Post by fred on Jan 28, 2011 11:29:32 GMT -6
Will, Darcloud, Steve, and Britt,
Let's have some more fun. I have decided to dump another file up here, a short one this time, and one I have already updated with some of the commentary we have been discussing in the "Markers" thread. Since weaponry is discussed on that thread, we can do the same here. Obviously again, yellow is for direct quotes.
DC, the Varnum letter to Graham regarding the cartridge charge is included here.
One disclaimer... I have eliminated from this post a section on Indian weaponry, simply because it is included in "Book I" and I think that would be a conflict with the publisher. Sorry.
WEAPONS AND TACTICS
ARMY WEAPONS
Troops used a .45 – caliber (.45/55 or .45/70), Model 1873 Springfield carbine (single – shot) and an 1873, 6 – shot, .45 – caliber Colt, single – action revolver:
• The carbine had a 1,000+ yards maximum range and a 250 yards maximum effective range.
• “The army’s Springfield carbine would reach a range of 2,800 yards before the bullet would fall below the minimum of 300 feet per second. The Model 1873 Colt Single Action Army revolver would reach 700 yards before the minimum velocity was achieved” [Swanson, G. A. Custer, His Life and Times, p. 293].
• A trained soldier could get off about 17 rounds per minute.
• Weapon weighed about 7.5 pounds.
• The National Armory of Springfield, MA, manufactured the carbine.
• One hundred rounds of carbine ammo and 24 rounds of pistol ammo were issued to each man.
All 90 unfired cartridges retrieved during the 1984 – 1985 archaeological dig were determined to be .45/55 rounds [Scott/Fox/Connor/Harmon, Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn, pp. 168 – 175].
1. 30 were found in the Custer area of fighting.
2. 60 were found on the Reno – Benteen field.
“… ll ninety rounds were identified as carbine by the presence of either the wad… or tube liner…. Only three rounds exhibited evidence of the tube liner….” [Perspectives, 173]
The ammunition for the .45 – caliber carbines and rifles was manufactured by the Frankford Arsenal [Bridesburg/Philadelphia, PA] from January 1874 to July 1882 [Smalley, More LBH Mysteries, pp. 9 – 1]. From March 1874 to July 1874 carbine rounds were head – stamped, “U. S. Carbine.” Starting in March 1877, head – stamping began again, a “C” designating carbine, an “R” for rifle. In addition, the date of manufacture was included, as was the arsenal (“F” for Frankford) [9 – 2].
NOTE—Military ammunition used in 1876 was not headstamped, but did have a distinctive style of crimping near the base of the cartridge.
In an undated letter to W. A. Graham, Varnum claimed, “I think and always have that the best guns in the hands of the Indians, were the carbines taken from Custer’s men and the 70 grain ammunition they got from the same source. We took, at least I think they all took, rifle ammunition instead of carbine 55 gr. On the hill most of the bullets came in with a zip sound. When a zing – g – g sound came, that made you take notice. However, that is only my opinion.” [Emphasis Varnum’s.] [The Custer Myth, 347].
1SG John Ryan, in an August 29, 1909, letter to Walter Camp, wrote: “At the time I possessed a seventeen – pound Sharp’s telescope rifle, made for me in Bismarck, which cost me $100. I used infantry ammunition, 70 grains of powder, which I procured from First Sgt. Wm. F. Bolton of Co. G, 17th U. S. Infantry, before going out on this trip. I gave him some of our carbine ammunition in place of it” [Barnard, Custer’s First Sergeant John Ryan, 191].
TACTICS (drawn primarily from Fox', Archaeology, History and Custer's Last Battle)
Emory Upton’s 1874 manual on tactics and formations established a unified system within the U. S. Army.
• Two other systems on tactics were used as well.
o Poinsett
o BG Philip St. George Cooke’s, Cavalry Tactics: or, Regulations for the Instruction, Formations, and Movements of The Cavalry of the Army and Volunteers of the United States, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1862.
The introduction of a “set of fours” as the basic unit affected tactical maneuverability, simplifying operations, i. e., a squad.
• Increased speed.
• Eliminated cumbersome maneuvers.
In 1876, the primary, i. e., minimum, tactical unit was still the platoon, not the squad. At the battle of the LBH, there was no evidence found of any platoon operations, per se, only company operations.
Regardless of organization, the primary mode of engaging the enemy was skirmishing:
• Prescribed intervals between skirmishers. Normal interval was 15 feet between men.
• Formation structures.
• Deployment procedures.
• Composition of units.
• Skirmish tactics for cavalry: dispersal of men on a combat or firing line.
• On a march, skirmishers cleared the way for the main body. Skirmishers could be mounted or on foot.
• Late 19th – century cavalry did not often employ mounted skirmishing; operated more as mounted infantry.
• Tactics prescribed normal interval of 5 yards between skirmishers on line, with intervals of 15 yards between squads.
• These intervals, as wide as they are, provide for the dispersal necessary to counteract effects of newer, more accurate weapons.
• Skirmishers usually aligned in a linear formation.
• 1876 cavalry used a single-shot carbine:
o Odd-numbered skirmishers fired first
o Then re-loaded as even-numbered fired
o Then all continued to fire.
INDIAN WEAPONS [not included]
Firearm artifact analysis indicates seven discrete Indian positions:
1. The so-called Henryville area near Calhoun Hill.
2. A small knoll some 200 meters northeast of Last Stand Hill.
3. Two positions on Greasy Grass Ridge.
4. Three positions on the lower end of Greasy Grass Ridge and the flanks of the upper portion of Deep Ravine.
• Government cartridge cases were found at these three positions, but it is possible these cartridges could have been retrieved from either the Rosebud fight or the Reno valley fighting.
• [This would give a good indication of the tribes involved. Probably Sioux at these locations, rather than Cheyenne.]
5. “For the Custer battlefield the number of Indian firearms is projected between 354 and 414. These figures suggest Custer’s command was outgunned about two to one” [Scott, et al., Archaeological Perspectives, p. 118].
6. “At the Reno – Benteen defense site the projected number of Indian guns ranges between 259 and 300, with the repeating guns ranging between 150 and 174” [Perspectives, p. 118].
Hope this adds some value to this whole thing. It has helped me, I'll tell you!
Best wishes,
Fred.
Let's have some more fun. I have decided to dump another file up here, a short one this time, and one I have already updated with some of the commentary we have been discussing in the "Markers" thread. Since weaponry is discussed on that thread, we can do the same here. Obviously again, yellow is for direct quotes.
DC, the Varnum letter to Graham regarding the cartridge charge is included here.
One disclaimer... I have eliminated from this post a section on Indian weaponry, simply because it is included in "Book I" and I think that would be a conflict with the publisher. Sorry.
WEAPONS AND TACTICS
ARMY WEAPONS
Troops used a .45 – caliber (.45/55 or .45/70), Model 1873 Springfield carbine (single – shot) and an 1873, 6 – shot, .45 – caliber Colt, single – action revolver:
• The carbine had a 1,000+ yards maximum range and a 250 yards maximum effective range.
• “The army’s Springfield carbine would reach a range of 2,800 yards before the bullet would fall below the minimum of 300 feet per second. The Model 1873 Colt Single Action Army revolver would reach 700 yards before the minimum velocity was achieved” [Swanson, G. A. Custer, His Life and Times, p. 293].
• A trained soldier could get off about 17 rounds per minute.
• Weapon weighed about 7.5 pounds.
• The National Armory of Springfield, MA, manufactured the carbine.
• One hundred rounds of carbine ammo and 24 rounds of pistol ammo were issued to each man.
All 90 unfired cartridges retrieved during the 1984 – 1985 archaeological dig were determined to be .45/55 rounds [Scott/Fox/Connor/Harmon, Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn, pp. 168 – 175].
1. 30 were found in the Custer area of fighting.
2. 60 were found on the Reno – Benteen field.
“… ll ninety rounds were identified as carbine by the presence of either the wad… or tube liner…. Only three rounds exhibited evidence of the tube liner….” [Perspectives, 173]
The ammunition for the .45 – caliber carbines and rifles was manufactured by the Frankford Arsenal [Bridesburg/Philadelphia, PA] from January 1874 to July 1882 [Smalley, More LBH Mysteries, pp. 9 – 1]. From March 1874 to July 1874 carbine rounds were head – stamped, “U. S. Carbine.” Starting in March 1877, head – stamping began again, a “C” designating carbine, an “R” for rifle. In addition, the date of manufacture was included, as was the arsenal (“F” for Frankford) [9 – 2].
NOTE—Military ammunition used in 1876 was not headstamped, but did have a distinctive style of crimping near the base of the cartridge.
In an undated letter to W. A. Graham, Varnum claimed, “I think and always have that the best guns in the hands of the Indians, were the carbines taken from Custer’s men and the 70 grain ammunition they got from the same source. We took, at least I think they all took, rifle ammunition instead of carbine 55 gr. On the hill most of the bullets came in with a zip sound. When a zing – g – g sound came, that made you take notice. However, that is only my opinion.” [Emphasis Varnum’s.] [The Custer Myth, 347].
1SG John Ryan, in an August 29, 1909, letter to Walter Camp, wrote: “At the time I possessed a seventeen – pound Sharp’s telescope rifle, made for me in Bismarck, which cost me $100. I used infantry ammunition, 70 grains of powder, which I procured from First Sgt. Wm. F. Bolton of Co. G, 17th U. S. Infantry, before going out on this trip. I gave him some of our carbine ammunition in place of it” [Barnard, Custer’s First Sergeant John Ryan, 191].
TACTICS (drawn primarily from Fox', Archaeology, History and Custer's Last Battle)
Emory Upton’s 1874 manual on tactics and formations established a unified system within the U. S. Army.
• Two other systems on tactics were used as well.
o Poinsett
o BG Philip St. George Cooke’s, Cavalry Tactics: or, Regulations for the Instruction, Formations, and Movements of The Cavalry of the Army and Volunteers of the United States, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1862.
The introduction of a “set of fours” as the basic unit affected tactical maneuverability, simplifying operations, i. e., a squad.
• Increased speed.
• Eliminated cumbersome maneuvers.
In 1876, the primary, i. e., minimum, tactical unit was still the platoon, not the squad. At the battle of the LBH, there was no evidence found of any platoon operations, per se, only company operations.
Regardless of organization, the primary mode of engaging the enemy was skirmishing:
• Prescribed intervals between skirmishers. Normal interval was 15 feet between men.
• Formation structures.
• Deployment procedures.
• Composition of units.
• Skirmish tactics for cavalry: dispersal of men on a combat or firing line.
• On a march, skirmishers cleared the way for the main body. Skirmishers could be mounted or on foot.
• Late 19th – century cavalry did not often employ mounted skirmishing; operated more as mounted infantry.
• Tactics prescribed normal interval of 5 yards between skirmishers on line, with intervals of 15 yards between squads.
• These intervals, as wide as they are, provide for the dispersal necessary to counteract effects of newer, more accurate weapons.
• Skirmishers usually aligned in a linear formation.
• 1876 cavalry used a single-shot carbine:
o Odd-numbered skirmishers fired first
o Then re-loaded as even-numbered fired
o Then all continued to fire.
INDIAN WEAPONS [not included]
Firearm artifact analysis indicates seven discrete Indian positions:
1. The so-called Henryville area near Calhoun Hill.
2. A small knoll some 200 meters northeast of Last Stand Hill.
3. Two positions on Greasy Grass Ridge.
4. Three positions on the lower end of Greasy Grass Ridge and the flanks of the upper portion of Deep Ravine.
• Government cartridge cases were found at these three positions, but it is possible these cartridges could have been retrieved from either the Rosebud fight or the Reno valley fighting.
• [This would give a good indication of the tribes involved. Probably Sioux at these locations, rather than Cheyenne.]
5. “For the Custer battlefield the number of Indian firearms is projected between 354 and 414. These figures suggest Custer’s command was outgunned about two to one” [Scott, et al., Archaeological Perspectives, p. 118].
6. “At the Reno – Benteen defense site the projected number of Indian guns ranges between 259 and 300, with the repeating guns ranging between 150 and 174” [Perspectives, p. 118].
Hope this adds some value to this whole thing. It has helped me, I'll tell you!
Best wishes,
Fred.