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Post by welshofficer on Jan 13, 2015 11:07:30 GMT -6
QC,
That's what I love about this board, assumptions and theories are challenged. Thanks Montrose.
What was in GAC's mind, at the time Kanipe and Martini were sent back to McDougall and Benteen? Reno doing well, let's recall Benteen, let's redirect the pack train away from possible harm in the valley, and then launch an assault (because only the 7th will be on the offensive, not the hostiles) on the dispersing/scattering village across the river from the eastern bluffs with 3 battalions/9 companies...?
Fred,
Taylor and Trevor-Roper at each other's throats was a real sight to behold...
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 13, 2015 11:13:30 GMT -6
Good point made by Montrose, what better way to keep the pack train out of danger, then to keep to the high ground, if this was successful then Custer would have nine Companies between the pack train and the village, and reserve ammo would be close to hand too.
Nice snippet Justin, you just don’t get men of that grade on TV anymore, the closest we have now is Peter Snow.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 13, 2015 11:16:24 GMT -6
I have no reason to believe that Custer was not trying to get into the Poker game WO. He just could not find a seat at the table, until someone got disgusted with him trying and threw him out of the bar.
Ian just remember what Montrose also said. The way that ammo in the pack train, and for that matter everything else it contained was packed, was for after battle replenishment, not during battle distribution. That alone argues that safety of the train, and not immediate need was the motivation behind the note. It is rare indeed when you have anything but individual basic load to fight with
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Post by fred on Jan 13, 2015 11:31:07 GMT -6
Where was Wolf Tooth? Don't really know. Moreover we don't know from what direction he came (exactly) or just when he crossed Custer's line of march. Distance and time matter. We must then make an analysis of what if any impact Wolf Tooth's presence made on decisions after first contact. Did his presence slow Custer down, or divert his attention. If they did, did that slowing or diversion have an impact on outcome. Wolf Tooth and Big Foot are generally referred to together. In my opinion, they represent the first organized (... reasonably organized!!... let's not go crazy here) resistance to Custer and Keogh. The only accounts we have are of him-- and about 50 warriors-- coming down MTC. This was about the same time Custer was on the bluffs above Ford B. It is my opinion, the Wolf Tooth/Big Foot band was part of the target of Keogh's volley firing. Nothing else makes sense... at least for that volume of firing. The band then supposedly divided, dogging Custer as he moved north beyond Calhoun Hill. There is archaeological evidence of an Indian presence in these environs, in the westerly direction of Ford D. From all accounts I have been able to muster-- and there aren't that many-- this band played a very large roll in blanketing Custer's movements and keeping them within sort sort of boundary. Does that answer your question? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 13, 2015 11:31:52 GMT -6
QC,
We all know the disaster/massacre that unfolded after Ford B, so trying to rewind to GAC's mind set when he sent off Kanipe and Martini. If the hostiles were believed dispersing/scattering, they wouldn't be assaulting anything up the eastern bluffs (pack train or anything else). Why put a river and pinch points behind any screen against GAC? Use the river. Defend the river and the fords. If the pack train takes too long, GAC just comes down and assaults the fleeing hostiles with 5 companies.
Ian,
There has been no great British historian really worth reading since Norman Stone's obsession with all things Ottoman took him off to Turkey 15-20 years ago. Saul David is a young historian to watch. A great book on the Bengal Army sepoy mutiny in 1857.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 13, 2015 11:33:04 GMT -6
Yes Chuck, a hundred round of carbine per man, I know that the companies that Custer beckoned had not fired a shot so far, were as Reno’s men had done a lot of shooting, as some officer alluded to the fact that some men had shot most of their personal ammo and had to run back to their horse to replenish, but yes that is strange, and similar to Isandlwanna (if that is true), no good having thousands of round boxed up when your men need the rounds.
Ian.
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Post by fred on Jan 13, 2015 11:38:24 GMT -6
There has been no great British historian really worth reading since Norman Stone's obsession with all things Ottoman took him off to Turkey 15-20 years ago. Saul David is a young historian to watch. A great book on the Bengal Army sepoy mutiny in 1857. Check out Christopher Clark. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jan 13, 2015 11:39:41 GMT -6
Taylor and Trevor-Roper at each other's throats was a real sight to behold... Hugh Trevor-Roper was another great one. Brilliant men whose works I would read any time. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 13, 2015 11:42:45 GMT -6
I would have thought that two couriers delivering virtually the same message would be pointless, Kanipe and Martini almost had the same mission, Martini had his in writing which makes the difference, Reno also sent out two couriers and to the same destination, but that would probably be out of desperation, if we could determine if Kanipe was a malingerer then we could make better sense out of it all, as Custer would only have sent one man and not two, or he had a change of plan similar to sending NCOs back and too to Benteen.
Ian.
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Post by Deleted on Jan 13, 2015 11:45:34 GMT -6
Weir accomplished nothing because he didn't have the support of Benteen. Utter nonsense. This is nothing but a made-up opinion based on absolutely no fact, no support, no nothing. I must tell you, Scarface. That comment is one of the most ludicrous I have ever read. You really need to do some more work before you reached conclusions like that. First of all, you need to define "trot." According to the cavalry manual, a trot was 6 MPH. Benton moved considerably faster, and if you know anything about horse speeds, you will understand a trot is considered as fast as 10 MPH, well above the manual's definition of a gallop. Next... Weir only went ahead of Benteen when he left the morass and Benteen caught up and passed him within a couple minutes. Weir being first to Reno is utter bullshit, and if that's what you are convinced of, then you really need to go back to the drawing board. Absolutely, completely, and utterly false. If you are convinced of this and have no room to change you have wasted your money purchasing my book. "A few hours..."? What do you think you are dealing with here? A two-week FTX? C'mon, Scarface. You're smarter than all this... I hope. This post is absolute nonsense. Best wishes, Fred. Book arrived this morning. I will read with an open mind and no agendas.
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Post by fred on Jan 13, 2015 11:55:59 GMT -6
Book arrived this morning. I will read with an open mind and no agendas. Please. That is all I ask. Then make up your own mind based on the "evidence." Don't parrot someone else's opinion .
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 13, 2015 11:56:55 GMT -6
Hi all, new to the boards and very new to the subject. I apologize in advance for any ignorance on the subject matter. I'm not sure I agree with the idea that Custer's communication broke down. Reno was ordered to attack the village, create a distraction while Custer advanced and mounted a flanking attack. What broke down is Reno. He failed to follow orders and then fell to pieces under fire. Custer didn't change his plan so therefore had no reason to send word to Reno. Custer sent for Benteen, who, like Reno failed to follow orders. Custer communicated correctly; just a shame his officers failed him (not that the result would have been any different). SF,
Nice to hear that you are finally dumping the agenda which brought you to this board. Good on you.
WO
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Post by fred on Jan 13, 2015 12:03:58 GMT -6
... if Kanipe was a malingerer.... If, eh? Here is the issue... 1. There was no specific reason for anyone to order the packs to hurry. Custer had not fired a single shot; he had not yet seen Reno in the valley; and nothing had changed from the moment he crossed the divide to this point. 2. The five-company command was short of NCOs. C Company had only four of its five authorized line-sergeants and three of its four corporals, and one of the sergeants—Hanley—was back with the packs, leaving only three, plus the first sergeant. Why send an NCO to do the problematic task of “speeding up” the pack train, especially when less important personnel were readily available? 3. Each of the three legitimate messengers we know were sent back—Voss, Sharrow, and Martini—all had instructions to return to the main column. Why didn’t Kanipe at least make the effort? When Kanipe left the column there was no specific activity going on, i. e., Custer had not viewed the valley, there was no known Indian presence on the east side of the river, etc. 4. Kanipe was not an orderly or on SD. Custer had Hughes, Martini, and Dose for those jobs. Since Martini would have been the least valuable—because of the language problem—why not send him on the mundane task? Why yank someone arbitrarily out of a line company? That was not Custer’s M. O. 5. Custer knew the route the packs were taking. He knew the difficulty in “speeding” them along. He knew they would have to travel all the way into the flats of Reno Creek before they could cut cross-country, the white bluffs along the route preventing any early change of direction. Why send a messenger to iterate the obvious? 6. Why not send Voss? He had done so before and he had plenty of trumpeters with him already… and he knew Voss would be reliable…. 7. Kanipe professed to have a message for the packs. If that were the case, why didn’t he deliver it? Both McDougall and Mathey said no one ever came back with any message from any of the Custers. And the recommendation letter McDougall wrote for Kanipe in the mid-1890s is not a valid argument. Twenty years had passed and McDougall may have been simply doing a favor for an old regimental comrade. 8. Where did Kanipe go after the message was supposedly delivered? One of the civilian packers saw him; heard him, in fact, say to move along smartly—or some such commentary—but then what? We hear nothing—from Kanipe or anyone else—of his “exploits” after that, other than policing-up duty and body identifying after the fighting was over. 9. His dropping out could have been easily explained to either George or Tom Custer: his horse gave out—fifteen others did, as well—and as a good NCO he took it upon himself to do something useful and hurry the packs along knowing they would be needed. 10. Kanipe never told anyone who sent him back until after it was known the Custer boys were wiped out, and then suddenly it was Tom who told him to go back to the packs. 11. This was contained in the Windolph book, I Fought with Custer, p. 82. In a 1903 article published in the magazine of the Historical Society of Montana, written by Kanipe, he claimed by the time the Custer command had reached the top of the bluffs, they were charging at full speed. At the sight of the village men began to cheer and some horses became so excited the men couldn’t hold them in ranks. Custer said, “Hold your horses in, boys, there are plenty of them down there for us all.” Kanipe said TWC gave him the order for the packs. He also told Kanipe if he saw Benteen to tell him to hurry. In interviews with Walter Mason Camp on June 16 – 17, 1908, Kanipe said Custer’s men went at a trot and a gallop all the way up the bluffs and when they saw Reno’s command charging, Custer’s men began yelling, urging their horses on at a breakneck speed, in a wild run. Many men actually got ahead of Custer and this was when he said, “Hold your horses, boys; there are Indians enough down there for all of us.” Then, Kanipe wrote a letter to Camp, dated July 20, 1908, at Marion, NC, that Custer turned a sharp right after seeing 50 to 100 Indians on the bluff. He claimed Custer never left the command, but rode right in front the whole distance until Kanipe was ordered back. “[W]hen the command got up on the bluff where the Indians were supposed to have been seen we could see across the valley, see Reno, and his three companies, about 35 Indian scouts, going right to the Indian camps. We could see the Indian camp, plainly” (Hammer, Custer in ’76, pp. 92 and 94). Based on Kanipe’s own words and Martini’s testimony at the RCOI, all this would have happened in the vicinity of 3,411, and within a 16-minute time-span. It would have been a couple minutes later when Kanipe was supposedly sent back, making the time differential between the two messages only about 13 minutes. What happened in that short span that would have precipitated a double message? 12. The most damning evidence lies in a careful timing analysis, using other related and near-by events to corroborate the data. These data show us Kanipe moved at a speed of only 3 MPH, and even Martini—with a wounded horse—moved faster than that. Where was the so-called urgency? 13. When Kanipe supposedly received these orders to hurry the packs, the column was just approaching the beginning of Cedar Coulee. TWC, as the titular A-d-C, rode point with his brother, George. Kanipe, in C Company, was the last company in the column. Why would Tom Custer ride all the way back to the end of the column to pick out a sergeant from C? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 13, 2015 12:04:10 GMT -6
I would have thought that two couriers delivering virtually the same message would be pointless, Kanipe and Martini almost had the same mission, Martini had his in writing which makes the difference, Reno also sent out two couriers and to the same destination, but that would probably be out of desperation, if we could determine if Kanipe was a malingerer then we could make better sense out of it all, as Custer would only have sent one man and not two, or he had a change of plan similar to sending NCOs back and too to Benteen. Ian. Ian,
The messengers were sent to different battalions, if Kanipe was a legitimate messenger.
Benteen could still have been way off on his left oblique "valley hunting ad infinitum", when Kanipe was passing on orders to McDougall.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 13, 2015 12:21:03 GMT -6
13. When Kanipe supposedly received these orders to hurry the packs, the column was just approaching the beginning of Cedar Coulee. TWC, as the titular A-d-C, rode point with his brother, George. Kanipe, in C Company, was the last company in the column. Why would Tom Custer ride all the way back to the end of the column to pick out a sergeant from C? Best wishes, Fred. Fred,
I don't wish to open old battles, but I do hope that the detail from F was riding ahead as the point, as opposed to TWC being at the head of the main column.
If GAC was riding as point at Ford B, the right wing deserved to be thrown into chaos by his getting shot and falling into chaos and chased to wipe out at LSH (happy, DC?) even if that was extremely unlikely to be the unravelling scenario.
I know it's "nit picking", just as I would probably call your book the tactics of defeat (or maybe the operational defeat) without even reading it.
WO
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