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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 13, 2014 13:02:22 GMT -6
TWC bringing the regiment forward is not the centerpiece of anything, but an unprovable likelihood because who else could have? Had it been another, Custer would have had a word with them.
If when a corps or division or an Army is to move there is no more paperwork and procedure by protocol including written orders than when a Captain tells a Lieutenant to move a company to a point a hundred yards away, I am pathetically misinformed. The issue, though, is we disagree on whether Custer was deluded and didn't realize tactics were different when you only had 600 men attacking thousands instead of a full cavalry division or corps or Army. I don't buy that.
I agree Custer can be presented as having acted weird and different that day, but not because he was acting as if he had huge forces. I think it was because he got hurt, may not have ceded command, and what was initially envisioned as a temporary epicycle of activity to get reorganized was hammered to where it ended up. I don't think Custer was given to 'wait', I don't think any officer would think extending distance between the village and themselves was an offensive action, and I don't think anyone in their right mind would approve of the east bank as good for cavalry.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 13, 2014 13:18:28 GMT -6
It does sound like TWC was detached in some shape or form from his Company and detailed to the RHQ. True or false though, just imagine what the conversation would have been like between Keogh and TWC, if GAC was incapacitated, Keogh by rank should take charge but Tom I guess would challenge this, I would think that Yates would have to intervene somewhere along the line and on what side he lent would be the deciding factor.
On the Officers performance that day, I would place the onus on three men, Custer, Reno and Benteen. Reno carried out his orders and nearly lost his Battalion whilst he waited for support in the valley, Benteen did what he was ordered to do and scout to the left and on receiving the note moved with the pack train following behind and followed the trail. Now Custer (without informing Reno) tried to get around the back of the village and then split his Command into two Battalions, now this decision to split was down to Custer alone so out of the three Officers it was Custer who made the mistakes.
Ian.
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Post by wild on Jan 13, 2014 14:12:23 GMT -6
Suppose Custer found himself up against 2000 Confederate cavalry under the command of Jeb himself. Would we be discussing Lilliputian tactics?Single company attacks?Ford D with 80 men? Troops in reserve? The last post there by Ian much like a million other posts can go through the main points of the battle without mentioning the Indians. We don't really rate the Indians do we?They don't have a RHQ and neat troops playing follow the leader. Well guess what boys on this day on this battle field fighting for their freedom these Indians were better than Jeb's elite horse soldiers.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 13, 2014 14:24:00 GMT -6
But it is a centerpiece DC. You point to it as having taken place, which it did, and use it as a justification for both an unofficial chain of command, and the suggested reason as to why, after in your scenario a Custer being wounded, a brother, upon whom command falls, puts aside his military responsibilities in favor of tending to siblings and kissing cousins. By "A"Custer, you only really mean "THE" Custer. The "A" is a beard, for it falls apart unless it is the "THE"
No the tactics are not different. Tactics are tactics. It is the appropriateness of the particular tactic that is in question. You chose the tactics in accordance with the capability, limitations, and combat power of the unit you command. You may command a platoon, so you chose the tactics that are within the capabilities of that sized unit to execute. What you don't do is choose something outside their capability to execute.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 13, 2014 15:25:44 GMT -6
Quincannon, I'm to new to this group to do this but, tactics be damned, Custer got himself in over his head and was either to foolish or to proud extricate himself. When I go to a bar for a Lager and someone gives me an Ale, I either drink the Ale or move on. Custer drank the Ale and it was to damn strong for his middle American taste. He should not have hung around for another. See below
Lagers The lager yeast simply flocculates (not at the surface) and sinks to the bottom. Therefore it is known as bottom fermenting. Lager yeasts need cool temperatures during fermentation to perform their magic.
Lagers tend to be lighter in color and usually taste drier than ales. They are generally less alcoholic and complex. This is the most common beer type sold in the U.S.
Ales An ale yeast is called top fermenting because of its tendency to flocculate (gather) at the surface of the brew during the first few days before settling to the bottom.
To brew an ale, fermentation must take place in warmer temperatures for the yeast to multiply and do its magic. Ales are usually higher in alcohol and will be noticeably fuller and more complex.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 13, 2014 15:28:35 GMT -6
Lastly I think he was wounded before he finished that first round!
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Post by fred on Jan 13, 2014 15:32:59 GMT -6
Fred: The only non-divisional brigades in Vietnam in 1966 was the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 196th Infantry Brigade (Light). The 196th operated in Tay Ninh from August 1966 to May 1967. I suspect that would be the one. I first thought Knowles was the commander, but I was looking at an incomplete list. Col Conaty brought them over. Upon arrival he was replace by Brigadier General Edward H. deSaussure for less than a month, and he was replaced by Conaty, still a Colonel, and then BG Knowles replaced Conaty. deSaussaur commanded in September 66, for only a couple of weeks, and the 196th was attached to the 25th ID at the time. The operation was Operation Attleboro. Great job, Chuck. Then it was the 196th... so my memory hasn't to ally deserted me, because I knew it was working with the 25th. (I know it was not the 173rd Airborne.) I am a little surprised, however, that it was Attleboro... I was in that operation, but for some reason I thought it was a little later in the year... like November. I'll take your word for it, however. Those names do not ring a bell, other than maybe deSaussure, and even then, only maybe because it is rather odd. I tried looking up that whole incident in my book about DePuy, but could find nothing. Maybe I will just Google the 196th and see what pops up. Nice to know, at least, I still have most of those marbles I keep hearing roll around between my ears. Best wishes... and thanks, Fred. PS-- Check this out... the old brain is still functioning... www.historynet.com/operation-attleboro-the-196ths-light-infantry-brigade-baptism-by-fire-in-the-vietnam-war.htmFCW
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Post by quincannon on Jan 13, 2014 15:44:26 GMT -6
Tom: If you think I am about to disagree with anything you said in your first line above, you are mistaken. You have cut it all down to the essentials. He was over his head, in more ways than one, but certainly in his ability to deal with the situation. I say this daily. He was not that good, and a puff piece for uneducated hero worship. That is what I meant by my earlier post regarding taking sides. There are those in Custerland who despite every bit of evidence to the contrary feel that Goldilocks could do no wrong and it therefore must be his subordinates that stuck the shive in his hack. Custer stuck his own shive in his own back.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 13, 2014 15:59:07 GMT -6
Fred: The 196th became operational in August. Attleboro was their first operation and it was named for Attleboro, Massachusetts, near Fort Devens, where the 196 came from.1-27 Infantry (Wolfhounds) from the 25th ID was attached to them for the operation, and the 196 in turn attached to the 25th ID.
Conaty brought the Brigade over. He had trained it Stateside. Upon arrival Conaty was replaced by deSaussure, a personal choice of Westmorland. He, deSaussure, had no Infantry experience. He was a fairly fresh made BG, a pretty boy from the FA who had spent the 1950;s in missile artillery, the real old stuff like Honest John and alike. Evidently there was an FA connection between him and Westmorland, but I have been unable to track it down.
Anyway deSaussure fornicates with Fido, Conaty who had become the deputy brigade commander, takes over, until Knowlton takes over in November. Knowlton keeps the brigade until mid 67.. deSaussure hangs around VN having a couple of FA positions, a corps artily job and Divarty of the 1st CD, but nowhere near any maneuver element. He goes back to the States never to return to VN, and is last seen out in the New Mexico desert commanding sand as a MG. He punches out in 72. Some rabbi from the Class of 41 was looking after him no doubt, or Westy himself when he became CofS.
There is some disconnect though in what I just related, from what the announcement of his retirement says. According to that document he keeps command of the 196 from Sept to Nov. I think my order of battle information drawn from several sources, all agreeing, is a little more reliable than some half assed newspaper from White Sands.
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Post by fred on Jan 13, 2014 16:06:09 GMT -6
There is some disconnect though in what I just related, from what the announcement of his retirement says. According to that document he keeps command of the 196 from Sept to Nov. I think my order of battle information drawn from several sources, all agreeing, is a little more reliable than some half assed newspaper from White Sands. Chuck, Here is another one... 31stinfantry.org/Documents/Chapter%2017.pdfHe got canned, ostensibly for poor control and tactics. We heard there was more, however, so it seems my recollections are pretty good after all. Nice job, Chuck. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 13, 2014 16:27:18 GMT -6
Stanton is a source I use, only when I have no other choice. Usually flushing one's self down the toilet is a better option, but in this instance I think he takes most of his material from Moloy's account.
One of the real benefits for me in having so much DC time and having many good friends at CMH is that I have very good order of battle information directly copied from their files, Thank God the copy machine was right down the hall from organizational history branch.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 13, 2014 18:03:42 GMT -6
Here is a little ditty about the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vietnam; linkDid the 196th Infantry Brigade ever get merged with the 11th Light Infantry Brigade? Or were they only attached to Task Force Oregon. Ian.
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Post by montrose on Jan 13, 2014 18:18:36 GMT -6
When I was serving as the Special Forces Branch chief in the Proponency office, I had to deal with Stanton. The books Stolen Valor had revealed his fraudulent claims. Stanton persists to this day that he was in Special Forces and was awarded the tab. It is not true. He had the gall to call me personally and "order" me to validate his fraudulent claims. I had his records on my desk as I talked to him. I was quoting dates and times and school records and this guy just had no shame. He just kept lying. He is a modern day Golden.
I regret that I stayed icily polite through 2 weeks of his nonsense. For those who don't understand military culture; if I had knuckled under to his demands I would have drafted a letter verifying his lies to be signed by MG Boykin, the branch proponent. Boykin would have tilted his head back, and shifted his glasses down his nose. Then he would ask if I was sure. Yes, means a signature. Boykin is the finest officer who has ever served in SF. I believe he has a purple heart in every grade served except LTG.
Surprised Stanton is not on these boards. He is definitely in the 'cavalry' school.
By the way, I also dealt with Hackworth, who also appears in Stolen Valor. He would call us to check on stories before he published. He dropped several incendiary stories when I told them they were not true, or were a very contrived view of reality. I found him a decent man, who listened. And his combat decorations were no fantasy. Hack's downfall was that he was a brigade commander who openly used illegal drugs. I think he burned out at the end. I see a difference between a warrior with stress issues and a never was fantasy liar.
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Post by fred on Jan 13, 2014 18:21:31 GMT -6
Did the 196th Infantry Brigade ever get merged with the 11th Light Infantry Brigade? Or were they only attached to Task Force Oregon. If memory serves me correctly-- and Chuck would know better than me... although, come to think of it, I could probably look it up on Wiki-- but TF Oregon was one of those machts-nichts outfits they put together for whatever singular purpose. I believe the original Oregon consisted of brigades from the 25th Inf. Div. and the 101st Airborne, as well as the 196th. That made it division-sized. They then brought over the 11th Light Inf. Bde and the 198th... or maybe the 199th, but I think it was the 198th. When they combined the 196th with the 11th and 198th, the brigades from the 25th and 101st were released back to their parent divisions and they formed the three lights into the Americal Division (also known as the 23rd). I believe it was an odd-ball division from the start, back in World War II, and if I am not mistaken, it is the only American infantry division known by a name rather than a number. I also remember it having a very spotty record in Vietnam... My Lai aside. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 13, 2014 18:44:47 GMT -6
Ian: The complete answer is much more complicated than the question
The 11th Infantry Brigade was originally designated the 1st Brigade 6th Infantry Division. It was intended that the division be sent to Vietnam after a years training. The division, less he 1st Brigade was activated at Fort Campbell, Kentucky after the 101st left for Vietnam. The 1st Brigade was activated at Scholfield Barracks, Hawaii. in the area vacated by the 25th ID. When Westmorland saw the patch of the 6th ID, a red, six pointed star, he threw a bloody fit. Evidently he had enough drag to make it stick and they never deployed and all but the 1st Brigade was inactivated shortly thereafter. The 1st Brigade was then redesignated 11th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light). It did go to VN to be continued
The 196th Infantry Brigade (Light) was activated at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, occupying the area of a brigade of the 5th Infantry Division. That brigade was moved on paper to Fort Carson to join the rest of the 5th ID, but the component parts were used to form a reinforcement package to the 1st Infantry Division when it deployed. Fred I don't remember all the units. You may, but I do remeember they were at least one and I think two battalions of the 2nd Infantry in that package. The 196th was built from the ground up around a cadre dawn from the Army at large. The intended area of deployment for them was to replace he 82nd Airborne in the Dominican Republic. Orders were changed and they went to VN to be continued
The 198th Infantry Brigade was raised at Fort Hood, Texas by cutting units out of the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions, taking away their APC, and calling the whole thing 198. to be continued
The 199th Infantry Brigade was raised at Fort Benning, and as far as I can tell were also raised from scratch. Basic and advanced training were conducted there then and it would not have been hard to take a few of the AIT battalions and just keep on training them until they reached line unit standards. They left just a couple of months before I reported there in March 67 for the Basic Officer Course, and I think they were out at Kelly Hill.
Task Force Oregon was originally a force made up of divisional brigades from the 25th ID and the 101st ABD, plus the 196th IB. They were thrown together as a provisional division, and supported by the ash and trash available. When Westy had a hissy fit about the 6th ID, they got the bright idea of making this a permanent division and chose the 23rd AMERICAL Infantry Division, as that division then on the inactive roles was formed in New Caladonia in 42 out of left overs, just as this new Americal would be. Anyway the divisional brigades of the 25th and 101st soon went back to their parent divisions and the 11th and 198th soon joined, and the rest as they say is bad history Not taking anything away from some very good and dismissing out of hand the few bad of that division, it was an abortion, a still birth, a red headed stepchild in need of lobotomy. Never could get its act together, and I attribute that to no sense of belonging and one hell of a lot of officer friction. Just a very bad organization, which was a shame because its WWII incarnation was first rate
Were I a complete turd I would say they were as good as they were because the regiments that made up the division in WWII were all left overs from the triangularization of National Guard divisions. The regiment from Massachusetts (182) and the one from North Dakota (164) were particularly good. The one from Illinois (132) was OK. The 182 is the oldest in U S service going back to the Plymouth Colony's North Regiment and Myles Standish. Many Guard units predate the U S Army. Trying not to be a turd I will mention it with great pride anyway.
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