|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 12, 2021 5:57:29 GMT -6
Noggy
I believe you have it right, as I stated before. Col Bender addressed decision points, and a critical one was in Reno Creek when Custer decided to move to the bluffs instead of following the advance guard.
As far as the Indians are always running, the numbers of Indians attacked and whether they have family present is a factor. Did the Indians run at Fetterman? Did the Indians run at the Washita? Did the Indian meet Crook, or did they run? Certainly, some of these same Indians were against the 1874 Montana Expedition in the same area. They came out to fight on numerous days.
To say they always ran when they had superior numbers based upon what? I know you didn't say it, but I am making a point for others who disagree. Some of Custer's scouts told him there would be a big fight. Bloody Knife told him they would die that day. It seems to me there was just as much evidence that Indians in large numbers would not run and that they were capable of leaving the Big Village to fight.
Regards
Steve
|
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Jul 12, 2021 6:14:10 GMT -6
Custer was scapegoated and this has bothered many people over time although it is not unusual. There are a number of reasons for this and amongst them is the quality of testimony upon which the 1879 Inquiry concluded.
Custer undoubtedly expected to be supported in the situation which developed and this occured so slowly that it can fairly be questioned.
He can only be fairly judged on the basis of the situation he found and his development of the attack. He ordered an attack and his senior officers knew this so RCoI was undermined from the minute Benteen opened his mouth - he had a career and reputation to protect. On Reno Hill, in the real World with Reno gone bizarre, what could Benteen do? Offer himself up for charges of mutiny? It doesn't happen and this was certainly not beneath Reno, I believe. Rock and a hard place all and this brings the best and the worst from people.
Sheridan was aware of the increased numerical threat to the expeditions and his warning arrived shortly after the battle. Had the size of the hostile force been known to Custer I believe that he would have declined contact and waited to be attacked but that is its own can of worms with Terry isolated on the Bighorn. There was never going to be a happy ending that summer and Washington completely misunderstood the Indian resolve that Summer after the St. Patrick's Day fight.
In June 1876, on the Northern Plains, the US Army's self confidence and belief in its ability to tame the Sioux was errantly misguided and a costly mistake in blood for all sides. There were valuable lessons to be learned from the fighting in 1873 and 1874 and I feel that Custer was up on them but was undone by the size of force he encountered. There were too many Indians and his deployment was unable to concentrate force for a number of reasons including enemy strength. The five companies destroyed could have been saved with timely information forwarded from Reno Hill.
There was a cover up in personal interests from Benteen all the way up those embarrassed by Custer and besides this, he was generally and honestly destested by those he overcame during ACW. This may have endured......
Opinion that Custer should have kept his force concentrated in the valley by following Reno, is an unfortunate and misguided red herring since had the five companies effected deployment into the valley by making a crossing of Ford B, and Benteen pressed on across Ford A, that is precisely what would have been. It is at that point of the whinning, that Reno is simply seen as what he was which is a many flavoured dish and revolting.
The US were out thought and outfought in 1876, on all fronts. It's not unusual but a sleeping giant was awoken. His name was Nelson A. Miles.
|
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Jul 12, 2021 7:36:52 GMT -6
Noggy I believe you have it right, as I stated before. Col Bender addressed decision points, and a critical one was in Reno Creek when Custer decided to move to the bluffs instead of following the advance guard. As far as the Indians are always running, the numbers of Indians attacked and whether they have family present is a factor. Did the Indians run at Fetterman? Did the Indians run at the Washita? Did the Indian meet Crook, or did they run? Certainly, some of these same Indians were against the 1874 Montana Expedition in the same area. They came out to fight on numerous days. To say they always ran when they had superior numbers based upon what? I know you didn't say it, but I am making a point for others who disagree. Some of Custer's scouts told him there would be a big fight. Bloody Knife told him they would die that day. It seems to me there was just as much evidence that Indians in large numbers would not run and that they were capable of leaving the Big Village to fight. Regards Steve Hi Az, Developing your thrust with the overall situation, the camp was actually too large to run and breaking into constituent camps of bands, simply offered one of them up as victim. The daytime attack was unexpected and achieved surprise and there was nothing the Sioux and Cheyenne could do other than surrender or fight. You fight to win when you fight regardless of the odds and that decision was taken by Custer. The rest is history and conjecture in regards who did what. The military climate was heavily influenced by Crook's actions towards J.J. Reynolds after the St. Patrick's Day Fight with all Officer's aware that precedent of Court Martial was inherent to setback and failure and it would be disingenious to ignore this. It didn't matter whether Custer followed Reno or crossed lower fords to fight as long as those companies engaged whilst Reno was in place and being reinforced by Benteen. That is, the 11 companies engaged in the valley and we do not to this day know why that didn't happen but I can surely tell you that beneath the bravado and post battle fisherman's tales from Reno's battalion - his fight was shoot and scoot and he was gone before Keogh and Yates or Benteen were able to engage. In terms of Benteen, this is fact as stated by Terry in report of 27th June, 1876. It's not the case of what, if and buts, and rather that Reno did not stand and was unable to present this reality in fear for his career and ambitions. If Custer failed then he was finished and that point can hardly have been lost upon the Major or others. On Reno Hill, where Reno stated under oath that he set up for the regiment to rally upon him, then he had either lost all sensibility in not being in command of the regiment, or he wrote Custer off and may have known Custer was dead and command had devolved upon him. Reno did not communicate his situation and location to Custer, Keogh and Yates and in consequence of that single and major deriliction of duty, the five companies were wiped out whilst he went back to the river and rifled Hodgson's pockets. |
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 12, 2021 7:41:33 GMT -6
When is an Advanced Guard, not an Advanced Guard?
When it has no elements following behind!
|
|
|
|
Post by noggy on Jul 12, 2021 11:17:25 GMT -6
When is an Advanced Guard, not an Advanced Guard? When it has no elements following behind! And this should preferably not come as a shock to the former advance guard  |
|
|
|
Post by noggy on Jul 12, 2021 11:20:26 GMT -6
To say they always ran when they had superior numbers based upon what? I know you didn't say it, but I am making a point for others who disagree. Some of Custer's scouts told him there would be a big fight. Bloody Knife told him they would die that day. It seems to me there was just as much evidence that Indians in large numbers would not run and that they were capable of leaving the Big Village to fight. Regards Steve Yep, this is my take on it too; they did not "always" run. Too many battles prove that. Ofc they picked their battles tons of times, but who doesn't? All the best, Noggy |
|
|
|
Post by backwater on Jul 18, 2021 11:11:28 GMT -6
"10,000 Swedes ran thru the weeds,. chased by one Norwegian" I've been working tons lately but check in here when i can get home. |
|
|
|
Post by noggy on Jul 18, 2021 14:11:11 GMT -6
"10,000 Swedes ran thru the weeds,. chased by one Norwegian" I've been working tons lately but check in here when i can get home. That's how it goes up here, very factual statement  (Had to google the poem) Noggy |
|
|
|
Post by Diane Merkel on Jul 19, 2021 8:19:59 GMT -6
(...)and the battle was considered a draw, and Crook withdrew back to the Goose Creek Camp. The NAs would take a draw like that any day. I could agree on it being a tactical draw, but strategically fending of 1 out of 3 columns was a blow to any US chances of succeeding in defeating the NAs in/around the LBH-river(s). Has Crook gotten a little easy off? Was it 2 months he stayed in camp after the battle? All the best, Noggy Diane |
|
|
|
Post by noggy on Jul 20, 2021 2:11:49 GMT -6
The NAs would take a draw like that any day. I could agree on it being a tactical draw, but strategically fending of 1 out of 3 columns was a blow to any US chances of succeeding in defeating the NAs in/around the LBH-river(s). Has Crook gotten a little easy off? Was it 2 months he stayed in camp after the battle? All the best, Noggy Diane Yes and to be clear on my part, I did not take that quote as yours I just personally find the battle interesting in the sense that both parties can claim victory, since they have different objectives/goals. All the best, Noggy |
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Jul 20, 2021 13:04:15 GMT -6
When is an Advanced Guard, not an Advanced Guard? When it has no elements following behind! It's quite possible that Reno got lost in translation. |
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Jul 24, 2021 10:51:43 GMT -6
The Battle of the Rosebud began when the hostiles clashed with the government Indian scouts about eight to ten miles from Crook’s bivouac. The scouts had little option but to gallop back and spread the alarm, the Sioux hard on their heels. It had been their frantic cries of “Lakota! Lakota!” that first gave Crook an inkling he had a major battle on his hands.
Just before Custer’s Little Big Horn, the southern portion of the U.S. Army pincer felt the fury of the Indians. Crook’s bivouac was located in a kind of natural amphitheater surrounded by a series of bluffs that paralleled the Rosebud. The bluffs to the north are some two hundred to six hundred yards from the Creek; behind them a huge ridge forms a rocky spine that stretches for five miles before ending in a high promontory now called Andrew’s Point. Another ridge, or series of rippling ridges, juts in from the southeast, joining the first in a kind of acute angle. Between the two ridges was a dry watercourse called Kollmar Creek.
When the attack began Crook’s command was on both sides of Rosebud Creek. Captain Henry Noyes’ battalion of five companies of the 2nd Cavalry was located on the north side of the stream, with Captain Frederick Van Vliet’s battalion of two companies of the 3rd Cavalry following behind. Long-suffering Major Alex Chambers’ “mule brigade” came next, five companies of mounted infantry, then the Montana miners. The Crow and Shoshoni allies under Captain George M. Randall brought up the rear, completing the forces on the north bank.
Captain Anson Mills’ battalion of four companies of the 3rd Cavalry was just across the Rosebud near the southern bank, accompanied by Captain Guy Henry’s four companies, also from the 3rd Cavalry. Counting all the troops, the Indian allies, and the civilian miners and packers, it is estimated Crook had 1,325 men.
Hundreds of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors appeared on the northern ridges, magnificent warriors in full regalia. Almost as if to taunt their unprepared enemies the braves—according to one witness—“dashed here, there, everywhere; up and down in ceaseless activity; gaudy decorations, waving plumes, and glittering arms, form a panorama of barbaric splendor.” Sioux rifles sent a scattering of shots into the soldier camp, a prelude to an all-out charge. The warriors surged forward, a human avalanche that seemed to gain momentum as it spilled down the slopes. The camp was unprepared for the onslaught, but just when things seemed their blackest, Chief of Scouts Captain Randall came bounding forward with the Crow and Shoshoni allies. Indian fought Indian for a good 20 minutes, the Shoshoni and Crow buying precious time for Crook to organize an adequate defense.
Individual warriors on both sides engaged in “bravery runs,” near-suicidal attempts to prove courage by deliberately drawing fire. Warriors were so intoxicated by the sheer joy of battle they scarcely felt wounds. Crow brave Bull Snake lay propped up against a tree with a bullet-shattered thigh, yet seemed oblivious to the pain as he “yelled like a madman” to encourage his comrades.
When the fight started Crook mounted his horse and rode to a hill to get a clearer picture of the overall situation. His absence was ill timed, because rapid Indian movements demanded immediate attention. Tactical command fell to Major Andrew Evans, 3rd Cavalry, who hastily issued a flurry of orders to deal with the developing crisis. Evans immediately dispatched Captain Van Vliet’s Company C and G, 3rd Cavalry, to take and hold the southern bluffs as a kind of defensive rearguard. Evans’ foresight proved invaluable, because Van Vliet’s men had scarcely occupied the southern bluffs before they repulsed a group of hostiles riding in from the east.
Evans now turned his attention to other pressing matters. Company G and H of the 9th Infantry were ordered to advance and hold the low bluffs to the north, with four dismounted companies of the 2nd cavalry in close support. Captain Thomas B. Dewee’s A Company, 2nd Cavalry, was given the onerous task of horse holders for three other companies now going into action.
Just before Custer’s Little Big Horn, the southern portion of the U.S. Army pincer felt the fury of the Indians.
To the west, Company C of the 9th Infantry and Company D and F of the 4th Infantry were sent forward in a skirmish line, eventually reaching the plateau where the Crows and Shoshonis were engaged in their holding action. Crow warrior Plenty Coups later recalled the fierce fighting, saying,“The enemy were like lice on a robe, and hot for battle.” Dust swirled, guns flashed, and Indian war cries echoed over the bluffs. The Crows and Shoshonis managed to smash the Sioux line, but the two broken halves tried to gallop around the government Indians to get at the foot-slogging, sweating soldiers coming up just behind. One party of Sioux rode east down a ravine, hoping to surprise the soldiers and steal their cavalry mounts in the valley below.
Alert to the danger, soldiers from the 9th Infantry and 2nd Cavalry prepared an ambush for the unsuspecting foe. At about 150 yards the troops unleashed a volley, a deadly gray rain of .45-caliber slugs that tore gaping wounds and tumbled warriors into the bloodstained earth. Their attack blunted, the Sioux split yet again into two separate streams, one of which managed to gain a northern ridge just in time to confront a cavalry charge led by Captain Mills.
Crazy Horse was present in the battle, conspicuous by his very simplicity of dress and manner. He wore a skin cape, but no war bonnet. The great Lakota warrior is sometimes credited as being the “commander” of the Sioux host at the Rosebud, a notion that displays little understanding of Plains Indian ways. Crazy Horse might suggest tactics, and warriors might listen, but Lakota leaders led by example alone.
Just prior to his departure to the observation knoll Crook sent Lieutenant Henry Lemly with an order to Captain Mills to “clear the center bluffs” just north of his position. Mills had already crossed the Rosebud, and once established on the north bank was in a good position to fulfill the general’s directive.
Mills, a distinguished-looking man whose trimmed mustache and goatee gave him the look of a cavalier, barked the command “Front into line” to his battalion. Each trooper had held his “trapdoor” .45-caliber Springfield carbine at the ready—sabers were rarely used on the frontier. Then Mills rose in his stirrups and shouted “Charge,” the order amplified by the brassy notes of a trumpeter’s bugle. His battalion, consisting of companies A, E, I, and M, bounded forward like a torrent. “We went in like a storm,” recalled one participant, and the crest of the bluffs were soon taken.
The captain’s charge was so rapid there was scarcely any time to use carbines, so troopers drew their single-action Colt revolvers and squeezed off a few rounds. The Sioux replied in kind, long plumes of smoke and flame jetting from their guns as they darted from place to place on swift ponies. Some Indian bullets must have found their mark, since horses tumbled and troopers spilled headlong into the dirt, but the others pressed on. The troopers reached the summit with a loud cheer, the Indians melting way before such a determined assault.
Indian warriors then taunted advancing troopers, slapping their buttocks in mockery. Other braves repeatedly exposed themselves to bluecoat fire. The Cheyenne Comes in Sight’s horse was stopped in its tracks by a .45-caliber slug, but the warrior landed on his feet and began to run. A hail of bullets dogged his every step, but just when all seemed lost his sister Buffalo Calf Road Woman rode up to save him. Comes in Sight leaped onto her horse and the pair made good their escape. Because of this incident the Cheyenne called the Battle of the Rosebud “Where the Girl Saved her Brother.”
Just before Custer’s Little Big Horn, the southern portion of the U.S. Army pincer felt the fury of the Indians.
Captain Mills found himself on a rocky ridge, which came under fire from another ridge about a half-mile distant. Dismounting the battalion, Mills went forward in a line of skirmishers. Even during the height of the fighting Mills couldn’t help admiring the superb equestrianship of the hostiles, men whom he considered “the best cavalry soldiers on earth.” Warriors galloped about, now advancing, now retreating, coming “in flocks or herds like buffalo.” The Indians were colorful; the Cheyenne Black Sun, for example, painted his entire body yellow, his loins wrapped in a blanket and the stuffed skin of a weasel on his head.
The Battle of the Rosebud was a complicated affair, made more confusing by the rugged terrain and the hostiles’ will-o’-the-wisp tactics. Some of its details are obscure, or at least subject to differing interpretation, to this very day.
Now dismounted, Mills’ troopers advanced and took the second line of bluffs just as the 2nd Cavalry took the ridge on the left. Crook came back from the observation hill and ordered Mills to take a rise [later to be known as Crook’s Hill]. Three companies under Lt. Col. William Royall would provide close support. Once again Mills led an adrenaline-pumping, pulse-quickening charge that was successful. Once again the Indians gave way, retreating to a conical mound some 1,200 yards from Crook’s Hill. During Mills’ charge, Lt. Col. Royall noticed gaudily painted warriors along a row of ridges about one mile southwest, across Kollmar Creek. Royall detached his three companies and went after this new threat, driving the hostiles in a northwesterly direction.
The colonel drew rein and halted on a ridge about a mile from Crook’s Hill, but Captain William Andrews led a platoon from his own Company I, 3rd Cavalry, to a high, wind-swept promontory—“Andrew’s Point”—that afforded a good view of the surrounding countryside. Lieutenant James Foster led another platoon just to the west and south of Andrews.
Andrews and Foster’s positions proved untenable, so they were recalled. Both men managed to reach Royall safely, but the colonel himself was “out on a limb” a mile from Crook and increasingly bothered by Indian enfilading fire. Crook’s command now had three far-flung components: Royall to the west, Crook in the center, and Van Vliet still holding the rear on the southern bluffs. It was time for consolidation, so Crook ordered Royall to extend his right and link up with the general’s main command.
Crook was dangerously strung out, in part because the bluecoats were reacting to Indian movements rather than following a rational plan of their own. The Sioux and Cheyenne had been moving “sideways” across Crook’s front, a crablike shuffle that moved ever westward. At the same time the Indians were playing a deadly game of “leapfrog” with the troops, retreating from hill to hill with the bluecoats in hot pursuit. The various components of Crook’s command—particularly Royall’s—were in danger of being isolated and destroyed in detail.
By about 10:30 am the Indians seemed to be concentrating on Royall, almost instinctively going for the jugular of his isolated command. The colonel was soon surrounded on three sides and subjected to an enfilading fire from the recently evacuated Andrew’s Point. Carbines pumped smoke and flame with clockwork regularity, the troopers flipping open the trapdoor of their weapons, then pushing the ejector to fling spent cartridges into the dust. Ordered by Crook to rejoin the main command, Royall was forced to conduct a fighting retreat.
The battle became a confusing jumble of events. The Cheyenne Wooden Leg recalled that “until the sun went far toward the west there were charges back and forth. Our Indians fought and ran away. The soldiers and their scouts did the same. Sometimes we chased them, sometimes they chased us.”
Amid the noise, smoke, and blood of battle some incidents stood out in sharp relief. During Royall’s retreat Sergeant David Marshal and a handful of men from Company F, 3rd Cavalry, were completely cut off and trapped by scores of hostiles. The troopers sold their lives dearly; though they were hot from constant use, carbine barrels pumped a steady stream of lead at the onrushing warriors. When the last round was fired the troopers fought on with clubbed carbines until only two were left, Private Phineas Towne and Private Richard Bennett. Bennett was cut to pieces, but Towne survived when other cavalry appeared and chased away his attackers.
Captain Guy Henry, 3rd Cavalry, was struck in the face by a bullet, the projectile drilling through his left cheek and exiting his right. Reeling in pain, temporarily blinded (he lost the use of one eye permanently), Henry’s mustache, face, and uniform were drenched in blood. Henry tumbled to the ground, the Sioux rushing forward to finish him off. The wounded officer was saved by a Crow countercharge, which rode though the Sioux warriors and forced them to turn tail.
Crook wanted Royall to join him because he was still under the impression—a false one—that the village was nearby. The beleaguered colonel managed to link up with Crook, thanks partly to a timely Crow and Shoshoni charge. Mills had been cautiously probing on the left, still hoping to take the hostile village, but when Crook saw how dangerous the situation had become he recalled him.
The Sioux and Cheyenne broke off the action around 2:30 pm. After six grueling hours, the Battle of the Rosebud petered out, sputtering like a gutted candle. The Indians did not have the white concept of total victory or defeat; they “were tired and hungry, so they went home.” Due in part to the confused nature of the fighting, casualty figures are disputed. Officially Crook lost nine men killed and 21 wounded, a suspiciously low figure that seems “doctored” for home consumption. Another report concedes 10 dead, four mortally wounded, and 43 less seriously hurt. One of the civilian scouts estimated 28 soldiers killed and 56 wounded, a figure than may be closer to the truth. The Crow claimed one killed and 10 wounded, the Shoshoni one killed.
Just before Custer’s Little Big Horn, the southern portion of the U.S. Army pincer felt the fury of the Indians.
Sioux and Cheyenne casualties are even harder to assess. Crazy Horse supposedly admitted to 36 killed and 63 wounded, a not-incredible figure given the battle’s length and hard-fought qualities. The Battle of the Rosebud was one of the great Indian fights of the 19th century, but it has been obscured by the events that occurred along the Little Bighorn River a week later. The sheer magnitude of the Custer disaster, coupled with his flamboyant and controversial personality, has relegated the Rosebud to a nearly forgotten footnote in history.
The Battle of the Rosebud was a prelude to disaster, yet there is reason to believe that Crook’s fight had a direct bearing on the Little Bighorn. If Crook had won on the Rosebud, perhaps Custer and his immediate command would not have been wiped out. Despite face-saving reports to the contrary, General George Crook was defeated at the Rosebud both strategically and tactically. In fact, the sheer shock of the unaccustomed reverse seems to have thrown Crook into an uncharacteristic lethargy, an over-caution that was also to have an impact on future events.
Crook maintained that he then needed reinforcements, even though his command was large and far from shattered. He made no attempt to immediately renew the advance—in fact, he didn’t even send a message to Terry to at least let the latter know what he was up against or that he had fought a battle. Instead, Crook and his men enjoyed a languid “vacation,” hunting and fishing, a holiday that extended into the period Custer searched out these same hostiles (who had now moved their village) and proceeded to be wiped out, some 60 miles to the north.
George Crook was one of the finest Indian fighting officers the army ever produced, but during the Great Sioux War he seems to have experienced a temporary—and to Custer, fatal—lapse in his powers.
|
|
