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Post by Margaret on Feb 10, 2014 6:50:28 GMT -6
...I love all these photos above... when you're this far away, any little crumbs like these are manna from Heaven....
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 10, 2014 11:03:55 GMT -6
The photo looking north at Weir Point illustrates why I still have trouble thinking the top to Weir Pt. is only seven feet higher than 3411. I also thought 3411 is further south, on the northeast corner of the Reno field.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 10, 2014 11:06:39 GMT -6
Margaret: I disagree.
Everything you have written above assumes the battle in terms of variations of what Custer did. Reno's fight, barging across Ford B, even the need to take hostages. That need not be, and in the hands of a capable commander, none of this, or any variation of it would have taken place. Surprise coupled with mass, executed by well trained, disciplined soldiers, could have, should have, attacked with such force as to prevent any prolonged screening of the village in the south. That was all that was required to win this battle. It very well may have been incomplete. Most battles are and that is to be expected. There are few Cannae, and they are far between.
Now think for a moment what effect that mass attack in the south would be like coupled with a prairie fire in the vicinity of the horse herd. If you have never experienced one, or seen the panic of livestock when exposed to one, and I have seen both, you cannot imagine the panic and confusion when fire is even smelled.
In addition, the mindset of a soldier is to win, and when battles are lost, their first reaction is to find out why, and determine if there was a way to win. That is the only reason I am here. I want to know what Custer did wrong, and what he did right, and over the years I have found my answer, everything and practically nothing, but that is a long way from saying that this battle could not have been won, by a competent commander. Custer was not competent to lead or command. That is the prime reason for failure.
In your original post you confined your compassion to Mrs. Custer. I have none for her. She was an enabler, and had he been called to account I would have no sympathy for either. That does not mean I do not have compassion for those who lost on both sides, just not her, nor him,. Never happen. My capacity for compassion comes to a screeching halt when a commander needlessly sacrifices lives in the cause of vanity spurred on by incompetence, and that goes double for those that enable and facilitate those actions.
PS: Look at those first two photos AK posted. That ground in the valley to your front is the killing ground for a competent commander's attack.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 10, 2014 13:33:59 GMT -6
Hello William, just a few points to discuss with you and everyone else of course.
Your comment on would the Indians move out of the way is a pet peeve of mine.
I am sure I have read that the Indians initially moved out the way of the soldiers, the first was Reno’s breakout, didn’t the Indians move back a little and allow them to move? I know this pause didn’t last long but they were at first took aback. The second comes for what the Indians said at the so called breakout from LSH to Deep Ravine, didn’t they move back and allowed the soldiers to run downhill? I would love to try and remember where I read that story, if I am wrong then I will apologise.
I have enormous difficulty with any theory that says LTC Custer intended to make Reno the main effort. His actions in the north make no sense whatsoever if he was not expecting Benteen and McDougall.
Now the problem I have with this is the fact that Custer moved up over them bluffs at a good pace, and apparently he views Reno from 3411, now given that the next part of his journey took him around an hour to complete he must have realised that Benteen and McDougall to be between one and two hours ride away, and did he expect Reno’s men to still have enough ammo to keep firing for nearly two hours?
It sounds to me that Custer rode as fast as the terrain allowed to get behind that village, now he intends to put things on hold, leave Reno to run out of bullets, all to wait between 60 to 120 minutes for his support to catch up.
So why wouldn’t he expect Benteen and McDougall to link up with Reno and push on north, Reno would have all the support and extra ammo that he would need, well in Custer mind he would because the last time he saw him he was in no real trouble.
And now to the photo’s;
Looking at the bluffs sloping down to the river and timber, it could be the reason Custer went to the high ground, he had to turn right because the ground looks so bad for Cavalry.
Ian.
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alanw
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by alanw on Feb 10, 2014 13:49:30 GMT -6
Margaret: I disagree. Everything you have written above assumes the battle in terms of variations of what Custer did. Reno's fight, barging across Ford B, even the need to take hostages. That need not be, and in the hands of a capable commander, none of this, or any variation of it would have taken place. Surprise coupled with mass, executed by well trained, disciplined soldiers, could have, should have, attacked with such force as to prevent any prolonged screening of the village in the south. That was all that was required to win this battle. It very well may have been incomplete. Most battles are and that is to be expected. There are few Cannae, and they are far between. Now think for a moment what effect that mass attack in the south would be like coupled with a prairie fire in the vicinity of the horse herd. If you have never experienced one, or seen the panic of livestock when exposed to one, and I have seen both, you cannot imagine the panic and confusion when fire is even smelled. Interesting argument. I always felt that if Custer could have remained undetected till dawn on the 26th and the Regiment, rested, attacked en masse, with the added intention of scattering the pony herd, then that would have been his best chance of success. I'm not in the camp that believes that Custer had several options which could have won the day, but do believe that although not necessarily delivering a decisive blow, he could have at least inflicted significant damage to seriously weaken the NAs, without suffering too many casualties himself. Talking of 'capable' commanders. Crook at the Rosebud had a force nearly twice the size of the 7th, yet despite expending over 20,000 rounds of annunition, hardly inflicted any casualties against a force similar in size to his own. I always felt that Crook should have inflicted more damage, and if he had done so, maybe the LBH would have turned out a little different. After all, it has been stated that the Sioux were cock-a-hoop after the Rosebud. One last thing. People often talk about 'The' pony herd, as if there was just one. Was it ever confirmed there was just one herd. As there were several different tribes, I felt that each would have their own herd close by. To have one big herd would delay warriors from some parts of the village from reaching their pony's, and doesn't seem practical to me. So scattering of the herd, didn't seem an option to me. But hey, maybe I'm wrong. What do I know, I'm just here to learn.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 10, 2014 14:27:34 GMT -6
Actually Alan I would have waited until an hour or so after dawn on the 26th to attack. I would give them time to have breakfasted and if they were intending to move that day, let them prepare to do so thereby distracting them even more from my purposes. I would have spent the afternoon and evening hours of the 25th conducting a stealthy reconnaissance and not with Indian scouts but with troops skilled in obtaining the information I would be seeking. During the late evening and nighttime hours I would have put a sufficient number of soldiers in place to light those fires to stampede the pony herd or herds. I might even consider starting those fires before, perhaps as much as a quarter to half an hour before I attacked.
Tom mentioned a Washington Redskin football player named Pat Fischer yesterday. Fischer was a small guy, and if your interested in looking up his photos on the internet do so. He consistently hit with all the power he could muster. He did not go for the legs in tackling, but rather launched his body directly at the upper body of those he wished to bring down. He hit suddenly and hard, and was able to overcome whatever he faced. That is the same principle that should have been in play here, and the only principle useful when smaller numbers go up against a larger whole.
Crook: He was commanding a scratch force from the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Regiments and not the well trained professionals he had in Arizona against the Apache. Neither of these two regiments were much better than Custer's 7th. The Army in the west was more of a rod and gun club than an army. There were exceptions. The 4th, 6th, 9th, and 10th Cavalry Regiments were all four far above the standard.
Decisive victory at LBH could be defined as forcing them away minus their underwear and spare socks.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 10, 2014 14:51:51 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, I wonder why the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Regiments were not kept whole instead of being split between columns and whose decision was this? The 7th fought as a Regiment but Crook took five Companies of the 2nd Cavalry plus five from the 3rd Cavalry, Gibbon another four from the 2nd. Ten other Companies were split up and stationed at various locations.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 10, 2014 15:02:18 GMT -6
Geographic dispersion I suppose.
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alanw
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by alanw on Feb 10, 2014 16:55:06 GMT -6
Decisive victory at LBH could be defined as forcing them away minus their underwear and spare socks. Forcing them away towards the Terry-Gibbon column might clinch it, especially if in dissaray. I wonder what people's thoughts are on Benteen supporting Custer. I have read some views that say Benteen should have gone to Custer, even if it resulted in the entire Regiment being wiped out, simply because they were his orders and they must be obeyed. Crazy I know! I'm not a military man, but I would have kept the various battalions of the Regiment within close support of each other and had a back up plan where they could hold out somewhere if necessary - this approach would apply to all operations, never mind just the LBH. Of course I have the benefit of hindsight regards LBH, but it is how I would operate in any 'real' military operation. Reckless and needless sacrifice of men is a no-go under my command. However, if I was playing a 'war game', I would ride hell for leather to the sound of the guns - 'Garry Owen!' But as we all know, in war games and Hollywood, nobody gets hurt.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 10, 2014 17:21:14 GMT -6
Alan:
1) Forcing them away is all that is necessary. By forcing them I mean by force and without what it takes to sustain life. I don't think if you did the job with surprise and great force, there would be any need for any confrontation with Terry or anyone else. Break them up without the ability to wage further hostilities, and them not certain of their next meal would be enough. Avoid unnecessary bloodshed. You must eventually make peace,. Don't make making peace harder than it already is.
2) Benteen supporting Custer. We used to have such a lunatic around these parts. Could not understand the concept of an order once being issued could be overcome by changing events, that coupled with our tradition of using judgment and not blindly following orders because they were issued without that full appreciation of how events may change.
3) When you hit someone, never slap them with open hand, punch them as hard and as fast, and as often as you can with your closed fist, where your fingers mutually support one another. A back up plan is not much good unless you have your primary plan in place. Review the evidence at LBH and tell me what the primary plan was,
4) Riding to the sound of the guns is completely overrated. Sneak up and stab the bastard in the back is much more effective.
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Post by Margaret on Feb 10, 2014 18:38:55 GMT -6
...aiming for a mass attack from the south end early hours of the 26th wouldn't have worked... as the village would have been alerted by the evening of the 25th... by new arrivals... they'd most likely be gone...or launch an attack themselves.....
so.. we have established that Custer was not the man for the job.. therefore with him in charge they could not win this battle.... I claim that no one else in charge could either... not whilst the Indians were in that position, on that day and with the number of people they had available to fight....
...Custer was lucky to get so close ... he wasn't discovered sooner because there was no hunting to be done east of the divide.... I deem it highly unlikely that any one else in command either, not Miles, Mackenzie, Crook,... would have been able to get to this village undiscovered, which would mean travelling at some speed, keeping all the command together...including the packs... to launch a mass attack from any direction, even at 4 am.... they would have been caught out at least by the day before.... this was mid summer....middle of winter would be a possibility...
...apologies for nagging...
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Post by quincannon on Feb 10, 2014 19:05:18 GMT -6
Margaret: I believe well trained and disciplined troops could have been with five hundred yards of the south end of that village, and stayed all night without a chance of discovery by those there or any new arrivals. The difference is in the training and discipline.
Tell you the truth though I think Montrose could do it. I suspect that Fred could as well. I am quite confident I could too. Now in my case and Fred's you would need to shave about 30 or so years off of us, and with Will ten would do quite nicely. But all this would not start on the afternoon of 25 June. It would have started the year before, and my evaluation is that the training of these soldiers would be so difficult that combat would be a walk in the park.
The thing is that I would wager none of us would do it in the manner you describe,. Further I think it could be done with the majority of the force dismounted. I believe that is the way I would approach it anyway.
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Post by Margaret on Feb 11, 2014 5:21:32 GMT -6
hi Chuck... ...the kind of troops you imagine could have done the job as you set out, I would venture to claim weren't available in 1876....and neither could the kind of people be found to be trained in the way you would like... you would suffer more desertions in a week than Custer had in a year... ... there are so many areas you haven't covered with your scenario....just getting there undetected with all your troops and ammunition packs...already having done your reconnaissance....I think you wouldn't have much more to work with than what Custer had... you talk from a modern day perspective, in my view... and you have been very cautious here with your declared modus operandi... General Miles and others, had more success as they were operating against an already fragmented people on the run...smaller villages,.. and with winter approaching.... which tended to make the military look better than they were, in my opinion... ...but.... who am I to argue.... ...I have to leave it there as I have a little matter of flooding to deal with...nothing serious at this stage....so I don't intend to float away just yet... but you may have the last word and chastise me with vigour if you wish.... ...so long as you don't chop my head off.... bi for now...
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 11, 2014 5:37:05 GMT -6
hi Chuck... ...but.... who am I to argue.... bi for now... This certainly is not Wild speculation on your part, you present valid points. The NA's would not have been defeated, but maybe dispersed into smaller groups at an earlier time or moved north for the greater objective.
And bi to you as well, for now hope the flooding subsides!
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Post by quincannon on Feb 11, 2014 9:58:51 GMT -6
Yes, I believe you do present valid points, but I take them only as challenges.
The human material I would have to work with was no worse than the material available for service in the British Army circa 1800 and I suspect Sir John Moore met these same challenges in a similar manner to that which I propose. Training and discipline are the key, and tough training builds character into soldiers who little by little achieve more than they thought they could. In addition soldiers undergoing such training start to police themselves especially in the primary group. Would there be desertions? Yes I expect there would, but I don't believe they would be as high as you expect. I believe I would lose a fair number of officers as well. To both I would say good riddance. At the end if I could come up with 600 well trained soldiers, under competent junior leadership, that could march forty miles a day, every day, on foot, or more on horseback, hit what they shoot at, navigate at night as well as broad daylight, were at peak levels of physical fitness, were used to short rations and other privations, and took them as the price of doing business, and understand that Dakota and Montana are not Gettysburg and Chancellorsville, and a new day has dawned, I think the task more than manageable
At that point, the tactics would take care of themselves, but know this I never served in an Army that decided something could not be done before they tried, and all this had been tried before with success, going back to the time of the Biblical Gideon.
I also reject the idea that I am thinking in a modern sense. The body of knowledge, the technology required, the methodology of training and discipline were all present, most of it before 1876, well before. All that has to be done is collect it all and apply it to the situation at hand. That is what was not done, and as in the story of the concubines war must be taken seriously. If not, don't fight.
I have a friend from a ship modeling site that has kept me posted on this weather you are having. The pictures he has posted from Plymouth look really bad.
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