Custer's orders from Terry

[redwhiteman]

I see that Custer's orders keep creeping up in another thread I started so I think it best to start this thread related to his orders. I am also repeating here something I had written in the other thread about those orders, along with more commentary.

Custer's Orders:
Had Custer been successful, no one today would be questioning whether or not he had "sufficient reason" for deviating from his orders. All of the scrutiny is of course due to the fact that he lost. Anyway, from what I understand, Terry's orders, though couched in polite language, were really orders, not suggestions. It's kind of like saying to someone, "Would you mind getting me that?" You really expect the person asked to do it, not say, "Yeah, I mind." It's just etiquette to phrase it that way. But again, orders sometimes have to be adapted to the circumstances at hand, which Terry was aware of, and so gave Custer leeway. So you see, the orders were direct orders while simultaneously being suggestions. If Custer had won, he would have been applauded for making use of his freedom to do what he saw fit when within proximity of the enemy, but having lost he is questioned, and sometimes damned, for disobeying. It's an endless quagmire.

S.E. Whitman, author of THE TROOPERS, claims that this polite way of phrasing orders was (still is?) a custom of the army and carried the full weight of orders. I don't know if this is accurate since he claims this is part of an unwritten custom, therefore it is part of an unwritten code. But it sounds accurate. Howver, Terry did add explicitly that Custer could deviate from the orders if he saw sufficient reason to do so. But who defines sufficient reason? Hence, the debate will rage forever! And again, had Custer been victorious, this issue wouldn't even be such a big deal. At most, some historian would have written that it's ironic Custer disobeyed orders, but because of his huge and brilliant victory, he escaped criticism and a court-martial.

[Tricia]

redwhiteman--

I tend to believe that Terry's orders gave GAC broad discretion to do as he saw fit. On the other thread, I agreed with DO Harris--that perhaps, Custer should have sent Terry a message telling him of his deviation, specifically, his decision to not complete a scout of Tulloch's Creek. The question that keeps coming up in my mind is had Terry and Gibbon gotten wind of GAC's plan, would they have been able to turn that debacle at LBH into a complete and overwhelming victory over the Native Americans and furthermore, ended the warfare and therefore, saving a whole lot of bloodshed--both Anglo and Indian--in the future? No Wounded Knee, no attacks on the Nez Pierce ... awful tragedies that humanity should have avoided.

BTW--have you read "The Curse of Destiny: The Court Martial of George Armstrong Custer" by Romain Wilhemlsen? Obviously, it's a novel, but is quite well written. Roy Bird, for some reason, in his book, "In His Brother's Shadow: The Life of Thomas Ward Custer", uses it as source material--that's how real and genuine the narrative reads.

Regards,
Leyton McLean

[d o harris]

rwm--I agree, we need this thread, but it should include a thorough discussion of Terry's plan, and the facts and assumptions upon which that plan was based. It is nearly impossible to understand the orders to Custer unless we know what that plan was. Of course, a great part of that plan may be inferred from the orders to Custer. One word of caution I'd offer to all. Argument or discussion should be based on what was clearly known by the participants before the battle, and not based on what was written days, months, and years after the fact.
I posted on the other thread before realizing this one had been set up. One thing I'd like to reiterate here. When Custer made the decision to turn West, contrary to Terry's express wish, he was under an absolute obligation to communicate that decision to Terry, and to explain what he saw as 'sufficient reason.'

[jdmackintosh]

I have always considered what Terry gave Custer to be operational directives, rather than strict orders, which Terry wanted followed The inclusion of the "sufficient reason" clause undermines our viewing these as strict, adhere-to-the-letter orders.

[elisabeth]

And even if you switch to the later "absolute necessity" wording, a living Custer could have argued at his court-martial that "absolute necessity" obtained: (a) the size of the trail making it insane not to follow it, and (b) the evidence for having been discovered making it "absolutely necessary" to attack at once. The one thing he'd have had real trouble arguing his way out of -- as D. O. says -- is not communicating the changed situation to HQ.

The wording of the order, or "Letter of Advice" as some have called it, is rather specific on that. In the first section, on the route to be followed, it's all couched as "he thinks you should...". On both scouting Tullock's Creek, and sending a scout back with news of the results, it switches to "the Department Commander DESIRES". Much more prescriptive, surely?

It's true that it probably wouldn't have made much difference to the eventual outcome, other than maybe saving some lives on Reno Hill if Terry had pressed on his march instead of halting on the 26th. But it's the principle of the thing. Hard for any commander to make sensible dispositions if his subordinates don't report to him as ordered. Benteen gets blame for not reporting back to Custer; the same logic must apply to Custer himself, one would have thought ...?

[alfuso]

Elizabeto

and not to forget the last few words of T's orders that Custer was to report to him at the end of the time rationed for. Custer set out with about 15 days rations which brings us to July 5.

so just what was Terry's "Plan" again?

alfuso

[elisabeth]

"... unless in the meantime you receive further orders". Isn't that a last-ditch proviso, to cover the eventuality that nothing else has happened -- e.g. no Indians have been found -- by the time Custer's rations expire?

I'm reading "report to me" as meaning "report to me in person with your entire command", rather than "send a messenger" -- as it's in the context of where supplies will be. Am I wrong?

[alfuso]

report to me can mean either. Especially since Custer made it know he'd hang on a trail past rations and into mule meat.

Terry's order still brings us to July 5. NOT June 26.

alfuso

[Nomad]

Hello everyone,

Re: Custer’s orders from Terry, I think we should all bear in mind two important points:
1. “General Terry had no practical experience fighting Indians” (Graham: 148).
2. Terry, Custer and Gibbon met aboard the Far West to construct a plan of attack.

During the conference on the Far West, probably no one was more aware of their lack of experience with Indian warfare, than General Alfred Terry. I think it is safe to assume that Terry relied on Custer to interpret the field intelligence gathered by Lt. James Bradley, Gibbon’s Chief of Scouts, and Maj. Reno’s Rosebud mission. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Custer must have played a decisive role in formulating the plan of attack.

To me, it doesn’t seem plausible that Terry would ignore Custer’s knowledge of their mutual opponent on the eve of battle, especially if he had no experience of his own to draw on. I think that Terry’s main contribution to the plan was primarily based on his experience with Euro-American military tactics. In essence, it probably wouldn’t stretch one’s imagination to believe that the operational plan was Custer’s idea, and that Terry simply added his tactical concerns, and put the whole thing in writing. When viewed in this context, Custer’s decision not to send Herendeen to Terry with dispatches takes on a different perspective.

Terry’s instructions read: “The Department Commander desires that […] you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock’s Creek and that you should endeavor to send a scout through […] with information of the result of your examination”. That Herendeen wasn’t sent could be interpreted to mean that the trail markers he (Custer) observed during his approach on the 24th and 25th of June, indicated that Bradley and Reno’s intelligence reports were accurate, i.e., the Indians were moving southwest toward the Little Bighorn. If any Indians did remain in the Tullock’s Creek basin, their small numbers would pose no threat his (Custer’s) supply train, he had a reinforced company as rear guard, or to Terry’s line of march. There was no need to send Herendeen, because nothing had changed since the conference, and Terry could proceed according to plan. Furthermore, if any Indians remained in the Tullock’s Creek basin, they were more than likely, newly arrived from the reservation, and thus, had not taken part in the battle with General Crook’s column, and if they had not taken part in the battle with General Crook, then they would have had no idea that hostilities had commenced, i.e., they had no reason to attack either detachment.

Up until Reno’s scouting mission, the trail showed scattered bands of Indians camping here-and-there throughout the region (See The Custer Myth: pages 127-130). Reno’s scout revealed that many of the scattered bands had linked-up to form larger groups, which appeared to be moving in the same general direction, and would at some point converge. Terry’s instructions imply that he needed evidence that no hostile forces were left in his rear, which is consistent with his conventional warfare training. Custer, on the other hand, knew from his experience that the plains Indians rarely, if ever, fought according to a preconceived military plan, and never as a cohesive tactical unit, a la the U.S. Cavalry; to him, Terry’s fears were unwarranted.

That Terry must have agreed with him is manifest in the casual tone of his instructions. If he truly considered the Tullock’s Creek scouting mission to be that important, he would have said so more forcefully, as opposed to the imploring “The Department Commander desires” posture that he eventually took. Then why, one might ask, did he mention it at all in his written instructions? Because his conventional military experience told him that his “orders” would become part of the official record, and thus, subject to scrutiny by his peers. In a nut shell, Terry wanted to go on record as having had some input with the planning phase, after all, he was the ranking officer in the field, and he wanted to show that his input was militarily sound.



Thank you for your time and consideration.



Nomad