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Post by noggy on Jul 7, 2021 6:25:34 GMT -6
Same, but I have strond interest in the Apache. That's also a bunch I'd rather not have messed with if i were a pioneer in the 1870s. Well, it could have been myself i'm thinking of; I made the point in an article I've been writing for a military history magazine here for years and years without finishing. However, even if I think the whole "loosing view" comes often from Americans looking at it from their/the soldiers point of view rather than the NAs, there is some validity to it; the mistakes made by GAC & friends are so big that they affected the battle more than the (re)actions of the NAs. At lat I think so. Not everyday they got to deal with an regiment piecemeal. They didn't at Rosebud, or in the later battles that Autumn. Noggy Before I launch into another of my diatribes, could you please confirm what mistakes you believe Custer & friends made at LBH? The Apache eh? Cochise, Geronimo et al. Yes, a fierce people, made so by the harsh environment in which they eventually had been pushed. Oddly enough, they had the same language root as the Inuit, so the assumption can be made that they had been pushed quite a long way from their original home. Fascinating too that many of the tribal names we label them by were not what they called themselves. "Hunk" Papa I’m not a fan of hindsight, and you’ll find many people way more critical towards him than me (and the other way around…). The extremely short answer is that if you are on the offensive against an enemy with a numerical advantage and then without recon split up your regiment several times, ending up with 3 out of 12 companies actually making somewhat of an attack, 5 other companies being wiped out, the rest have their hands ful of surviving a siege….well, something went wrong and it was not only due to the NAs’ ability to fight. But this is ofc an enormous topic, Many tribes seem to be known by names given them by others. I’ve read “Sioux” comes from other tribes’ nicknames (meaning “snakes” or something French. Both Comanche and Apache is often believed to be another word for “enemy” by other tribes, etc etc. Imo Cochise should rank right up there with Sitting Bull. A great character and leader. Speaking of Apache and inuit language, 80 ish years ago, my fellow Noggy Helge Ingstad spent time with both. He at one point went south into the Sierra Madre, looking for the so-called “Renegade Apaches” who hid and fought in the mountains for decades after 1886. I find the perido after geronimo’s surrender very interesting. Either way, his book has been translated to English and is very much worth a look for anyone interested in the subject. www.amazon.com/Apache-Indians-Search-Missing-Tribe/dp/0803271859/ref=sr_1_6?dchild=1&qid=1625659157&refinements=p_27%3AHelge+Ingstad&s=books&sr=1-6 All the best, Noggy |
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jul 7, 2021 11:03:32 GMT -6
Before I launch into another of my diatribes, could you please confirm what mistakes you believe Custer & friends made at LBH? The Apache eh? Cochise, Geronimo et al. Yes, a fierce people, made so by the harsh environment in which they eventually had been pushed. Oddly enough, they had the same language root as the Inuit, so the assumption can be made that they had been pushed quite a long way from their original home. Fascinating too that many of the tribal names we label them by were not what they called themselves. "Hunk" Papa I’m not a fan of hindsight, and you’ll find many people way more critical towards him than me (and the other way around…). The extremely short answer is that if you are on the offensive against an enemy with a numerical advantage and then without recon split up your regiment several times, ending up with 3 out of 12 companies actually making somewhat of an attack, 5 other companies being wiped out, the rest have their hands ful of surviving a siege….well, something went wrong and it was not only due to the NAs’ ability to fight. But this is ofc an enormous topic, Many tribes seem to be known by names given them by others. I’ve read “Sioux” comes from other tribes’ nicknames (meaning “snakes” or something French. Both Comanche and Apache is often believed to be another word for “enemy” by other tribes, etc etc. Imo Cochise should rank right up there with Sitting Bull. A great character and leader. Speaking of Apache and inuit language, 80 ish years ago, my fellow Noggy Helge Ingstad spent time with both. He at one point went south into the Sierra Madre, looking for the so-called “Renegade Apaches” who hid and fought in the mountains for decades after 1886. I find the perido after geronimo’s surrender very interesting. Either way, his book has been translated to English and is very much worth a look for anyone interested in the subject. www.amazon.com/Apache-Indians-Search-Missing-Tribe/dp/0803271859/ref=sr_1_6?dchild=1&qid=1625659157&refinements=p_27%3AHelge+Ingstad&s=books&sr=1-6 All the best, Noggy You are correct in stating that it is an enormous topic and you make an equally interesting observation about not being a fan of hindsight. That there are a great number of people who as you say, are considerably more critical of Custer than you are, does not make them right in my view, because, in the main, I believe they are allowing hindsight bias to intrude into their thinking. To avoid going on for pages, it is my opinion that the realities of the real time situation are overlooked. Both Terry and Gibbon had been looking for the Indians for weeks and but for Reno’s uncharacteristic disobedience in finding a relatively fresh trail leading up the Rosebud, they might have continuing looking in vain. On the back of Reno’s news, the well known ‘plan’ was executed with it being well understood that Custer’s was the strike force. His scouts confirmed the village location early on June 25 and…the rest is history, or at least history as some would have it. Now let’s look at the situation in real time. Where exactly Terry and Crook are is unknown to Custer, but he believes he has been discovered, so what does he do? He knows it is a large village but calculates some 1,500 warriors, so doable in the thinking of that time. His scouts have done all the recon possible to that point and the only way he can learn more is on the hoof. As I see it, his options are either to attack or retreat. If he retreats contact with the village will be lost and it will most probably break up and scatter in all directions before contact can be reestablished. If so, Custer will be castigated for not striking it as planned and probably court-martialled. So being an aggressive leader he must op to attack. He advances toward the village using the standard operating procedure of the time. Benteen’s wide sweep is to ensure that there are no satellite villages on his left flank which could attack his rear once he engages the main village warriors. Reno is sent to act as the holding force in a classic envelopment while Custer aims for the northern end of the village to attack it there as expected. The tactic is rendered void when Reno takes most of G Company into the timber and never comes out again, De Rudio follows him with half of A Company and a scared Moylan soon withdraws the rest of the skirmish line into the timber. The initiative is now with the Indians who grow even bolder when Reno bursts from the timber seeking safety and they are able to cut down around 30 of his troopers. Meanwhile Benteen has received his note but has virtually ignored it but stops to aid Reno. Meantime, Custer, unaware of all this, has found the village stretches further north than he thought but has ventured that far anyway, only to be foiled by the unexpectedly large number of warriors still at that end getting their horses, so has to retreat back toward Custer Hill to hopefully join up with Keogh, who is already under pressure from the large number of warriors coming from corralling Reno. Once the warriors hold the upper hand they never let go. Whilst it might be argued that his subordinates may not have fulfilled their roles as anticipated, what ‘mistakes’ did Custer make in all of that? He didn’t have a crystal ball to divine that the warriors were not going to run this time, that they were fresh from defeating Crook and Reno so were confident of taking him on. Of course, then their greater numbers came into play and he was heading for the disaster that befell his immediate command. I note you say “then without recon split up your regiment” and this is an oft used criticism. My question, which has never been answered satisfactorily, is, “what recon?” Perhaps you could enlarge on this for me as it is the elephant in the room! Thanks for the elucidation of tribal names which is my understanding also and for the Apache book reference which I will follow up in due course. Waiting now for 8.00 p.m. our time to see if your near neighbours spoil England's dream! Sincerely, “Hunk” Papa |
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Post by noggy on Jul 7, 2021 13:08:50 GMT -6
I’m not a fan of hindsight, and you’ll find many people way more critical towards him than me (and the other way around…). The extremely short answer is that if you are on the offensive against an enemy with a numerical advantage and then without recon split up your regiment several times, ending up with 3 out of 12 companies actually making somewhat of an attack, 5 other companies being wiped out, the rest have their hands ful of surviving a siege….well, something went wrong and it was not only due to the NAs’ ability to fight. But this is ofc an enormous topic, Many tribes seem to be known by names given them by others. I’ve read “Sioux” comes from other tribes’ nicknames (meaning “snakes” or something French. Both Comanche and Apache is often believed to be another word for “enemy” by other tribes, etc etc. Imo Cochise should rank right up there with Sitting Bull. A great character and leader. Speaking of Apache and inuit language, 80 ish years ago, my fellow Noggy Helge Ingstad spent time with both. He at one point went south into the Sierra Madre, looking for the so-called “Renegade Apaches” who hid and fought in the mountains for decades after 1886. I find the perido after geronimo’s surrender very interesting. Either way, his book has been translated to English and is very much worth a look for anyone interested in the subject. www.amazon.com/Apache-Indians-Search-Missing-Tribe/dp/0803271859/ref=sr_1_6?dchild=1&qid=1625659157&refinements=p_27%3AHelge+Ingstad&s=books&sr=1-6 All the best, Noggy As I see it, his options are either to attack or retreat. If he retreats contact with the village will be lost and it will most probably break up and scatter in all directions before contact can be reestablished. If so, Custer will be castigated for not striking it as planned and probably court-martialled. So being an aggressive leader he must op to attack. He advances toward the village using the standard operating procedure of the time. Benteen’s wide sweep is to ensure that there are no satellite villages on his left flank which could attack his rear once he engages the main village warriors. Reno is sent to act as the holding force in a classic envelopment while Custer aims for the northern end of the village to attack it there as expected. The tactic is rendered void when Reno takes most of G Company into the timber and never comes out again, De Rudio follows him with half of A Company and a scared Moylan soon withdraws the rest of the skirmish line into the timber. The initiative is now with the Indians who grow even bolder when Reno bursts from the timber seeking safety and they are able to cut down around 30 of his troopers. Meanwhile Benteen has received his note but has virtually ignored it but stops to aid Reno. (...) I note you say “then without recon split up your regiment” and this is an oft used criticism. My question, which has never been answered satisfactorily, is, “what recon?” Perhaps you could enlarge on this for me as it is the elephant in the room! I'll make this as short as possible, but my thoughts are that he did the right thing in attacking on the 25th. Waiting a full day would, if they were discovered, give NAs the possibility of either running or attacking (with Rosebud in mind, they wouldn't have run). I can understand not gambling on going a whole day undetected. Custer knows by this point he is facing a force of some 1 500 men. He has 650 ish. His greatest strength apart from the surprise element a quick and determined cavalry charge with ensuing chaos could create, would be concentrated fire power. Reno could attest to 3 companies by themselves not being enough. Neither were 5 strung out on BR. How 8, like GAC told Reno would be the case, could have fared in the valley is an interesting thought. As far as the whole recon comment, I see how it can be perceived (is that the right word?). What I meant is that if you are going to split your forces and do so with real «purpose» (as in a targeted flank maneuver and so on) against an enemy that outnumber you, you really should know where your enemy is. Hey, it helps letting your buddies know where you are too! If not, you might be feeding the enemy your units piece by piece. But recon takes time. And he chose to attack. Which I can understand. But when the only thing you really have of intel is the direction of the enemy (and his herd), I for one agree with Benteen who wasn't to keen on being sent valley hunting or whatever he called it. Without recon of any sort, splitting shouldn't be an option. Yet it was. So by the time he decided to split his forces in four, of course recon was not an option. Neither were any chances of breaking up the village or having enough rifles firing at the same time. I change my mind about stuff all the time, and by this board's standard, I'm a novice. In addition my language and time available when writing don't always do my thoughts justice. Plus, I'm often wrong  All the best, Noggy |
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Post by backwater on Jul 7, 2021 19:19:22 GMT -6
fun thread. I think Crook figured he could go where he pleased and would only get some harassment/snipers to deal with. I don't believe he thought he had a chance in hell of cornering a village. Custer hated being under anyone's command but i think Crook had it worse but for different reasons. He seems geared lower, deuce and a half truck vs Custer's ford raptor. He traveled heavy and slogged after a trail. Good subject of fierce N.A. tribe try the Meskwaki (Fox) tribe against the French. good book on that is-
The Fox Wars: The Mesquakie Challenge to New France (Volume 211) (The Civilization of the American Indian Series) Paperback – Illustrated, April 26, 2014
by R. David Edmunds (Author), Joseph L. Peyser
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Post by noggy on Jul 8, 2021 4:09:23 GMT -6
fun thread. I think Crook figured he could go where he pleased and would only get some harassment/snipers to deal with. I don't believe he thought he had a chance in hell of cornering a village. Custer hated being under anyone's command but i think Crook had it worse but for different reasons. He seems geared lower, deuce and a half truck vs Custer's ford raptor. He traveled heavy and slogged after a trail. Good subject of fierce N.A. tribe try the Meskwaki (Fox) tribe against the French. good book on that is- The Fox Wars: The Mesquakie Challenge to New France (Volume 211) (The Civilization of the American Indian Series) Paperback – Illustrated, April 26, 2014 by R. David Edmunds (Author), Joseph L. Peyser There are instances/scenarioes where I would have chosen GAC over Crook, for example in a traditional cavalry charge during the ACW. During a potentially long-term, strategic operation, I'd go for Crook. Been planning on expaning my "NA horizon" as far as Eastern USA goes, Ill check this book out, so cheers for the tip. All the best, Noggy |
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jul 8, 2021 8:32:42 GMT -6
As I see it, his options are either to attack or retreat. If he retreats contact with the village will be lost and it will most probably break up and scatter in all directions before contact can be reestablished. If so, Custer will be castigated for not striking it as planned and probably court-martialled. So being an aggressive leader he must op to attack. He advances toward the village using the standard operating procedure of the time. Benteen’s wide sweep is to ensure that there are no satellite villages on his left flank which could attack his rear once he engages the main village warriors. Reno is sent to act as the holding force in a classic envelopment while Custer aims for the northern end of the village to attack it there as expected. The tactic is rendered void when Reno takes most of G Company into the timber and never comes out again, De Rudio follows him with half of A Company and a scared Moylan soon withdraws the rest of the skirmish line into the timber. The initiative is now with the Indians who grow even bolder when Reno bursts from the timber seeking safety and they are able to cut down around 30 of his troopers. Meanwhile Benteen has received his note but has virtually ignored it but stops to aid Reno. (...) I note you say “then without recon split up your regiment” and this is an oft used criticism. My question, which has never been answered satisfactorily, is, “what recon?” Perhaps you could enlarge on this for me as it is the elephant in the room! I'll make this as short as possible, but my thoughts are that he did the right thing in attacking on the 25th. Waiting a full day would, if they were discovered, give NAs the possibility of either running or attacking (with Rosebud in mind, they wouldn't have run). I can understand not gambling on going a whole day undetected. Custer knows by this point he is facing a force of some 1 500 men. He has 650 ish. His greatest strength apart from the surprise element a quick and determined cavalry charge with ensuing chaos could create, would be concentrated fire power. Reno could attest to 3 companies by themselves not being enough. Neither were 5 strung out on BR. How 8, like GAC told Reno would be the case, could have fared in the valley is an interesting thought. As far as the whole recon comment, I see how it can be perceived (is that the right word?). What I meant is that if you are going to split your forces and do so with real «purpose» (as in a targeted flank maneuver and so on) against an enemy that outnumber you, you really should know where your enemy is. Hey, it helps letting your buddies know where you are too! If not, you might be feeding the enemy your units piece by piece. But recon takes time. And he chose to attack. Which I can understand. But when the only thing you really have of intel is the direction of the enemy (and his herd), I for one agree with Benteen who wasn't to keen on being sent valley hunting or whatever he called it. Without recon of any sort, splitting shouldn't be an option. Yet it was. So by the time he decided to split his forces in four, of course recon was not an option. Neither were any chances of breaking up the village or having enough rifles firing at the same time. I change my mind about stuff all the time, and by this board's standard, I'm a novice. In addition my language and time available when writing don't always do my thoughts justice. Plus, I'm often wrong All the best, Noggy Noggy, there is very little wrong with your English considering it is not your first language. By comparison my Norwegian is non-existent! I'll tackle the points you raise singly. The records indicate that Custer was primed to hide his regiment on the 25th then attack at dawn on the 26th, until the belief that Lakota scouts had discovered his command prompted the 25th attack. The firm belief of the entire Army command was that the hostiles would flee and scatter if any of the army forces managed to find them. Custer, of course, had no knowledge of the Rosebud fight and therefore that the Lakota/Cheyennes were prepared to fight. Yes, he had calculated a possible 1,500 warriors but he was not alone in thinking that he had enough men to defeat that number. "Gibbon to Terry April 21st, 1876: 10.40 a.m. I had just got this far when a courier arrived with your dispatches of the 15th. I have in accordance with the directions moved my camp alongside Fort Pease, where I am strong enough to defy the whole Sioux nation, should they feel inclined to come this way, " "Terry to Sheridan May 16th, 1876: The storm was very severe yesterday, making the plain below the post on which we were encamped almost impossible for wagons loaded as ours are. It has not rained now since sunrise and I am very confident that we shall be able to pull out and make a short march tomorrow. I have no doubt of the ability of my column to whip all the Sioux who we can find. " Finally, "Sheridan to Terry May 16th, 1876: I will hurry up Crook, but you must rely on the ability of your own column for your best success. I believe it to be fully equal to all the Sioux which can be brought against it, and only hope they will hold fast to meet it.That is just a sampling of the military's overwhelming confidence that they would easily defeat the hostiles, so the idea that Custer was rash to attack with his 486 effectives is mistaken. The idea that he and Benteen should have joined Reno in the valley and charged te village is often cited as a tactic he should have used. The problem is that by the time of the LBH the days of the cavalry charge were virtually over. the 7th and other cavalry regiments were armed with the 1873 Springfields which dictated that their tactic would be to close with their Indian foes until they reached the point where their longer range carbines would give them the advantage. That single shot weapon was not suited to a charge and their six shot revolvers would soon need reloading, difficult whilst under fire. Without their sabres or the usual infantry support which normally held the ground made by their initial charge, the possibility of the type of charge you envisage, was not possible. There is also a consistent belief that when Custer told Reno that he would be supported, he meant behind him in the valley, which is what Reno claimed. Personally I cannot believe that the arrogant Custer would go into any attack behind a subordinate and in my opinion, what Custer was referring to was the alternative tactic of an envelopment with Reno as the holding force, Custer attacking from the north and Benteen wherever he could. Yes, I understand that they would be charging without sabres or infantry support, but past experience had taught army forces that the Indians could not cope with near enough simultaneous attacks from different directions. As far as recon is concerned, bear in mind that Custer had Boyer and the six Crows with him, operating in their own backyard. They had seen from the Crow's Nest, the smoke from the village fires, so they would have known more or less where the village was located. In fact a large party of Crows had camped there about 3 or 4 years earlier (indeed White Swan was definitely there) so Custer would learned this intel from them. We only have the word of Reno and Benteen that Custer had not let them know but by sending Benteen off to the left he had eliminated the possibility of a regimental charge, so that only left the envelopment which Reno acknowledged at the RCOI. There could be very little recon either by waiting a day or attacking because his scouts could not have operated in the valley without the risk of being caught or killed. I must repeat therefore, what recon do you believe he did not do? "Hunk" Papa |
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Post by noggy on Jul 8, 2021 11:30:21 GMT -6
As far as recon is concerned, bear in mind that Custer had Boyer and the six Crows with him, operating in their own backyard. They had seen from the Crow's Nest, the smoke from the village fires, so they would have known more or less where the village was located. In fact a large party of Crows had camped there about 3 or 4 years earlier (indeed White Swan was definitely there) so Custer would learned this intel from them. We only have the word of Reno and Benteen that Custer had not let them know but by sending Benteen off to the left he had eliminated the possibility of a regimental charge, so that only left the envelopment which Reno acknowledged at the RCOI. There could be very little recon either by waiting a day or attacking because his scouts could not have operated in the valley without the risk of being caught or killed. I must repeat therefore, what recon do you believe he did not do? "Hunk" Papa It took me a little while but after a couple of rounds re-reading, I think I found where we appear to misunderstand each other/I was unclear. This is what I wrote: "The extremely short answer is that if you are on the offensive against an enemy with a numerical advantage and then without recon split up your regiment several times, ending up with 3 out of 12 companies actually making somewhat of an attack, 5 other companies being wiped out, the rest have their hands ful of surviving a siege….well, something went wrong and it was not only due to the NAs’ ability to fight." Now, I see this can be read as a criticism of lacking recon/scouting...but... It isn't meant that way. It is meant as a criticism of splitting up a regiment/unit when the circumstances aren't right. They weren't, in my opinion. The lack of recon or lack of the possibility to recon (this isn't a verb, I fear) if you so will...in this setting they are the same. It isn there/it isn't possible. Those are the circumstances. Either way; don' split up the regiment. I hope that was better explained? As far as splitting up and stuff, I have no problems with differing opinions here, at all. On the contrary. On of the things I enjoy about reading posts from well read LBH scholars is how good points people of different opinions can make. I learn a load every day i read here/other sites, be it current or old threads. I just personally believe he should have kept his regiment united. I also do believe GAC could have won/gotten out of it okay with 650 men if they acted like a unit. Not necessarily in the shape of a massive charge riding through the village. Just showing up on foot firing several hundred of rifles would be enough to cause enough panic in the village/herd areas. A big difference from Rosebud would have been the proximity to the non-combatants, whose safety would have been a huge deal for the warriors. At the same time, he could have lost with 1 500 men if he sent them in groups of ten at the time towards the warriors (Custer was lucky to have any Crow scouts at all. If I recall correctly. Neither he or Terry hired any, and had to «borrow» some from Gibbon. Crook had 170-190 Crows or whatever it was. Quite a difference in preparations. But I might remember the numbers and details completely wrong) All the best, Noggy |
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jul 8, 2021 15:17:24 GMT -6
As far as recon is concerned, bear in mind that Custer had Boyer and the six Crows with him, operating in their own backyard. They had seen from the Crow's Nest, the smoke from the village fires, so they would have known more or less where the village was located. In fact a large party of Crows had camped there about 3 or 4 years earlier (indeed White Swan was definitely there) so Custer would learned this intel from them. We only have the word of Reno and Benteen that Custer had not let them know but by sending Benteen off to the left he had eliminated the possibility of a regimental charge, so that only left the envelopment which Reno acknowledged at the RCOI. There could be very little recon either by waiting a day or attacking because his scouts could not have operated in the valley without the risk of being caught or killed. I must repeat therefore, what recon do you believe he did not do? "Hunk" Papa It took me a little while but after a couple of rounds re-reading, I think I found where we appear to misunderstand each other/I was unclear. This is what I wrote: "The extremely short answer is that if you are on the offensive against an enemy with a numerical advantage and then without recon split up your regiment several times, ending up with 3 out of 12 companies actually making somewhat of an attack, 5 other companies being wiped out, the rest have their hands ful of surviving a siege….well, something went wrong and it was not only due to the NAs’ ability to fight." Now, I see this can be read as a criticism of lacking recon/scouting...but... It isn't meant that way. It is meant as a criticism of splitting up a regiment/unit when the circumstances aren't right. They weren't, in my opinion. The lack of recon or lack of the possibility to recon (this isn't a verb, I fear) if you so will...in this setting they are the same. It isn there/it isn't possible. Those are the circumstances. Either way; don' split up the regiment. I hope that was better explained? As far as splitting up and stuff, I have no problems with differing opinions here, at all. On the contrary. On of the things I enjoy about reading posts from well read LBH scholars is how good points people of different opinions can make. I learn a load every day i read here/other sites, be it current or old threads. I just personally believe he should have kept his regiment united. I also do believe GAC could have won/gotten out of it okay with 650 men if they acted like a unit. Not necessarily in the shape of a massive charge riding through the village. Just showing up on foot firing several hundred of rifles would be enough to cause enough panic in the village/herd areas. A big difference from Rosebud would have been the proximity to the non-combatants, whose safety would have been a huge deal for the warriors. At the same time, he could have lost with 1 500 men if he sent them in groups of ten at the time towards the warriors (Custer was lucky to have any Crow scouts at all. If I recall correctly. Neither he or Terry hired any, and had to «borrow» some from Gibbon. Crook had 170-190 Crows or whatever it was. Quite a difference in preparations. But I might remember the numbers and details completely wrong) All the best, Noggy I understand where you are coming from and what you state is the opinion of a great many who criticise Custer’s actions at the LBH. What is almost always overlooked I believe, is that viewpoint is one taken in hindsight, i.e., knowing the end result. As I have already demonstrated, the army attitude (and therefore Custer’s), was that whatever the numbers were, the Indians would not stand against any of the military columns in the field, but would try to scatter and run. When Custer took his regiment into that valley therefore, that mindset prevailed so the warrior numbers were of no real concern to him. All of what you say subsequently is true only if Custer had been aware of Crook’s battle [which the Indians viewed as a victory] and Sitting Bull’s vision, which together had pumped up the warriors’ confidence. With that foreknowledge he could be criticised for the way he deployed his regiment, but without it he could only deal with his command on the basis of using standard operating procedure, which in the case of the LBH, was an envelopment. He was suckered by the arrogance of army thinking, that his foe would try to run, thinking he was guilty of himself, but past experience with these Indians dictated that such would be the case. In fact, the LBH was a prime example of what one army officer’s thesis called the “Victory Disease,” assuming that a win was inevitable because the enemy was predictable. It was also unique as never had a military force gone up against a village of that size, nor would again. Regarding the Crows, the Dakota Column came from east, passing through country known to the Ree scouts. When it met up with Gibbon at the Yellowstone/Rosebud confluence and it had been decided that Custer would be following the Rosebud trail, then Crow scouts would be valuable as he would be heading into their country. The Crow interpreter Mitch Boyer, who actually lived with the tribe, was detached by Gibbon, together with 6 braves. Take care friend Noggy, “Hunk” Papa |
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 9, 2021 6:38:26 GMT -6
Noggy
I believe you have it right. This is not a matter of hindsight. That is an excuse to cover up basic known implementation errors. We know that from William, who served in the US Army. He pointed out that Custer should have followed his advance guard into the valley. He wrote about the NOGO terrain features that were present before the battle, during the battle, and are still there today. They are not hindsight issues.
We know from Col Hoyt that the horses should have been considered the Center of Gravity (COG) and would be best addressed in the valley. Focus on the COG is not a hindsight issue.
We know from simple math that if the force is smaller, it takes fewer enemies to outnumber that force. That is not a hindsight issue. As one early poster who was also a U.S. military person, Custer fed the 7th to the Indians a few companies at a time in groups of 2 and 3.
All of the factors are not hindsight. They were known to military leaders and were common knowledge.
I doubt that anyone could say that Custer did not know the advantage of recon and that only in hindsight did we learn of its use in making military decisions. One of the things we do after an action is debriefing. We discuss what worked, what didn't work, and how to make improvements. Hindsight would imply that the above-listed elements were unknown. Hogwash
Custer knew he could follow the advance guard.
Custer knew what NOGO terrain features were, including the bluffs and river
Custer knew how to calculate numbers, and if you reduce a force size, then it takes fewer enemy forces to overwhelm it
Custer knew he could not command forces that he could not see
Custer knew the value of recon
Custer gambled on things he didn't know, and it cost him but to say he didn't have choices is not true. Even some of the scouts told him of the numbers in the valley. General Miles said he understood what Custer was attempting to do, but that doesn't change all the factors that Custer ignored before engaging in his battle-making decisions.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by mikerobel on Jul 9, 2021 10:36:07 GMT -6
Regarding Crooks actions and the outcome.
Surprise and defeat occur largely in the commander's mind and a result of lack of proper security and reconnaissance.
Crook was surprised at the Rosebud. Only the Scout's being deployed forever mitigated the surprise.
Crook of course claimed that he held the field so he won the victory. Strictly speaking this is true as the Indians withdrew from the fight. However, he was defeated, as I said, in his mind. The current Army definition of "defeat" is (From FM 3-90.1 Tactics) "Defeat is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable to pursue that individual’s adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander’s will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use."
Destroy is similar, but involves significant loss to the enemy force: "Destroy is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue that individual's adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander's will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat* can result from the use of force or the threat of its use. The amount of damage needed to render a unit combat-ineffective depends on the unit’s type, discipline, and morale. Destroying armored or dug-in targets with area fire weapons requires considerable ammunition and time, so forces do not normally attempt it unless they have terminally guided munitions."
*Including the Defeat statement in the Destroy definition is confusing. Destroy requires the use of force whereas Defeat can occur from the threat of force.
Lesser forms of destruction include Neutralization and Suppress. These are temporary conditions. Neutralization is generally thought to occur when the attacked force suffers 30-40% casualties and Suppression at 10%.
"Neutralize is a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation. (Figure B-25 shows the neutralize tactical mission graphic.) The two lines cross over the symbol of the unit or facility targeted for neutralization. When assigning a task to neutralize, the commander specifies the enemy force or materiel to neutralize and the duration, which is time- or event-driven. The neutralized target may become effective again when casualties are replaced, damage is repaired, or effort resulting in the neutralization is lifted. The commander normally uses a combination of lethal and nonlethal effects to neutralize enemy personnel or materiel. The assets required to neutralize a target vary accordingly."
"Suppress is a tactical mission task that results in the temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapon system below the level needed to accomplish its mission. It occurs when a commander employs direct or indirect lethal and nonlethal effects, such as artillery, electronic warfare, or smoke on enemy personnel, weapons, and equipment to prevent or degrade enemy fires, sensors, and visual observation of friendly forces. Unlike the neutralization task, the original target regains its effectiveness without needing to reconstitute, once the effects of the systems involved in the suppression effort lift or shift to another target."
Lots of people like to use the terms "decimate" or "decimated" to describe severe casualties on a unit, but the term really means 1 out of 10. Thus, it is more like Suppression than Destroyed.
Custer's Battalion was Destroyed. The 7th Cavalry suffered about 268 killed and 55 wounded for a total of 323 casualties out of a strength of about 700. This reflects a 46% loss which result in them being Neutralized until they had a chance to rest, eat, rearm, and consolidate. Reno/Benteen had a strength of about 355 and suffered about 50 KIA and 55 WIA for 105/355 for about a 29% loss, so they are close to be Neutralized, but they were certainly Suppressed and Fixed/Contained.
Fix is a tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy force from moving any part of that force from a specific location for a specific period. This may occur by engaging the enemy force to prevent its withdrawal for use elsewhere, or by using military deception, such as transmitting false orders. The commander uses fix in offensive and defensive actions; it is always a shaping operation. (Figure B-21 shows the tactical mission graphic for fix.) The commander points the arrow toward the desired enemy unit to fix. The broken part of the arrow indicates the desired location for that event to occur. B-57. Fixing an enemy force does not mean destroying it. The friendly force has to prevent the enemy from moving in any direction. This task usually has a time constraint, such as “fix the enemy reserve force until OBJECTIVE FALON, the decisive operation, is secured.” The tactical mission task of fix differs from that of block in that a fixed enemy force cannot move from a given location, but a blocked enemy force can move in any direction other than the one obstructed.
Contain is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to stop, hold, or surround enemy forces or to cause them to center their activity on a given front and prevent them from withdrawing any part of their forces for use elsewhere. Containment allows an enemy force to reposition itself within the designated geographical area, while fixing an enemy does not. Geographic terms or time may express the limits of the containment. The contain graphic encompasses the entire area in which the commander desires to contain the enemy during the development of alternative courses of action.
The Terry Column as a whole was defeated. One could argue the Reno/Benteen battalion conducted a successful defense but this conclusion should be tempered by the Indians withdrew as the Gibbon Column came closer. One could also argue, since the 7th held the field at the end, they won the battle.
Hopefully, this doctrinal destruction can provide some clarity in the way we examine and evaluate the battle.
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Post by shan on Jul 10, 2021 5:58:02 GMT -6
"Hunk" Papa
Thank you for your summing up of Custer's decision making and the reasons why the battle unfolded as it did. You bring to it a clear concise mind ~ unlike my own ~~ and manage to put your points across without becoming caught up in the mire that bedevils most of us.
I could meander as is my wont, but I think the main thing we all have to remember is that we're all dissecting this event in hindsight. Nobody who was present that day could have known what we know, and that goes for both sides, they just played the cards they were dealt and hoped for the best.
Shan
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jul 10, 2021 12:42:38 GMT -6
Noggy I believe you have it right. This is not a matter of hindsight. That is an excuse to cover up basic known implementation errors. We know that from William, who served in the US Army. He pointed out that Custer should have followed his advance guard into the valley. He wrote about the NOGO terrain features that were present before the battle, during the battle, and are still there today. They are not hindsight issues. We know from Col Hoyt that the horses should have been considered the Center of Gravity (COG) and would be best addressed in the valley. Focus on the COG is not a hindsight issue. We know from simple math that if the force is smaller, it takes fewer enemies to outnumber that force. That is not a hindsight issue. As one early poster who was also a U.S. military person, Custer fed the 7th to the Indians a few companies at a time in groups of 2 and 3. All of the factors are not hindsight. They were known to military leaders and were common knowledge. I doubt that anyone could say that Custer did not know the advantage of recon and that only in hindsight did we learn of its use in making military decisions. One of the things we do after an action is debriefing. We discuss what worked, what didn't work, and how to make improvements. Hindsight would imply that the above-listed elements were unknown. Hogwash Custer knew he could follow the advance guard. Custer knew what NOGO terrain features were, including the bluffs and river Custer knew how to calculate numbers, and if you reduce a force size, then it takes fewer enemy forces to overwhelm it Custer knew he could not command forces that he could not see Custer knew the value of recon Custer gambled on things he didn't know, and it cost him but to say he didn't have choices is not true. Even some of the scouts told him of the numbers in the valley. General Miles said he understood what Custer was attempting to do, but that doesn't change all the factors that Custer ignored before engaging in his battle-making decisions. Regards AZ Ranger So Steve, straight for the jugular eh? Teaching that upstart from the U.K. not to foist his views onto an apparently defenceless Norwegian it appears. Well, let’s look at the points you raise and I will do you the courtesy of not calling them hogwash. That William served in the U.S. Army does not give him any greater insight into the LBH battle than anyone else who is capable of researching the primary records. What he avers is merely his opinion, nothing else. Presumably Reno’s command is William’s ‘advance guard’, which is, I suggest, nothing of the kind. As Reno himself admitted in his Report, “After traveling over his trail, it is evident to me that Custer intended to support me by moving further down the stream and attacking the village in the flank,” which means that Custer was affecting the SOP of an envelopment with Reno as the holding force, not as advance guard. I assume that Reno’s nervousness at having his command alone in the valley prompted him to suggest that he expected Custer to be behind him from which anti-Custer people construe Reno’s situation as advance guard. Webster’s New World College Dictionary defines an advance guard as “a detachment of troops sent ahead to reconnoiter and protect the line of march” and “a body of troops going before the main force to clear the way, guard against surprise, etc”, yet according to his RCOI testimony, Reno’s received orders were, “General Custer directs you to take as rapid a gait as you think prudent, and charge the village afterwards, and you will be supported by the whole outfit.” There is nothing in that wording that accords with the status of an advance guard, so William’s opinion that Reno’s command was one, is just that. Presumably by ‘following the advance guard into the valley’, William can only be alluding to a charge into the village by the combined Custer/Reno force as otherwise there seems little point in the combined force forming a skirmish line. How would any such charge by 373 men need to be organised? Reno’s skirmish line of approximately 150 men had stretched almost across the valley floor so maybe the charge could have been organised in two lines, one of 187 and the next o 186, with a suitable interval between them. What is certain however, is that as soon as the first line hit the tipis it would be broken up and the same applies to the second. Furthermore, using only their six-shooters, both lines, now fragmented, would need to reload. Stopped in their tracks, trying to reload, the warriors would be shooting them out of their saddles when the only possible course of action would be to retreat. Not a very good plan I feel, though perhaps William has a better answer. The actual answer is that charges into Indians villages, unless very small, were made with infantry support, whereby the infantry consolidated the ground won and provided covering fire whilst the cavalry reloaded. As to the NOGO terrain features, that again is William’s opinion. Custer’s 5 companies had no difficulty in traversing that terrain, every inch of which was known to Boyer and the Crows. Certainly, it was not best suited for a traditional cavalry attack, but then as traditional cavalry attacks were, by then, obsolete and Custer’s drive to go further north made it clear that he had no intention of attacking from there, William’s opinion is not only moot, but is based on hindsight views of how he perceives what should have happened, ignoring those things that do not suit his case. What he is guilty of is second guessing Custer’s decisions, which is a matter of hindsight. Currently under international military law, judgments about whether military commanders have acted proportionately can only consider what information was available to them at the time the decision was made. The actual outcome of their decisions cannot be brought into consideration. So Custer can only be judged by what he knew at any given point. Then we have Col. Hoyt’s 2003 thesis based on his perception that the Indians mobility and ability to mass at crucial points, was due to their horses being their Centre of Gravity. What is that? The Army University Press defines it as, “The center of gravity of an armed force refers to those sources of strength or balance. It is that characteristic, capability, or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Clausewitz defined it as 'the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” So what does Col Hoyt advocate? According to you it is simply “We know from Col Hoyt that the horses should have been considered the Center of Gravity (COG) and would be best addressed in the valley. Focus on the COG is not a hindsight issue.” Actually, what you have done is to extract a very small part of Hoyt’s 121 page thesis as if that was his central point, which it is not. Right from the start, he makes it clear that his focus on the Indians’ horses as their centre of gravity, is not something that the Army of 1876 considered to be the case. He speaks of three expeditions against these Indians in the first half of 1876 that focused on attacking and destroying their villages and questions this by adding, “If the Army had a complete understanding of the Sioux they would have realized that the “hub of all power” or center of gravity of the Sioux was the horse, which every major aspect of Sioux life was augmented and dependent upon.” It will be noted here that it is not Custer in isolation who is blind to this concept, but ‘the Army.’ After a lengthy process of confirmation of his central argument that the horses were the Indians’ center of gravity, Hoyt covers the Little Bighorn fight then reviews the various engagements he has been using as examples. Of Custer’s fight he states, “Custer could have won the Battle of the Little Bighorn by striking earlier and striking at the horse herds with a consolidated force. However, Custer like all other Army commanders in accordance with Army strategy was focused on attacking and destroying or capturing the enemy village. Custer after realizing that his command had been compromised attacked during the middle of the day to prevent the worst-case scenario-- that the village with its mobility would get away or disperse. Attacking the horse herd was more suitable for Custer’s command and probably the only viable tactic capable of allowing his command to defeat the large village at the Little Bighorn. For Custer to retain the initiative, he had to be more mobile than his enemy. They only way for Custer to be more mobile was to take the horse herd.” The point here is, that had Custer had a known, current, military option to go for the Indians’ horses but chose against it, then yes, he made a big mistake. The fact is however, that the Army’s doctrine and therefore Custer’s, was to attack the villages, which Custer attempted to do. One further point which underlines a weakness in Hoyt’s argument is that there was more than the most obvious herd of ten to twenty thousand on the benchlands to the west of the village for Custer to ’take’. As Wooden Leg confirms in the Marquis book, “The Cheyenne horses were put out to graze in the valley below our camp. Horses belonging to other tribes were placed at other feeding areas on the valley and on the bench hills just west of the combined Indian camps.” My question then is, which herd should Custer have taken and whichever one it was, how could his command of around 500 men round up any of the large herds whilst trying to counter fire from the warriors? Also, where would the pack train fare in all of this. Col. Hoyt proposes an intriguing thesis (and that’s all it is) but as I have pointed out, it was not the Army’s doctrine of the time and could therefore play no part in Custer’s thinking. As you seem to place great store by Col. Hoyt’s thesis Steve, what do you think of the later and similar general works by Col. Mark Cancian (USMCR, ret) in 1998, “Centers of Gravity are a Myth” and Col. Dale C. Eikmeier (U.S. Army ret.) in 2017, “The Center of Gravity, Still Relevant after all these Years?” As they are Army officers, presumably they should be heeded just as much as Col. Hoyt? My analysis to date demonstrates that your comment, “All of the factors are not hindsight. They were known to military leaders and were common knowledge,” is incorrect. Williams’s opinions are based on hindsight evaluations driven by his antipathy to LTC Custer and looking for any front on which to attack the man. Col. Hoyt’s thesis was not ‘known to military leaders nor even common knowledge” and does not conclude that Custer knew he should have gone for the horses. On the contrary it reveals that the entire Army command never had that concept in mind. He concludes in his 2003 evaluation, that IF Custer had known of that possibility, THEN he might have used that tactic to procure a possible victory. As I have mentioned however, there was more than one large herd, Custer had too few men for the job and importantly, it’s only Hoyt’s theory. All the rest of what you have stated obviously falls back on the oft repeated idea that Custer didn’t know what he was doing. Col. Hoyt covers this matter succinctly. Referring to Custer’s consideration of his next move, Hoyt states, “Another factor weighed in this decision. Terry had placed Custer in charge of the more mobile and larger column. Custer knew that Terry’s intent was for at least one column to strike the Indians. Both Terry and Custer believed that either command was sufficient to handle the warriors at the village. With these facts in mind Custer chose to alter the original plan and immediately attack the village to prevent the Sioux from escaping.” So now what did Custer ignore? Or is this a part of Hoyt’s thesis to which you object? “Hunk” Papa |
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jul 10, 2021 12:46:32 GMT -6
"Hunk" Papa Thank you for your summing up of Custer's decision making and the reasons why the battle unfolded as it did. You bring to it a clear concise mind ~ unlike my own ~~ and manage to put your points across without becoming caught up in the mire that bedevils most of us. I could meander as is my wont, but I think the main thing we all have to remember is that we're all dissecting this event in hindsight. Nobody who was present that day could have known what we know, and that goes for both sides, they just played the cards they were dealt and hoped for the best. Shan Thanks for the vote of confidence David and for what I consider to be a knowledgeable summing up. Unfortunately, not everyone is likely to agree! Thanks for your input. "Hunk" Papa |
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 10, 2021 21:28:18 GMT -6
Noggy I believe you have it right. This is not a matter of hindsight. That is an excuse to cover up basic known implementation errors. We know that from William, who served in the US Army. He pointed out that Custer should have followed his advance guard into the valley. He wrote about the NOGO terrain features that were present before the battle, during the battle, and are still there today. They are not hindsight issues. We know from Col Hoyt that the horses should have been considered the Center of Gravity (COG) and would be best addressed in the valley. Focus on the COG is not a hindsight issue. We know from simple math that if the force is smaller, it takes fewer enemies to outnumber that force. That is not a hindsight issue. As one early poster who was also a U.S. military person, Custer fed the 7th to the Indians a few companies at a time in groups of 2 and 3. All of the factors are not hindsight. They were known to military leaders and were common knowledge. I doubt that anyone could say that Custer did not know the advantage of recon and that only in hindsight did we learn of its use in making military decisions. One of the things we do after an action is debriefing. We discuss what worked, what didn't work, and how to make improvements. Hindsight would imply that the above-listed elements were unknown. Hogwash Custer knew he could follow the advance guard. Custer knew what NOGO terrain features were, including the bluffs and river Custer knew how to calculate numbers, and if you reduce a force size, then it takes fewer enemy forces to overwhelm it Custer knew he could not command forces that he could not see Custer knew the value of recon Custer gambled on things he didn't know, and it cost him but to say he didn't have choices is not true. Even some of the scouts told him of the numbers in the valley. General Miles said he understood what Custer was attempting to do, but that doesn't change all the factors that Custer ignored before engaging in his battle-making decisions. Regards AZ Ranger So Steve, straight for the jugular eh? Teaching that upstart from the U.K. not to foist his views onto an apparently defenceless Norwegian it appears. Well, let’s look at the points you raise and I will do you the courtesy of not calling them hogwash. Nope The hogwash refers to what would have known in advance and that some say it was only in hindsight.That William served in the U.S. Army does not give him any greater insight into the LBH battle than anyone else who is capable of researching the primary records. What he avers is merely his opinion, nothing else. Wrong He would have training such as the college of Command and Control that would cover doctrine for instance. Presumably Reno’s command is William’s ‘advance guard’, which is, I suggest, nothing of the kind. Reno states he was the advance guard. How did you miss that?As Reno himself admitted in his Report, “After traveling over his trail, it is evident to me that Custer intended to support me by moving further down the stream and attacking the village in the flank,” which means that Custer was affecting the SOP of an envelopment with Reno as the holding force, not as advance guard. I think you need to read the duties of the advance guard when moving to contact. It is different than on a march.I assume that Reno’s nervousness at having his command alone in the valley prompted him to suggest that he expected Custer to be behind him from which anti-Custer people construe Reno’s situation as advance guard. Assumptions can lead to trouble. Captain French thought Custer was in the valley also. Webster’s New World College Dictionary defines an advance guard as “a detachment of troops sent ahead to reconnoiter and protect the line of march” and “a body of troops going before the main force to clear the way, guard against surprise, etc”, yet according to his RCOI testimony, Reno’s received orders were, “General Custer directs you to take as rapid a gait as you think prudent, and charge the village afterwards, and you will be supported by the whole outfit.” There is nothing in that wording that accords with the status of an advance guard, so William’s opinion that Reno’s command was one, is just that. William would use Reno's statement that he was the advance guard. There is quite a lengthy discussion here on what constitutes supporting distance but you stand alone as Reno not being the advance guard.Presumably by ‘following the advance guard into the valley’, William can only be alluding to a charge into the village by the combined Custer/Reno force as otherwise there seems little point in the combined force forming a skirmish line. Custer would be a regimental commander there and could direct things in person How would any such charge by 373 men need to be organised? Reno’s skirmish line of approximately 150 men had stretched almost across the valley floor so maybe the charge could have been organised in two lines, one of 187 and the next o 186, with a suitable interval between them. What is certain however, is that as soon as the first line hit the tipis it would be broken up and the same applies to the second. Furthermore, using only their six-shooters, both lines, now fragmented, would need to reload. Stopped in their tracks, trying to reload, the warriors would be shooting them out of their saddles when the only possible course of action would be to retreat. Not a very good plan I feel, though perhaps William has a better answer. The actual answer is that charges into Indians villages, unless very small, were made with infantry support, whereby the infantry consolidated the ground won and provided covering fire whilst the cavalry reloaded. My opinion is that Reno should have never dismounted.As the Indians move toward him move back drawing them from the Big Village. If they retreat move toward them, As to the NOGO terrain features, that again is William’s opinion. False Have you ridden a horse along the bluffs? The ingress and egress are the NOGO features along the river. Custer’s 5 companies had no difficulty in traversing that terrain, every inch of which was known to Boyer and the Crows. False they were engaged in north fork MTC and were slowed. A soldier's body was found on NC before the crossing to the Calhoun. I would call that terrain SLOWGO do to ups and downs and the available cover for the enemy to engage Certainly, it was not best suited for a traditional cavalry attack, but then as traditional cavalry attacks were, by then, obsolete and Custer’s drive to go further north made it clear that he had no intention of attacking from there, William’s opinion is not only moot, but is based on hindsight views of how he perceives what should have happened, ignoring those things that do not suit his case. What he is guilty of is second guessing Custer’s decisions, which is a matter of hindsight. False you have not read his posts which is quite clear from your comments. He lays out in a proper military debriefing fashion the decision points. The decision point in Reno Creek was to follow Reno or move to the bluffs. Maybe you can share where William states something different or did you assume he did? Currently under international military law, judgments about whether military commanders have acted proportionately can only consider what information was available to them at the time the decision was made. The actual outcome of their decisions cannot be brought into consideration. So Custer can only be judged by what he knew at any given point. You think there was international military law in 1876? If not that is useless in this discussion. Again I listed all the things he would know and any officer would know. For me the unknowns were the Indians to the east of the before he crossed MTC Then we have Col. Hoyt’s 2003 thesis based on his perception that the Indians mobility and ability to mass at crucial points, was due to their horses being their Centre of Gravity. Fact not opinion What is that? The Army University Press defines it as, “The center of gravity of an armed force refers to those sources of strength or balance. It is that characteristic, capability, or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Clausewitz defined it as 'the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” So what does Col Hoyt advocate? According to you it is simply “We know from Col Hoyt that the horses should have been considered the Center of Gravity (COG) and would be best addressed in the valley. Focus on the COG is not a hindsight issue.” Actually, what you have done is to extract a very small part of Hoyt’s 121 page thesis as if that was his central point, which it is not. Right from the start, he makes it clear that his focus on the Indians’ horses as their centre of gravity, is not something that the Army of 1876 considered to be the case. He speaks of three expeditions against these Indians in the first half of 1876 that focused on attacking and destroying their villages and questions this by adding, “If the Army had a complete understanding of the Sioux they would have realized that the “hub of all power” or center of gravity of the Sioux was the horse, which every major aspect of Sioux life was augmented and dependent upon.” It will be noted here that it is not Custer in isolation who is blind to this concept, but ‘the Army.’ After a lengthy process of confirmation of his central argument that the horses were the Indians’ center of gravity, Hoyt covers the Little Bighorn fight then reviews the various engagements he has been using as examples. This technique was used during the civil war so it was known and not something in hindsight. Why did Custer destroy the horses at Washita?Of Custer’s fight he states, “Custer could have won the Battle of the Little Bighorn by striking earlier and striking at the horse herds with a consolidated force. However, Custer like all other Army commanders in accordance with Army strategy was focused on attacking and destroying or capturing the enemy village. Guess where they took the horses too when Reno appeared. Custer could have been on the bluffs to the west shooting into the horses in the Big Village. The horses would destroy the infrastructure. There would be no way for Custer to capture thousands of horses if that is what you thought. Custer after realizing that his command had been compromised attacked during the middle of the day to prevent the worst-case scenario-- that the village with its mobility would get away or disperse. Attacking the horse herd was more suitable for Custer’s command and probably the only viable tactic capable of allowing his command to defeat the large village at the Little Bighorn. For Custer to retain the initiative, he had to be more mobile than his enemy. They only way for Custer to be more mobile was to take the horse herd.” The point here is, that had Custer had a known, current, military option to go for the Indians’ horses but chose against it, then yes, he made a big mistake. The fact is however, that the Army’s doctrine and therefore Custer’s, was to attack the villages, which Custer attempted to do. One further point which underlines a weakness in Hoyt’s argument is that there was more than the most obvious herd of ten to twenty thousand on the benchlands to the west of the village for Custer to ’take’. As Wooden Leg confirms in the Marquis book, “The Cheyenne horses were put out to graze in the valley below our camp. Horses belonging to other tribes were placed at other feeding areas on the valley and on the bench hills just west of the combined Indian camps.” My question then is, which herd should Custer have taken and whichever one it was, how could his command of around 500 men round up any of the large herds whilst trying to counter fire from the warriors? Also, where would the pack train fare in all of this. Col. Hoyt proposes an intriguing thesis (and that’s all it is) but as I have pointed out, it was not the Army’s doctrine of the time and could therefore play no part in Custer’s thinking. They drove the horses into the Big Village area. Shoot them and they will run and destroy the infrastructure trying to get away. If Reno did exactly what he did and Custer moved around Reno's left flank then the Indians could not have moved as they did. Custer would be on the bluffs to the west with open fields of fire and all 12 companies could be in mutual support of each other. What you would have is Reno Crossing first then Custer. Benteen arrives ahead of the pack train and they cross at Ford A with the rear guard. The ford would be unopposed since Custer would block those Indians attempting move around Reno's left flank.As you seem to place great store by Col. Hoyt’s thesis Steve, what do you think of the later and similar general works by Col. Mark Cancian (USMCR, ret) in 1998, “Centers of Gravity are a Myth” and Col. Dale C. Eikmeier (U.S. Army ret.) in 2017, “The Center of Gravity, Still Relevant after all these Years?” As they are Army officers, presumably they should be heeded just as much as Col. Hoyt? I will ask Col Hoyt if he would like to respond to your question. [Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest Winner
An important element of emerging joint doctrine is the idea that potential enemies have centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, states, "The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy's sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them. In theory, destruction or neutralization of enemy centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory." Navy and Marine Corps doctrine echo this focus. Both Naval Doctrine Publication-1, Naval Warfare, and Marine Corps Doctrine Publication-1, Warfighting, talk of concentrating effort on enemy centers of gravity to win decisively.
Apparently your source lost in the essay contest.
My analysis to date demonstrates that your comment, “All of the factors are not hindsight. They were known to military leaders and were common knowledge,” is incorrect. I have already formed an opinion on your analysis. Do you really want us to believe that Custer could not have followed Reno into the valley? Check my list and you have to agree that your analysist is incorrect. Williams’s opinions are based on hindsight evaluations driven by his antipathy to LTC Custer and looking for any front on which to attack the man. Col. Hoyt’s thesis was not ‘known to military leaders nor even common knowledge” and does not conclude that Custer knew he should have gone for the horses. On the contrary it reveals that the entire Army command never had that concept in mind. He concludes in his 2003 evaluation, that IF Custer had known of that possibility, THEN he might have used that tactic to procure a possible victory. As I have mentioned however, there was more than one large herd, Custer had too few men for the job and importantly, it’s only Hoyt’s theory. All the rest of what you have stated obviously falls back on the oft repeated idea that Custer didn’t know what he was doing. Col. Hoyt covers this matter succinctly. Referring to Custer’s consideration of his next move, Hoyt states, “Another factor weighed in this decision. Terry had placed Custer in charge of the more mobile and larger column. Custer knew that Terry’s intent was for at least one column to strike the Indians. Both Terry and Custer believed that either command was sufficient to handle the warriors at the village. With these facts in mind Custer chose to alter the original plan and immediately attack the village to prevent the Sioux from escaping.” So now what did Custer ignore? Or is this a part of Hoyt’s thesis to which you object? “Hunk” Papa Actually, my opinion falls back to what Clair Conzelman stated and William modified. Clair stated officers are to make the best choice. William modified to an officer should make the best available choice. I think you have your opinion and everyone can have one but if you think you changed my mind that your opinion is better than William's or Col Hoyts you are in error. Come to the battlefield we can ride horses and I will show the NOGO features that you think are only opinions.
Two years ago, I rode with my friend Will Hutchison along the bluffs and I am sure he will tell that you are one step away from death or serious injury at some locations. You can keep on saying that NOGO terrain features are opinion but it is not factually based.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by noggy on Jul 12, 2021 2:26:39 GMT -6
It took me a little while but after a couple of rounds re-reading, I think I found where we appear to misunderstand each other/I was unclear. This is what I wrote: "The extremely short answer is that if you are on the offensive against an enemy with a numerical advantage and then without recon split up your regiment several times, ending up with 3 out of 12 companies actually making somewhat of an attack, 5 other companies being wiped out, the rest have their hands ful of surviving a siege….well, something went wrong and it was not only due to the NAs’ ability to fight." Now, I see this can be read as a criticism of lacking recon/scouting...but... It isn't meant that way. It is meant as a criticism of splitting up a regiment/unit when the circumstances aren't right. They weren't, in my opinion. The lack of recon or lack of the possibility to recon (this isn't a verb, I fear) if you so will...in this setting they are the same. It isn there/it isn't possible. Those are the circumstances. Either way; don' split up the regiment. I hope that was better explained? As far as splitting up and stuff, I have no problems with differing opinions here, at all. On the contrary. On of the things I enjoy about reading posts from well read LBH scholars is how good points people of different opinions can make. I learn a load every day i read here/other sites, be it current or old threads. I just personally believe he should have kept his regiment united. I also do believe GAC could have won/gotten out of it okay with 650 men if they acted like a unit. Not necessarily in the shape of a massive charge riding through the village. Just showing up on foot firing several hundred of rifles would be enough to cause enough panic in the village/herd areas. A big difference from Rosebud would have been the proximity to the non-combatants, whose safety would have been a huge deal for the warriors. At the same time, he could have lost with 1 500 men if he sent them in groups of ten at the time towards the warriors (Custer was lucky to have any Crow scouts at all. If I recall correctly. Neither he or Terry hired any, and had to «borrow» some from Gibbon. Crook had 170-190 Crows or whatever it was. Quite a difference in preparations. But I might remember the numbers and details completely wrong) All the best, Noggy I understand where you are coming from and what you state is the opinion of a great many who criticise Custer’s actions at the LBH. What is almost always overlooked I believe, is that viewpoint is one taken in hindsight, i.e., knowing the end result. As I have already demonstrated, the army attitude (and therefore Custer’s), was that whatever the numbers were, the Indians would not stand against any of the military columns in the field, but would try to scatter and run. When Custer took his regiment into that valley therefore, that mindset prevailed so the warrior numbers were of no real concern to him. All of what you say subsequently is true only if Custer had been aware of Crook’s battle [which the Indians viewed as a victory] and Sitting Bull’s vision, which together had pumped up the warriors’ confidence. With that foreknowledge he could be criticised for the way he deployed his regiment, but without it he could only deal with his command on the basis of using standard operating procedure, which in the case of the LBH, was an envelopment. He was suckered by the arrogance of army thinking, that his foe would try to run, thinking he was guilty of himself, but past experience with these Indians dictated that such would be the case. In fact, the LBH was a prime example of what one army officer’s thesis called the “Victory Disease,” assuming that a win was inevitable because the enemy was predictable. It was also unique as never had a military force gone up against a village of that size, nor would again. Regarding the Crows, the Dakota Column came from east, passing through country known to the Ree scouts. When it met up with Gibbon at the Yellowstone/Rosebud confluence and it had been decided that Custer would be following the Rosebud trail, then Crow scouts would be valuable as he would be heading into their country. The Crow interpreter Mitch Boyer, who actually lived with the tribe, was detached by Gibbon, together with 6 braves. Take care friend Noggy, “Hunk” Papa Really not sure about the «defenseless Norwegian» part. I didn't even know I was under attack (I don't think I am either, just joking,) That Custer/the Army as a whole generally underestimated the enemy's capacity/will to fight is all good, and generally accepted. But how many times had they been in this type of situation? As in one which could compare to the that on the 25th? It was not daily that the Army managed to surprise a village. And certainly not one of this size. At the Washita, they had to use human shields in order to deter the NAs from attacking them. That day they they were perhaps caught a little off guard by additional warriors coming from other camps. At the LBH, GAC knew he was out-numbered roughly 3 to 1, at least The Army had been in drawn out stand-offs with large Sioux/Cheyenne forces in 72 and 73. Custer knew of Fettermann. He knew of Elliott. He knew what could happen to if smaller units went up against numerical superior and pissed off Indians. Nobody would survive. The Indians did not «always run». They could tie themselves to the battlefield if deemed necessary. The «Dying Dance» and so-called Suicide Boys wasn't about running from the soldiers. Yet, he split up his regimentet not once but several times, leaving out reliable ways of communication and supporting each other. This is stuff I don't view as hindsight. I view this as a mistake. The regiment was served piecemeal to the NAs, with the 3 battalions not really knowing what the others where up to or even were, at differing times. (I see the terrain on GACs side of the river being up for debate. I have never been there so I'll let tha be, but it seems to be tons of ridges, ravines and at that time hefty vegetatiton.) As far as Crow scouts goes; one should think that with several months available for preparations, getting a couple of Crows who knew the area should have been doable. But then again, they didn't procure (right word?) enough horses for the outfit so maybe expecting them get scouts is a little too optimistic All the best, Noggy |
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