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Post by dave on Apr 18, 2016 10:09:57 GMT -6
jodak You are very perceptive with your observation the US could have lost the Battle of the Coral Sea as a result of the Doolittle Raid. But as “The president was insistent that we find ways and means of carrying home to Japan proper, in the form of a bombing raid, the real meaning of war.”*, the operation was born and would be carried to birth. Political pressure and national moral required a proper response.
As a note of little importance, the first book I ever bought was 30 Seconds Over Tokyo, by Ted Lawson, in the first grade 1955 for 50 cents. Still have it. Regards Dave
*http://www.historynet.com/aftermath-doolittle-raid-reexamined.htm (Lt General Hap Arnold)
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Post by montrose on May 26, 2016 17:19:33 GMT -6
This thread has caused me to restudy the Pacific war, for the last year.
Here is my analysis.
1. Operations. There were four operational environments.
a. China. This was Japan's main effort where the majority of their resources were deployed. This was the USA 4th priority, with minimal effort.
b. Southwest Pacific. This was the reason Japan attacked USA, to control resources in this area. This was the Japanese second effort, and USA economy of force 3rd priority.
c. East Pacific. This area was the US main effort in WW2. It was an economy of force area for Japan, sometimes their 3rd priority, sometimes their 4th priority. Note anything in this area was US only, with marginal. or no, allied participation.
d. Burma/India. This area was also an economy of force area for Japan. It varied between their 3rd and 4th effort. Overall, it consumed more resources than east Pacific. For the Allies, this was the main effort for the UK, and a 10th rate sideshow for the USA. The USA deliberately under resourced this area, to weaken UK and EU post war colonies.
2. Center of Mass. Japan was defeated by operations in the SW Pacific, that destroyed the majority of their combat power and all of their sustainment.
One of the challenges here is Mac. He is MAJ Reno as senior officer in US military. We did not win this war because of MAC, but despite him. But we must admit that in any comparison with Nimitz or Arnold, he wins.
3. Tactics vice operations. The US Army sent their worst and dimmest to the Pacific, The best and brightest went to Europe. The larger the Army formation, the more useless they were. Army battalion, regiment and division commanders were relieved frequently and often.
My issue is the United States would be better off with an integrated ground force with respect to man train and equip Title 10 functions. I fully understand that the USMC is better than the Army at battalion and below. But wars are won above battalion level.
3. The Issue. The pacific war was won by a marginally competent commander persuing personal goals vice operational or strategic. The central pacific main effort of the USA was far more a war crime than a rational military effort.
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Post by dave on May 26, 2016 18:01:23 GMT -6
montrose A ripping good post very informative and interesting. My father who spent time in Japan post war and occupying use to bitch about MacArthur not change the Japanese to drive on the right side of the road. He said many deaths and accidents occurred. I suspect that alcohol may have been involved. Regards Dave
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Post by tubman13 on Jun 3, 2016 8:29:07 GMT -6
This thread has caused me to restudy the Pacific war, for the last year. Here is my analysis. 1. Operations. There were four operational environments. a. China. This was Japan's main effort where the majority of their resources were deployed. This was the USA 4th priority, with minimal effort. b. Southwest Pacific. This was the reason Japan attacked USA, to control resources in this area. This was the Japanese second effort, and USA economy of force 3rd priority. c. East Pacific. This area was the US main effort in WW2. It was an economy of force area for Japan, sometimes their 3rd priority, sometimes their 4th priority. Note anything in this area was US only, with marginal. or no, allied participation. d. Burma/India. This area was also an economy of force area for Japan. It varied between their 3rd and 4th effort. Overall, it consumed more resources than east Pacific. For the Allies, this was the main effort for the UK, and a 10th rate sideshow for the USA. The USA deliberately under resourced this area, to weaken UK and EU post war colonies. 2. Center of Mass. Japan was defeated by operations in the SW Pacific, that destroyed the majority of their combat power and all of their sustainment. One of the challenges here is Mac. He is MAJ Reno as senior officer in US military. We did not win this war because of MAC, but despite him. But we must admit that in any comparison with Nimitz or Arnold, he wins. 3. Tactics vice operations. The US Army sent their worst and dimmest to the Pacific, The best and brightest went to Europe. The larger the Army formation, the more useless they were. Army battalion, regiment and division commanders were relieved frequently and often. My issue is the United States would be better off with an integrated ground force with respect to man train and equip Title 10 functions. I fully understand that the USMC is better than the Army at battalion and below. But wars are won above battalion level. 3. The Issue. The pacific war was won by a marginally competent commander persuing personal goals vice operational or strategic. The central pacific main effort of the USA was far more a war crime than a rational military effort. This an outstanding post, thank you.
Regards, Tom
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Post by jodak on Jun 21, 2016 14:56:21 GMT -6
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Post by edavids on Jun 21, 2016 17:02:00 GMT -6
Wonderful article Jodak. For family pride, my mother worked in MacArthur's office in Tokyo. It was much more interesting than being a schoolteacher in Kansas. She also met my Dad who at the time was skipper of the USS Chatterer. The Chattererwas a wooden minesweeper removing 'influence' mines from Tokyo Harbor. Thank you for posting! Best, David
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Post by jodak on Jun 22, 2016 7:06:26 GMT -6
David, Do you have any interesting anecdotes from your mother concerning her time at MacArthur's headquarters that you would care to share? What were her impressions of him?
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Post by dave on Jun 22, 2016 18:48:21 GMT -6
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Post by dave on Jun 27, 2016 8:40:01 GMT -6
Has anyone read about the discovery of the USS Herring (SS 233) by a "joint expedition of the Russian Geographical Society (RGS) and Defense Ministry?" The article was published on June 22 and I would have expected the US to have acknowledged the claim but would determine for themselves if it were indeed the Herring. If this discovery is indeed the Herring it would be the 6th* submarine lost during WW II to have be found. Five were lost in enemy action and one from a training accident. Regards Dave * 1 submarine ran aground during the war and was destroyed atop the reef and some wreckage still remains and 1 submarine www.rt.com/news/347834-us-submarine-found-wwii/
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Post by jodak on Jun 27, 2016 12:37:02 GMT -6
This is the first that I have heard of it, and a Google search returns no additional articles. However, this article is dated less than a week ago and says that "records suggest" that it is the Herring and that all information has been passed on to U.S. authorities. That probably means that a review of records indicates that it is the most likely candidate as to a sub thought to have been lost in that general location but that the U.S. Navy will make the final determination as to its identity.
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Post by dave on Jun 27, 2016 13:05:26 GMT -6
jodak I agree with you about the follow up to the Russian's claim by the US Navy. It should easily verified if it is the Herring. The Wahoo was discovered in a similar fashion and then verified by the Navy.
I hope they are able to determine how the boat was lost and if in fact she was sunk by depth charges as surmised. I am sure family members of those lost would appreciate more information that might be of comfort.
I wonder if not more lost subs and other vessels will be found with the continued improvements of technology for sea floor surveying. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Jun 27, 2016 13:32:50 GMT -6
Dave, I didn't interpret the Russian statement as being a "claim" but more along the lines of speculation that they are leaving up to the U.S. to verify. Japanese records indicate that a sub in that location was hit by artillery fire from the shore after torpedoing two freighters in the harbor. I'm sure that any number of additional wrecks could be found now, but it is just a matter of someone or organization having the resources and inclination to do it.
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Post by dave on Jun 27, 2016 15:02:24 GMT -6
jodak I am sure you are correct with it being a claim but Russia did find the Wahoo and why would Russia believe they had found the Herring if not pretty sure? Why embarrass themselves with a false statement? Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Jun 29, 2016 12:34:38 GMT -6
From the Pearl harbor thread:
jodak Reading the last few posts seems to show just how out of touch the British were with the Japanese plans and abilities. Regards Dave
I think that the British were actually pretty perceptive as to the likely Japanese actions. We often see it stated the British expected and planned only for an attack from the sea or south, but that is really not the case. In 1937 the then commander of Malaya, General William Dobbie, with General Percival as his chief of staff, conducted a detailed study of Malaya’s/Singapore’s vulnerabilities, including conducting exercises with troops, and concluded that, contrary to previously accepted view, Japanese landings on the peninsula were possible from October to March. They also concluded that the Japanese would probably make landings along the coast of Thailand and establish advance airfields and other bases prior to invading Malaya. All of that is exactly what the Japanese did. However, these accurate assessments did not translate into preparedness. The first couple of years following the study were during the time that Britain was in denial about developing threats, and later the British focus was on Europe and the North Africa, leaving very limited resources for improving the Malayan defenses. The scant monies allocated for that purpose were used primarily for the construction of machine gun emplacements, while the troops were generally of poor quality, only partially trained, and poorly led, with a large proportion consisting of Malaysian volunteers. The British equipment was also decidedly limited and inferior. The land forces had no tanks, while the Japanese utilized over 200. While these were the typical poor quality light and medium Japanese tanks, they were better than what the British had to oppose them with, which was primarily 1920’s vintage Lanchester armored cars and Boys anti-tank rifles. Political and economic interests also came into play, with northern Malaya plantation owners resisting efforts to build defensive works on their properties or even allow troops to exercise on them. As a result of all of this the British defensive plans relied heavily on their air force, but that consisted largely of outdated American Brewster Buffalo fighters that were no match for the Japanese planes. In addition, many of the airfields had been situated in poor defensive locations, often without even consulting the army as to the practicality of their defense, and, as a result, many were quickly overrun when the invasion began. To their credit the British Chiefs of Staff had proposed large enhancements to the troops and equipment in 1940 but had been shot down by Churchill who insisted that essentially all available troops and equipment be sent to North Africa. In particular, the chiefs had proposed sending several squadrons of Hurricanes and a couple of armored regiments to Malaya, but Churchill demurred. He also insisted on sending all available older Matilda and Valentine tanks, which the British considered inadequate for their own use in Europe, to the Soviet Union rather than to Malaya. Although outdated and inferior, they were equal to or superior to the Japanese tanks and may have made a decisive difference.
This is getting long, so I will stop for now but follow up with another post concerning the British commanders and tactics.
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Post by dave on Jun 29, 2016 12:52:58 GMT -6
jodak I look forward to more posts. Singapore was a failure for the Brits was it not? RegaDave
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