The divide and regroup

[Yan Taylor]

Just thought I would open up the subject of Custer’s Battalion separating and regrouping before and after any foray down to Ford B.
There are certain people who post on this site (me included) that think that Custer was under no real threat when his Battalion first arrived at the MTC area, others think different and that is there opinion, but consider this;

Custer divides his Battalion and approaches the area from two locations. Now if Capt. Keogh and his Wing was up on the high ground to the east (Luce/Nye-Cartwright ridges) and Col. Custer was down on the flats in front of the ford then then any serious attack by the Indians would force him to move back up to re-join Keogh on the ridges to the east, and if Keogh had already moved to Calhoun hill then Custer would have regrouped there.

I just can’t imagine the Warriors being in such numbers to not only force Custer away from the ford but away from his own support, the most logical thing to do if faced by large groups of Indians would be to re-group with Keogh and either defend the area and wait for any support to come from the south or move south.

So that is why I reckon that Custer did receive a few shots from the west bank and he could of seen that more Warriors were moving into the area, he then re-groups we Keogh and makes the decision to split once again and move north, let’s face it if the Indians had hit Custer and Yates at the ford with such a force that the whole wing had to flee away from its own support, then there would have been a trail of dead men and horses leading all the way to LSH.

Ian.

[wild]

'

[wild]

Custer rode into a negative tactical situation in MTC & Ford.
This situation called for a withdrawal.No force was required from the Indians to force Custer to turn away.
If one cannot understand the potential of a force and it's effects on the opposing force's options then one has no understanding of the nonlethal but strategic advantage of situational circumstances.
Could there be a worse tactical move than turning your back on the enemy while in contact with that enemy?
A handful of Indians could have seen Custer on his way.
His escape route could have been cut off leaving him with no other option but to try to break contact by heading North.
No line of dead troopers was required to have Custer snookered on Battle Ridge

[quincannon]

Ian: You are correct. No significant threat faced Custer when he arrived at MTC Ford, leaving the bulk of his force on high ground to his right and rear. Had there been any threat greater then what the Indians themselves say at the time of his arrival there, the natural, both human and military, reaction would be to fall back upon his supporting force, for that is why they were there in the first place. The time to do so was certainly there, as evidenced by the fact that he did indeed move away from the ford. It must also be considered that in order to take away that fall back to L-N-C option there must be a significant body of hostiles coming from what is now Custer rear, and inserting themselves between Custer/Yates and Keogh. The only place those folks could have come from was those that faced Reno and were chasing him at that very time, or at best had just completed the chase, and were still fiddling around trying to decide upon getting at him up on the bluffs.

It would be very easy to understand all this if each of these actions took place as isolated incidents, but they were not. They took place as part of the ebb and flow of battle, therefore time, space, and terrain must be considered.

[Yan Taylor]

Yes Chuck, I don’t think that the line of communication between Custer and Keogh was blocked when a move was made down at Ford B. it is not impossible for the Custer/Yates Wing to get pushed first to the east and then cut off with Warriors moving between Custer/Yates and Keogh, they then are forced north to find another band just waiting to chase them up to LSH were another band has moved up and cut off his easterly rout, but I don’t buy it, the only way that this could happen is if the Warriors had already gathered in masses in the village and they had motorcycles to out maneuverer Custer before he could get away, and I thought the lightning war was in 1940.

Ian.

[quincannon]

Ian: That is exactly the point. For all of this to transpire those Indians that dealt with Custer in such a way would have to be lying in wait for him and have positive knowledge of just where he would go. There is only one place down there where a large body could both concentrate and stay hidden from an approach down the coulee, that being behind Greasy Grass Ridge, and even then their presence in force would not close Custer's back door. To separate Custer/Yates from Keogh, a wedge must be driven between the two in the coulee itself. Had that been the case, it is doubtful that Keogh could have moved from L-N-C to the Calhoun Hill area, and that takes no consideration at all of the advisability of such a move.

Speculating only that the cartridges that were found in the area of L-N-C are from the battle, it is a fairly long way from the site of those finds, presumably for the sake of argument the Keogh position, to Calhoun Hill.

[wild]

Approaching to within carbine range of 2000 indians,who outflanked/overlapped the column, with a river crossing to your front gave rise to the probability of a negative result.Custer placed his command within the maw of a force outnumbering him 10 to one.That was the threat.
SOP for such is get the hell out which is what he did.
A word to the wise;don't ever put your head in the lions mouth.

[mac]

wild
We are talking about Custer here, Mr. Attack! The number of warriors in the village was small by all accounts so you cannot use 2000 warriors. I'd love to see this option but it is just not there, even if you kill Custer at the ford.
Cheers