer I would be dead.
In law enforcement everything is small numbers of officers involved with a few large scale (for LE) events. We train to make contact as individuals or pairs. It is only recently say the last 10 years that the average officer is becoming involved in an active shooter training in which they operate in squad.
There are very few LE agencies in Arizona that could put together over 600 officers to a single location and of those that could it would be a very low percentage that would know what to do including the ground forces.
At a dedication some 15 years ago we were asked to provide horse security and we thought we did. Looked great but we were not "battle ready" if something went wrong. When I attended the Arizona Mounted Officer School I finally realized how unprepared we were.
So after this long winded post I would like the officers here to guide us through the discussion.
I am sure that we all do not use the word tactic(s) the same as a military officer would use it for example.
Regards
Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 10, 2015 8:39:29 GMT -6
Will your scaring me. You answered my post before I posted it. Good start Thanks Steve
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 10, 2015 8:49:21 GMT -6
Montrose has certainly been on top of his game of late, so much so that the learnings here have accelerated.
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Post by montrose on Jan 10, 2015 8:49:30 GMT -6
Fred
I do not agree that the Ree scouts told Gerard anything. Gerard had abandoned his appointed place of duty hours ago, and was skulking in the rear, miles away from the Rees.
Okay, back to GAC's decision tree.
1. Decision Point One. -Location Divide. -Estimated village location; Ash Creek and south fork intersection. -Decision: Main body down Ash creek. Benteen Bn to scout to left, and approach village from the south fork avenue of approach. This puts Benteen in position to conduct a flank attack, and block enemy retreat. Just a note. Benteen's movement was based on an enemy on Ash Creek. It in no way, shape or form had anything to do with enemies located in the LBH valley.
2. Decision Point Two. -Location Intersection of Ash Creek and South Fork, also called the Lone Tepee site. 1.7 miles from river. -Estimated village location: Two miles away, meaning just across the LBH river at Ford A. -Decision: Regimental attack on the village. 3 companies up front, 5 companies following in support.
3. Decision Point Three
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 10, 2015 8:55:49 GMT -6
Montrose, you mention decision points, what about planning or communication points? I have to go to the dump and get chicken feed, I look forward to your response when I return.
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Post by Deleted on Jan 10, 2015 9:12:41 GMT -6
Hmmmmm, so you believe in the papoose theory? That if LTC Custer had captured a few squaws and babies, the Indians would have surrendered. In the post ACW Indian wars when and where did this ever occur. There were numerous US attacks on villages and moving Indian parties that resulted in captured women and children. But the papoose theory never went into action. Too many people look at LBH in isolation, with no consideration of the decades of conflict and hundreds of other actions. The papoose theory is an LBH thing, no one discusses it in the broader study of the Indian wars. So is the theory that Indians always run away. This one is just crazy, contradicted by hundreds of actions and a complete contradiction of Indian culture. Respectfully, William I didn't say I believed this theory simply stating I had watched a documentary which discussed it. It did work for GAC at Waschita.
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Post by montrose on Jan 10, 2015 9:21:08 GMT -6
One of the joys of this site is that you can always learn from other posters. You claim that because the Indians had captured some babies, that the Indians at Washita gave up. Provide an Indian primary source that supports your claim. There were thousands of Indians at Washita, all I ask is a single testimony. Just one. Ever.
You will not, because you can not.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 10, 2015 9:29:24 GMT -6
Montrose, you mention decision points, what about planning or communication points? I have to go to the dump and get chicken feed, I look forward to your response when I return. The bigger issue is decisions having to be made post-Crow's Nest with incomplete intelligence.
And "incomplete" is being very generous...
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