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Post by Gen. Kuster on Apr 14, 2010 19:21:26 GMT -6
Well my comrades, I come to you from the afterlife to finally speak about this battle.
In a nutshell, the great Seventh Cavalry was defeated because those Dog Soldiers and their cohorts put up a great fight, and my plan, although I felt it was a good one that could have been successful was not executed properly. Speed was needed that day both in movement and the crisp and exact execution of orders, and it was not present that day for various reasons. Speed, or more precisely the lack of it, combined with the valiant determination of those Indians are why we lost. I give them credit, and to be honest, they fought as I expected they would. If that surprises you, well then you don’t know me.
There were a great many things too that were outside my control that influenced the battle. The geography was such that my options were extremely limited and slowed us down. I still feel that we, with an emphasis on we, could have been successful if the geography had been more advantageous, but it was not to be. Then there was the matter of Colonel Benteen. We all cursed him when he failed in his mission to rendezvous with us as I had instructed and ordered. Waiting for him not only slowed us down and allowed the savages to catch up to and surround us, but changed my entire strategy. The injury I received at the river slowed us all down too. Thus, the advantages of having a Cavalry were all negated that day, and it was reduced to a standing fight between 200 foot soldiers versus those 2,000 savages. Now, is there any wonder why we lost? There shouldn’t be. I just explained it.
Now as I pen this, I know you are thinking this is a hoax. You must be thinking that I alone was responsible for the disastrous outcome. But I am here to tell you that there were a great many reasons, many of which were outside my control. Unfortunately, as I have said many times, the duty of an officer is not an easy one, and I get blamed because, as I admit, I am the one who made the key decisions. Then again, battle is like dealing cards, and you do the best with the hand you are dealt.
Was I courageous and daring? Sure, but not crazy as some have surmised. There is much that you don’t know about this event. You only know the tip of the iceberg as they say, and if you knew all I know, it would change your perspective. These are basically my thoughts about the battle after being silent more than 130 years. More to come…..I promise that I will not leave you waiting long like someone I know.
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Post by Gen. Kuster on Apr 18, 2010 13:08:30 GMT -6
Here is my basic plan. Keep in mind that the best plans are the simplest plans that create the most confusion and problems for the enemy. There is a reason I was often seen alone by myself along the Rosebud in deep thought. I was not contemplating my death (although I knew it was certainly possible and was prepared for it, as evident by me cutting my hair so my scalp would not end up in a trophy case somewhere). No, I was formulating my plan (actually refining it) and assessing the strengths and weakness of my men (including Reno and Benteen) against the information I was constantly receiving.
First, let me say that I harbored no strong personal hatred for the Indians on the Plains. On the contrary, I was a bit enamored and intrigued by them. However, I was doing my duty that day. It was not a personal thing, so it’s still hard for me to understand why I am hated in such a personal way. The Government is responsible for the policies and laws, not me. I was just following orders as aggressively and earnestly as possible. My military training has taught me that is the only way to follow orders.
So now back to strategy. The idea was to hit them first (Reno) with a small force (120 men or so). The Indians had plenty of time to prepare (despite what they say) and they had to know the first point of attack was going to be at the far southern edge of their camp because that was the point nearest to my force. Plus, there was a good ford near there that was commonly used. Thus, they were setting a trap, and I was not going to fall for it by sending all my men in to get slaughtered at once.
There is no way in the world that I would conduct a full frontal assault on the strongest point in their camp. There were 1,000 or more on their front line and another 1,000 behind them in reserve. There is no way I was going to send my 700 men against that kind of strength. That is a brutal way to fight a battle, with no attention paid to tactics and leveraging all your strengths. We had some advantages and I intended to use them. It would have ended in another Picket’s Charge, but in this case, the enemy was even more concentrated.
Reno’s charge was intended as a probe so that I could assess their strength and fighting spirit from my vantage point high on the bluffs. I saw his skirmish line and I saw that the Indians were swarming. It was a not a surprise to me that they were fighting, after all, they had confidence because of their large numbers. The other point of his charge was to draw them out. I expected Reno would be easily repulsed with about a third of his men killed, and I expected that he would have to retreat. That is obvious. But his attack should not be looked at as a single event but an event that was part of a larger plan.
Next, I supported Reno by an attack at MTC which commenced about the time he was retreating from the Timber. This attack would use a slightly larger force (150 men) and I stationed several companies under Keogh in reserve up on Nye - Cartwright ridge in order to show the Indians we had a relatively large force in reserve. The point of this attack was to draw the Indians up to the Badlands to tire them out and also extend them away from the camp. The attack at MTC also supported Reno (as I said I would) by drawing the Indians away from him (we all know the shooting there in the valley ceased after my attack at MTC), and it also tired them a little by re-directing their forces from the far southern edge of the camp to the far eastern edge. That is a distance of over 1 mile they would have to traverse. One of the elements of my plan was to force them to cover sizable distances on foot in order to respond to my attacks, and this would tire them out. Speed of movement and conservation of energy is one of the key advantages of having a Cavalry. Again, this advantage would have been nullified by the full frontal assault that many said should have been executed.
After this 2nd attack commenced, I fully expected Colonel Benteen to rendezvous with me. The time would be a little after 4pm. However, he was still four miles away and moving way too slow. If he was pouting after having thought I was reserving the glory for me, he was sadly mistaken. His men and his assault would be critical to our success.
The 3rd attack was scheduled to begin around 4:30 and would have involved over 200 men in an assault on the far northern edge of the camp (basically, the five companies that perished with me on the ridge). The timeline was aggressive but achievable if Colonel Benteen had been moving at the required speed and had responded promptly to my orders. As I said above, speed was essential to my plan.
With the 4th attack, I deliver the coup de grace, but I won’t tell you how that is delivered except that it would have been spectacular and greatly, greatly unexpected. It would have been a huge surprise and would have brought those great warriors to their knees. Ah, If only Colonel Benteen had followed simple orders and had a little more faith.
The key question, as we all know, is how do you defeat a larger force that outnumbers you 3 to 1? You tire them out, use superior firepower (remember we had more guns than they had) use guerilla tactics of hit and run, draw them away from the camp so that you can cause disruption in the camp, but most importantly you need to demoralize them. By escalating the numbers in each attack and hitting them from several points in rapid succession, I wanted to create the impression that my force was larger than just 700 men. I wanted the Indians tired and thinking where will I hit next and how many more Cavalry are coming? I wanted them to start wondering if the attacks would ever end.
Think about this: Did the Indians know exactly how many men I had and where they were located? Did they know where General Terry’s column was? These were key advantages that I intended to use.
I wanted to create a lot of uncertainty in order to break their will. I wanted to push their endurance to the limit, and then deliver a fatal, unexpected blow that would have broke them. Instead, it was us who had the broken spirit, but I place a lot of the blame for that on Reno and Benteen.
Plus, I had a final card I could have used (an insurance policy if you will) that would have surely brought victory to our side if only Colonel Benteen had supported me. I was not asking him to come to my aid - Just support me. There is a big difference!!! It was a great plan!!!
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Reddirt
Full Member
Life is But a Dream...
Posts: 208
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Post by Reddirt on Apr 18, 2010 17:18:50 GMT -6
General, isn't it true that Reno's hasty retreat from the timber freed up hundreds of warriors that would have been, otherwise, to occupied with him to have molested you? While Benteen's failure to meet up with you was critical, Reno's failure seems (to me) to have ended any chance you may have had to defeat the Indians.
There's a possibly that yours and Benteen's command may have both been annihilated in the process if he had met you as ordered.
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Post by Gen. Kuster on Apr 18, 2010 19:05:39 GMT -6
General, isn't it true that Reno's hasty retreat from the timber freed up hundreds of warriors that would have been, otherwise, to occupied with him to have molested you? Yes. True statement. While Benteen's failure to meet up with you was critical, Reno's failure seems (to me) to have ended any chance you may have had to defeat the Indians. No. Not true. While I would have liked Reno to have fought an additional 10 minutes, his hasty retreat did not end any chance of victory. It did, however, decrease the odds of a victory by some percentage because it allowed more Indians to gather EARLIER at MTC and at the northern end. This meant the resistance I faced at both MTC and from the northern end was a little greater than I would have liked but definitely not insurmountable (assuming Col. Benteens support as ordered). There's a possibly that yours and Benteen's command may have both been annihilated in the process if he had met you as ordered. In my plan discussed above, there was a very small margin for error. That means for every second Colonel Benteen was behind schedule in his rendezvous with me, the Indians had an additional second to mass in front of me at MTC, Henryville, and at the Northern end (or more accurately NW end of the village). By my calculations, he was 30 minutes late in arriving on the scene. Imagine what 30 minutes meant in the grand scheme of things!!! In the military we always have a schedule for everything we do. Whether it be procurement of weapons from a supply source, the building of a bridge, or fighting a battle, there is always a schedule that is tied to the objective. In the military, we know that if we fall behind schedule, the odds of meeting the objective decrease. So we use a schedule as a management tool. If he had joined the fray (late by 30 minutes) upon meeting Reno, it's obvious he probably would have met the same fate. Thus, I don’t criticize him for that, but I do criticize him for being late by 30 minutes in the first place. That was the whole key to the battle (up until that time). Imagine this. Instead of arriving at the Reno defense site when he did, he arrives 30 minutes sooner. He looks down and can see Reno fighting and he wonders where I am. But he has two messengers to help point the way. If he follows his orders exactly, he ignores Reno like he is supposed to and heads for MTC, arriving there just after I have initiated a charge at MTF. I left Keogh at Nye-Cartwright so that Benteen would have a visual aide in finding me too. Plus, he can hear the guns. Colonel Benteen saying that he did not know where I was or something to that effect is another one of his lies. Now how do things look? Much better right?
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 19, 2010 9:05:09 GMT -6
Where in the orders does it say ignore any fighting, even if it looks like the command is taking a licking and go off somewhere downriver and try to find Custer? Benteen had no idea of the command being divided after he left for his scout. He had no message of an attack order for Reno and the command being further divided.
And Gen., why didn't you inform Benteen of Indians being sighted, the command divided and Reno ordered to attack running Indians while you go off with the rest of the command somewhere downriver?
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Post by Gen. Kuster on Apr 19, 2010 10:47:02 GMT -6
After Colonel Benteen arrived, I planned for him to go to Luce Ridge and set up a modified skirmish line to start shooting at all the Indians coming up MTF who were in pursuit of me after my feigned crossing. The reason I did not try to ford at MTC is that this place was not a natural ford. Access down to the river is narrow, ground is uneven, and a little muddy near the water. Ideally, I like to charge across the river with 20 men in front row and several rows of men behind. That was not possible at MTC. It was too narrow, and like a traffic jam due to a bottleneck (i.e., lanes that merge together), all my men would have had to slow down to cross leaving them sitting ducks for the Indian sharpshooters. Plus, it led straight into the center of the Indian Camp. I am bold, but not that bold.
All I needed to do there was create a diversion to relieve the pressure off Reno. I was also hoping that the Indians would cross at that point and pursue me (I was setting a trap). My plan was for Colonel Benteen to be waiting for them as they headed up the coulees in pursuit of me. That's exactly what happened, except that there was no Colonel Benteen to cover my retreat. He would have had a field day picking off Indians, and if things got too hot, he had many routes of escape just like Reno did in the valley. If they expected the Indians to welcome us with roses, they were mistaken. This is battle, and you must accept some casualties and calculated risk taking.
With my five companies, I planned to spin around, and near ford D (I had already scouted that area and knew I could ford there), cross over and charge into the village from the north at about 4:30. With five companies all charging hard, I would have been able to make it into the camp even though I would have taken a lot of casualties along the way.
I was not able to execute this maneuver (basically outflanking them on their left) because after my feigned crossing at MTC, I headed up to the Calhoun area to wait for Colonel Benteens arrival. I did not want to take off and leave him in a lurch with zero knowledge where I was headed. I attempted to send another messenger, but he never made it out of the MTC area before he was shot down.
I left Calhoun in my rear to fend off Gall and other attackers who were in pursuit of us, but he began taking heavy enemy fire from two sides; from his front (Nye-Cartwright area) and on his right from Henryville. Keogh was in reserve behind him and a little below the ridge hiding the ponies. Meanwhile, I took E and F companies and most of the remaining officers and headed north along the ridge. There was not much I could do at that point except hope that Benteen miraculously showed up (by this time, he was listening to Reno’s sob story about how he had retreated from the Timber and how I supposedly never supported him).
Calhouns right side eventually got rolled up after 200 Indians approached not only from Henryville but from the Deep Ravine area. That effectively split my command into two. Keogh was a sitting duck at that point. Imagine 400 Indians headed straight for you, whooping and hollering. It terrified most of the men, but Keogh never flinched and fought to his last breath.
I kept looking back for any sign of Benteen, but there was none and there was no dust cloud either. Somewhere along the top of the ridge, I realized Benteen was not coming, so I asked my scout Boyer to go and see if he could make contact with General Terry and take some riders with him, but as he headed off LSH, they were swarmed with about 200 Indians coming up from the Cemetery area. Escape was futile, so the only other remaining escape route was down near the Deep Ravine. They were trying for the river, but never made it. By this time, the Indians were circling us and whooping and hollering. Everyone was mad that Benteen never came. If I had known that was going to be the case, I would never have left Calhoun where I did. We would have all headed north together, and with a full five companies, at least some would have escaped the carnage.
Some may wonder why I headed north at all after my feigned crossing. Well, all throughout the battle, I expected Benteen to support me, so naturally I stayed on the offensive. It wasn’t till I reached the LSH area that I knew for certain he was not coming. I figured he had encountered some type of resistance.
I died with pride knowing that my plan was a good one, but I needed Reno to hold out a little longer, and I needed Benteen to take his orders with a sense of urgency and respect instead of his typical laissez-faire attitude. He knew the plan too, and thought I was crazy. I almost relieved him, but felt it would create too much animosity among our men, some of whom were loyal to him. I just asked him to support me (cover my retreat) and figured he would. That's not asking a lot.
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 19, 2010 11:25:04 GMT -6
<I did not want to take off and leave him in a lurch with zero knowledge where I was headed>
Apparently Custer had no qualms about leaving Reno "in a lurch" and if some say Custer knew about Reno's predicament didn't do anything to help other than keep going downriver.
To say Custer waited for Benteen when, according to Martini, had the village ripe for taking is assuming way to much. Custer was not the 'wait around kind'. If you believe Custer was expecting support from Benteen I guess Custer now felt like Reno did when Custer promised Reno the support of the entire command.
All this time Benteen was never informed of what was going on . . . and when he did he had to choose what door to open . . . the one to help Reno or the one to help Custer. Reminds me of the old game show: "Let's Make A Deal"!
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 19, 2010 11:54:39 GMT -6
<That's exactly what happened, except that there was no Colonel Benteen to cover my retreat. He would have had a field day picking off Indians>
When Benteen arrived to view the Reno "Charge" he didn't have a field day picking off Indians chasing Reno's command. Probably couldn't . . . just like he couldn't have picked off Indians chasing Custer.
I'm starting to think Houdini was right about people speaking from the grave!
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Post by darkmoon on Apr 19, 2010 15:53:17 GMT -6
My dearly departed, you simply must not labor so much with false plans and tell these poor souls the truth of the matter. We know the pain in your head must be overwhelming, and the wound in your breast buried deep within your heart. But this should not cause you to find derangement in simple things.
We both know my dear that “feigned diversions” were not in your bosoms nature. And such acts would only bring the whole Indian camp down on your tiny force. Think my darling, it was barely a mile from the ford to Calhoun hill, only 12 city blocks. And your telling these poor souls that you only left Calley behind? Nye-C ridge was occupied to, and we both know that Keogh was there, now do you remember my darling? There was no need for Benteen to go to Nye-C, remember now? Don’t you remember leaving about ½ of your battalion there in that area, while you took the rest northwest? Now don’t be shy, and don’t tell these people fibs. Why would you try to “feign” an attack at “B” and then only moments later (1 mile) put half of your battalion on a ridge to defend, and then take the other half on downriver - when you knew you would be cut off from the rest of your regiment? People are beginning to think it was your fault my darling, and starting to compare you to Houdini. And quite simply “waiting for Benteen” is no excuse is it? And we all know that once you put half of your tiny force on detail as defenders, against hundreds of Indians how much chance did you really think you had with a mere handful of a hundred effective skirmishers?
And one last cherished thought my dear, Curley said: "And then (Custer) struck our for higher ground in columns of fours, going directly to the...southeast point of the battlefield. Before they got to this point...the Indians were in front and in the ravines on both sides, and a strong force of Indians was coming up in the rear.” My darling if this was horribly true, how on earth did you make it out of deep coulee up to Calhoun hill after your “feigned attack“? You were surrounded before you ever arrived there. Why if you broke out of this encirclement, didn't you go back to the safety of your regiment?
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Post by Gen. Kuster on Apr 19, 2010 19:37:12 GMT -6
Apparently Custer had no qualms about leaving Reno "in a lurch" That's a bold accusation. Do you care to back it up with some solid logic instead of throwing it out there without any supporting information?
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 20, 2010 6:22:58 GMT -6
The Crow Scouts stated they knew Custer had seen Reno's rout and did nothing to support him (believe it or not)
Reno was never supported by anyone other than Benteen who was not even aware of Custer's attack order to Reno or the further division of the command.
Custer never supported Reno, at least in the sense that Reno thought he would, and this was after Reno had sent two messengers to Custer for further instructions. As far as Reno was concerned he was not supported and from hindsight we see that was so.
And what must have been going through some of the Reno/Benteen survivors' minds was the "abandonment" of Elliot at the Washita.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 20, 2010 7:42:08 GMT -6
There was not plan. A recon in force may lead to a plan but it didn't that day.
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Post by Gen. Kuster on Apr 20, 2010 10:20:39 GMT -6
Look, I never told Reno specifically how I would support him because there were too many unknowns at the time. We were still miles away from the Indian Camp when I gave him the order right? So why he expected any particular type of support (e.g., from the rear) is an assumption he made, incorrectly I might add. After all, this is battle, so expecting anything specific is a stretch.
All I knew was that however the situation unfolded (e.g., Indians decide to fight, decide to run, or invite us to dinner with them), I was going to support him. In my mind, I meant I would assist him once he encountered serious trouble. I would never leave his whole command by itself to get annihilated.
By charging that village, he had to know he would have a lot of casualties (particularly since he was charging without my direct, immediate support). My guarantee of support just meant that I would be looking out for him, and when he got into serious trouble (e.g., surrounded), as I knew he would considering the odds, I would be able to take the heat off him.
As soon as he retreated into the Timber, I started my charge at MTC. That's why there are many reports from witnesses in the Timber who heard gun fire down stream. The result of my charge, as we all know, is that most of the Indians left Reno, and went to MTC. The reason they left Reno is that he was retreating, and there was a new, ominous threat to the village - - ME.
Now, we also know that once Reno arrived on the bluffs, the shooting there ceased for the most part. I believe it was a whole hour of unfettered bliss. Wow! Who was responsible for that?
Thus, in conclusion, my attack at MTC supported Reno because it diverted hundreds of blood thirsty Indians away from his command and allowed him to retreat and spend time on the bluffs in order to prepare a defense there.
We can debate the method I supported him or the timing or something like that, but I don't think we should debate IF I supported him. It's clear, at least to me, that I took the heat off his command and saved most of his men, so I supported him!!!
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 20, 2010 12:54:46 GMT -6
<So why he expected any particular type of support (e.g., from the rear) is an assumption he made, incorrectly I might add>
Reno stated that he was told by Cooke that he would be supported by the whole command.
Reno was not told to attack a village . . . he was told the Indians and/or village was fleeing and to bring them to battle. When he realized the village was stationary and Indians were not running he made an "executive decision" to halt his command. And in doing so brought the Indians to battle.
<I took the heat off his command and saved most of his men, so I supported him!!! >
With that "type" of support no wonder the 7th was crushed!
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Post by darkmoon on Apr 20, 2010 14:04:53 GMT -6
Crz... Reno in later years had his ghost to face and chase. The mere idea of my dear husband supporting him on the field of battle must have weighed heavily upon his mind. Although doubtless in reality, it was the other way around, truth be told. The very idea of support could not be recalled by even Lt. Wallace, nor the exact words used, whether it was “I”, “we” or some other pronoun. Odd that neither Wallace nor Reno ever remembered their talks with my husband that dreadful morning, the “I” or even the “we” making more sense in light of the fact. But the Cooke disconnect with my dear husband proved to be their salvation, just as it did for Benteen. See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil, only in their case it was - See no good, hear no good, speak no good. The fact of the matter was, my husband gave Reno no such offer of support, neither directly nor through Lt. Cooke. He knew, just like they knew, that once a unit was cut loose they were pretty much on their own, and it was the commanders decisions that would weigh to save the day, or not. What could not be accomplished by courier, had to be accomplished by that commanders knowledge and skills pursuant to the orders they were given to the best of their ability to comply. And if my husband kept on going downstream, it wasn’t because he was ignoring Reno, he just didn’t see any immediate danger to Reno’s condition, and that was best exemplified by what he told his own men about ’finishing up here and going home to their station.” There is no evil to see, hear or speak, other than Reno and Wallace’s little confabulated white lie, is there my dear?
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