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Post by herosrest on Jun 10, 2012 14:13:03 GMT -6
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jun 10, 2012 15:38:56 GMT -6
As per attached file - Analysis3.pdf Whoops, doesn't appear to have attached......... So.................. don't forget to smile. OK, I'm smiling, but mostly at some of the nonsense in your 'Analysis'. What, if anything, are we supposed to glean? For example, I have never seen anywhere that Magure called Ford B 'Custer's watering place' and that is not the only hole one could pick. Do stop putting this stuff up without comment as that is somewhat insulting to those of us who are not clairvoyant. Keep burying your nuts or someone else will. Hunk
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Post by herosrest on Jun 11, 2012 14:48:31 GMT -6
It might seem that error with the calculation related to 15 miles, undermines matters. Fortunately and unlike Lt. Wallace's use of Lt. Maguire's reported 2pm, on the 25th; that is not at all a problem in 'Analysis 3'. I acknowledge that one calculation supporting arguments in 'Analysis 3' is acotyledonous and consider its product significant by offering perfectly feasable rate of march. How the result was obtained is irrelevant, this is Little Big Horn. After all, John S. Gray and W.A. Graham got away with it for decades without a murmour of discontent - opinion is altering. The calculation's logical result is ridiculous, applying the result would require cavalry mounts to engage reverse or walk keeping all four legs simultaneously on the ground. Doubling the result produced ugly digits giving 4 at thity-first decimal point. I plumped for point four and added five after. This detracts in no way from a practical and useful intermediate, or mean, gait. 5.45 mph is a perfectly respectable rate of march for late 19th century cavalry horses in the field and pressing on to battle. It is a beautiful number of which even One Beer (Einstein) would be proud. In this instance and not at all unusual, the result matters. Arriving there interests some more than most. Usually milage varies and playing with time is for physicists and quantum mechanics who keep hands clean and heads in the clouds. I believe retreat from the timber exceeded the 5.45 rate at some point and wonder in that respect, if C4 where the sun doesn't shine also constitutes a charge to the rear? 5.45 mph was a toss up with 4.54 mph, both present decent intermediate or average rates, the greater representing more closely, perhaps, a degree of urgency. The difference in completing a steady mile would be two minutes. Either are properly representative of averaged advances from the night halt towards Sitting Bull's tepee's and offer a difference between them of eight to ten minutes per hour . Please consult Lt. Maguire for further clarification. Applied to Graham's times, 5.45mph for 5.75 decimal hours would place the regiment on Big Horn River and beyond. It was suggested that Benteen headed towards the Rosebud, during the Reno Inquiry. Of course had he done that he could not have given testimony in Chicago. Graham moderated his stupidity with excessive halts of eight and a half hours during the 25th June. Holmes Offley Paulding was told differently, but of course Paulding was there immediately after, and Graham wasn't.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jun 11, 2012 16:18:07 GMT -6
It might seem that error with the calculation related to 15 miles, undermines matters. Fortunately and unlike Lt. Wallace's use of Lt. Maguire's reported 2pm, on the 25th; that is not at all a problem in 'Analysis 3'. I acknowledge that one calculation supporting arguments in 'Analysis 3' is acotyledonous and consider its product significant by offering perfectly feasable rate of march. How the result was obtained is irrelevant, this is Little Big Horn. After all, John S. Gray and W.A. Graham got away with it for decades without a murmour of discontent - opinion is altering. The calculation's logical result is ridiculous, applying the result would require cavalry mounts to engage reverse or walk keeping all four legs simultaneously on the ground. Doubling the result produced ugly digits giving 4 at thity-first decimal point. I plumped for point four and added five after. This detracts in no way from a practical and useful intermediate, or mean, gait. 5.45 mph is a perfectly respectable rate of march for late 19th century cavalry horses in the field and pressing on to battle. It is a beautiful number of which even One Beer (Einstein) would be proud. In this instance and not at all unusual, the result matters. Arriving there interests some more than most. Usually milage varies and playing with time is for physicists and quantum mechanics who keep hands clean and heads in the clouds. I believe retreat from the timber exceeded the 5.45 rate at some point and wonder in that respect, if C4 where the sun doesn't shine also constitutes a charge to the rear? 5.45 mph was a toss up with 4.54 mph, both present decent intermediate or average rates, the greater representing more closely, perhaps, a degree of urgency. The difference in completing a steady mile would be two minutes. Either are properly representative of averaged advances from the night halt towards Sitting Bull's tepee's and offer a difference between them of eight to ten minutes per hour . Please consult Lt. Maguire for further clarification. Applied to Graham's times, 5.45mph for 5.75 decimal hours would place the regiment on Big Horn River and beyond. It was suggested that Benteen headed towards the Rosebud, during the Reno Inquiry. Of course had he done that he could not have given testimony in Chicago. Graham moderated his stupidity with excessive halts of eight and a half hours during the 25th June. Holmes Offley Paulding was told differently, but of course Paulding was there immediately after, and Graham wasn't. You really do get into a convoluted argument using incorrect information. As I have posted on the Wallace thread, Maguire wrote nothing, I repeat nothing, in his Report about what Wallace reported about 25th/26th June at the LBH. Anything that Maguire did put into his Report about those events was what he was told by the survivors, so please do not keep quoting Maguire as an authority. Also, it was not suggested that Benteen 'headed toward the Rosebud' at the RCOI. The following is taken from Major Reno's testimony: Q. Did you not know at the time you crossed the river, that Captain Benteen was on your left? A. I did not know where he was. I never saw him after he left the column. He might have gone to the mouth of the Rosebud for all I knew. Q. Had you any reason to believe that Captain Benteen might have gone to the mouth of the Rosebud? A. No, sir. I knew nothing about it. So it can be seen from this that Reno was trying to confirm that he had no knowledge of Benteen's whereabouts by exaggerating the possibilties to the mouth of the Rosebud. There was never the remotest possibility that Benteen would have gone that far. Finally, we gain nothing from trying to prove Graham or Gray wrong. They were not privy to the information we have today and whatever flaws there may be in their books are long since redundant. Why waste your time and ours? Sincerely, Hunk
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Post by herosrest on Jan 17, 2013 22:00:21 GMT -6
A general response. An understanding of Custer's fight developed through a succesion of interests and study from Dustin, then Kuhlman and on through development of an approach and subsequent halt by cavalry involving the terrain of todays National Cemetary. This is considered to be an important development in understanding the fighting and brushes aside criticism as irrelevant in the face of a broadly uneducated acceptance of very poor substance. One should expect modern tribal history, accounts passed down by participants, to agree the first hand record given to such as G.B. Grinnell and E.S. Curtis. In the case of Curtis, his conclusions remain mired in controvercy and are happily ignored. Such is not true of George Bird Grinnell who arrived at best guess conclusions after his considerable interest in LBH. He was told by, for example, White Shield, where the cavalry went and what they did and where they halted at the time an officer was killed. But that just isn't good enough, is it. Oh dear no, what if that officer was the CO. We can't have that can we, so close to the 2nd in command across the river. Custer's command halted on the flat across from MTC and Deep Coulee. Who was shot then we do not know but it seems to have spawned concerns that ruin any serious interest in what took place or realistic study of what took place. Serious modern beliefs now dictate an organised early presence by a significant force of soldiers downriver beyond LSH. One of the contributing factors reinforcing this concept of the battle is interpretation of a photograph taken by D.F. Barry of a skirmish line position indicated to him by Gall. Asessments in 'Where Custer Fell' and by Richard Fox, locate the skirmish lines in two pictures as being wesr of LSH. One of the images is included below to a terrain comparison illustrating the error inherent to assessments upon which the entire theory of Custer dividing his command to move downriver to what are referred to as Ford D's. Brief study of the comparison shows the error inherent to previous analyses. Beyond that, and just as an aside, on the terrain behind the central groups of skirmishers is a something little dark spot. Any idea what that might be, possibly just a smudge, poor print....... any ideas. LBH needs some seriously professional assistance from dispassionate experts and a huge dollop of multi~million dollar financing. It could also use a world class race course, but the weather is a real K-9. There were races, once upon a time.Who was Mr. Frisk and what took him less than 10 minutes?
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Post by herosrest on Jan 18, 2013 22:17:25 GMT -6
Some tactics ~cavalry on marksmen
The morning of September 30th was a cold one. Capt. Snyder, Fifth Infantry wrote in his diary that day, "Off early this morning. Ground frozen and ice upon streams. After marching five or six miles discovered Indians to front and left... the entire command moved forward to charge . . ."
The blood-spattered horse of killed Sgt. James Alberts was brought to Godfrey and after some difficulty, he mounted and rejoined his company, now dismounted and skirmishing on the right to reinforce Hale's Company. Godfrey was not out of the danger yet.
Holding on to his McClellan saddle, Godfrey made it back to his companies former position now occupied by 5th Infantry. Helped to his horse, he rode back with great difficulty to the field hospital set up 1/4 of a mile in the rear. Not long after he arrived, Moylan rode up with a wound in his right leg.
During the initial charge, Hale swept to the right of line and Co. K was having a difficult time. Riding ahead he crossed a coulee just beyond the site Godfrey would be hit, and up to flat prairie east of the camp. Moylan recalled, "When opposite the village he charged front and advanced when the Indians opened fire from the top of the bluff.
Hale could not charge through so dismounted to fight on foot and advanced to near the edge of a cutbank but Indians pushed up ravines on the flanks, surrounding and rushing his horse holders and led horses. The conflict became hand to hand. By this time A & D were approaching...at the double time and the Indians withdrew to positions along the bluff covering the village.
Capt. Hale reformed his line, several wounded and the dead were left on the lineā¦ several who could not help themselves, among them Lt. J.W. Biddle were subsequently killed.
Capt. Moylan had dismounted to report when a bullet struck him in the thigh. A few minutes after Moylan left for the hospital, Capt. Hale was shot, the bullet entering just under his 'Adams Apple' and passing through the neck killing him instantly."
Lt. Baird rode up to Hale with orders from Miles and unaware that he had just been killed, saluted and salutated, "The General's compliments and he directs." which he cut short upon observing that he was saluting the dead!
The Nez Perce picked targets carefully that morning (Shoulder straps and Chevrons-Trouser Stripes) Of three companies of the Seventh, only Lt. Eckerson was left on line and all First Sergeants were killed! Eckerson reported to Miles, "I'm the only damned man of the Seventh Cavalry wearing shoulder straps who's alive."
LBH, Custer fight. CO ~ 2 wounds. 2 Captains known wounded. Officers scattered about LSH, absent their commands. NCO's all over the place, clustered around senior officers. Fall back and mount....... how? Where are they....... Company C, no trumpeter. Identified outlying dead, NCO's.
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