Post by montrose on Feb 22, 2011 11:18:56 GMT -6
1. Purpose. I want to start a new thread to discuss command and control.
2. Background. Steve has been raising command and control issues in different threads. My intent is to consolidate my responses here. My response will take several posts. I am going to start with Custer's long history on the plains of independent movements.
3. Scouting. The purpose of scouting is to gain relevant and timely information for the unit. Scouting is an art of both getting information, and getting t back to commanders in enough time that they can respond.
4. GAC and scouting. I call this the Custer Scouting Myth. Because Custer often went far off from his command, therefore he was scouting.
a. Custer romps. By his own admission, Custer left his command on campaign to joy lark. Nearly every day he would ride off into the prairie. He hunted fished, collected animals as pets, collected animals to practice taxidermy, and played pranks.
b. Custer reprimands. Stanley and Terry both reprimanded Custer for his unauthorized absences. He was not tasked to scout, and he provided no relevant information.
c. Independent command. On independent operations, Custer could and did claim he was scouting. Obviously, no one could challenge him. But his own writings show that he was not scouting.
Remember when he left his regiment on a true scouting mission to find a river? When he got there he drank, and went to sleep. Column was left to their own devices. Any LT who did that would be fired.
d. Custer's ability. When Custer wanted to, he was a talented scout. I find it amusing that some of his best scout efforts were immediately after being reprimanded for screwing around. Custer had a natural eye for terrain.
4. Commander. For a regiment sized force, scouting is a LT responsibility. The purpose of scouting is to provide information to influence a decision. When the commander leaves his own command for extended periods every day, how is this influencing anything?
a. Command training. One of the challenges in rise in rank is the change from doing yourself, to delegating to others. It is a transition in mindset to delegate an important function like scouting to others, since junior officers lead from the front. It takes training and experience to develop a feeling for translating scout reports.
Since Custer rarely let others scout, he never developed this ability. Another consequence is that Custer had little faith in scouts observations. He wanted to see for himself.
b. Subordinate training. Training scout leaders is important. They have to learn their jobs through experience. In today's army, the scout platoon leader is one of the top LTs in the battalion. (Okay, for the record, I was a scout, so may be an old man's ego is involved somewhere).
7th Cav officers were not given enough opportunity to learn this vital task. As a scout you have to learn the balance between boldness and caution. You learn by doing. I admit I learned by dying. I remember many times looking at the blinking orange lights of the army laser tag MILES system. Out in the plains you only were allowed to die once.
c. Vignettes.
(1) LT Bradley and Gibbon had an awkward relationship. Bradley's writings show that he was routinely challenged by unnamed members of Gibbon's staff. He was defensive in his later writings. Somewhere there was a shortfall between Bradley's ability to communicate and be trusted, and Gibbon's ability to hear and react.
(2) GAC appeared to have uncertainty responding to his scout's reports at the Crow's nest. Custer's record of second guessing scout reports is lengthy, and I would like discussions kept to a minimum. It has been discussed many times.
(3) Hare and Varnum returned to their units. Being in close contact with the enemy is not the time to abandon scout efforts. I admit this call boggles my mind. Imagine if Custer left an OP on the bluffs to observe Reno's fight and report developments?
5. LBH. Implications for LBH.
a. Custer scout. The move north was influenced by Custer's scout mentality. It should have been a move to support and/or take opportunity of Reno's attack. But Custer was still in scout mode. His delay on the bluffs, ford B actions (quite a bit if Thompson is right, moderate if not), and Ford D scout show a focus on reconnaissance, not an attack.
b. Custer command and control. As Custer pursued his scout function, he lost control of his command function. After leaving 3411 he lost the ability to know or influence what was happening to the 7 companies and trains. After leaving Calhoun Hill he lost the same ability with three more companies. He went from a regimental commander to a scout platoon leader.
c. The gap. As Custer pushed north, he knowingly created a wide gap between the north and south ends of the regiment. It was essential to create a command and control measure on this gap. This was critical terrain, if the Indians occupied it, it could fatally compromise his plans.
(1) An OP on the bluffs would seem essential, since no combat power was left to control the terrain. An OP could observe the Reno fight, movement on the backtrail, and movement to their north. They could provide information to both the Custer force and Regimental units arriving from the south.
(2) The decision to move Keough from L/C/N complex to Calhoun Hill shows a conscious decision to cede ground between the two halves of the regiment to Indian forces. Messengers became impossible. As a consequence of this decision, Custer had a responsibility to stay at Calhoun Hill.
Calhoun Hill became the vital place on the battlefield. It was the key terrain for linking up the regiment. It also was the closest US position to the village, directly beside the main enemy avenue of approach, ford B. It also was very weak defensive terrain. This was the key terrain for the regiment, and the place where the commander needed to be.
(3) Command versus scout leader. Custer's move north shows he was thinking like a scout, not a commander. As he kept moving north he showed less and less regard for what was behind him. This may make sense as you approach an enemy force. But he was no longer approaching, he was bypassing the enemy. His follow on units would have to deal with the enemy main body, and he did not warn them that they would have to fight the enemy to reach him.
(4) Custer did not act like a commander on 25 June. At first I thought that LBH was an aberration. It seems totally out of touch with his LBH performance. But then you have to consider that he faced a very different enemy and ACW was 11 years ago. He showed a pattern of behavior that set the conditions for LBH. Not just for himself, but for his unit.
Steve, do you see the link to Blink yet?
6. Summary. I see an issue between GAC in his responsibilities as regimental commander, and his personal preference for scouting. In addition, this tendency for 10 years in the 7th led to a unit that organizationally had issues with managing the function of scouting with the function of command. The eyes and brain were often not connected.
Respectfully,
William
2. Background. Steve has been raising command and control issues in different threads. My intent is to consolidate my responses here. My response will take several posts. I am going to start with Custer's long history on the plains of independent movements.
3. Scouting. The purpose of scouting is to gain relevant and timely information for the unit. Scouting is an art of both getting information, and getting t back to commanders in enough time that they can respond.
4. GAC and scouting. I call this the Custer Scouting Myth. Because Custer often went far off from his command, therefore he was scouting.
a. Custer romps. By his own admission, Custer left his command on campaign to joy lark. Nearly every day he would ride off into the prairie. He hunted fished, collected animals as pets, collected animals to practice taxidermy, and played pranks.
b. Custer reprimands. Stanley and Terry both reprimanded Custer for his unauthorized absences. He was not tasked to scout, and he provided no relevant information.
c. Independent command. On independent operations, Custer could and did claim he was scouting. Obviously, no one could challenge him. But his own writings show that he was not scouting.
Remember when he left his regiment on a true scouting mission to find a river? When he got there he drank, and went to sleep. Column was left to their own devices. Any LT who did that would be fired.
d. Custer's ability. When Custer wanted to, he was a talented scout. I find it amusing that some of his best scout efforts were immediately after being reprimanded for screwing around. Custer had a natural eye for terrain.
4. Commander. For a regiment sized force, scouting is a LT responsibility. The purpose of scouting is to provide information to influence a decision. When the commander leaves his own command for extended periods every day, how is this influencing anything?
a. Command training. One of the challenges in rise in rank is the change from doing yourself, to delegating to others. It is a transition in mindset to delegate an important function like scouting to others, since junior officers lead from the front. It takes training and experience to develop a feeling for translating scout reports.
Since Custer rarely let others scout, he never developed this ability. Another consequence is that Custer had little faith in scouts observations. He wanted to see for himself.
b. Subordinate training. Training scout leaders is important. They have to learn their jobs through experience. In today's army, the scout platoon leader is one of the top LTs in the battalion. (Okay, for the record, I was a scout, so may be an old man's ego is involved somewhere).
7th Cav officers were not given enough opportunity to learn this vital task. As a scout you have to learn the balance between boldness and caution. You learn by doing. I admit I learned by dying. I remember many times looking at the blinking orange lights of the army laser tag MILES system. Out in the plains you only were allowed to die once.
c. Vignettes.
(1) LT Bradley and Gibbon had an awkward relationship. Bradley's writings show that he was routinely challenged by unnamed members of Gibbon's staff. He was defensive in his later writings. Somewhere there was a shortfall between Bradley's ability to communicate and be trusted, and Gibbon's ability to hear and react.
(2) GAC appeared to have uncertainty responding to his scout's reports at the Crow's nest. Custer's record of second guessing scout reports is lengthy, and I would like discussions kept to a minimum. It has been discussed many times.
(3) Hare and Varnum returned to their units. Being in close contact with the enemy is not the time to abandon scout efforts. I admit this call boggles my mind. Imagine if Custer left an OP on the bluffs to observe Reno's fight and report developments?
5. LBH. Implications for LBH.
a. Custer scout. The move north was influenced by Custer's scout mentality. It should have been a move to support and/or take opportunity of Reno's attack. But Custer was still in scout mode. His delay on the bluffs, ford B actions (quite a bit if Thompson is right, moderate if not), and Ford D scout show a focus on reconnaissance, not an attack.
b. Custer command and control. As Custer pursued his scout function, he lost control of his command function. After leaving 3411 he lost the ability to know or influence what was happening to the 7 companies and trains. After leaving Calhoun Hill he lost the same ability with three more companies. He went from a regimental commander to a scout platoon leader.
c. The gap. As Custer pushed north, he knowingly created a wide gap between the north and south ends of the regiment. It was essential to create a command and control measure on this gap. This was critical terrain, if the Indians occupied it, it could fatally compromise his plans.
(1) An OP on the bluffs would seem essential, since no combat power was left to control the terrain. An OP could observe the Reno fight, movement on the backtrail, and movement to their north. They could provide information to both the Custer force and Regimental units arriving from the south.
(2) The decision to move Keough from L/C/N complex to Calhoun Hill shows a conscious decision to cede ground between the two halves of the regiment to Indian forces. Messengers became impossible. As a consequence of this decision, Custer had a responsibility to stay at Calhoun Hill.
Calhoun Hill became the vital place on the battlefield. It was the key terrain for linking up the regiment. It also was the closest US position to the village, directly beside the main enemy avenue of approach, ford B. It also was very weak defensive terrain. This was the key terrain for the regiment, and the place where the commander needed to be.
(3) Command versus scout leader. Custer's move north shows he was thinking like a scout, not a commander. As he kept moving north he showed less and less regard for what was behind him. This may make sense as you approach an enemy force. But he was no longer approaching, he was bypassing the enemy. His follow on units would have to deal with the enemy main body, and he did not warn them that they would have to fight the enemy to reach him.
(4) Custer did not act like a commander on 25 June. At first I thought that LBH was an aberration. It seems totally out of touch with his LBH performance. But then you have to consider that he faced a very different enemy and ACW was 11 years ago. He showed a pattern of behavior that set the conditions for LBH. Not just for himself, but for his unit.
Steve, do you see the link to Blink yet?
6. Summary. I see an issue between GAC in his responsibilities as regimental commander, and his personal preference for scouting. In addition, this tendency for 10 years in the 7th led to a unit that organizationally had issues with managing the function of scouting with the function of command. The eyes and brain were often not connected.
Respectfully,
William