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Post by wild on Oct 19, 2011 6:52:01 GMT -6
Another point. The jumble on LSH with horses and men intermixed could not have offered anything other than individuals fighting for their lives. With no cohesion the end came very quickly. I would hazard a guess that it was all over in 10 minutes. DC offers a Custer mortally wounded as a reason for the debacle.Up to now I could not argue against this.But even carrying a wounded Custer would vet civil war officers have allowed the command to have been destroyed so easly? I think that the terrain had once again done for Custer. First off preventing him from attacking or going to Reno's aid now rendering him blind to what was coming down the tracks.
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Post by El Crab on Oct 19, 2011 17:54:36 GMT -6
If Custer was mortally wounded early on, they would not have proceeded further north. Nor would the companies be separated by the distances.
And Keogh would have taken command, no matter what anyone says about nepotism.
The very top of Custer Hill had horses shot around the edges, forming a rough circle. It was described as such. That wasn't random. The horses below were probably just shot where ever they were found. I would guess because there wasn't as much cover at the time they were shot. The slope makes the troopers a more inviting target, since if they were standing behind a horse facing the river, they'd be higher in relation to the horse than those at the top. That's my best guess on that one.
Now, here's the thing. The horses at the top were described as mostly sorrels. Trinque suggests the horses below the hilltop and those on the hilltop were destroyed BEFORE the fugitives from the Right Wing showed up. That the horses at the very top were killed to provide protection for those troopers firing toward the threat from the river/Deep Ravine. When the Right Wing collapsed and the survivors came, they then killed their horses at the top to provide protection to those firing back towards the Indians coming from the Keogh Sector.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Oct 19, 2011 19:32:22 GMT -6
You could well be correct, but you currently pose the issue with straw dogs.
It isn't necessary for Custer to be mortally wounded; only wounded. It isn't necessary that it be Custer. Only A Custer. A line of five companies down MTC cannot stop within MTC under any amount of fire. They don't particularly intend to head north, but that's the easiest direction for them in the lead with the wounded to keep moving, and away from the enemy. This does not take place at the ford, please note, but back where activity was noted later.
Keogh would surely take command if 1.) Custer ceded it or was clearly out of it and 2.) the info actually reached him. All he may have known was the front was heading north, because they could not stop to await someone riding to give him the news and for him to return to take the lead, which would have been silly. If Custer was wounded, someone not named Keogh gave orders. Might still have been Custer. Or Yates. Or Cooke. Or TWC.
And no matter if it would have resulted in more wounded, and no matter who said otherwise, I don't think any Custer or Reed was going to be left mortally wounded on the ground for the Sioux.
Keogh would see no need for his wing or group to ride down just to turn north at a point now presighted for fire, so he leads them out of the coulee from wherever he is. They proceed more or less parallel to Yates' group where they ended up, perhaps sacrificing/deploying a platoon to delay pursuit.
The horses were described, sorta, as you suggest, but differently and not by everyone. Weren't most of the horses sorrel or close anyway? And Vic, for example, was in one scenario described as killed down the hill while running, and people cut off his hooves later for inkwells. So, he wasn't part of the Great Wall of Hill's Horsemeat, if true.
I don't know where there is evidence suggesting the wall was arranged for specific direction, or how you imagine that might be realistically accomplished, given their skill and conditions. These were not excessively trained horsemen and this was the first time in a while ANY of them - man or beast - had been under serious fire and this does not lend itself to much time arranging placement of pre-corpse horses, who cannot be counted upon to fall as planned anyway, nor a lot of time given to killing them with pistol, given other more pressing options. If it were necessary to kill them for protection, that implies retreat in any direction was not possible, and that condition would have been drawn to their attention from fire from all directions, which reduces the likelihood the horses, or many of them, were killed by their riders.
And, you forego discussion on why so many officers were found where they were, and whether that bolsters your half-baked theory or my half-baked one. To me, it seems likely company commanders on their bigger, faster mounts summited the hill and they and horse got hit, went down, and that's what she wrote. Zero proof.
It's upsetting to see suggested options concluded as Fact, though. We have, and can have, no clue if Keogh's guys were running for Custer, or departing Custer to join Calhoun or anything. Or anything.
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Post by rosebud on Oct 19, 2011 19:33:46 GMT -6
Typical... and pretty sad to me. I notice as well, that every time I mention "hard-copy" or "proof," pikers like you back right off. And that includes your so-called contacts with Dickson. "Warning," indeed. Fred
Thought you were no longer responding. Not a man of your word I see.
I will have more for you at a later date. Don't have time right now to play with you. Where are your " facts" on Kanipe?" You have none.
Couple of weeks and I will have time. Best wishes Rosebud
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Post by wild on Oct 20, 2011 0:30:45 GMT -6
DC A wounded Custer is a reason for breaking off the attack at MTC and heading North.It does not explain the failure to withdraw the horses from the firing lines. A decision to fight on foot should have triggered drills.There is no evidence of such. The Keogh/Calhoun position suggests some sort of organisation with the troops in something resembling a skirmish line.Is there even a suggestion that horses were withdrawn to a ravine? The Custer position resembles nothing more than a collision of two forces,one of which was a juggernaut. Al lthis knocks the jaunt to Ford D on the head.
el crab When the Right Wing collapsed and the survivors came, they then killed their horses at the top to provide protection to those firing back towards the Indians coming from the Keogh Sector How many of Keogh's troops were found on LSH?Would you have names? LSH is 800 metres distant.Did Keogh also fight with the horses present in the firing lines? What chance is there of finding a horse,breaking out of a collasping position and riding nearly 800 meters through hundreds of Indians and breaking into another collasping position?
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Post by El Crab on Oct 20, 2011 2:13:59 GMT -6
You could well be correct, but you currently pose the issue with straw dogs. It isn't necessary for Custer to be mortally wounded; only wounded. It isn't necessary that it be Custer. Only A Custer. A line of five companies down MTC cannot stop within MTC under any amount of fire. They don't particularly intend to head north, but that's the easiest direction for them in the lead with the wounded to keep moving, and away from the enemy. This does not take place at the ford, please note, but back where activity was noted later. See, I just can't agree with that. I do understand that turning a column around isn't like pulling a u-turn with a car, but we're talking about a column of armed men. I'm sure they had ways of turning a column around. It seems a bit daffy to prefer to believe they headed another mile north, away from the the rest of the regiment because they couldn't turn around. There weren't all that many Indians behind them. Keogh would surely take command if 1.) Custer ceded it or was clearly out of it and 2.) the info actually reached him. All he may have known was the front was heading north, because they could not stop to await someone riding to give him the news and for him to return to take the lead, which would have been silly. If Custer was wounded, someone not named Keogh gave orders. Might still have been Custer. Or Yates. Or Cooke. Or TWC. If Custer was incapacitated and unable to command, I'd guess they'd at least make an attempt to alert Keogh. Since if they followed protocol, he would be the next ranking officer. But you're likely right, they probably wouldn't instantly try to contact Keogh. But at some point down the road, they would likely do so. And no matter if it would have resulted in more wounded, and no matter who said otherwise, I don't think any Custer or Reed was going to be left mortally wounded on the ground for the Sioux. Completely agree. In fact, I think you could extend it to the entirety of Custer's commissioned officers. I don't think any officer would've been left in that situation, even if killed. I would say they'd make every attempt to haul off the body of a downed officer, dead or gravely wounded. Keogh would see no need for his wing or group to ride down just to turn north at a point now presighted for fire, so he leads them out of the coulee from wherever he is. They proceed more or less parallel to Yates' group where they ended up, perhaps sacrificing/deploying a platoon to delay pursuit. I see nothing wrong with this. The horses were described, sorta, as you suggest, but differently and not by everyone. Weren't most of the horses sorrel or close anyway? And Vic, for example, was in one scenario described as killed down the hill while running, and people cut off his hooves later for inkwells. So, he wasn't part of the Great Wall of Hill's Horsemeat, if true. Around 70 dead cavalry horses were found on the field. Godfrey counted 39 on the slope and/or on top of Last Stand Hill. He counted 42 men. And the following soldiers were of the opinion that the horses on LSH were shot for breastworks: Lt. McClernand Pvt. Adams Lt. Thompson Capt. Clifford Pvt. Goldin Lt. DeRudio Lt. Wallace Those names are from Trinque's article in Vol. 8, No. 2 of the Research Review (June 1994), titled The Defense of Custer Hill. Each one is quoted as saying they felt the horses on Custer Hill were shot for breastworks, with some saying they appeared to be led head to tail and shot. Most of the horses at the top, where Custer and the HQ and a few Right Wing troopers were found, were sorrels. You're paraphrasing Connell in SotMS when you talk about someone supposedly identifying Vic, and upon inspection, deciding the horse was killed while at a gallop. I'd be a little hesitant to believe horse identification, except maybe by Burkman, who might be familiar enough with Custer's mounts to identify them. But even then... I don't know where there is evidence suggesting the wall was arranged for specific direction, or how you imagine that might be realistically accomplished, given their skill and conditions. These were not excessively trained horsemen and this was the first time in a while ANY of them - man or beast - had been under serious fire and this does not lend itself to much time arranging placement of pre-corpse horses, who cannot be counted upon to fall as planned anyway, nor a lot of time given to killing them with pistol, given other more pressing options. If it were necessary to kill them for protection, that implies retreat in any direction was not possible, and that condition would have been drawn to their attention from fire from all directions, which reduces the likelihood the horses, or many of them, were killed by their riders. Can't agree. Some might've not been that great of horsemen, but they rode those horses all the way from Fort Lincoln. I'll agree all day that marksmanship was lacking throughout the command, but these guys drilled almost daily, didn't they? They'd been riding horses for the past 40 days straight. Reno's men were able to charge, halt, dismount, lead the horses away, get back on, ride away. Its not impossible for soldiers to shoot their horses. It probably happened. Quite a few soldiers who saw the field after the battle felt that was what occurred. Either that, or it was just fortuitous that those horses were killed so that the men could used them for breastworks. Wooden Leg said they couldn't see the soldiers on Last Stand Hill, but knew they were behind the dead horses. Ok. Wooden Leg said something to someone, who then said to someone else that that's what Wooden Leg said. But I'm pretty sure that's not the type of thing that's going to be compromised through the telephone game. And, you forego discussion on why so many officers were found where they were, and whether that bolsters your half-baked theory or my half-baked one. To me, it seems likely company commanders on their bigger, faster mounts summited the hill and they and horse got hit, went down, and that's what she wrote. Zero proof. Only two officers were found out of place. And its debatable that Tom Custer was out of place. Harrington led C Company on the Reno Scout. Its likely Harrington led C Company after that point as well. Smith was the other officer. For whatever reason, he was found at the top of the hill, and not around any E Company men. Everyone else is where I'd expect them. I know you think officers should be around the perimeter, not the center, or in the case of Custer, not at the top of the hill. But I don't agree, and here's why. F Company men were found on the slope, with both of their officers. As you say often, DC, where men were found does not guarantee the exact spot where they were killed. Yates and Reilly were found in the same area as identified F Company men. Custer and Cooke and most of the HQ group (Voss, Vickory, possibly Hughes) were found above that position, at the top. Yates was probably Custer's best friend in the regiment, yet he wasn't found with Custer. Its not as if it was even that far away either. Yates was found with men of his company. The situation didn't call for officers to be anywhere but within the position. They were surrounded, after all. I'll totally agree that the position was not much of their choosing, and while I do think they did shoot any horse they could, they didn't have the ability to consolidate as well as they would've liked. They shot horses, got as much cover as afforded by a dead horse, and tried not to get killed. They all failed, clearly. Crook found a hill from which to command his troops at the Rosebud. It appears to me that Custer chose to occupy the top of the hill. It makes sense if you think, like Trinque does, that the Left Wing occupied that position BEFORE the Right Wing was destroyed. It would make sense for Custer to occupy the highest point so he could see his entire command and as much of the field as possible. And back the direction they came, and where the rest of the regiment could be found. And once again, I'm going to mention that F Company was found with its officers, and the HQ group was found at the top. With the HQ we also had several Right Wing troopers identified. Its proposed that these were the survivors Custer's command received. Trinque proposes that the horses were shot when Custer realized how severe the situation was, and the threat came from the Deep Ravine area. And when the Right Wing collapsed, those few men who made it joined the HQ position, killed their horses in a place to counter the Indians coming from the direction of the Keogh Sector. Remember, this is not my theory, but Trinque's. It's upsetting to see suggested options concluded as Fact, though. We have, and can have, no clue if Keogh's guys were running for Custer, or departing Custer to join Calhoun or anything. Or anything. Eh, I got over this aspect of discussion long ago. None of us know anything for certain, we're all just guessing. I could preface every single line of every single post with a litany of I thinks, I propose, it's possible, some have said, blah blah blah, but I'm not going to do that anymore. We're all well aware that anything after a certain point is conjecture, and while we might believe it to be, we'll likely never know if it is true. In other words, everything is my or someone else's opinion. Even if I don't say so.
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Post by El Crab on Oct 20, 2011 2:24:43 GMT -6
el crab When the Right Wing collapsed and the survivors came, they then killed their horses at the top to provide protection to those firing back towards the Indians coming from the Keogh SectorHow many of Keogh's troops were found on LSH?Would you have names? LSH is 800 metres distant.Did Keogh also fight with the horses present in the firing lines? What chance is there of finding a horse,breaking out of a collasping position and riding nearly 800 meters through hundreds of Indians and breaking into another collasping position? Fred would probably be a better person for the names, but DeRudio said the horses at the top were sorrels, and only C Company were mounted on sorrels. Hope he doesn't mind... Ian, There was only one "set" of men running toward-- not for, but toward-- Deep Ravine: E Company. I have posted this before, but it seems apt to put it again, as well. I have not seen a better or newer listing anywhere. For my two-cents or gold guinea, you can take it to the bank: Douglas Scott-- the archaeologist-- claimed Custer, five officers, and perhaps forty enlisted personnel lay on Custer/Last Stand Hill. These are the ones identified. • 28 names are documented: 14 privates Ygnatz Stungewitz (C) Willis B. Wright (C) Anton Dohman (F) Gustav Klein (F) William H. Lerock (F) Werner L. Liemann (F) Edward C. Driscoll (I) Archibald McIlhargey (I) John E. Mitchell (I) John Parker (I) Francis T. Hughes (L) Charles McCarthy (L) Oscar F. Pardee (L) Thomas S. Tweed (L) • Two civilians Boston Custer (QM) Autie Reed • One surgeon: Dr. George Lord (HQ) • One trumpeter: Henry Voss (HQ) • Four NCOs SGM William Sharrow (HQ) 1SG Michael Kenney (F) SGT John H. Groesbeck (F) CPL William Teeman (F) • SGT Robert Hughes’ (K) body was most likely the one found at the head of Deep Ravine, though there is a remote chance he was killed on Custer Hill. Supposedly identified by CPT McDougall. • Six officers: GAC (HQ) William Cooke (HQ) Tom Custer (C – HQ) Algernon Smith (E) George Yates (F) William Van W. Reily (F) • Presently, 52 markers are located on Custer Hill; 42 bodies had been buried there initially. • Deep Ravine (8 men from Company E): 1SG Frederick Hohmeyer SGT John S. Ogden CPL George C. Brown CPL Albert H. Meyer PVT Richard Farrell PVT William Huber PVT Andy Knecht PVT William H. Rees I know there is some confusion and controversy regarding Lord and Voss, but I have no credible evidence refuting Scott's claim. Bruce Liddic presented his own description of where bodies were found. Grouped near Custer around the top of the knoll: LT Cooke (HQ) PVT Driscoll (I) PVT Parker (I) LT Smith (E) SGT John Vickory – Groesbeck (F) TMP Voss (HQ) PVT McCarthy (L) • Deep Ravine: SGT Hughes (K) PVT Tim Donnelly (F) PVT Andrew Knecht (E) • On a rise above Deep Ravine: CPL John Briody (F) • Farthest north on the battlefield, opposite the present parking lot on the east side of the service entrance road: SGM Sharrow (HQ). • Lower west side, down the slope from the monument, about one hundred yards from George Custer: Boston Custer Autie Reed • About 20 feet southeast of GAC, on a hillside: Dr. Lord (HQ) It seems to me the only discrepancies between the two are with Liddic's PVT Tim Donnelly and CPL John Briody, and I would accept Liddic's view on this because according to the narratives of several Indians who were there, a small group of horsemen-- I guess there were some remaining-- broke from LSH at the very end and were cut down near the headcut of Deep Ravine. This would account for Hughes, Briody, and Donnelly. There is also some talk about one or two men-- possibly as many as four-- who tried to make a getaway. These are generally thought to be 1SG Butler (L) and CPL Foley (C). I would suspect they died earlier in the fighting rather than later because of their units. If I remember correctly, Richard Fox said in all likelihood they came from the Keogh Sector and were cut down before Benteen would have arrived on Weir Peaks. I make the case that Tom Weir reached the northernmost peak at 3:51 PM and I also claim that the most intense fighting on Calhoun Hill and in the Keogh Sector occurred from 3:53 to 4:25 PM. Since Edgerly would not have reached the loaf area and consolidated his troops until about 4:14 PM, I would venture to say Butler and Foley made their run some time between 4 PM and 4:15. Foley was probably killed first, while it may have taken a few minutes longer to kill Butler, but both men would have reached their gravesites in very short order, no more than a couple of minutes. Another thing to consider is the fact that there was an enormous amount of dust and smoke and I doubt seriously if anyone could peer into that imbroglio and come out with a cogent tale of what was occurring. Tom Weir lived only about 5 1/2 months after the battle, but claimed he had a tale to tell. I suspect part of that may have been the sighting of Foley and Butler. Not a single solitary sole ever said a word about it, not officer, not EM. This being the case, it is clear to me, no one saw it... except maybe Weir. We all speculate that Tom Weir had this smoking gun he brought to his grave. I just wonder if it wasn't merely his own guilt in not telling what he saw and did nothing about. Combat is funny; you sometimes take blame for events you could not control or do anything about, almost as though you blame yourself for living when others have died. I sometimes wonder if it wasn't just such thoughts that haunted Fred Benteen for the rest of his life. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Oct 20, 2011 3:00:43 GMT -6
This has been discussed previously but no harm in revisiting it. In spite of a number of troops and possibly the HQ group having died on the summit of LSH this in no way could this be described as holding or defending the summit. The bulk of Custer's troops died on the slope with their horses. By not holding the summit Custer allowed Indians get within spitting distance and fire down into a horse encumbered rabble. The" fact" that the command died on a slope in a heaped up jumble of men and horses indicates roadkill.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Oct 20, 2011 11:10:01 GMT -6
Crab,
1. Of course they had methods of turning around, etc. But this is the aspect that makes the naval comparison less daffy.
What I sense is that there is group momentum that was more powerful in the days before instant communication. In any event, although MTC in places is wide, it isn't great ground. The units are in lines of two or four or combo of both as they adjust to environment heading down to MTCF. If they changed their mind, they could follow their leaders around in a tight reversal although that might demand the command go to two abreast if MTC becomes a two lane. To keep unit cohesion, they might follow to the turn point, or they might all halt and peel away as the head of the line passed them heading in the other direction. AZ would know.
Or, like the High Seas Fleet, they may have practiced simultaneous unit turn arounds at command so the last unit is the front, but probably not in narrow gorges. Unlike a single unit ship, there'd still be confusion as the new officers in charge and their gofers now headed up their companies from the opposite end. And, of course, Custer and his 'headquarters' would not reasonably be left at the line rear to absorb and deflect shot. Because in this case, as at Jutland, the T had been crossed by the enemy, so to speak, and they had to move out of there. If Custer, always at the front, or A Custer was wounded, there'd be nothing like what happened to the farrier later.
It's for that reason I don't think they would/could 'stop' under fire while mounted. They had to keep moving and there was not quick way to inform the companies strung out behind. The land at that point might have been more welcoming to the north.
2. If this happened, no doubt they'd make the attempt to get to Keogh, and as they moved north the hope would be they'd get to slow, reorganize, and go from there. It wasn't to be.
3. Probably true of every officer, but also civvys Boston and Reed
4. I wasn't implying anything wrong with what I postulate Keogh does. It's responsible, shows constructive initiative and a guy in clear command of his units not knowing what his commander is doing. But moving in parallel under eventual fire from all sides to bad ground was the result of unit momentum, changing events, and not pro-active command. They would NOT have wanted to end up there.
5. "Around 70 dead cavalry horses were found on the field. Godfrey counted 39 on the slope and/or on top of Last Stand Hill. He counted 42 men." Godfrey also initially said few were mutilated and later ended saying all had been except Custer. We don't know the dimensions of his LSH. We tend to think of it as the immediate area within the fence.
People thought lots of things. Did they SEE the horses, though? Or come to the accepted story later? Goldin, 17 at the time and a proven liar, would be given to the Last Stand motif, as indeed everyone in those years was given to a Last Stand motif. And, quite probable at least SOME were shot intentionally.
They may all have been actual sorrels at the top. On the other hand, speaking to my ignorance of horses, sorrel is a brown horse. Most horses are brown. Sweaty and covered with dust, they're dust colored. I do know people come to blows like kids with crayons over horse color. Burnt Umber isn't brown?
6. I don't paraphrase Connell at all in SotMS, but reference the same story he does (I may have initially read it there in 1984) and my stated point was just to say there are other stories out there, just like the location of Custer's wounds and which was the killing one.
7. In many cases, they merely sat on their horses from Ft. Lincoln, and there is no indication the 7th drilled almost daily, especially in winter when expensive horse feed was an issue. In any case, they could have ridden around the world and still lacked the ability to rapidly jump off the horse, lead it to a place specific for breastworks, and shoot it with the horse, of necessity, at least partially cooperating. There's a lot going on around them. Other horses in pain, for example.
Never said it to be impossible, but I've ridden enough to know that horses, when emotionally involved, are way strong and not given to strange new activity especially with lots of gunfire about (well, I have to imagine that true).
A dead horse is a breastwork in two directions, so when surrounded it can look like intent.
8. It's all in the spin. If, indeed, only 2 officers were found out of place, that's 40% of Custer's company commanders. But it's not just that they were found out of place, it's the place they were found: around Custer at the hill top.
9. "I know you think officers should be around the perimeter, not the center, or in the case of Custer, not at the top of the hill."
That's 180 degrees wrong. If it were a proactive defensive position, officers would be in places of command for their units to give orders and directions, i.e. near the center, behind the men. They would not be on the perimeter which is, indeed, where they were found, as the top of the hill was part of the perimeter and not the center of the defensive scheme.
And you ignore the accounts that say the men were yea nay disgusting and unrecognizable. A few were Id'd, but that doesn't mean two members of one company denote the others about them were necessarily also of that company, and even so there were admissions of different companies together.
It might be true, but people leap at that sort of thing because they want to believe the 7th went down by accepted and moving template. But, there is significant evidence to suggest it might not have been. Not enough to prove, but to suggest.
10. Crook had, what, 1500 men to command? Custer had 210. You are suggesting that Custer - GEORGE CUSTER - planned to set up a headquarters on a hill with neither cover nor concealment, with flags and runners, and sit out the fight himself? And this against Indians? Look at me, Crab. Over here. No. No. Look at me. AT ME! Tell me you believe that Custer at this time and place decided to d...... LOOK AT ME! That Custer decided to command from a hill a paltry 210 men against the Sioux. You agree they didn't want to be where they were, so it was not a chosen location. So......Custer decided to make lemonade out of a bad sitch?
It WASN'T the highest point. That would be Weir Point. And he could not see Reno's fight or much of the village from LSH.
Whether your theory or Trinque's, it has too much pro active decision making (and BAD proactive decision making) that I don't find probable for Custer. This allows the mental picture of Custer as one abandoned and disappointed and to staple his wrist to forehead and bemoan the Eumenides. I don't think anything on the field suggests the clear weighing of options and proactive command. Everything from MTC suggests, to me, that Custer was under near constant pressure. If my 'eh' theory about a Custer being wounded to initiate a variable to the day's task is true, it probably in the cold light of cynicism not important to the result.
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Post by fred on Oct 20, 2011 17:17:21 GMT -6
Fred would probably be a better person for the names, but DeRudio said the horses at the top were sorrels, and only C Company were mounted on sorrels. Hope he doesn't mind... Crab, No, I do not mind, not at all. I am not very proficient on the colors of horses, especially if you were to line up a few of the more similar ones. "C" rode sorrels; "F" rode light bays; "I" rode light bays, but in 1868 the company rode sorrels; and "L" rode bays and light bays. If you check out various descriptions of horse's colors, you will find that bays are described as various shades of red-brown ranging from tan to dark mahogany, though they have black manes and tails and generally black "socks." Then if you see what constitutes chestnuts, they are described as red-brown and sorrels. Sorrels run the gamut from a light, yellow-brown to a light red-brown. So with all of that, the commonality is that red-brown seems to be a theme between all four of those companies. Are the horses' color altered by two days lying dead in the sun? I have no idea. All in all, I think I would take DeRudio's comments with a grain of salt, though there is plenty of evidence that at least two C Company men made it to LSH. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by zekesgirl on Oct 20, 2011 18:16:20 GMT -6
My own half-baked opinion is: Keogh is left waiting for whoever while Custer & company approach Ford D. Not saying he got there but that he went in that direction and was wounded. They put enough space between them and the warriors and stop to check on GAC along Cemetery Ridge. Lord pronounces a mortal but not yet fatal wound and they try returning to Keogh.
By this time however there is no Keogh to return to. Yada, yada, yada.........
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Post by wild on Oct 21, 2011 1:55:13 GMT -6
Custer heading North was probably due as much to pride as to terrain Custer performing a u turn in MTC is admitting defeat,a blunder,causing confusion.From "we caught them napping" to "let's get out of here" is not good for morale or Custer's image. Just imagine that picture hanging in the regimental mess.
Zakesgirl My own half-baked opinion is: Keogh is left waiting for whoever while Custer & company approach Ford D. Not saying he got there but that he went in that direction and was wounded. They put enough space between them and the warriors and stop to check on GAC along Cemetery Ridge. Lord pronounces a mortal but not yet fatal wound and they try returning to Keogh When Custer fails to attack at MTC Ford he hands the initiative to the Indians.He no longer controls the elements of the battle.Neither time nor terrain are his. Rather than me explain how complex is the operation[ford D] you are suggesting why don't you, as an exercise, write out the orders and timing Custer would give to his subordinates for such an undertaking.
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Post by seeker on Oct 21, 2011 4:20:52 GMT -6
Dark Cloud:
I agree. There isn't any evidence for a ordered movement to or a organized defense of LSH. The situation on LSH looks like the remnants of a collapse elsewhere. Too many officers and too many horses grouped in a hopeless tangle on the hill side proves this. Custer's last stand was on LSH but his first stand was elsewhere, possibly on Cemetary hill.
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Post by fred on Oct 21, 2011 5:02:49 GMT -6
I must say, along with the DC post "seeker" alludes to, these are really good posts. The notion that Custer made any sort of attempt to set up an organized defense of LSH-- as we have seen from a "notable other" on the neighboring boards-- LSH is utterly ludicrous. "Seeker" hits the nail on the head, in my opinion, as does Dark Cloud.... There isn't any evidence for a ordered movement to or a organized defense of LSH. The situation on LSH looks like the remnants of a collapse elsewhere. Too many officers and too many horses grouped in a hopeless tangle on the hill side proves this. Custer's last stand was on LSH but his first stand was elsewhere, possibly on Cemetary hill. "Seeker's" statement-- again, in my opinion-- is absolutely correct and to think otherwise is to eschew too many accounts of too many Indians. The situation as found, shows no semblance whatsoever of a defense and I like the notion of multiple "stands" beginning on Cemetery Ridge. That is exactly the way I picture it. ... and, as usual, Terry is her typical succinct self, also as correct-- and as lovely-- as a spring rain, though I do not agree with the attempt to return to Keogh. I think by this time they were too consumed by their own problems. Keogh is left waiting for whoever while Custer & company approach Ford D. Not saying he got there but that he went in that direction and was wounded. They put enough space between them and the warriors and stop to check on GAC along Cemetery Ridge. The evidence for an arrival at Ford D may be sketchy at best, but the evidence of an attempt to go there is fairly substantial. I believe Custer did reach the ford, but I am basing much of that opinion on the location of Mark Kellogg's body rather than JSIT's late-breaking news. I also do not buy Custer's wounds at any place other than LSH... too much time between any wounding and death, and according to Porter, either of those wound were almost instantly fatal (obviously the head wound was, and I have personally witnessed a similar chest/side wound that would have entered the lungs and exited the other side; doesn't take long). When Custer fails to attack at MTC Ford he hands the initiative to the Indians.He no longer controls the elements of the battle. Neither time nor terrain are his. This is one of the most powerful statements we can make regarding Custer's actions. By not attacking-- and there were reasons he wouldn't or couldn't-- and then moving further north, he put too much space between himself and any means of support or reenforcement, and the move itself allowed Indians to close off his southern flank. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Oct 21, 2011 6:39:33 GMT -6
There is confusion and contrary accounts of Custer's wounds. The guy in WCF says, contrary to others, that the head wound wasn't fatal because it bled long and across the face into the mouth. Others get the sides mixed up. To me, it sounds very much like there was an attempt to come to a common agreement of story as to Custer's condition for La Custer's benefit that got fouled up, as these things do invariably. Obviously, no proof.
I have difficulty imagining Porter or anyone doing much of an autopsy on Custer - because, Lo!, his body was not disfigured, mutilated, or subject to laws of nature regarding decomposition - and with the body swollen and revolting, tracing the path of a bullet would be difficult, given the path would be contorted and all and tissue wouldn't hold the path for three days in heat. I don't doubt at all what you say, Fred, but what is described as a wound on the left (sometimes right) side of the chest somehow becomes more and more specific as the tale got told. It could have been an exhausted round that made a bloody but not deep wound. Same with the head. For all we know, the fatal incident was a head clubbing that, killing him, didn't swell. Or heart attack from fluid loss and wearing buckskin in 98 degree heat in battle. No clue, but there is certainly room to entertain the possibility of wound that did not quite incapacitate early on.
One thing about Custerland is that there is a tendency when, confronted with conflicting accounts or no accounts, to latch on to the most confidently expressed option or mere opinion because 'it's all we have' and proceed as if it were true. That's probably provided most of the conflict and confusion. We don't know why Custer headed north, only that he did, and because we don't like to end the tale there with a shrug and a who knows? (which Connell did, although he listed some of the options for reader acceptance and choice) much is made of evidence that can be used for many conflicting alternatives.
My opinion was shaped by recalibrating the hill to what photo, testimony, and accounts in existence before 1879 ended suggest. It looks very, very different, and the theory I tend towards looks far more plausible and, to me, likely. The coagulation of stones, at least 20% too many, within a fence/fort with the commanding monument like a castle tower gives the impression of a solid defense. The reality was different.
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