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Post by jodak on Jun 29, 2016 15:44:36 GMT -6
Dave, First of all, let me clarify what we mean by Singapore. When we speak of it in regard to WW2, it is generally used as a colloquial term for the Malay Peninsula, with the island of Singapore at its tip and the city of Singapore on the island. So, in reality, they were really three different things but are commonly just lumped together under the all encompassing term of Singapore, and any discussion of the defense of "Singapore" might really pertain to one or more of them to varying degrees. I tend to go back and forth in my terminology but generally mean the whole shebang.
That aside, its loss most definitely represented a failure for the British on the operational level, and, while it might not have necessarily been a strategic failure, it certainly had strategic ramifications. To begin with, unlike the Philippines that were of limited value to the Japanese, other than the fact that they could not afford to allow us to be there, the Malay Peninsula supplied over 50% of the world's rubber and tin and significant portions of other raw materials. Its capture was therefore a significant gain for the Japanese and loss for the Allies for that reason alone. That was largely the basis for the several documents that we have seen in which the German's encouraged the Japanese to take action against Singapore - to deny those strategically important raw materials to Britain. In addition, Singapore Island was the epicenter of British defensive plans in the Far East, being strategically located to control the South China Sea, entrance to the Indian Ocean, and the Dutch East Indies. To facilitate that it contained a newly completed major naval base (although no significant naval presence was normally based there) and numerous airfields, both on the island and on the peninsula. It was also considered to be much more defensible than the Philippines, which could be encircled and isolated, as it had "defenses to the rear" in India and Burma, so its loss was a tremendous setback for the Allies in that regard as well.
The Singapore/Malaya campaign was also a tremendous operational failure that Churchill called the worst disaster in British military history. However, as I indicated in my previous post, he bore a large responsibility for that himself through his refusal to adequately resource it, and, while he may have been entirely correct in his reasons for doing so, he can't escape his share of the fallout. Of course the majority of the blame is attributed to ineffective leadership by General Percival, and that is largely true. As indicated in my previous post, he had served as the chief of staff of the Malayan command prior to having been given the command himself. In this he was promoted to Lieutenant General over numerous more senior generals, largely through the efforts of his mentor Sir John Dill, who was then serving as Chief of the Imperial Staff. Percival's career had been spent largely in staff assignments, which, while there was nothing inherently wrong with, limited his exposure to troops and command. However, Dill seemed to have a preference for those of similar background and was instrumental in elevating a number of them to high commands for which they were unsuited. When he replaced Dill as CIGS Sir Alan Brooke observed that officers were being promoted to high command because they were proficient in staff work, which he considered wrong and vowed to not continue in the future. As it specifically related to Percival, he was said to be excellent in any job which did not involve contact with troops. He was colorless and unimaginative and simply did not have an inspiring presence or look like a commander that the troops could have confidence in. His problems were exacerbated by his confusing chain of command, which included General Pownall, as British CinC Far East, and General Wavell, the head of the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) command, both of which were collocated in Singapore with Percival and led to the inevitable stepping on toes. He was also saddled with troublesome subordinates, particularly General Heath, who was senior to and resented serving under him, and the Australian General Bennett who resented and disliked the British military hierarchy and, as a commonwealth officer, had the right to challenge orders that he did not agree with to the Australian government, thus allowing him to do largely as he pleased. All-in-all, Percival was in a difficult position for even the best of commanders, which he was not.
On the other hand, his opponent, General Yamashita was a highly capable general, although he also had to contend with troublesome subordinates, some of which he was barely on speaking terms with. Although the attacking Japanese force bore the impressive sounding name of the 25th Army, it was really only three divisions. The Japanese army did not have a command echelon of corps, with a Japanese Army being analogous to a western Corps, so, in that sense, the Japanese mounted their offensive with only a corps, and a small one at that, which was actually considerably outnumbered by the British defenders (the same was true of the Japanese/Americans in the Philippines). However, as previously indicated, the British forces were of generally poor quality and inadequately equipped. Even so, they gave a better accounting of themselves than what is commonly perceived, particularly the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which were really the only first rate troops at Percival's disposal. However, he did not effectively deploy and utilize the troops that he did have, especially as it related to the jungle. The British troops were generally married to the roads, while the Japanese repeatedly outflanked the British positions by detouring through the jungle. The perceived obstacle of the jungle was a prime consideration in the decision to not equip the defenders with an armored element, as it was thought that tanks were unsuited for the terrain. However, the Japanese not only could but did move tanks through the jungle, and in that were not unlike the Germans traversing the Ardennes in 1940, so it would appear that the British did not learn from their mistakes.
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Post by dave on Jun 29, 2016 19:29:02 GMT -6
Did not the Japanese came through the back door in a sense because the British did not plan a defensive structure for the landward side of the fortress? The Japanese had fewer troops but better leadership and in a sense convinced the Allies they were outnumbered correct? Regards Dave
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Post by chardvc on Jun 30, 2016 1:27:46 GMT -6
Did not the Japanese came through the back door in a sense because the British did not plan a defensive structure for the landward side of the fortress? The Japanese had fewer troops but better leadership and in a sense convinced the Allies they were outnumbered correct? Regards Dave Both correct. The British assumed that Singapore would be attacked from the sea and therefore didn't have a coherent defence plan for an attack by land. Likewise they believed that the jungle was impenetrable to tanks. The Japanese moved quickly using bicycles and (from a veteran I knew as a child) the noise of the bikes ridden on rims (the tyres had been discarded after puncture) was mistaken for tanks, leading to reports that the Japanese force was overwhelming.
In terms of British military failures it is right up there. Embarrassing at the time for those in authority but worse for many of those captured at Singapore as it was them who died in their thousands working as slave labour on the Burma railway. My child-hood acquaintance harboured an anti-Japanese sentiment until his death - bizarrely by lightning whilst playing cricket - but his greatest scorn was for his commanders who he felt had surrendered far too easily.
RIP Bill Hodges
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Post by jodak on Jun 30, 2016 6:36:27 GMT -6
Did not the Japanese came through the back door in a sense because the British did not plan a defensive structure for the landward side of the fortress? The Japanese had fewer troops but better leadership and in a sense convinced the Allies they were outnumbered correct? Regards Dave Maybe I did not express it well, but that is what I have been trying to say - that rather than attacking Singapore Island directly from the sea to the south, the Japanese landed on the Malay Peninsula to the north and fought their way down the peninsula to Singapore. That had been anticipated in the 1937 study, but only very limited resources had been allocated to prepare for it.
Maybe this will make it easier to visualize. Think of the United States as Asia, with the Florida Panhandle as the coast of Thailand and the Florida Peninsula jutting down to the south as the Malay Peninsula and Miami at the tip of Florida as Singapore (although on an island separated from the mainland by a thin strip of water). From its strategic location naval and air forces located around Miami can control the Caribbean (South China) Sea and the islands it contains (Dutch East Indies). An enemy (Bermuda) desires to capture these islands to claim their rich resources, but to do so must first neutralize Miami. Instead of attacking Miami directly from the sea, he elects to land along both coasts of northern Florida, let's say around Tampa and Jacksonville, and fight his way down the peninsula to Miami in the south. However, before doing so, he first lands along the Florida Panhandle to establish advance airfields to aid his attack on the peninsula. All of this has been anticipated by the defender and prepared for within the limits of the available resources. In particular a brigade of South Carolinians (Indians) has been stationed in the extreme north of the peninsula for the purpose of advancing into the panhandle to contest landings there. However, their corps commander has a low opinion of South Carolinian troops and resents, bordering on insubordination, serving under his overall commander. Also, political realities will not allow them to preemptively enter the panhandle until the landings are actually under way (In this they face a situation similar to that faced by the British in 1940, when politics precluded them from advancing into Belgium to the prescribed Dyle Line prior to Belgium neutrality being abrogated by the Germans), by which time it is too late. At the same time, a strong naval force at Miami steams up the coast with the intent of attacking the enemy landing forces. However, due to the confusion and indecisiveness of its commander, it reverses course several times and runs across the same enemy submarine three times. Each time the submarine diligently reports the particulars as to position and course, with the result that the enemy knows exactly where this force is and what it is doing. However, due to his concern for radio security, the force commander fails to report this information to his own air force, which is supposed to provide air cover but is unable to do so because they have no idea where the force really is. As a result, enemy planes from the advance air bases in the panhandle attack the unprotected fleet and devastate it. Subsequently, with the enemy firmly ashore, the defender consolidates his forces and conducts a fighting withdrawal toward Miami. Early in the process the defender's chief engineer proposes the construction of additional defenses to the north of Miami but is forbidden to do so by his commander who states that defenses are bad for moral. The noose quickly tightens and more and more of the airfields on the peninsula, which are the defender's chief military asset, fall into the hands of the enemy, until the defender holds only the city of Miami itself, which is of no military significance. When the reservoirs and pumping stations that supply water to the city fall into enemy hands the jig is up and the defender surrenders.
I think this gives a fair representation of what happened at Singapore/Malaya. Although the geographic scale was much greater, the relative position of things is similar, with the exception that Thailand was on the opposite side of the peninsula from what is represented here and the city of Singapore was located on an island of the same name.
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Post by dave on Jun 30, 2016 8:37:49 GMT -6
jodak Ah Master, Grasshopper understands! Excellent analogy with Florida as it really makes things clearer and explains the mistakes made by the Allies. I am currently reading Unrestricted Warfare: How a New Breed of Officers Led the Submarine Force to Victory in World War II by James DeRose which focuses on the officers of the USS Wahoo (SS 238) and he covers her third patrol when 497 soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment, capyured at Singapore, were on Japanese merchant ships sunk by the Wahoo along with many Japanese troops.
Commander Dudley "Mush" Morton, skipper of the Wahoo surfaced after the sinking of the ships and ordered "Battle Stations Surface" and his crew opened fire on the survivors, Indian and Japanese alike. Morton's actions were caused by his all consuming hatred of Japan and anything Japanese but hardly defensible. He died later in the year and was never really judged for his killing the helpless survivors and this event was consigned to the lore of the Silent Service and allowed to wither away. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Jun 30, 2016 12:51:44 GMT -6
One of the first books that I remember reading as a kid about WW2 was Wake of the Wahoo, written by a former crewmember that was reassigned just before the final patrol. I guess because of that the Wahoo and Morton have always been among my favorites, although Sam Dealy and the Harder are up there as well.
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Post by dave on Jun 30, 2016 20:53:28 GMT -6
jodak Two fine sub skippers who perhaps made one patrol too many. Dealy lost his academy roommate when the Rueben James was sunk and fiercely fought the war. Morton had been stationed in China during the 1930's and was a racist with non whites and hated the Japanese with an incendiary passion. Both men were very aggressive and concerned some junior officers, especially George Girder who came to fame commanding the USS FLasher (SS 249)
Slade Cutter, who gained fame commanding the USS Seahorse (SS 304), stated that after 5 patrols he was contemptuous of the Japanese ASW forces and took too many foolish chances. Both Morton and Dealy were unafraid of attacking Destroyers and that is kinda like "pros who make pars and dogs that chase cars" which does not lead to long life
Forest Sterling was the author of Wake of the Wahoo and served as the Yeoman for the sub. Really good read. Regards Dave
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Post by dave on Jul 1, 2016 13:19:41 GMT -6
pequod Run Silent Run Deep! was filmed on the USS Redfish (SS 395) in 1957 and my father was the Chief of the Boat during the filming. He had autographed photos of the stars and liked Burt Lancaster best. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Jul 6, 2016 11:58:37 GMT -6
I didn't think to refer to this, my go to reference source for Pacific War information, during our recent discussion about the Malayan Campaign. pwencycl.kgbudge.com/M/a/Malaya.htm. It has a lot of interesting information in itself but also includes numerous embedded links to additional information for those who wish to explore further. One line in particular caught my attention ("As a result, the British correctly anticipated that the Japanese would land farther up the Kra Peninsula, in Thai territory") as it reinforces what I previously said and is contrary to the generally believed and oft repeated assertion that the British expected and prepared for attack only from the sea or south.
I also did some additional digging and found the following interesting pieces of information -
1. I previously said that the Japanese attack force consisted of only 3 divisions. However, while that is technically true, one of the three was diverted to capture Bangkok and only joined the drive southward at a later time. Therefore, it was actually only 2 divisions that took part in the initial landings and battles in southern Thailand (Siam) and northern Malaya. However, these were both high quality divisions that had spent several years fighting in China. Interestingly, General Yamashita had been offered 2 additional divisions but had declined them due to his belief that they would have placed too great of a strain on his logistics. In this he was totally at odds with the thinking of many commanders, who always seem to want more troops.
2. To oppose them the British initially had the equivalent of about 5 to 6 divisions (there were a number of independent brigades and battalions), but many of these troops had only recently arrived and, as previously indicated, were mostly of fairly low quality - being poorly trained and equipped (I read an account by one Australian soldier who said that, prior to leaving Australia, he had never fired his rifle and lectures were held on board the troop ship to acquaint the troops with their rifles.) and what training and equipment that they did have was geared primarily toward desert warfare. In addition, although the British had a decisive numeric advantage and the benefit of fighting from at least somewhat prepared defensive positions, they were committed piecemeal, with the Japanese having to deal with only a portion of them at any one time. Also, the British and Indian troops apparently felt a high degree of resentment and animosity toward the Australians due to the latter's much better pay and food rations. When "in country" the Australians received pay of 6 shillings per day (about 60 cents U.S.), while the British received only 1 shilling and the Indians probably a good deal less. Even the Australian pay may not seem like much now, but keep in mind that this was during the period of time when a beer and a lot of other things cost about 5 cents.
3. To make up for not adequately resourcing Malaya/Singapore in the first place (Percival had said that he needed 8 divisions to mount an adequate defense), the British funneled the equivalent of 2 additional divisions into Singapore after the campaign was already underway and essentially lost, and it was said that they might as well have just unloaded them directly from the ships into Japanese POW camps.
4. Such as attempts were made to build and improve defenses, airfields, etc. in the months prior to the beginning of the war, these were hampered by the policy that the various rubber plantations, mines, and other economic interests received priority for the use of native workers.
5. A large number of trucks and other motor vehicles were abandoned by these same economic interests in northern Malaya when the workers fled south after the invasion. The Japanese were able to make good use of these in facilitating their drive southward. As part of this, the Japanese had anticipated having to deal with many destroyed bridges and other obstacles, but, with good planning, had included a higher proportion of engineers and their equipment than was the norm, in order to address those issues. In total the campaign lasted 70 days as opposed to the 100 days that the Japanese had anticipated.
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Post by jodak on Jul 11, 2016 11:37:13 GMT -6
... When "in country" the Australians received pay of 6 shillings per day (about 60 cents U.S.), while the British received only 1 shilling and the Indians probably a good deal less. Even the Australian pay may not seem like much now, but keep in mind that this was during the period of time when a beer and a lot of other things cost about 5 cents.
I just happened to stumble across this in a link from a today's news article. Kind of places the soldiers' pay in perspective, although it doesn't say what quantities of each item it is talking about. I assume that it probably means a pound of bacon or chicken, a dozen eggs, etc. cpi.mooseroots.com/stories/13236/price-of-bacon-rise-fall-pork-pig-stock-cpi?utm_medium=cm&utm_source=outbrain&utm_campaign=mo.cm.ob.dt.10701#2-1941
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Post by herosrest on Jul 16, 2016 3:47:30 GMT -6
Ducemus - Coffee cooler
Images are links, please click away....
At about 07:00 on 11 November 1940, Atlantis encountered the Blue Funnel Line cargo ship Automedon about 250 mi (400 km) northwest of Sumatra. At 08:20, Atlantis fired a warning shot across Automedon's bow, and her radio operator at once began transmitting a distress call of "RRRR – Automedon – 0416N" ("RRRR" meant "under attack by armed raider").
At a range of around 2,000 yd (1,800 m), Atlantis shelled Automedon, ceasing fire after three minutes in which she had destroyed her bridge, accommodation, and lifeboats. Six crew members were killed and twelve injured.
The Germans boarded the stricken ship and broke into the strong room, where they found fifteen bags of Top Secret mail for the British Far East Command, including a large quantity of decoding tables, fleet orders, gunnery instructions, and naval intelligence reports. After wasting an hour breaking open the ship's safe only to discover "a few shillings in cash", a search of the Automedon's chart room found a small weighted green bag marked "Highly Confidential" containing the Chief of Staff's report to the Commander in Chief Far East, Robert Brooke Popham. The bag was supposed to be thrown overboard if there was risk of loss, but the personnel responsible for this had been killed or incapacitated. The report contained the latest assessment of the Japanese Empire's military strength in the Far East, along with details of Royal Air Force units, naval strength, and notes on Singapore's defences. It painted a gloomy picture of British land and naval capabilities in the Far East, and declared that Britain was too weak to risk war with Japan.
Automedon was sunk at 15:07. Rogge soon realised the importance of the intelligence material he had captured and quickly transferred the documents to the recently acquired prize vessel Ole Jacob, ordering Lieutenant Commander Paul Kamenz and six of his crew to take charge of the vessel. After an uneventful voyage they arrived in Kobe, Japan, on 4 December 1940.
The mail reached the German Embassy in Tokyo on 5 December. The German Naval attaché Paul Wenneker had the summary of the British plan wired to Berlin, while the original was hand-carried by Kamenz to Berlin via the Trans-Siberian railway. A copy was given to the Japanese, to whom it provided valuable intelligence prior to their commencing hostilities against the Western Powers. Rogge was rewarded for this with an ornate Samurai sword; the only other Germans so honoured were Hermann Göring and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel.
After reading the captured Chief of Staff report, on 7 January 1941 Japanese Admiral Yamamoto wrote to the Naval Minister asking whether, if Japan knocked out America, the remaining British and Dutch forces would be suitably weakened for the Japanese to deliver a death blow; the Automedon intelligence on the weakness of the British Empire is thus credibly linked with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the attack leading to the fall of Singapore.
Click on image for 'The Ship That Doomed A Colony'.
Atlantis Commerce raider.
The Military campaign unleashed by Japan on 7th December 1941, was (arguably) the most effective ever undertaken in so brief a time period, to achieve all its aims within three months. It was possible because of 'Zero'. The fight back began at Coral Sea and took until August 1945 to win. Strike first. Strike hardest. Strike sure.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 16, 2016 4:48:19 GMT -6
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Post by jodak on Jul 18, 2016 6:14:49 GMT -6
July 18, 1943
An aircraft carrying the Commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, is shot down by P-38 Lighting fighters over Bougainville.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=fKvJgFldgGA
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Post by jodak on Jul 18, 2016 9:08:16 GMT -6
As an adjunct to my previous post, the reason that the mission was assigned to an Army P38 squadron was that they were the only fighters with the necessary range. However, in a more general sense, I think that the P38 deserves to be ranked among the very best fighters of WW2, although it seems that it is often overlooked in that regard. I would be interested in hearing what others consider as the foremost fighters of the war and why and hope that we can get some comments and discussion going about that.
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Post by dave on Jul 18, 2016 10:31:09 GMT -6
jodak John Mitchell, from Enid, MS thirty miles from Oxford, was the commander of Operation Vengeance that shot down Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Remarkable how small the world is. Regards Dave
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