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Post by wild on Aug 20, 2011 15:55:55 GMT -6
Jag Who was the second in command?
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Post by Dark Cloud on Aug 20, 2011 16:04:09 GMT -6
"What is obvious to the Indian might not be obvious to the translator....Or even worse, purposely twisted to fit their view." Or obvious to either. That's why I thought your football example was good. The Indian tells what he saw, having no clue what people are supposed to be doing or what the actual point is. The translator, trying to be helpful, fills in terms but may have made the story 180 degrees wrong. This may have happened with CH and his promise to fight the Nez Perce or not. Or any number of things. In any case, it makes no sense to argue about whether the quarterback was drunk or the safety on meth if we don't know who caught the ball (or threw it, for that matter, could have been a wildcat to the running back) and who scored. Especially in an unscheduled game out of wifi range in different languages. FYI, on languages from long ago on another board. www.mohicanpress.com/messageboard2/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=614&whichpage=1
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Post by rosebud on Aug 20, 2011 16:45:42 GMT -6
Jag: You need to make up your mind. I agree with you and you still want to argue. Does this mean I was right in the first place?
How can you give so much credit to Calhoun when you have no idea what the plan was? For all we know, Calhoun could have screwed the whole plan up by not following orders.
Geeezzzz
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jag
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Post by jag on Aug 20, 2011 17:27:35 GMT -6
Jag Who was the second in command? In Custer's battalion tt should have been by seniority which would have been: Lt. Colonel G.A. Custer Captain M Keogh- I Captain G Yates- F Captain T Custer- C 1st lieutenant W Cooke 1st lieutenant A Smith- E 1st lieutenant J Calhoun- L 1st lieutenant E Porter- I 1st lieutenant G Lord, Regimental Surgeon 2nd lieutenant H Harrington- C 2nd lieutenant J Sturgis- E 2nd lieutenant J Crittenden- L 2nd lieutenant W Riley- F
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jag
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Post by jag on Aug 20, 2011 17:36:38 GMT -6
Jag: You need to make up your mind. I agree with you and you still want to argue. Does this mean I was right in the first place? How can you give so much credit to Calhoun when you have no idea what the plan was? For all we know, Calhoun could have screwed the whole plan up by not following orders. Geeezzzz Not arguing the points made. And yes you're correct, for all we know Calhoun probably did screw things up. I just made the point that there is evidence that they did stay together. And no, it's not iron clad, wrap it up and go home evidence. But it is a good discussion point to further the conversation and end the frustration you'd expressed earlier. Calhoun was found with his men, one of a few (3) commanders that were, as testified to at the RCOI by F. Benteen. If he was there and died with them, which evidence says he did, then he was responsible for them being there, no doubt about it.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 20, 2011 20:10:44 GMT -6
JAG: Old friend you have been through the wringer this afternoon. Some thoughts on your last two posts.
Calhoun was found with his men. Responsability for being there could of course rest with him. If on the other hand he was ordered to hold that position (and I am not saying, or do I think he was) the the responsability lies with the person who ordered him.
My previous belief was that Lord was not a commissioned officer. It appears I am incorrect. That does not change the fact that he was not a combat arms officer. Normally a medical officer would be ranked by the next senior CA officer regardless of actual rank and or date of rank.
I think the chain of command is a mute point. For a moment let's us look where the bodies were found. There is a distance of about 900 meters between the Keogh area and LSH.
Were Custer to be incapacitated early on Keogh may have known and would most likely take over command. That mitigates against a early wounding somewhere other than Battle Ridge, unless Keogh would have told Yates to move off to the north, lugging the wounded or dead Custer with him, and fine me better ground, meanwhile I will stay here and try to get this mess sorted out and join you as soon as possible.
In the event Custer was wounded on LSH, (considering Keogh was still alive which I doubt) at the time, there would be no practical way that Keogh would know this fact, nor would there be any way he could effectively exercise command even if by some chance he did.
To tell you all the truth, this is without doubt the most sane, rational discussion I have ever observed on either of the two boards. I believe we are all close to agreement than we may know.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Aug 20, 2011 21:49:27 GMT -6
I ask again that, for the sake of me, you visualize all five companies heading down Weir or Cedar to MTC and hanging west and heading down. How much distance, front to back? Quite a surprising bit, given that the various speeds allowed would keep some distance between horses. IF firing hits the front and IF Custer is wounded and everyone pulls up to fight and clear the wounded, Keogh in the back may or may not know what the hey is happening, but he surely would NOT allow his men to be caught in a gully without reason, which is not forthcoming in a timely manner. He leads them out at handiest exit north. He periodically stops for mounted volleys of support to Yates' chased command. And now, Keogh's stern is getting bit, and they head north parallel to Yates.
If Custer is wounded has he ceded command? IS it Custer, does anyone know? Don't stop, keep riding till we can get organized. F___! Keep going.
Momentum, shucking off platoons for delaying actions - they don't really work and they have to run for it before any support can be set up for their retreat. Get to Calhoun Hill and think it the place for a breather but f___!, they're all around us. Yates guys racing up LSH and leaders get blown off at apex. Genuine horror and short, short time.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 20, 2011 21:51:01 GMT -6
Richard my dear friend from the Old Sod,you have indeed pinned the tail on the donkey of my post above, but you pinned it to the groin and not a little higher up in the Panthion of one of my more noble posts on this board.
The route I described may have in fact been the shortest, most secure route to LSH, but I don't particularly think that was Custer's intent. Note and mark this as pure speculation. I don't think he had any idea what happened to Reno. I believe he though moving Benteen to him would produce enough combat power for Reno/Benteen to hold. After a short time the hostiles would cover Reno/Benteen and start a semi-organized slipping away to the north. At which time Custer would attack them once they had been flushed away from the treeline along the river and the river itself. He would then strike somewhere between present Highway 212 and Crow Agency. I don't believe he ever intended to cross at Ford B. Any recon he may (and that's a big may) have conducted there was purely for the purpose of ascertaining progress toward that end. Therefore I think Custer was going for the Big Solution, and attack across Ford B being the Small Solution. He got caught on unfavorable terrain and by at least some surpirse.
If he took the route that Rosebud and I favor it was for some higher purpose than (everyone is using a fooball expression so I will also) a screen pass. This one has down and out written all over it.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 20, 2011 21:56:00 GMT -6
DC: If you moved that scenario 400 or so meters to the east, I would by you a drink the next time I am in Boulder. Maybe six hundred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Aug 20, 2011 22:06:45 GMT -6
What? The eastern trail around SSR? Sure, makes no dif, really, it's the five companies in column of whatevers moving down MTC with small ability of communication between front and back. If you mean 400 meters from river to turn off, also fine. It's the idea that Custer would bypass a good crossing now for a hypothetical better one later with great advantage to the enemy in so doing that I cannot fathom.
And I do believe Curley that they would stop to tighten saddles. Makes sense.
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Post by wild on Aug 20, 2011 23:05:33 GMT -6
Jag I asked the question re second in command more to make a point rather than seek an answer but my friend Cathal stole my thunder.There was no de facto functioning second in command with HQ fully briefed as to what the call was.
And I do believe Curley that they would stop to tighten saddles. Makes sense What does not make sense is an attack at ford B.Remember we have 500+warriors within striking distance of the ford.These are the warriors who will harry the command up onto Battle Ridge. But for Custer to have been shot he must have got within 200 metres of the ford. Are we saying he was going to attack across the ford?
Cathal If he took the route that Rosebud and I favor it was for some higher purpose Then he was not shot and there was no confusion and no pressure and Fred's theory is back on the sand table. I must roll out my theory that the man had just cracked up.
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jag
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Post by jag on Aug 21, 2011 7:19:21 GMT -6
JAG: Old friend you have been through the wringer this afternoon. Some thoughts on your last two posts. Calhoun was found with his men. Responsability for being there could of course rest with him. If on the other hand he was ordered to hold that position (and I am not saying, or do I think he was) the the responsability lies with the person who ordered him. My previous belief was that Lord was not a commissioned officer. It appears I am incorrect. That does not change the fact that he was not a combat arms officer. Normally a medical officer would be ranked by the next senior CA officer regardless of actual rank and or date of rank. I think the chain of command is a mute point. For a moment let's us look where the bodies were found. There is a distance of about 900 meters between the Keogh area and LSH. Were Custer to be incapacitated early on Keogh may have known and would most likely take over command. That mitigates against a early wounding somewhere other than Battle Ridge, unless Keogh would have told Yates to move off to the north, lugging the wounded or dead Custer with him, and fine me better ground, meanwhile I will stay here and try to get this mess sorted out and join you as soon as possible. In the event Custer was wounded on LSH, (considering Keogh was still alive which I doubt) at the time, there would be no practical way that Keogh would know this fact, nor would there be any way he could effectively exercise command even if by some chance he did. To tell you all the truth, this is without doubt the most sane, rational discussion I have ever observed on either of the two boards. I believe we are all close to agreement than we may know. QC It's difficult for some to believe that Custer didn't desperately want to know, and didn't desperately want to see for himself what was happening to Reno. They just have to have him running all over that broken country, many with belief that he had his whole battalion in tow and this all based upon and because of those idiotic and supposed sightings of Custer and or his whole battalion on the bluffs. I've already stated the obvious about individual sightings up there, no need to beat that one to death. But the whole battalion? BS. Not a one of Reno's men ever said anything about seeing his whole battalion up there, and they didn't because they couldn't because he and his whole battalion wasn't ever up there. The scouts and scouting details were, nothing more, and nothing more than that can be proven by what those who rode down the right bank with Custer said about those kinds of events. So while many a wannabe and hopeful sighting of someone who gave a damn about them down there, expressed to the court in such a way as to defray any doubt that he did in sympathy do it. The sheer idiocy of the timing of such events and his untimely departure and return unduly delayed their arrival downstream by such untimely shenanigans and lunar idiocy that the stupid idiot could have been 10 to 15 minutes into destroying their village, capturing the women and children by the time the warriors returned from getting their ponies. Instead he meets head on their full force of mounted warriors just as he's trying to cross the river... idiot. So yeah, each an every time someone gives this man credit for some brilliant tactical meandering (prior to his arrival at their death site) that serves no useful and timely purpose but to toot their own horn, beat their own chest about, and say Me Tarzan, wooo hooo, they can also call Gen. George A. Custer an idiot to. And while they're at it, each and every time they have him splitting off a company or two, maybe more for some dumb reason before reaching where they died, try explaining why some of those men who had been split off early and further away from their own death fields sooner, didn't escape? Not one of them did, seems a bit far fetched doesn't it? We know that at some point some of them did run by more than one Indians statment. Seems a bit convoluted to think that at least one private who'd been spared the early arrival at their death scene would have tried it. What was that desertion rate again? And that wasn't even in a life and death struggle, where had the opportunity have presented itself, how many would have? What seems obvious is that none of them were ever presented with enough of a good opportunity, and then again there is the Kanipe problem and those who dropped out because of horse fatigue trying to keep up with the command, or were they? The route down the right bank, for some, has been a sealed deal. And of late Godfrey's route has been in disfavor for some time. Less exciting you see. And also when someone does put the route way back there outta sight, outta mind, less... should we say.. time-line appealing. That one aspect alone puts a Burdizzo on a lot of pregnant ideas regarding Godfrey's route. Nope, can't be that-a-way, because I can't put a time to his movements, and if I can't do it neither can you, said with an attitude.
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jag
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Post by jag on Aug 21, 2011 7:27:30 GMT -6
Jag I asked the question re second in command more to make a point rather than seek an answer but my friend Cathal stole my thunder.There was no de facto functioning second in command with HQ fully briefed as to what the call was. And I do believe Curley that they would stop to tighten saddles. Makes senseWhat does not make sense is an attack at ford B.Remember we have 500+warriors within striking distance of the ford.These are the warriors who will harry the command up onto Battle Ridge. But for Custer to have been shot he must have got within 200 metres of the ford. Are we saying he was going to attack across the ford? Cathal If he took the route that Rosebud and I favor it was for some higher purposeThen he was not shot and there was no confusion and no pressure and Fred's theory is back on the sand table. I must roll out my theory that the man had just cracked up. One thing that gets me here is everyone can tell us where Keogh rode. Really? For sure? He wasn't up there with Custer? You know this for a 100 percent fact? At the point where Custer stopped to view the valley and Martin's empty village, Keogh wasn't there? Really? You know that for sure? You were there and can state for sure that he wasn't? Where was Keogh earlier, oh say... not to long after Reno had been sent off? Just like Wallace and a few of the other men who reported this phenomenon, they didn't always play by your text book rules of where you think they should have been. Interesting that everyone believes Curley all of a sudden. Like this should make some kind of difference. He said, "upper Medicine Tail Coulee", for all you know that could have been 5 miles up its course. And it proves only one thing, Godfrey's rendition of Custer's trail, and that's all it does, because there is no shred of evidence continueing their march on to Ford "B" from there. And you're right, it not only doesn't make any sense to make an attack at MTCF, he didn't. As I indicated it was a death trap, something me and QC agree on. And if Custer was any good at summing up terrain and what was good and what was bad, he wouldn't have gone there and he didn't. No sane commander in his right mind would have gone there to make an attack, he didn't.
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jag
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Post by jag on Aug 21, 2011 7:42:45 GMT -6
DC: If you moved that scenario 400 or so meters to the east, I would by you a drink the next time I am in Boulder. Maybe six hundred. And I'll up that ante by a belly up to the bar for all, if he moves that scenario a further modified mile to the northwest.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 21, 2011 8:18:27 GMT -6
JAG: Your correct about MTC. It is a funnel, a death trap, which no sane commander would enter into. Off to church now. I have all my sins on this board this week to atone for. I can by another four or five hundred meters added to my four to six. Tighten saddles yes. Tighten saddles in MTC, not on your life.
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