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Post by bc on Aug 24, 2012 12:05:07 GMT -6
I guess we first need to start with what is the definition of a Last Stand. bc Britt, As to the battle,I have always agreed with Richard that this was a vicious, violent and bloody affair that was over in far less time than most people believe. As to a "Last Stand" I feel there has to be a stand of some kind to begin with before it can be a "Last Stand". Again I agree with Richard. A stand is purposeful, concious, and intentional action, an example would be Reno/Benteen defense site. Where it was "men, dig in we are not going anywhere, we are going to fight it out right here,we win or die, come home with your shield or on it. I dont believe that is what happened either in the Keogh sector where there was a skirmish line by L Company and perhaps attempts made by others, but where quickly broken and over-run. On the Custer side the men were herded by the warriors to the vacinity of LSH where some attempted to flee the killing field by heading North, South, East, and some E Company troopers heading West towards the village where they got trapped in a ravine and slaughtered. Yes there were a few that stayed together on LSH but were quickly dispatched once the fire slackened. Britt I am in no way, shape, or form saying that your opinion of a "Last Stand" is wrong. I think more people would agree with you, I simply think differently. I guess beauty is in the eye of the beholder. One thing I would like to amend in my post was that the soldiers panicked. I believe that is what many did but it seems disrespectful to brave soldiers that made the ultimate sacrifice. So I would like to amend it to read . The soldiers were hit so fast and so hard by so many that all they could do is run for their lives in the hope they could find a place to fight. Unfortunatly the warriors cut them down before they had a chance to do so. They never had a chance. Be Well Dan No problem Dan, I don't expect everone to have the same opinion or adopt my opinion. You do bring up another issue though: Panic. What is a panic? To me, a panic is when you have NAs rushing at a soldier and he throws away his gun, turns around, and mindlessly runs in another direction. On the other hand, if you have some soldiers in dire straights about to be overrun, and they see an opening in the enemy lines and they make a calculated intentional move to escape and evade the encroaching enemy, that to me is not a panic no matter how fast they run when they do it. The soldiers pulling back from Calhoun Hill to the Keogh sector or LSH after being overrun would be a pullback to me and not a panic. Same for anyone pulling back from the Keogh sector to LSH would be a pull back even if they were running as fast as they can for their lives. The Co. E move to Deep Ravine seems to be an intentional move and not a panic. The bunch of soldiers along with Bouyer and maybe Lord who ran from LSH towards DR seems to me to be an intentional escape and evade maneuver and not panic. When LSH was finally overrun by the NAs I don't believe there was anyone left standing to panic. So basically I can contribute panic to a few soldiers but not most or all. Now if we want to use the term: rout, as Benteen did, then that has a different meaning but does not automatically make something a panic. There is no doubt that Calhoun Hill, Findley/Finckle Ridge, and the Keogh sector were overrun and was a rout. I guess I would still want to know what Fox and Scott define as panic although apparently Scott does not agree with Fox about everything. bc
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Post by benteen on Aug 24, 2012 12:55:56 GMT -6
So basically I can contribute panic to a few soldiers but not most or all. Now if we want to use the term: rout, as Benteen did, then that has a different meaning but does not automatically make something a panic. There is no doubt that Calhoun Hill, Findley/Finckle Ridge, and the Keogh sector were overrun and was a rout. bc Britt, I think there was a little more panic than you do, but I do agree in spirit with you and tried to convey that in my last sentence by amending my original statement. Be Well Dan
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Post by rosebud on Aug 24, 2012 13:17:42 GMT -6
Nobody was 'intimidated,' much less beaten up and left in the desert. Sorry, but that's not correct.
I seem to recall Diane removing threads. They sure weren't happy birthday wishes she was forced to remove.
About 1200 members, and 450 regular guests. Yet only about a dozen contribute. Intimidation plays a big factor in the small number of participants.
Not sure why you felt the need to respond to something this insignificant.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 24, 2012 13:20:08 GMT -6
I just want to add two things:
Were there not some panic on that battlefield it would be the only such battlefield since man first picked up a rock. I would think that at least one Marine paniced on Edson's Ridge. I would think at least one trooper of the 82nd paniced when he found he had jumped up to his nostrils in a swamp at Normandy, and if the Germans did not get him his equipment would cause him to drown. Some panic is to be expected. You try to overcome this natural human emotion with training, but even the best training does not always work and the natural desire to survive takes over. It has nothing to do with being brave or a coward. All of us are brave. All of us are cowards, each in its own circumstance.
Now I have seen this show before. I have listened to the battlefield tape. Someone please tell me how men one hundred twenty years after the fact see into men's hearts and differentiate panic from escape and evade. Escape and evade is a conscience deliberate thing, while panic is mindless, but the trail they both leave mirrors one another.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 24, 2012 13:45:52 GMT -6
I imagine that the Soldiers knew what would happen to them if the Indians got them alive, all the stories around the camp fire, some of the old soaks scaring the rookies about what dastardly fate awaited them if they got captured, plus the fact the only way of escaping this fate was to either be killed fighting or shooting yourself, I bet when they saw what they were facing, surrounded by hundreds of warriors, then panic I mean real panic would set in, there was no Geneva convention on the Little Big Horn River.
Ian.
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Post by benteen on Aug 24, 2012 14:05:40 GMT -6
I bet when they saw what they were facing, surrounded by hundreds of warriors, then panic I mean real panic would set in, there was no Geneva convention on the Little Big Horn River. Ian. Ian, You bring up an excellent point, there was no Geneva convention at the LBH, nor was there any in the war in the Pacific, the Japanese didnt sign it. As to panic I believe the Colonels post is spot on and explains it as well as can be done. Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on Aug 24, 2012 14:11:24 GMT -6
Panic does not necessarly trigger running.Pte Ryan him of "saving" fame gives a very good demonstration of a man panicing on the spot.Likewise Cpl Upham [unfortunate name reminds me of Cpl Jones].
Dan It is so good when someone shares the same view.It is such a relief to know that there is at least one another voice crying in the wild-erness.
Just an observation triggered by something the Colonel said. The dynamic which motivated the swamping of Custer's command is not unlike the dynamic which triggers panic.It's just a matter of direction.Once some brave individuals start going forward it build into a massive unstopable surge. That is why I don't see an initial firefight or gradual slow investment of Custer's position.
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Post by fred on Aug 24, 2012 15:08:09 GMT -6
As a whole, I agree with DC's interpretation of flight from these boards.
When I say, "intimidate," I refer to those who remain here, year after year, and post once or twice, preferring to sit back and read. Too many are just too shy to post, figuring they will receive the sharp end of the stick; others prefer just to read... with an occasional, non-committal-type comment. It is those who are simply afraid of that stick who I refer to as intimidated. It has nothing to do with caving in to ProBoards; it has nothing to do with the sissy crap others from other sites whine about; it has nothing to do with winning or losing arguments, then skulking off into a corner to feel sorry for oneself. You are always going to have the stone-headed louts who cannot be called out and thrashed without their whining and leaving the playing field. Then again, you have the Iantaylors of the world who have a passion, who take their lumps, who learn, understand, change for the better, and make hearty and fine contributions. Unfortunately, there are too few Ians in this world and far too many Joe Wiggs'... whoever that person is.
Even Rosebud... who can be utterly maddening at times... takes it, gives it out, heads off, then returns. That shows me guts; it shows me intelligence (some of his posts are damn fine); and it shows me character. And you want character? Go back and make an honest profile of DC, based on what he has posted here. Then check out his detractors and their comments. Check out the comments of those who have "reconciled," if that is the correct word. Talk about a man with guts and character.... I should live so long.
Again, I am unsure of "rock drill" and what you all are getting at here. "Panic" and "last stand," however, are examples of semantics. There was GAC and 209 men; not everyone panicked, but too many did. We have Indian accounts of "drunken soldiers"; we have body placement; we have the opinion of the best soldier on the field. All indicate panic. So for those of you who do not believe an American soldier can panic, you're lickin' the wrong apple... get over it. Too many young men panicked that day, and Chuck, explaining the horrors of capture by Indians, hit it on the head.
"Last stand"... I know Richard Fox. He and I have discussed this over a few beers and a steak or two. Most LBH "scholars" look at a last stand as some heroic grouping of men, overrun by hordes of savages... be they Chinese, Vietnamese, or red guys from the American West. Fox doesn't believe that happened, simply because of the way bodies were found and positioned, as well as the ammo placement. He understands fully about scavenging, pre-fire metal detecting, souvenir-hunting, salting, and all the rest. Still, the man is a scientist of sorts-- is archaeology/anthropology a science, per se?-- and he is charged with making determinations based on the discipline and the medium he works in/under. To him, all the things he found-- or didn't find-- indicate less of a "last stand" and more of a grouping of men, no military discipline/formation discernible, picked off, chopped up one at a time, fighting individually, than anything resembling a last stand. It is semantics... and quite frankly, not much to argue over. I'm kinda like Rosebud with this one... let it drop and go onto something else, something more important, something more interesting; something about the battle, not the English language.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Aug 24, 2012 15:30:45 GMT -6
Most LBH "scholars" look at a last stand as some heroic grouping of men, overrun by hordes of savages... be they Chinese, Vietnamese, or red guys from the American West Just for balance be they Irish,French,Italian.
Then again, you have the Ian taylors of the world who have a passion, who take their lumps, who learn, understand, change for the better, I disagree Fred.[what would you expect?] There was never anything wrong with Ian that required Lumps to be dished out to him.In fact you yourself possibly saved a great contributer for the board by your patience and good manners in comparison to our resident hammer. Regards
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Post by justvisiting on Aug 24, 2012 18:34:16 GMT -6
As a whole, I agree with DC's interpretation of flight from these boards. When I say, "intimidate," I refer to those who remain here, year after year, and post once or twice, preferring to sit back and read. Too many are just too shy to post, figuring they will receive the sharp end of the stick; others prefer just to read... with an occasional, non-committal-type comment. It is those who are simply afraid of that stick who I refer to as intimidated. It has nothing to do with caving in to ProBoards; it has nothing to do with the sissy crap others from other sites whine about; it has nothing to do with winning or losing arguments, then skulking off into a corner to feel sorry for oneself. You are always going to have the stone-headed louts who cannot be called out and thrashed without their whining and leaving the playing field. Then again, you have the Iantaylors of the world who have a passion, who take their lumps, who learn, understand, change for the better, and make hearty and fine contributions. Unfortunately, there are too few Ians in this world and far too many Joe Wiggs'... whoever that person is. Even Rosebud... who can be utterly maddening at times... takes it, gives it out, heads off, then returns. That shows me guts; it shows me intelligence (some of his posts are damn fine); and it shows me character. And you want character? Go back and make an honest profile of DC, based on what he has posted here. Then check out his detractors and their comments. Check out the comments of those who have "reconciled," if that is the correct word. Talk about a man with guts and character.... I should live so long. Again, I am unsure of "rock drill" and what you all are getting at here. "Panic" and "last stand," however, are examples of semantics. There was GAC and 209 men; not everyone panicked, but too many did. We have Indian accounts of "drunken soldiers"; we have body placement; we have the opinion of the best soldier on the field. All indicate panic. So for those of you who do not believe an American soldier can panic, you're lickin' the wrong apple... get over it. Too many young men panicked that day, and Chuck, explaining the horrors of capture by Indians, hit it on the head. "Last stand"... I know Richard Fox. He and I have discussed this over a few beers and a steak or two. Most LBH "scholars" look at a last stand as some heroic grouping of men, overrun by hordes of savages... be they Chinese, Vietnamese, or red guys from the American West. Fox doesn't believe that happened, simply because of the way bodies were found and positioned, as well as the ammo placement. He understands fully about scavenging, pre-fire metal detecting, souvenir-hunting, salting, and all the rest. Still, the man is a scientist of sorts-- is archaeology/anthropology a science, per se?-- and he is charged with making determinations based on the discipline and the medium he works in/under. To him, all the things he found-- or didn't find-- indicate less of a "last stand" and more of a grouping of men, no military discipline/formation discernible, picked off, chopped up one at a time, fighting individually, than anything resembling a last stand. It is semantics... and quite frankly, not much to argue over. I'm kinda like Rosebud with this one... let it drop and go onto something else, something more important, something more interesting; something about the battle, not the English language. Best wishes, Fred. I'm just trying to remember how many PMs and phone calls were exchanged before you ralized he did have a point. Billy P.S. Give the lady my best wishes!
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Post by quincannon on Aug 24, 2012 20:46:59 GMT -6
Just pulled the following quote out of one of my favorite books and thought it might interest some in light of our recent discussion. I have redacted the part that gives away the action, and thought it might be fun for some of you to try and fill in these blanks and tell me what action these passages refer to
"What will happen to the guns if the __________ get through the infantry up there""
"One of the infantry officers told him "Don't worry they'll never get that far"
It was generally agreed that the ___________, when they found out who they were fighting, would turn around and go back. The young soldiers of __________ were quite confident; at this point none of them felt fear
They had been told this was a _______ action, and that they would soon be home in _______. . It was a happy thought because life in _____ was quite good. And the training was not bad. There was no real training, and there was not much ________ could do about it although he made noises.
Any takers?
I will tell you this. When this book was first published the subtitle was "A Study in Unpreparedness" When the book was reprinted by the mouthpiece organ of the U S Army Chowder and Marching Society, that subtitle was removed and all references to it were themselves redacted. It seems that Uncle Sam's Army does not like to be reminded, just like everyone else I guess, of the times that they fornicated with Fido. And, that is exactly why it happens time after time, war after war, because we don't want to be reminded. We would rather manufacture glory, and victory, and gallantry, and all that other nonsense, instead of taking a good hard look at our mistakes, find oiut what caused them, vow never to repeat them, and fix the damned thing once and for all.
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Post by fred on Aug 24, 2012 21:10:37 GMT -6
I'm just trying to remember how many PMs and phone calls were exchanged before you ralized he did have a point. "He" who? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by justvisiting on Aug 25, 2012 7:48:39 GMT -6
I'm just trying to remember how many PMs and phone calls were exchanged before you ralized he did have a point. "He" who? Best wishes, Fred. DC of course. I don't believe we've ever had extensive discussions about anyone else other than those two at the other place. My understanding, and I will have to reread what William initially proposed to confirm that understanding, is that the "rock drill" is basically a flow chart. You have decision points with various options which lead to other decision points with more options. Be good, Billy P.S. Let us know the pre-order information for the book!
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Post by montrose on Aug 25, 2012 9:07:08 GMT -6
Let's start with the decision to launch the attack.
The location of LTC Custer and 3 Bns is about 1.5 miles from Ford A. Lt Varnum had just reported in with his observations form the left of the valley,this data may have been the decision trigger. Girard had previously reported in from the right side of the valley. I mean Ash Creek,since the scouts were divided into a Varnum group on left,and a Hare group on right).
Blue: 3 Bns located with GAC. Benteen BN still scouting south fork of Ash Creek,exact locations would be an estimate. Pack train is to rear, and likely badly straggled.
Red: Main village likely still has received no warning.
For Red, since the Indians had no central command and control, we have to pay attention to what I will call bands. This means a grouping of Indians who we can observe taking common action.
The Ash Creek band of about 30 warriors is retreating ahead of Custer down Ash Creek.
We have stragglers, scattered individuals or small groups between Ford A and the camp. This includes Deeds and father,and the women and children gathering turnips who are soon to be Crowed and give Gall a bad heart.
There is a band of 100 ish hunters between Ford A and the camp,on west side of valley. They would be ignorant at this point. My source here is MacLean.
Blue estimate of the situation. GAC's believed the Indian village was past Ford A, and definately downstream. He believed it was only 1-2 miles from Ford A. (based on orders given to Reno, though I will go further on this later).
The evidence that the village was downstream of Ford A was likely compelling. Dust and smoke from the village and pony herd should have been visible to the scouts, if not main body. The main Indian trail went to A, but there may have been a secondary trail heading up the bluffs indicating a downstream direction. It is possible that the Indians they were pursuing were seen heading right after crossing LBH.
Now consider what they did not know. They did not know the exact location of the village, herds, or warriors. They did not know whether the Indians were camped in a large village, or scattered in a series occamps along the river (which was the normal procedure).
They were operating very high on assumptions.
Nevertheless, Blue has the initiative. Red isclearly surprised.
So what should Blue do?
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Post by quincannon on Aug 25, 2012 9:35:09 GMT -6
ACTIONS AND ORDERS:
Blue modifies task organization giving 2nd Battalion (Reno's) an additional company to enable him to form two squadrons. 1st Battalion is given to Keogh, who also forms two squadrons.
Blue commander places command group between 2nd and 1st Battalions.
Scouts out in a broad east-west line at least a mile in front of 2nd Battalion, with orders to find and report, engage to fix, and withdraw on main body if necessary. Insure that the scouts also sweep the woodline along the river as they move forward.
Establish contact with Benteen (3rd Battalion) and recall him with orders to follow main body once he reaches their backtrail.
Inform the pack train (hereafter Trains Group) of what's going on. Order them to close up and move forward as best possible speed, laager at Ford A upon arrival, but under no circumstances cross at Ford A until ordered.
Order of march 2nd Battalion, command group, 1st Battalion. Cross at Ford A. After crossing adopt battalion echelon left, squadrons in left echelon, utilizing the river and bluffs as flank protection on the right.
Move north, keeping the mounts well in hand at aproximately a 4 MPH pace until contact is established.
RATIONAL:
As long as you are basing this attack on assumptions, the main assumption that I am using here is that the main camp or camps will be located on the west bank of the river, convienent to the water supply. The bluffs preclude easy access to water if the camp(s) are on the east side. In addition the broad valley provides good grazing for the horse herd.
The option for a fixing and a flanking attack are retained by this course of action with the 1st or 3rd (upon arrival) available for employment. Such an attack launched from the west has the advantage of possibly pinning the hostiles against the river and bluffs
The hostile family members to the north could possibly escape in that direction, and there is the additional possability that other family members in the middle may choose to escape to the east. Those are acceptable risks and have no real bearing on the scheme of maneuver of the main battle, although if it happens may it lead to a more prolonged after battle subsequent activity. The echelon formation provides flank protection on the left.
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