|
Post by starman on Jul 15, 2012 7:46:40 GMT -6
Do egotistical and arrogance have the same meaning? I believe Custer was overconfident and impetuous rather than arrogant. He had faith in his own ability but one must remember he was no Indian fighter. His only experience was at the Washita.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2012 8:15:13 GMT -6
Ego and arrogance go together like a thick steak and a baked potato. When you enter in Custer's inner self, the little boy who never quite grew up, you have a combination that should never be allowed to lead troops.
He was an indian fighter. Just read his books and articles, he will tell you so himself. Now look at the record. The Washita incomplete, and if you want to call it a victory it stretches credibility. The Yellowstone where he walked into an ambush, and was lucky to survive, and that other thing where he could not get across a river and hung on by a thread until someone saved his bacon once again.
Custer's reputation was built during the Civil War. It is very easy to build a reputation when you are on the winning side and you enter the arena, at least as a general officer at the high water mark, and your enemies tide receeds thereafter. Look then at the generals who perform depite the handicaps. Look at the generals who deal with adversity and pull out the win, when by all rights they should not. Ask yourself what a Custer would do in Vandergrift's place at Guadalcanal. Ask yourself what would a Custer do in place of Fletcher or Spruance at Midway. Ask yourself if a Custer could hold an army together long enough to win at Trenton or Princeton. Ask yourself if a Custer could have kept an army intact at Valley Forge. Do you think he could cut it? I don't, but that's just me.
There is a fellow over on the other board best known for unbridled hypebole that has stated several times that Custer was the greatest division commander in American history. I invite you to look at Custer's record as a division commander alone, and see how it stacks up against Lejeune, Ridgeway, Vandergrift, Gavin, Harmon, Allen, Robertson, Rose, Wood, Fredericks, Truscott, O'Daniel, Kinnard, DePuy, and about fifty others that don't immediately come to mind. Judge for yourself Custer's generalship, and leadership. I think you may conclude that not only was it lacking, but the aforementioned statement was if not the most ignorant statement made upon these boards certainly in the top three.
When you were a little boy, you probably played in the sandbox with your little lead soldiers that you bought at the five and dime. Like most of us you probably had a favorite The one in the manly pose. The one that the shine never wore off of. Most of us as we grew older followed the admonishment of Saint Paul and put away childish things. Custer and the poster did not and for them fantasy, the manly pose, the shine, all childlike things are very real and will endure
|
|
|
Post by brenda56 on Jul 15, 2012 11:58:47 GMT -6
Quinn, Within the 1st Air Cavalry did Kinnard command the same level of respect as Custer commanded within the 7th. ?
Brenda H. K.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2012 12:40:52 GMT -6
Brenda: I have known people who knew Kinnard in the 101st in World War II, as a commander of 1st Battle Group (Airborne) 501st Infantry in the 1950's and as commander of both the 11th Air Assault Division which morphed into the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and I have never heard or read anything other than the positive said concerning him. Not one bit of negativism at any level. I rate him very high in that era along with David Grange (Senior) of whom there is none better.
I think Custer would have made a very good Second Lieutenant of Cavalry had he developed a little more maturity under a hard as nails company commander. Rising beyond that who can say. The problem is that he was never allowed to mature as a company grade officer, and thus you get what you get.
Brenda: I might add about Kinnard. All he had to start with in the 11th Air Assault was the report of the Howtz Board, and a directive from SECDEF , that bypassed SECARMY, to make it work. Add to this a small staff, no division to start with, and a spirit of inovation, to free the army from the tyrany of terrain. One of the first things he did was establish an idea center where anyone from private to assistant division commander could submit a proposal on how they thought things could be done better operationally. That idea center paid great dividends and when the 1st Cavalry Division went into combat most of the technique and equipment used by that division was an outgrowth of that idea center. Does that sound to you like something a Custer or a Custerlike officer would do?
For the first time in our history under Kinnard American Cavalry operated as cavalry can and should operate. My late friend was Kinnard's assistant G-2 and later his G-2, and a commander of 1-7 Cavalry under Casey. He rated Kinnard the best of the best and his experience included service in Korea as well.
|
|
|
Post by brenda56 on Jul 15, 2012 17:01:39 GMT -6
Thanks for the feedback, very interesting indeed.
What strikes me from your post is the following -
One of the first things he did was establish an idea center where anyone from private to assistant division commander could submit a proposal on how they though things could be done better operationally?
That takes a particularly perceptive and single minded individual to put in place such a process, particularly so when tradition could indicate otherwise. I do not believe Custer was similarly skilled.
Kinnard appears in my family tree as a not too distant relative. My grandfather, a first and second war veteran, often referred to him.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2012 18:11:07 GMT -6
There were four guys in the Army that would bring air cavalry into existence. Jim Gavin had the idea ever since he was given a cavalry mission to execute with a Parachute Infantry Regiment the 505th in Sicily. He ended up writing an article for Colliers Magazine in 1955 called "Cavalry and I Don't Mean Horses" Jay Vanderpool started with Gavin's article, and old horse cavalry field manual, and an OH13 Helicopter he strapped a couple of M1919A6 machine guns on just to see if it would work. Hamilton Howtz studied the whole issue of airmobility from start to finish in the summer of 1962. They started with a clean sheet of paper and by summers end they created not only the airmobile division, but also the air transportation brigade and the air cavalry combat brigade. They were designed to operate in concert with one another. Only the airmobile division saw combat. Kinnard took what he was given and put it together start to finish in two years and went into combat with it at the end of that period. They were all remarkable men but it would have been stillborn without Kinnard's leadership in development and combat.
|
|
|
Post by wild on Jul 16, 2012 6:16:37 GMT -6
Colonel I'm inclined to go with the German post Crete view of para operations.That view reinforced by Arnhem and the shambles of Sicily. Pretty and romantic but just not worth the effort.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Jul 16, 2012 6:19:35 GMT -6
I respectfully disagree with Colonel Reese.
You can not compare LTC Custer with LTG Gavin.
First, the Army had changed. There was an officer education system. Officers no longer got an OPTIONAL basic course for a few weeks as their only military training for the next 30-40 years. The 1876 Army was an Army of amateurs, sink or swim.
Second, the Army changed from seniority based promotions to merit based promotions. You had to prove yourself at every grade. Gavin commanded superbly at platoon, company, battalion, and regiment before being selected for division command.
Third, discipline existed in the modern Army. LTC Custer would have never seen command again after his 1867 conviction. In fact, you know very well he would have been demoted to private and received a bad conduct discharge.
Changing gears,innovation did exist in the 1870s Army. Look ar Crook and Mackenzie. LTC Custer did experiment with asharpshooter element, but only for one campaign. His more lasting innovation was his regimental band.
Do you have opinion for a chronically understrength unit permanently devoting manpower from line companies to a band?
In my opinion, Custer's superiors did not do their job is mentoring, leading, and disciplining their wild young leader.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 16, 2012 8:47:53 GMT -6
William: Not sure what you are disagreeing with here. Don't think I did compare Custer with Gavin or Kinnard,
I stated what I thought about Kinnard as requested.
I stated that Gavin dreamed up the idea of airmobile cavalry after being assigned what was generally a cavalry mission for the invasion of Sicily
I refuted the statement that Custer was the best division commander in American history. American history covers a lot of territory and I suggested that the statement was false and offered the names of several division commanders whose record of achievement expceeds Custer's a long way/
I agree that had Custer been led and mentored early in his career as a junior officer he might just as well have been quite different. He was not. By the time he was a defrocked major general and a Regular Army LTC I think he was well beyond the mentoring stage if for no other reason his own ego.
Richard: Gavin I'm sure would agree. That is why he suggested that there must be a better way, thus his 1948 book on the subject and the article in Colliers.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Jul 16, 2012 9:13:48 GMT -6
Chuck,
You were naming some of the best and brightest officers to ever serve in the US Army; and comparing them to GAC and the horrible 1870s Army.
Very few of the members of the 1870s Army could meet today's standards for initial entry. I do not think I am exaggerating when I say at best, 15%. This is both officers and enlisted. This means we wouldn't even let them in the door.
WW2 was an intermediate step in the evolution of our Army. So maybe, at best, 40% would be allowed in.
This has nothing to do with how many would survive their first 3 years in the Army. For planning purposes, Army assumes we will lose half (includes officers).
LT Crittenden flunked out of USMA and was blind in one eye. He got commissioned anyway. Now I believe Calhoun and Crittenden died hard, doing their duty. But he should not have been commissioned.
So I guess my issues are comparing the 1876 7th Cav circus to the Airborne gang of WW2.
No offense intended.
V/R
Former Action Guy
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 16, 2012 9:22:33 GMT -6
See what you mean Will, and I heartily agree that the very best of 1876 would be welcome even today, and the other 97 percent out on the corner selling newspapers.
|
|
|
Post by benteen on Jul 16, 2012 14:05:43 GMT -6
Gentlemen,
Certainly I agree with your sentiments about the quality of the 1876 Cavalry compared to later times, but in fairness to the Army, could it be a case of water seeking its own level. What I mean is that after the CW we were not facing any armed and trained military. At worst thay felt they had to contend with what they thought were nothing but stone age savages and who needed highly trained and skilled Officers and men to do that. Why bother with costly training to slap that bunch around. And let anyone who wants to enlist, do so. Half or more of the Cavalry were people who couldnt find jobs, wanted a horse and gun to skip out to the gold fields, were escaping crimes and debts, they enlisted under false names, dates of birth etc. It was a you say Colonel Montrose, a circus, and who needs well trained officers to lead that.
Be Well Dan
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jul 16, 2012 14:17:43 GMT -6
Dan: Spoken like a member of the Senate or House Appropriations Committee. The U S Army reverted post ACW to a constabulary, a role they had with minor interuptions since the outset. Simple neglect of the force was shameless in my estimation. If you are going to have an army common sense dictates it should be the absolute best army you can afford. It should also be tailored for circumstance. Quality like mass is a force all unto its own on the battlefield, but that is lost on bean counters, and the arrogant we are better than they are crowd, just because.
Funding an army is a lot like buying an automobile. You have a budget for both purchase, as well as the cost to insure, maintain, and fuel. You look at all these things carefully to insure they do not exceed your budget. If you have special requirements like off road travel you factor that in as well. Now if you adopt the attitude that any old thing will do, you usually get any old thing. On the other hand if you are prudent with your dollars and buying as much quality as possible for those dollars is important to you, the general result is quality within the limitations of budget. The prudent will stay away from new technology until that technology is well proven and enters the mainstream. Sometimes when we use simple common sense it's result exceeds expectations.
|
|
|
Post by bc on Jul 17, 2012 0:41:43 GMT -6
Funding an army is a lot like buying an automobile. Yep. We've got a Toyota Prius with some nice gadgets but not the greatest ride. The marines have a Kia. bc
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 17, 2012 7:12:58 GMT -6
It's difficult to imagine today how much the concept of a standing army was anathema to many, perhaps most, of immigrants and citizens alike in 1876. It's one of the main reasons they were here, to get away from the European militarism. The quartering of troops was such an issue that it made it into all the early documents of the nation as an evil beyond our ability to appreciate today. The rapidity with which the GAR was broken down, defunded, paraded and waved goodbye is something we cannot imagine today.
The role of a necessary military in this Republic is the great debate within us. Our history with it has been unique and painful and constructive beyond anything. Even after the most vile presidential campaign, the idea that someone willingly gives the keys to the military to someone despised but elected - and this isn't a big deal - just amazes me. For 236 years. That is something to be proud of, and I am.
The way the military is broken up and diverse and wasteful is due to institutional fear of coup, and not without reason. I'll pay for that.
|
|