Timing issues and distance.

[Yan Taylor]

Thanks Fred, I was wondering why Custer didn’t make use of if these two couriers after he had left 3,411, McIlhargey was detached from his Company and place with Reno for the purpose of running messages so Custer could have sent him instead of the hapless Martini.

Yes Dan, a strange choice Martini, especially as he couldn’t ``speaka de lingo’’ very good.

Ian.

[herosrest]

Oct 20, 2013 14:41:32 GMT -6 fred said:

Since this thread is for timing issues, maybe it's a good "time" to post this here. I have posted it "next door," as well.

I'm not sure how well this will take or how good it will look here, but since this has been published in the Research Review I thought I would post it here, especially since we have all this silliness over timelines and how some people discount them. Sheer laziness to me. "Time-frames," whether in 5-minute increments or 15-minute increments are also BS. I reiterate: unless you understand the time an event occurred, you do not and can not understand the battle of the Little Big Horn. If you think you do, you're kidding yourself.

This same timeline will be published in Book II, along with twenty-four others, a few somewhat shorter, but most a lot longer. Times in yellow are local sun, but it is my opinion the command rode on HQ time; that fits in best with estimates and accounts. And where applicable, speeds are in yellow; distances, in pink. The number at the end of each entry corresponds to the "source note" at the end.

Well... I guess that is all for now.

Best wishes,
Fred.

As given in quote, fred published his timeline work, bumped from post but on page ! of topic and of course forming the back-bone of the thought provoking 'Strategy of Defeat'.

This is a seriously thought provoking work of labour and love, which I have digested once, twice and now hope to 'effectively' discuss in delving beneath the bonnet of premise and its biases. Nothing is perfect but the work pulls together an immense body of work supported variously by modern experts in the field. I know fred loves a challenge and I hope to examine the thrust of his vision of the battle and what really happened.

There is only one place for me to begin, which is events during march down Ash Creek and what took place before arriving to the Lone tepee across from the South fork.

Record from the four Crow scouts who accompanied Bouyer's advance recon to the White Bluff, is entirely dismissed as unrealistic in regards what was observed in LBH valley, and more importantly, what was then reported back to Custer. This dismissal of important event should be explained, please; since it goes very much towards what Custer knew or at least was told, and ow and why what followed did. I believe that all four scouts variously record and broadly agree their scout ahead of the advance, so how can the information they gave, be ignored?

It's a good work, fred. Let the inquest begin. Not the thrust but the detail and assumptions. I know you are busy but plaudits are earned, begin a defence please.


Glad to move this to its seperate topic, if you wish. It could become classic. Be well!

[herosrest]

The scout Goes Ahead, gave that he and three others were told by Bouyer at White Rocks, to go with Custer and confirming an event whereby they rejoined the the command marching down Reno Creek. There was an event of some type.

White Man Runs Him stated to McCoy, in 1919, on the battlefield, that he: 'told Custer he had better go down Reno Creek, then wait this side of the Divide before going into the Little Horn Valley. Custer moved forward, the soldiers at fast trot down the Creek. Our ponies were smaller than the soldier horses, so we galloped to keep up. Custer followed the Lodge Pole Trail down the North Fork of Upper Ash Creek. This trail comes from the Rosebud up Davis Creek through a pass to the North Fork of Upper Ash Creek, then down Ash Creek to the Little Horn River and is fairly smooth.
About nine miles down the Upper Fork of Ash Creek, we found a lodge with a dead Indian inside. As we passed by, soldiers set fire to this lodge.

We have discovered an event and learned that WMRH was not amongst the scouting party led by Mitch Bouyer. There were six Crows scouting under Bouyer as guide.
Hairy Moccasin from the Teepee Book, June 1916: ' I was sent ahead. Custer said, "You go and find that village." I went to a butte at the head of Reno Creek, from where I could see the village. I reported the camp to Custer. He asked if any were running about away from the camp. I said "No." We then came on down to the forks of Reno Creek. When we stopped there to divide up I could hear the Indians in camp shouting and whooping. It seems that HM accompanied Custer to eno Creek's forks.

We can surmise, given that Curley was not noted to be wearing a blanket during the morning of "5th June, 1876; that the party accompanying Mitch Bouyer included Half Yellow Face, White Swan, and possibly Goes Ahead. As the persevering student of Little Bighorn eventually discovers - It's research is hell. Hellish at least. The astute Mr Wagner the third might be onto something of maybe not. Whittaker's timeline had not yet blessed the noted Curley yet, with means of his and Custer's escape from the battle. Custer, the officer and gentleman, tea-tooting to boot, would not be seen dead in a blanket - he saved best smile for that occasion.

No worthwhile conclusion possible, although weight of input is slightly against the non-blanket Indian (so mightily wronged by Whittaker).We must, like Microsoft's Windows file searching API - persist.

Our vanishing argument is saved by 'The Vanishing Race' and direct reference to the matter from a second party who was first party, to the first party of the event. Well Haleluja! At page 88 of aforementioned pending invisibility, Runs the Enemy's account of Crook's Rosebud fight offers an interesting insight or two. Page 153, see inset attachment, which clarifies the White Rocks Butte issue.

On balance, I have made and carried my case. I believe there to be more, and will hunt it up.

Regards.

TVR - archive.org/details/thevanishingrace27616gut

Interview with Curley, September 18, 1908 - Note this was shortly after visit by Edward S. Curtiss.

On September 18, 1908, the Crow Curley, scout with Custer on July 25, 1876, accompanied me on a visit to the vicinity of the burning tepee and from there back over Custer's route to the battlefield. On this day he, with three other Crows (Hairy Moccasin, Goes Ahead, and White Man Runs Him) were with Mitch Bouyer. Two other Crow scouts, White Swan and Half Yellow Face, were with Gerard. At this time Curley was 20 years old.

He directed me to the site of the big Sioux camp, all of which, with the exception of the lone tepee covering a dead warrior, had been moved in advance of Custer's arrival. This was located on the north side of Benteen Creek, about 4 miles from the Little Bighorn, on a wide and smooth piece of ground gently sloping toward the creek. When we arrived on this ground, Curley drew my attention to rotten pieces of wood lying about, which he said had been carried there by the Sioux for their camp fires. Buffalo heads and joint bones were also strewn over the ground, and these he also said were still good evidence of an Indian camp which evidently had extended about 1/2 mile.

The site of the burning tepee he could not locate exactly, ("Heap Sioux tepee here," said Curley) but said it was on one side or the other of a gulch running through the camping ground. Pointing his finger, he said: "Mebby so here, mebby so there," meaning that he was not sure on which side of the ravine it was standing. His means of identifying the locality was a high rocky bluff, from which he, with Mitch Bouyer and three other Crow scouts, had been watching the Sioux with field glasses all that forenoon before the arrival of Custer's command. Curley said the tepee stood just opposite the bluff, and as the troops came along, the tepee was set on fire by the soldiers.

From this point he went with Custer's battalion as it came along, and when Custer diverged from Reno's trail, about 1 1/4 miles from the river, Bouyer and his four Crows went with Custer. Custer's route from this point was directly across the country, on the crest of a long ridge, running to the bluffs and coming out at a point about 500 ft. north of the Reno corral. From here Custer passed along the crest of the bluffs for fully 3/4 mile, in full view of the river and of the valley over across it. Custer hurried his men, going at a gallop most of the time. Reno and his command were plainly seen by Custer's whole command while marching this 3/4 mile. On the first line of bluffs back from the river there are two high peaks marked "A" on the map, now called Reno peaks. For some distance south of these there is a high ridge running parallel with the river, but not so high as the peaks. Custer's command passed into the valley of a tributary of Reno Creek just behind this ridge and the peaks and went down it, going in a direction directly north and coming out into the bed of Reno Creek about a mile from its mouth at Ford B. From the moment Custer's command commenced to descend this tributary of Reno Creek, it passed out of view of Reno's battalion, but Bouyer and his four scouts kept to the left of Custer, on the crest of the high ridge and peaks, and at all times could command a view of the river and the bottoms beyond.

Before Bouyer got to the peaks, he left three of his Crow scouts behind, with orders to watch the Indian camp in the valley opposite and any movements of Indians in Custer's rear. Taking Curley with him, he passed on and over the peaks, and then on a course parallel with that of Custer (directly north) until they came down into the bed of Reno Creek, where they met Custer about 1/2 mile from the river. When they got to the top of the first of these peaks, they looked across and observed that Reno's command was fighting. At the sight of this, Bouyer could hardly restrain himself and shouted and waved his hat excitedly for some little time. Undoubtedly Bouyer is the man seen by some in Reno's command to wave his hat, for Custer never went to the peaks or high ridge; and when the hat was waved, Custer was entirely out of sight from Reno's position and must have been so for several minutes.

After Bouyer and Curley joined Custer, the command passed rapidly down to Ford B. As soon as the soldiers came in sight of the village, the Sioux gave voice to a "heap big yell, like dog," as Curley expressed it, and when Custer's soldiers got closer, there was "heap shoot, bang! bang! bang!" The troops did not dismount here, and some of them rode into the river before stopping and turning back. Curley saw one soldier gallop across the river just below the ford at great speed, pass up the bank, through the Sioux posted along it, and come out into full view on the open ground beyond the ford. The Sioux defending the ford he observed to be all dismounted. He afterwards learned that these were men who did not have time to get their ponies, which were grazing back on the hills west of the village.

When Custer withdrew from the ford, he proceeded down the river for some distance and then struck out for higher ground in columns of fours, going direct to the point where markers are found at the southeast point of the battlefield ([at] Sergeant Finley's marker). Before they got to this point, Mitch Bouyer lost his horse. Indians were now in front and in the ravines on both sides, and a strong force of Indians were coming up in the rear. Curley says the command was being driven like a herd of horses, and the only thing that could be done was to charge the enemy in the direction that was thought to be most advantageous to go and then only to have them close in on all sides. The front was driving the Indians and the rear was being driven. In ascending to the elevation now marked by slabs for Calhoun and Crittenden, an attempt was made to cover the retreat until some kind of a stand could be made. Men were left at the Finley marker, and some of the troops dismounted just beyond this, Curley staking his horse with the rest. The dismounted men then tried to drive the Indians from the gulch ahead, but the men left in the rear were quickly killed, and the advance of the Indians from that direction was hardly checked at all.

Custer stopped at this point for a brief space of time, and what was decided upon had to be done in great haste. There was a hurried conference of officers, and Bouyer told Curley that the subject of conversation was to the effect that if the command could make a stand somewhere, the remainder of the regiment would probably soon come up and relieve them. Personally, Bouyer did not expect that relief would come, as he thought the other commands had been scared out. Bouyer thought the orders would be to charge straight ahead, drive the Indians from the ravine, and try to find more favourable ground. For a moment or two the fire of the Indians slackened in this direction, and it was thought the plan could be carried out, when a large force of warriors swept around that corner as if in anticipation of the intentions of the soldiers, and the scheme had to be given up. There was then "heap shoot, shoot, shoot" (Curley clapping his hands after the manner of the sign language to indicate the rapidity of the firing). It was now plain that no advance could be made in the intended direction, and Custer struck out westward, it being understood that some of the soldiers (probably Calhoun's troop) would try to hold the ground at this corner. Curley says, however, that the men would not stand, all who could do so either going for their horses or running in the direction of the general retreat, which was headed for the highest ground, now occupied by the monument. In doing this they had to run the gauntlet of a fire from a ravine full of warriors to the northward and a large force of Indians shooting over the long ridge extending westerly to the monument. Curley said that while on the way to where the Calhoun marker now stands, a few men had started in the direction of the monument along the southside of the ridge, but as the Indians charged up from the direction of the river these men were driven over the crest and fell in with the line of retreat.

Most of the men able to do so had now followed the line of retreat down the gully and diagonally up the slope toward the monument. In this the men with the gray horses appeared to be keeping well together, but it seemed to him that the other companies were getting badly mixed up.

Mitch Bouyer now turned to Curley, saying that Tom Custer had suggested that the scouts had better save themselves if they could. Bouyer advised Curley to try it, and Curley said he told Bouyer he would do so if he (Bouyer) also would try it. Bouyer declined by saying that he was too badly wounded, and he would have to stay to fight it out, although he believed they would all be killed. Curley now decided to stay no longer. He turned around to look for his horse, and there he found a hand-to-hand encounter. As for him the Sioux were a little too quick, and he saw a warrior running off with his horse at the end of the lariat. Just then a mounted Indian was shot off his pony. Catching the warrior's horse and taking his Winchester and belt of cartridge to replace his own weapon which was dirty and working badly, he mounted and rode out. The mass of Indians had now charged around on the flanks of the retreating soldiers, and Curley, by riding around the corner as though one of the charging Indians and giving voice to the Sioux yell or war cry, passed out without being recognized and was soon in a ravine, out of sight. He went up the right-hand ravine (to the right of Godfrey's spring), and stopped to look back only twice. He estimates that his last look at the battlefield must have been 1/2 hour after leaving, and the soldiers were still fighting, although he could not discern anything as to the formation. He travelled on a wide circuit and met the steamer Far West lying at the mouth of the Little Bighorn, where he got aboard and remained for several days. See also the account of James Sipes. According to the account of Grant Marsh, captain of the steamer, Curley came through the brush on the river's bank, naked, armed and riding an Indian pony. They at once saw that something was wrong with the Indian, but no Crow interpreter was around, and Curley was having difficulty in making his audience understand. He would grab his hair, pull it straight up, groan, and then make a motion to indicate scalping, but this was not definite enough, and he was pressed for further explanation. Finally he grabbed up a piece of paper and pencil and undertook the graphics method. He first drew a small circle and within it made dots, which he intended to represent soldiers. He next drew a much larger circle surrounding the first and between them drew a large number of dots, saying, as he dotted them down, "Heap Sioux, heap Sioux." This made matters clearer to the dull people, for they now understood that the soldiers had been surrounded.



Notes

When, precisely - Did Frederick Whittaker interview Curley and who translated?

Walter Camp field notes, folder 27, BYU Library. Curley was a Crow Indian born about 1856 on the Little Rosebud. He enlisted in the 7th Infantry on April 10, 1876, at the Crow Agency as a scout and was attached to the 7th Cavalry on June 21. He was with the Custer column on June 25, witnessed the fight of the Custer column, and carried the news of the fight to the steamer Far West. He was mustered out on September 30, 1876. He died of pneumonia on May 21, 1923, at his ranch near the Crow Agency and was buried in the Custer Battlefield National Cemetery. ''Curley's Narrative" as told to Lieutenant Charles F. Roe with Thomas LeForge interpreting is in the Army and Navy Journal, Washington, D.C., March 25, 1882, 19:34, p. 761. The New Northwest (Deer Lodge, Mont.) for July 21, 1876, and July 21, 1907, has the "Story of Curley the Scout." Copies are in the Montana State Historical Society Library. His account is found also in Joseph Dixon's The Vanishing Race (Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1925), pp. 14045, 15964 and in John Finerty's Warpath and Bivouac (Chicago: M. A. Donohue & Co., 1890). "Curley The Crow Scout Once More" is found in Winners Of The West (St. Joseph, Missouri: National Indian Wars Veterans), July, 1924, 1:8, 12, and the "Statement of Curley The Scout" is found in The Tepee Book, June 1916, and June 1926. There are innumerable accounts attributed to Curley in newspapers beginning from 1876.

Walter Camp also identifies Benteen Creek as Reno Creek. It is identified by Indians as Ash Creek and by Lieutenant Godfrey as Sundance Creek.

Walter Camp prepared several maps pertaining to the Little Bighorn River fight, one of which is a large table-size map in several sections. The identifications in this Curley narrative are not shown in the Camp map illustrated in this book. Camp uses the terms Reno peaks, Edgerley peaks, and Weir peaks interchangeably.

Reference to Reno Creek and later references are confusing and misleading. Camp almost undoubtedly was referring to Cedar Coulee as the tributary, (Ha, ha!) and by Reno Creek he was referring to Medicine Tail Coulee.

The direct quotation in this footnote is from the July 1908 letter of Daniel Knipe to Walter Camp. This soldier that crossed the river may have been Sergeant James Bustard of Company I. Sergeant of I Troop was lying, he and his horse, across the ford in the Indian village or camp. He was not mutilated; his horse was some twenty or thirty steps from him. (In Walter Camp Collection, box 5, folder 7, BYU Library.)




From Interview with Curley, August 34, 1909, Russell White Bear (see link bottom of post) , Interpreter Curley interview August 3 on battlefield, August 4 on divide.

Curley was born on Rosebud River. Before 1876 I had had experience in three battles with Sioux. . . .
What do the Crows call Little Bighorn? Little Bighorn.
Also Big Horn River? Big Horn.
Before 1876 what was considered eastern boundary of Crow country? Tongue. The Crow country extended to the Tongue.

Curley: Shi shi' esh; Half Yellow Face: Ischu shi dish; White Swan: Be da'chish; Hairy Moccasin: Isape eshish; Goes Ahead: Ba suck osh; White Man: Ba chida crush (long u).

Curley said Mitch Bouyer and 4 Crows, including himself, lay on rocky hill all forenoon watching the Sioux, and lone tepee in Indian camp was down under them, to left. When soldiers came along they set the tepee on fire. Here they joined Custer.

While with Custer did he hear Reno's firing, and where was Curley then? No, after came down off bluff too much excitement and not paying attention to matters in that direction. While Reno's fight was still in progress when he left the bluffs south of Ford B, he heard nothing of it after passing Dry Creek, as the excitement in our front was too great.

After Custer had sighted the village and was moving toward it, did Mitch Bouyer say what movement he thought Custer was about to make?
Did he think Custer was going to charge the village? Yes, thought Custer would charge.

Escape of Hairy Moccasin, Goes Ahead, and White Man Runs Him: These three Crows were with Bouyer and me as far as the bluff at the cut bank just south of Ford B and about 1500 ft. from that ford. While we were here, Custer's command hove in sight, galloping right down the coulee toward the river. Bouyer now said he would cut across and meet it, and he started down off the east slope of the bluff and I with him. Here Hairy Moccasin, Goes Ahead, and White Man Runs Him turned tail and put back up the river following our trail along the bluffs. Hairy Moccasin, White Man, and Goes Ahead got away when Mitch Bouyer went down to see what Custer intended to do, as Custer was coming down Dry Creek. Then the 3 Crows shipped out without leave and went south along bluffs. This was the last I saw of them until I met them on the Yellowstone some weeks later, but they have told me that they retreated as far as Sundance Creek, went up the trail we came in on, and then cut a wide circuit over to the vicinity of the mouth of the Little Bighorn where the next day they yelled over to Gibbon's Crows the information of Custer's defeat, of which they saw only the part in which Reno participated.

Custer's route according to Curley: Custer left coulee of Dry Creek 900 ft. east of its mouth and struck the river 1,000 ft. downstream from its mouth. It is about 900 ft. further to the first high cut bank. It appeared to Curley here that Custer would charge across into the village, but the west bank was thick with dismounted Sioux, and back in the village hundreds of mounted ones were coming up. Good many soldiers got nearly into water and one got across and was killed in village. He was some non-commissioned officer. The hot fire then impressed Curley with the idea that it would be necessary for Custer to retreat, and he did so, going in a direction downstream and quartering back upon the high ridge.

While Custer's firing at the cut bank was in progress I saw no large body of Indians fording, but as soon as we began to retreat they must have swarmed across both above and below us, for we had not proceeded one-third of the way to the ridge before the Sioux were thick upon both our right and left flanks firing into us heavily. I do not know whether or not any one was killed on the way to the ridge but the firing was so heavy that I do not see how the command made the ridge without some loss. Going up from river, Sioux on all sides except front. Mitch Bouyer told me to keep out of the skirmish as much as possible, as they might wish to send me with a dispatch to the other troops.

When Custer retreated up from the river, did he stop anywhere to fight? Did not stop but did some firing. When got up to about where fence is they began dismounting, and dismounted men were on flanks of horse-holders to protect them.

After we made the ridge just west of where Calhoun's marker is placed, we were twice ordered to load and fire together. It occurred to me at the time that this must be some signal. Does not know whether or not it was a signal, but there seemed to be some understanding or system about it. The apparent line of men between C and H Curley says were men who charged Indians. Other Indians charged in behind them and cut them off and most of them were killed.

I escaped by riding to the right and front, through dust and powder smoke, pulling over my head a cape made by cutting up blankets, which I had tied to my saddle.5 The Sioux appeared not to discover my identity. I was dressed in shirt and leggings, abut the same as the Sioux, most of whom had their faces and clothing painted in striking colors. As nearly as I can recollect I went straight east or south of east, turning the point of the hill [where Sergeant Butler was found]. As I did this, I passed a dead Sioux who had been killed by the fire of our soldiers on their retreat up from the river. I dismounted quickly and seized his gun6 and cartridge belt. Further on, and on the north slope of the coulee of Dry Creek, rather out of view from the battle in progress, I caught up with a loose Sioux pony which I led along with me until I came to the steamer.

Curley's story has been both believed and disbelieved. As to the disbelief, I have never heard or seen in print the least particle of reliable evidence to prove that he was not in the beginning of the fight, as he states. His story throughout agrees with other authentic accounts. The story about my going to Custer on the battlefield and trying to persuade him to try to escape after the men were nearly all killed is untrue. I never told it. The fact that I could speak no English and Custer not a word of Crow shows how ridiculous the story is. The familiar story to the effect that Curley went to Custer late in the battle and offered to pilot him out and that Custer disdainfully refused to go is not true. Curley did not talk with General Custer on the battlefield at all, nor at any other time, because he could speak no English. He talked only with Mitch Bouyer, who could interpret Crow. Curley left early in the battle, from the point where Calhoun fell, which was 3/4 mile from where Custer fell. And far from Curley suggesting to Custer a means of escape, it was Tom Custer who suggested to Bouyer and Curley how they could get away, and but for which, and the advice of Bouyer, Curley would probably never have attempted to leave the battlefield in the way he did.

Says W. M. Camp is the first man who seemed to take down his interview carefully and ask questions about particular things in a careful and persistent manner.

Ask Curley if river at Reno's skirmish line has changed much since 1876. Yes, a good deal. Also same applies north of Ford B.



Russell White Bear map - mtmemory.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p15018coll5/id/623/rec/80

[herosrest]

What do you call an Arikaree scout? Mr Ree

What do you call a Cheyenne poet? Shakes Spear

[herosrest]

There is more data. The Arikara Narrative (where else) and Young Hawk.

Note - Young Hawk reported scouts peering over a ridge toward the lone tepee.

The Arikara grouped themselves about the older men who spoke to the younger men as is the custom of the tribe. Stabbed spoke to the young men and Custer gave the instructions here to the scouts through Gerard. He said : "Boys, I want you to take the horses away from the Sioux camp." Then Stabbed told the Arikara scouts to obey Custer's instructions and to try and take away as many horses as possible. Custer continued: ''Make up your minds to go straight to their camp and capture their horses. Boys, you are going to have a hard day, you must keep up your courage, you will get experience today." On the top of the ridge the bugle sounded for the unfurling of the flag (this is what Gerard told the scouts) . This caused great excitement, all made ready, girths were tightened, loads were made light.

Another bugle sounded and Custer ordered the scouts forward. They went down the dry coulee and when about half way to the high ridge at the right, Young Hawk saw a group of scouts at the lower end of the ridge peering over toward the lone tepee. The scouts he was with slowed up as the others came toward them. Then behind them they heard a call from Gerard. He said to them: ''The Chief says for you to run." At this Strikes Two gave the war-whoop and called back: "What are we doing ?" and rode on. At this we all whooped and Strikes Two reached the lone tepee first and struck it with his whip. Then Young Hawk came. He got off on the north side of the tepee, took a knife from his belt, pierced the tent through and ran the knife down to the ground. Inside of the lone tepee he saw a scaffold, and upon it a dead body wrapped in a buffalo robe.


Note - Custer's orders for scouts to capture horses after going straight to the hostile camp, suggests strongly that Custer kept details of his plan of attack, from the officers of his command.
Note - In his report to the Report of Secretary of War, 1876, I, p480; Benteen says : "I came to a burning lodge with the dead body of an Indian in it on a scaffold." - As matters are understood, this was obviously a very slow burning tipi. Quite rare.
Note - Quoting from the author's note - This point whether the Dakotas knew of Custer's movements and realized he was about to attack them, is a disputed one. Captain Godfrey, in his valuable account which is given the place in military history, mentions many incidents which prove that the Indians knew of the movements of the column and of an impending attack; but General Sheridan, in his report of November 25, 1876, says that he believes that 'the Indians were not aware of the proximity of Custer until he arrived within about eight or nine miles of their village, and that then their scouts who carried the intelligence back to the valley were so closely followed up by Custer that he arrived on the summit of the divide overlooking the upper portion of the village almost as soon as the scouts reached it." — Report of Secretary of War, 1876, I, p444.
Note (on the note above) - Sheridan obviously was not referring to the divide between Rosebud and Little Bighorn.
Note (on the note above, both relating to the note above the note above) - Custer went up on the divide to see for himself whether the report of the scouts was true, while the command remained concealed in a ravine where it halted at 10:30 a.m., June 25th. — Godfrey, Custer's Last Battle, pp. 368, 367.
It is obvious that this cannot refer to the Crow's Nest episode during which Custer and a small party left the regiment behind, and led by Red Star advanced to Lt. Varnum at the Crow's Nest.
A further auther's note (TAN, Libby) - Custer went up on the divide to see for himself whether the report of the scouts was true, while the command remained concealed in a ravine where it halted at 10:30 a.m., June 25th. — Godfrey, Custer's Last Battle, pp. 368, 367. Obviously this was a later observation made by Custer during the advance and assignment of companies to four battalion commanders. Maj. Reno and the three senior captains, Benteen, Keogh and Yates. Peter Thompson told of Custer leaving the marching companies and returning after making an observation. It is immensely unlikely that Custer would avoid opportunity to view the village reported by his scouts at the White Rocks Butte.
The advance of the command to the Crow's Nest was unaccompanied by Custer who had gone ahead much earlier. Numerous historians and scholars have immense problems with events surrounding these different events, but the letter to Katherine Gibson Fougera of July 4th 1876, explains the matter fully. (see With Custer's Cavalry, 1882)
Evidence in favour of Bouyer and 4 Crow scouts at the White Rocks Butte is becoming significant besides proven. That Custer himself would not climb to a vantage point overlooking his target is impossible. It was recorded by Thompsonwho confused the earlier officer's call with the assignment of companies to battalion commanders some seven or eight miles from the Little Bighorn river crossing called now Ford A and known to the hostiles as the place we crossed over yesterday. A majority of the battle's most earnest students have fumbled, fallen and continued their theory based upon a flawed and useless grasp of the nuts of the situation presented to Custer. Gibson saw dust ahead when ten miles distant from the village, scouts are stating the village is standing.

[herosrest]

There is more data. The Arikara Narrative (where else) and Young Hawk.


Note - Young Hawk reported scouts peering over a ridge toward the lone tepee.


The Arikara grouped themselves about the older men who spoke to the younger men as is the custom of the tribe. Stabbed spoke to the young men and Custer gave the instructions here to the scouts through Gerard. He said : "Boys, I want you to take the horses away from the Sioux camp." Then Stabbed told the Arikara scouts to obey Custer's instructions and to try and take away as many horses as possible. Custer continued: ''Make up your minds to go straight to their camp and capture their horses. Boys, you are going to have a hard day, you must keep up your courage, you will get experience today." On the top of the ridge the bugle sounded for the unfurling of the flag (this is what Gerard told the scouts) . This caused great excitement, all made ready, girths were tightened, loads were made light.

Another bugle sounded and Custer ordered the scouts forward. They went down the dry coulee and when about half way to the high ridge at the right, Young Hawk saw a group of scouts at the lower end of the ridge peering over toward the lone tepee. The scouts he was with slowed up as the others came toward them. Then behind them they heard a call from Gerard. He said to them: ''The Chief says for you to run." At this Strikes Two gave the war-whoop and called back: "What are we doing ?" and rode on. At this we all whooped and Strikes Two reached the lone tepee first and struck it with his whip. Then Young Hawk came. He got off on the north side of the tepee, took a knife from his belt, pierced the tent through and ran the knife down to the ground. Inside of the lone tepee he saw a scaffold, and upon it a dead body wrapped in a buffalo robe.


Note - Custer's orders for scouts to capture horses after going straight to the hostile camp, suggests strongly that Custer kept details of his plan of attack, from the officers of his command.

Note - In his report to the Report of Secretary of War, 1876, I, p480; Benteen says : "I came to a burning lodge with the dead body of an Indian in it on a scaffold." - As matters are understood, this was obviously a very slow burning tipi. Quite rare.

Note - Quoting from the author's note - This point whether the Dakotas knew of Custer's movements and realized he was about to attack them, is a disputed one. Captain Godfrey, in his valuable account which is given the place in military history, mentions many incidents which prove that the Indians knew of the movements of the column and of an impending attack; but General Sheridan, in his report of November 25, 1876, says that he believes that 'the Indians were not aware of the proximity of Custer until he arrived within about eight or nine miles of their village, and that then their scouts who carried the intelligence back to the valley were so closely followed up by Custer that he arrived on the summit of the divide overlooking the upper portion of the village almost as soon as the scouts reached it." — Report of Secretary of War, 1876, I, p444.

Note (on the note above) - Sheridan obviously was not referring to the divide between Rosebud and Little Bighorn.

Note (on the note above, both relating to the note above the note above) - Custer went up on the divide to see for himself whether the report of the scouts was true, while the command remained concealed in a ravine where it halted at 10:30 a.m., June 25th. — Godfrey, Custer's Last Battle, pp. 368, 367.

It is obvious that this cannot refer to the Crow's Nest episode during which Custer and a small party left the regiment behind in camp, cooking breakfasts, and led by Red Star advanced to Lt. Varnum at the Crow's Nest.

A further auther's note (TAN, Libby) - Custer went up on the divide to see for himself whether the report of the scouts was true, while the command remained concealed in a ravine where it halted at 10:30 a.m., June 25th. — Godfrey, Custer's Last Battle, pp. 368, 367. Obviously this was a later observation made by Custer during the advance and assignment of companies to four battalion commanders. Maj. Reno and the three senior captains, Benteen, Keogh and Yates. Peter Thompson told of Custer leaving the marching companies and returning after making an observation. It is immensely unlikely that Custer would avoid opportunity to view the village reported by his scouts at the White Rocks Butte.

Advance of the command to the Crow's Nest was unaccompanied by Custer who had gone ahead much earlier. Numerous historians and scholars have immense problems with events surrounding these different events, but the letter to Katherine Gibson Fougera of July 4th 1876, explains the matter fully. (see With Custer's Cavalry, 1882)

Evidence in favour of Bouyer and 4 Crow scouts at the White Rocks Butte has become significant besides proven. That Custer himself would not climb to a vantage point overlooking his target is impossible. It was recorded by Thompson who confused the earlier officer's call with the assignment of companies to battalion commanders some seven or eight miles from the Little Bighorn river crossing called now Ford A and known to the hostiles as the place we crossed over yesterday. A majority of the battle's most earnest students have fumbled, fallen and continued their theory based upon a flawed and useless grasp of the nuts of the situation presented to Custer. Gibson saw dust ahead when ten miles distant from the village, scouts are stating the village is standing.

The worry of course was hordes of warriors mounting up (dust) to ride out and give battle, interdict, delay Unfortunately - that did not take place.

[herosrest]

Concencus - Feel the love - One of the techniques adopted into professional analyses of Little Bighorn is concencus. It is a powerful tool which underpins way of life and which allows a like minded majority or cabal, to impose themselves. This can assume the form of overt and covert bullying and is a perfectly normal social activity and history in chaotic focus.

This activity is commonly practiced by experts who gather a following of acolytes accepting considered opinion as moot of seed for further development. It is a process of exclusion and focus which has broadly served practical sciences very well, however.......... modern practice leaves something to be required in newly developing fields including that at Greasy Grass.

Archaeology records the discovery of battle related cavalry artifacts from combat, on the terrain of Gresy Grass Ridge but by a quirk of technical analysis, this location is assigned libly as a warrior position by research material which has gone on to exclude proper consideration of implication.

Without reservation, here is example of the type of question resolved by technical analysis. A number of studies concluded that cartridge extraction from Springfield carbines was of not relevance to outcome of the battle. Researchers including Hedren and consideration by Weibert. Record of the fighting by Reno's initial fight clearly indicates that problems occured with the carbines and yet examination of collected relics showed that very few exhibited evidence of being prised free with metal implement. Private Peter Thompson extracted a jammed round from his weapon with fingers and how anyone might detect this from study of a fired cartridge is a mystery. Despite a lack of official recognition of problems, the move to brass ammunition was rapid and at least one regiment's commander, Miles, was aware of problems with copper ammunition when he marched to join the Plain's fighting. There is broad record within participant accounts, of problems with the carbines and particularlt jamming. Comment exists also of men using pistols on Custer's battleground where bands full of cartridges were recovered from dead soldiers.
Melt down - castboolits.gunloads.com/showthread.php?67440-What-would-General-Custer-do&s=66a7487e90915008b8274c0489b33e5f&p=731028&viewfull=1#post731028


We return to the expanding topic to consider the part of Lt. Varnum's scpout ahead of the night march.
Quoting his words, given by C.T. Brady (renowned cleric and scholar of history - Praise Be.): "We got into camp about dark, and I was skirmishing for grub, being pretty well tired out. Custer came to our camp (the scouts') and sat down, holding a confab in the brush with the Crow scouts. Custer then explained to me that the Crows said that on the divide between the Little Big Horn and the Rosebud there was a high hill with a Crow's nest in it, where the Crows went when they tried to steal horses from the Sioux; that when it became daylight they could tell by the rising of the smoke whether there were Indians on the Little Big Horn or not.

He wanted some intelligent white man to go with these Crows and get from them what they saw, and send word back to him. I told him I supposed that meant me, and it ended in my going. I took with me Charles Reynolds, Mick Bouyer, five Crows and eight or ten Rees. Custer said he would move at 11 o'clock at night; I was to go at 9.

He would go to the base of the mountains where I was to be, and I was to send him a note as early as possible of what I learned. I got to the Crows' nest about 2.30am on the 25th, and about twenty-five miles from where I had left Custer. I threw myself down and fell asleep; but in about three-quarters of an hour I was waked up. It was then just day light. The Indians (Crows) wanted me on the bluff above us. I scrambled up. I saw the two tepees, spoken of so often, on the branch down which we went to fight. The Indians tried to show me an immense pony herd in the valley of the Little Big Horn. I couldn't see it. They told me to 'look for worms.' In fact my eyes were pretty sore anyway. I had ridden about seventy miles without sleep, and my eyesight was not very good for long range.

I sat down and wrote a despatch to Custer, and sent it off at about 4.45. Before the Rees left with the message, however, the smoke of some of Custer's camp-fires was seen about ten miles off, possibly not so far. The Crows were angry at Custer for allowing fires under the circumstances. Custer got my message at about 8 o'clock and started soon after, and the dust of his column could be plainly seen as soon as he did so, though not his troops."

A broadly important record from Varnum, which underpins quite some modern analysis of the march to Little Bighorn during the morning of 25th June. Varnum was way off with distances but, by his admissions - ehausted after a trying and long all day march.

Note - Varnum could only reliably have have learnt of his note's delivery to Custer, from Custer, and 8 o'clock must be as completely suspect as the distance of 10 miles to camp-fires. During events at the Crow's Nest as Custer rejoined his command which arrived behind him, noting here that time spent on the heights differentiates the relative start times of Custer and 7th Cavalry's march; from the night halt at Camp 1; Varnum was sent further ahead to observe and did not return until a brief meeting as he joined Major Reno's column at the Two Tepee's seen earlier. Varnum was referring to the two or one and a half tepees located near the mouth of Reno Creek, and not the burning tepee.

Descending from Crow's Nest, an officer's call was advised of the decision to advance to battle and the compamies ordered inspected. Four Crows and Mitch Bouyer were sent further forward in addition to but seperately from Varnum, and the balance of the scouts given orders to attack the Dakotas (Sioux) and steal their ponies.

If we allow 15 minutes for personal care and nature's call to Red Star in carrying the note from Varnum (or Lucky Man) to Custer, and measure the journey as from 5am; by Varnum's data the arrival to Custer at 8am, indicates a journey of 12-25 miles. Varnum was clearly mistaken about distances and the time at which his note was delivered. *am is relative to something else and being the time at which the regiment was odered to march by some accounts, Varnum was probably referring to Custer arriving with hi at 8am. Now, John Shipley Gray was very fond of pointing out these inconsistencies and could not complete a single page of work in his books, without at least several - making me immensely wary of the practice of correction. In this exceedingly important insight to events there is little else for me but to bend you. Thwack! Thwack! Thwack! An important lesson demands six. Thwack! Thwack! Thwack! You will be escorted to the guard-house by Cpl. Punishment.

[herosrest]

Concencus - Feel the love - One of the techniques adopted into professional analyses of Little Bighorn is concencus. It is a powerful tool which underpins way of life and which allows a like minded majority or cabal, to impose themselves. This can assume the form of overt and covert bullying and is a perfectly normal social activity and history in chaotic focus.

This activity is commonly practiced by experts who gather a following of acolytes accepting considered opinion as moot seed for further development. It is a process of exclusion and focus which has broadly served practical sciences very well, however.......... modern practice leaves something to be required in newly developing fields including that at Greasy Grass.

Archaeology records the discovery of battle related cavalry artifacts from combat, on the terrain of Gresy Grass Ridge but by a quirk of technical analysis, this location is assigned libly as a warrior position by research material which has gone on to exclude proper consideration of implication.

Without reservation, here is example of the type of question resolved by technical analysis. A number of studies concluded that cartridge extraction from Springfield carbines was of not relevance to outcome of the battle. Researchers including Hedren and consideration by Weibert. Record of the fighting by Reno's initial fight clearly indicates that problems occured with the carbines and yet examination of collected relics showed that very few exhibited evidence of being prised free with metal implement. Private Peter Thompson extracted a jammed round from his weapon with fingers and how anyone might detect this from study of a fired cartridge is a mystery. Despite a lack of official recognition of problems, the move to brass ammunition was rapid and at least one regiment's commander, Miles, was aware of problems with copper ammunition when he marched to join the Plain's fighting. There is broad record within participant accounts, of problems with the carbines and particularlt jamming. Comment exists also of men using pistols on Custer's battleground where bands full of cartridges were recovered from dead soldiers.
Melt down - castboolits.gunloads.com/showthread.php?67440-What-would-General-Custer-do&s=66a7487e90915008b8274c0489b33e5f&p=731028&viewfull=1#post731028


We return to the expanding topic to consider the part of Lt. Varnum's scpout ahead of the night march.

Quoting his words, given by C.T. Brady (renowned cleric and scholar of history - Praise Be.)

"We got into camp about dark, and I was skirmishing for grub, being pretty well tired out. Custer came to our camp (the scouts') and sat down, holding a confab in the brush with the Crow scouts. Custer then explained to me that the Crows said that on the divide between the Little Big Horn and the Rosebud there was a high hill with a Crow's nest in it, where the Crows went when they tried to steal horses from the Sioux; that when it became daylight they could tell by the rising of the smoke whether there were Indians on the Little Big Horn or not.

He wanted some intelligent white man to go with these Crows and get from them what they saw, and send word back to him. I told him I supposed that meant me, and it ended in my going. I took with me Charles Reynolds, Mick Bouyer, five Crows and eight or ten Rees. Custer said he would move at 11 o'clock at night; I was to go at 9.

He would go to the base of the mountains where I was to be, and I was to send him a note as early as possible of what I learned. I got to the Crows' nest about 2.30am on the 25th, and about twenty-five miles from where I had left Custer. I threw myself down and fell asleep; but in about three-quarters of an hour I was waked up. It was then just day light. The Indians (Crows) wanted me on the bluff above us. I scrambled up. I saw the two tepees, spoken of so often, on the branch down which we went to fight. The Indians tried to show me an immense pony herd in the valley of the Little Big Horn. I couldn't see it. They told me to 'look for worms.' In fact my eyes were pretty sore anyway. I had ridden about seventy miles without sleep, and my eyesight was not very good for long range.

I sat down and wrote a despatch to Custer, and sent it off at about 4.45. Before the Rees left with the message, however, the smoke of some of Custer's camp-fires was seen about ten miles off, possibly not so far. The Crows were angry at Custer for allowing fires under the circumstances. Custer got my message at about 8 o'clock and started soon after, and the dust of his column could be plainly seen as soon as he did so, though not his troops."

A broadly important record from Varnum, which underpins quite some modern analysis of the march to Little Bighorn during the morning of 25th June. Varnum was way off with distances but, by his admissions - ehausted after a trying and long all day march.

Note - Varnum could only reliably have have learnt of his note's delivery to Custer, from Custer, and 8 o'clock must be as completely suspect as the distance of 10 miles to camp-fires. During events at the Crow's Nest as Custer rejoined his command which arrived behind him, noting here that time spent on the heights differentiates the relative start times of Custer and 7th Cavalry's march; from the night halt at Camp 1; Varnum was sent further ahead to observe and did not return until a brief meeting as he joined Major Reno's column at the Two Tepee's seen earlier. Varnum was referring to the two or one and a half tepees located near the mouth of Reno Creek, and not the burning tepee.

Descending from Crow's Nest, an officer's call was advised of the decision to advance to battle and the compamies ordered inspected. Four Crows and Mitch Bouyer were sent further forward in addition to but seperately from Varnum, and the balance of the scouts given orders to attack the Dakotas (Sioux) and steal their ponies.

If we allow 15 minutes for personal care and nature's call to Red Star in carrying the note from Varnum (or Lucky Man) to Custer, and measure the journey as from 5am; by Varnum's data the arrival to Custer at 8am, indicates a journey of 12-25 miles. Varnum was clearly mistaken about distances and the time at which his note was delivered. *am is relative to something else and being the time at which the regiment was odered to march by some accounts, Varnum was probably referring to Custer arriving with hi at 8am. Now, John Shipley Gray was very fond of pointing out these inconsistencies and could not complete a single page of work in his books, without at least several - making me immensely wary of the practice of correction. In this exceedingly important insight to events there is little else for me but to bend you. Thwack! Thwack! Thwack! An important lesson demands six. Thwack! Thwack! Thwack! You will be escorted to the guard-house by Cpl. Punishment.

In essence, Custer ordered his Ree contingent to conduct advance recon into the valley, where Sioux horse herds were reported, and open the fight or shake the tree. After the Officer's Call, Custer issued tactical orders to his contingent of scouts, as to how to proceed once the regiment closed with the village.

Thus with preparation completed, scouting advances suitably underway, and a basic plan of action in place with everyone briefed as far as then possible, the advance continued until the further halt at 10:30am - See Godfrey (previous posts) and Reno official data. Information provided by Gibson, Benteen and DeRudio placed the further march as covering 5, 8 or 3 miles. The distance of march until noon given in the notes published by Lounsberry had not quite been covered.

[herosrest]

This useful tool will prove help with interpretion of further data which is to anlaysed - www.gaisma.com/en/location/billings-montana.html

[herosrest]

Time - - briefly to eat some dirt, as volleys chew up the ground around; and examine attitudes... the aroma of the realities of life and death as civilisation spread across America. It was almighty struggle in clash of civilisations as a dream became reality. Those with the vision of uniting two shores, drove ahead the rail links that promised fruition and wealth it would generate from limitless resources and the burgeoning population. Interestingly, although post battle by decade and a half, R.B. Marshall produced the first U.S. Geo map (No.1) of the battleground and surveyed the recently placed markers. He went on as one of the nations most unassuming contributors, to tame and provide the water resources of California. Let's hope this proves not to have been in vain.

A most interesting article of news, giving the lawless nature of it all - - query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9D00E1DC1F31EE3ABC4D53DFB266838B699FDE (downloadable pdf) and an insightful reflection upon the bigger picture of the post Civil War drive to build a nation, by Paul L. Hedren. www.historynet.com/interview-with-historian-paul-hedren.htm

Moving to the tail of the column, LBH should never forget Jacob Adams, given by various as cracker-barrel, for the immense contribution of his interviews to understanding of the battle.

Time and distance analyses in various innovative forms has greatly developed what people are able to pick and choose from study of 25th June, 1876; but it is considerably tarnished by the Whittaker attacks upon members of the 7th Cavalry. The author produced a sound analysis of times and distance from good data which became the cross to beat Reno and Benteen. In addressing quite horrid accusations against them, whittaker's study of time and distances HAD to be discredited and this was done at Chicago with the convening of Inquiry into Maj. Reno's conduct; on January 13, 1879. In dire consequence of the proceedings, all study of the battle which had occurred two and one half years earlier and which incorporates times of the place offered by Lt George D. Wallace is complete rubbish. Those pinning events to charts of the possible and impossible or unlikely with reliance and faith in Wallace's data, are hopeless in endevour, ability and output. The most basic assessment of his given times, should discard them as unreliably divergent from any relevance to Little Bighorn; and purely instrument of undoing Whittaker and his time and distance study.

On we go. Custer ordered his scouts to run off the Dakota (Sioux) ponies and intended the scouts to open the attack into the valley. They congregated at the lone tepee in worry at prospect of approaching the camp. There were some stern words and threat from Custer, some humered ice-breaking banter, and Reno was detailed to escort the scouts recon into the valley. Plan A faultered but Custer's resolve and nerve propelled matters onward. Having learnt from scouts that the large camp ahead was standing rather than running, and with warning again from the senior Crow present that there were too many to fight, alarm bells at least - should have been ringing for George. Considering this matter, there is but brief conclusion to be drawn in that the guy would rather attack than be attacked - as happened at Pease Bottom on the Bighorn River, three years earlier. We are discovered, we go for it. This entire phase of events has been entire mollycoddled with fudge for a very long time because different people want to blame and protect the different people responsible for 7th Cavalry's part. Liberal modernity kicks a dead lion without due consideration of the times and difficulties which forged the great American dream of unifying and settling the nation. There was a war under way which began in the 17th Century and was reaching its culmination.

Comment by Custer's scouts of his instructions and order to strike the pony herds cannot be doubted due to the innumerable number of accounts by those scouts and many made under oath, before a judge. Immediately subsequent to the Officer's Call - Custer addressed the assembled ranks of his scouts and disseminated his plan of attack, so far as it involved those scouts. He put a plan of attack into effect. I shall assemble a number (good number) of these accounts into their relevance for the very interesting additional insight they provide and bump them out as quickly as possible. An interesting contention for those who do not like it straight and simple, revolves around Peter Thompson : Did Custer ride away ahead of the regiment on a scout, as told by the noted survivor of Company C? Why would he lie. Confused - maybe......... but what motive to complete mislead about Custer's scout ahead of the advance from the \crow's Nest. It could not have occurred prior to the Regiment meeting Custer as he descended with Varnum from observing the valley ahead.

[herosrest]

GH

Attachments:

[herosrest]

In regards timing issues, I was unaware of Gordon Harper's contribution until discovery during research yesterday. I understand him to have been very well thought of, he just helped me no end.

[Beth]

That is a magnificent picture! Thanks for sharing it.

[herosrest]

Tra la..........

No criticisms in regards what is a hugely considered topic of weapons system reliability. I am reminded..... of another warrior whose code wpuld not allow unsuccesful return from a critical mission - June 4th, 1942. Torpedo Eight.

One possibility is/was of over-heated carbines, rifles also which armed the scouts, softening copper alloy sufficientl that the extractor sheared away the cartridges rim. There is little, if any support of this matter. Maj. Reno officially reported a half dozen weapons with defective breeches.

There is no way to indentify fired rounds extracted by hand, as far as I know and understand. This was what Peter Thompson reported of his skirmish at the ford: 'I fired, but missed him, because Watson who was on a line with the Indian made a movement which distracted my aim. I threw open the breech lock of my carbine to throw the shell out, but it was stuck fast. Being afraid that the Indian would escape, I worked at it in a desperate manner and finally got it out far enough to use my thumb nail, which proved effective. The cartridge was very dirty, a nice predicament for a man to be in at close quarters with an enemy. I was careful to put in a clean one next time.

Calling for Watson to remain quiet for a moment, I fired when the Indian was 'within three feet of his horse. The ball plowed through his body, and buried itself in the ground under the horse, throwing the dirt in every direction. The Indian threw up his hands and fell with his head between the legs of his pony. It may seem hard to take human life, but he had been try- ing to take mine, and self preservation is the first law of nature.

So, it was dirty carried rounds and not all rounds were dirty. Call for the bright shiny reserve ammunition and little point archaeology examing battle relics for verdigree. I doubt that many jammed rounds were extracted as Thompson managed and perhaps the weapons were simply discarded or captured. Obviously 'tis impossible to know if this occured or how often. Nelson A. Miles did keep his companies of Fifth Infantry hard at it polishing brass daily during their march to the frontier, after the massacre (as it was then called). Blurb - A “sidebar” study held by the Terry Board (Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry)

The Allin System’s performance in the Indian Wars is much debated. Often cited are the “large number” of empty cartridges found at the Battle of Little Big Horn which exhibited signs of malfunction. Such examples were found, however, they are a small percentage (2.7 – 3.4% by some counts) of the thousands rounds that were fired in that conflict. The concern over jamming weapons in the Indian Wars is not a modern one. Even at the time, it was a known concern among soldiers. This was due in large part to the use of a copper alloy (“Bloomfield Gilding Metal”) in the manufacture of the ammunition’s case. Copper was prone to expanding in the breech upon firing and could also prevent the extractor from properly functioning. This often required the user to pry the cartridge from the breech or to push it out by using the ramrod. Such a remedy was not an option on the carbine version which did not include that valuable tool. This brought about the use of brass cases to reduce expansion, a material still in use to this day. Read more: www.ammoland.com/2013/10/a-look-back-at-the-springfield-trapdoor-rifle/#ixzz3UmHeR3qS
www.youtube.com/watch?v=XjRGIOszSY0

As imparted previously, Mitch Burey (Bouyer and 4 Crow scouts out ahead of 7th Cavalry's advance, had watched the Lone Tepee camping ground from White Rocks (pine covered hill) during the forenoon until rejoining the command as Custer beckoned Reno to the right side of Reno Creek.

Curtis, NAI, Vol III, p43 - In my close personal study of the Little Bighorn battlefield I took with me the three Crow scouts, White Man Runs Him, Goes Ahead, and Hairy Moccasins, who, with other scouts and Mitch Boyer, guided the command from the Yellowstone up the Rosebud and across from its waters to the Little Bighorn. These three men remained with Custer until he was actively engaged in the final brief fight. With these three scouts and Upshaw as interpreter, I traveled carefully time after time over all the ground covered by the troops in this encounter. I also visited the Sioux country and interviewed many participants. Red Hawk, whose recollection of the fight seemed to be particularly clear, I persuaded to visit the field with me. His description of the battle was exceedingly lucid and remarkably detailed for one who had been a participant. I also went over the ground with Two Moons and a party of his Cheyenne warriors. Following this study I accompanied General Charles A. Woodruff, U. S. A., over the area covered by the troops. In this study we had with us the three Crows, as I particularly desired that the testimony of these men might be considered by an experienced army officer. Following the day spent on the field with General Woodruff and the scouts, I visited the country of the Arikara and interviewed the scouts of that tribe who had been with the command, gathering much valuable information from them.


Vaughn, Then and Now, 1900, p311 - From an account given by Billy Cross - “Mitch Bouille, William Cross and myself were acting as guides and scouts for the Custer-Terry expedition against the Sioux and Cheyennes who were under the leadership of the wily old Sitting Bull. The battle, as you know, took place on June 25, 1876. On the morning of that day the troopers had made an early start and we, the scouts, had gone ahead on a reconnoitering expedition. When we returned to report we met the command crossing the divide between the Rosebud and Little Big Horn rivers, General Custer rode at the head of his command, the Seventh Cavalry, and Captains311 French and Benteen and Major Reno were in command of other divisions.

“We had discovered the hostiles camped near the Little Big Horn and about seven miles straight ahead of the soldiers. We so reported to General Custer, and he, calling a halt, summoned the officers under him for a council. The troops were shut out from view on the part of the hostiles by a ridge of land, and it was at the base of this that the council of war was held. It lasted but a few minutes, and Custer’s desire for an immediate engagement carried the day. The soldiers were divided into three battalions. Major Reno with three companies and all of the scouts was to advance rapidly and from a commanding ridge make a charge upon the upper end of the Sioux camp, first gaining a patch of timber about six hundred yards from the enemy. In the meantime General Custer, with five companies, would deploy around the edge of the ridge where they were now halted and attack the lower end of the village and cut off all retreat on the part of the Sioux. Captain Benteen, with four companies, would take up a position on the east bank of the Little Big Horn, overlooking the village and protecting the pack train and baggage.

“As the officers left the council they quickly gave orders to the men, and in an instant all were busy inspecting and loading their pistols and carbines, filling their ammunition belts, tightening saddles and looking to every detail preparatory to the fight. Soon the bugle sounded, ‘Prepare to mount; mount, forward!’ Custer and his men went to the right, Reno to the left, toward the ford of the Little Big Horn. The horses went forward at a sharp trot, and in the moment of waiting on the bank of the stream I looked back and saw Custer with his five companies charging upon the village, Custer fully fifty yards in the lead. That was the last time I ever looked upon that heroic soldier alive or his gallant men. We312 were soon busy in making the ford, which was somewhat difficult, and then we advanced up the ridge, taking the position assigned us at the council. Up to that time there had been no incident of interest. The troops were dismounted and the horses left in the care of every fourth soldier. Everything was ready for the fight to begin and the wait was not long.

“The hostiles had discovered us at once and took the initiative by making a vicious charge up the hill. Their main body gained a vantage ground behind an elevation sufficient to protect them and just in front of our position. As they charged they drove in our skirmish line, which took a position just inside the timber. The fight was furious for a time, the Indians outnumbering Reno’s command at least ten to one. A second charge from the hostiles drove us still higher up the ridge, at least one mile further from the village, and it was in our retreat that we first heard the sounds of firing in the lower end of the village where Custer was engaged. It could not have been very heavy, as he met but few hostiles at the first of the engagement, but it was sufficient to draw the attention of the Indians away from us and turn it upon the unfortunates who were attacking them in the rear. This was between 3 and 4 o’clock in the afternoon and from that time the fighting in the lower end of the Indian camp was hot and heavy. The sound of firing increased steadily until it became a roar, and then it died gradually away until there was only the scattered reports of single shots. All this took place in the space of two hours, and when the June sun set behind the Little Big Horn mountains the Custer command had been entirely wiped out.

“Of course we did not know this at the time, but wondered how the fight had gone. Soon we suspected that something was wrong, for the Indians again turned their attention to313 Reno, and from that time there was no opportunity to think of anything save what we saw going on about us, and in which we were vitally interested, for the onslaughts of the painted warriors became desperate. Inflamed by their success in killing the Custer command, they now determined to sweep away the rest of their enemies, and time and again they charged up the hill to capture Reno. Only the strength of our position prevented our meeting a fate like that of Custer, and it was after dark before the hostiles gave up their attempt to dislodge and slaughter us. My personal interest in the fray was strong. I had been in the skirmish line, and when we were driven back by the hostiles we retreated slowly, protecting the withdrawal of the main body of Reno’s command. In doing this fourteen of us were cut off from the command and had to take to the brush and hide. Before we could conceal ourselves ten of the fourteen had been killed,.......



fourteen men. On the plain. In the valley............... skirmishing the Sioux. Oh my God! Benteen saw it!

Crow delegation in Washington, 1873. Fellows D. Pease centre tophat.

The success of an effort made to ascend the Yellowstone with steamboats in 1873 determined the citizens of Bozeman, early in 1874, to send an expedition down the river for the purpose of opening a wagon-road to the head of navigation, and making connection with the advancing line of the Northern Pacific by means of this road and a line of steamers on the Yellowstone, and also to prospect for the precious metals. The expedition failed of its purpose, being harassed by Indians after getting into the Bighorn country, and was short of supplies, though its reports were of some use to the country. It had four engagements with the Sioux, lost one man and seventeen horses killed, and had twenty horses wounded. They found the Indians to be armed with breech -loading rifles, as well as every other firearm, bows and arrows; they were well supplied with ammunition, and mounted. But in a battle they aimed loo high, and the white men, being better marksmen and courageous fighters, killed fifty for there one. B. F. Grounds was captain; William Wright, Lieutenant; E. B. Way, adjutant; Hugh O’Donovan, signal-officer; B. P. Wickersbam, secretary; councilmen, George Herendeen F. B. Wilson, T. C. Bums, William Langston, Addison N. Quivey, D. A. Yates (killed in battle), George Miller, A. B. Ford, James Hancock, Joseph Brown, Henry Bostwick, Muggins Taylor and 130 others. There were 22 wagons, 28 yoke of oxen, over 200 horses and mules, 2 pieces of artillery, arms of the best description, and provisions for months. A large portion of these provisions were furnished by the citizens of the Gallatin Valley, who much desired to open the proposed road, and were greatly vexed by the return of the expedition without having accomplished its purpose. Delegate Maginnis had asked congress for an appropriation for the removal of obstructions to navigation hi the Yellowstone.

Warriors attacked the Wagon Road party along Rosebud Creek and near the Little Bighorn River and South Fork of Reno Creek. Heavily armed, well supplied, and hauling two artillery pieces, the adventurers were able to defend themselves, returning to Bozeman with the loss of only one man.5 The event failed to stir the government’s involvement in opening the Yellowstone valley to settlement or removing the Indians from the region.

Lots, and lots and lots of White rocks (butte) behind the line of march. www.youtube.com/watch?v=9i-YNE3xeFo Hills with pine tree's on them.

[herosrest]

Poteen break -



A straggler named Vernon - archive.org/stream/blackhillstrails00brow#page/558/mode/2up