Reno at Ft Walla Walla 1861

[AZ Ranger]

Jan 26, 2009 16:24:17 GMT -6 Melani said:

Just for starters, he could have made sure his orders were properly communicated to everyone, and that the retreat took place in some kind of formation, instead of a panicked mob.

Why don't you take one of those scenarios, dc, and show exactly what you think would have happened, using the same criteria?

I am not sure it is a COs job to do that. I can't ever remember my CO asking me if I understood his order. To many troopers made it out of the timber for it to be a random panicked event. First if we are going to use panic then it should be military panic which would mean throwing down arms running away and not rallying at any point. That did not happen. There is a difference between fast and panic. Fast movements of horses causes formations to fall apart over time and distance.

There is enough testimony of those that did hear an order. Even DeRudio had his horse brought to him. Doesn't sound like panic to me. DeRudio then made his own choice on what to do.

As far as formation if there was none how did the majority end up going the same direction? It is my impression that they mounted and then rode out of the timber which had constraints on how you enter-move through- or exit. It was enough of a formation to make the Indians give way at an initial contact point. I do not believe there is a percise equally spaced and lined up formation that can be maintained at a charge gait if they had gone over 400 yards at that speed. Horses such as Pvt Thompson's would be walking in a short distance.

The problem I see and without any suitable resolution is that with 6 shots in the revolver at some point you are unable to defend yourself except at close quarters. At that point I believe the Indian superior in numbers, better at close quarter battle from horseback, and resolute to fight inflicts many casualties as they slowed to cross the river.

The troopers performed as they were ordered which is not panic. High caualties in cavalry engagements at speed are not unusual. They all knew if they fell out of formation that they would die. It was more important to stay on your horse and keep moving then to engage the Indians.

AZ Ranger

[Dark Cloud]

"Why don't you take one of those scenarios, dc, and show exactly what you think would have happened, using the same criteria?"

To what purpose? I'm not qualified to do so, but then I'm not the one publicly denigrating an officer - a breveted general - of the US for his actions and choices in combat, because I have no standing to do so. In any case, I don't see what would have surely resulted in fewer casualties in men or mounts, and nothing I have seen proposed would have either.

My contention is that a run for it, while not thrilling to the Miniver Cheevys, is sometimes the best of a sorry choice. If people feel free to mock Reno (and now, it appears, his son), they'd best be able to show how things would have turned out better in detail, wouldn't you think? Where the error lay for these reasons. These guys aren't pinatas for never weres and wannabes to batter for virtual relevance.

And if people cannot, it would not be inappropriate to - if not shut up - at least apply the same standards to all three officers at the battle. You'd think someone would have the courtesy of showing how combat should correctly have been executed, but under tender pressure it all falls apart into insistence that what Custer attempted - periodic delaying firing lines - would somehow have worked here, and that surely once across the river, covering fire from the East bank most definitely should have been implemented and successful. More soldiers visible with small cover high up - recalling who? hands? - and unable to gain the top except under fire.

Based on what Reno could know or assume at the time, a strong case can be made for his actions.

[biggordie]

In re: "Sitting still on the horses, theyu;d have been better targets" or whatever the exact quote is - it is educational to read Moylan's testimony in this regard, and Reno's also. The parts where the two troops are brought out into the bottom, one at a time, and then drawn up in columns of Four, with A sitting waiting while M formed, and then the two "charging" off, leaving poor G to do whatever it might do on its own.

Nice picture. As for the rest - gait, panic etc. - Steve is probably right. I think that there was some panic as the more poorly-mounted troopers started to lag, and the rear began stringing out, with warriors closing in for the kill, as it were; and probably also at the crossing, where there was a constricted space for getting in and out, and warriors were firing into the men.

Get out and get up the hills would have been the order of the day, never mind covering the crossing of anyone else. That there was disorder is perfectly obvious to anyone who examines all the evidence, and panic often accompanies disorder - witness Moylan when he arrived at the top of the bluffs.

Gordie

[Dark Cloud]

Nobody is saying there was no 'disorder', which under the circumstances would be expected. If G didn't get it together - everyone else had - that could be due to incompetence beneath Reno, could it not? Regardless, how long should they have stood there waiting for G to get it together, in the open, in the trees, in the bushes round their knees? Is this highly unusual in combat, that part of the unit is slow/incompetent and pays for it so the majority can function?

I'm a layman, so forgive me. But if you're in enemy territory - right up under their window sills in fact - would it have been wise to dismount once across the LBH on the eastern bank at the base of high ground without having first taken the high ground? Wasn't there fire from the eastern bank and high bluffs suggesting that enemy elements might be moving to take said high ground? Isn't that what Reno did and should have done?

We have maps and all sorts of goodies. If it could have been done with less loss of life show how.

[biggordie]

I am not in the blame business, although I think that Wallace and Moylan were the real culprits of the piece, I merely try to arrive at the facts and present them to the reader, who can make up his own mind.

The only combat I was ever in was more or less individualized action, and it did indeed take place "right up under their window sills" and in their doorways too, and I have either a piece of shrapnel or a bullet fragment in my right shoulder as a memento, and no medals that I can brag about on any Internet forum.

Who knows what would have been wise, and who knows where those [not many] warriors wereon the bluffs, and not, on the east side of the river. Certainly DeWolf and his orderly were reportedly killed by shots coming from up there [not arrows, BTW], and several troopers were hit by gunfire from somewhere, while climbing the bluffs.

I think that there should have been a covering of the crossing, and so do some of the witnesses, at least one that I can recall offhand [Casey Stengel]. Whether or not Reno could have handled the retreat or charge better is a matter of conjecture, and you have made yours known several times. I don't conjecture, if I can help it.

Even my inanities are based on SOME evidence.

Gordie

[markland]

Jan 26, 2009 9:26:11 GMT -6 bc said:

Sounds pretty hard core to me. No Mercy. No trial/court of inquiry. Rather callous. I've read of other accounts where accused NAs were required to be turned over to authorities and then hung. The NAs showed how hard core they can be 1876.

On the other hand, Fort Walla Walla and the Columbia River area is home to the Hoh Indians. Maybe Reno, Coleman, and Moran became engaged in a little hanky panky with a couple of Hohs.

bc

BC, the pre-war campaigns in California, Washington and Oregon were pretty callous. The following information is from Kip's "Indian War In The Pacific Northwest." In the 1858 campaign against the Coer d'Alenes after the Steptoe battle, Col. Wright captured Qualchen and his father Owhi when they went separately to talk with Wright about surrender. Owhi was later shot trying to escape while Quelchen was hung. At the end of the campaign, Wright had a talk with the Walla Walla Indians in which he stated that he knew several of them had participated in the fights (of the campaign) and told them that everyone of them who had participated in the two fights must stand up. Thirty-five stood up and four were selected, supposedly "who were known to have been engaged in several murders in the valley," and "hung on the spot." Kip goes on to say that sixteen Indians have been executed in this way. Also, four Pelouze [sic] Indians had been hung, one for murder and three for being "notorious marauders."

As well, in the pre-war battles with the Utes in Utah, the Mormons executed prisoners quite often. That is in Michno's Encyclopedia.

Billy

P.S. Thought these were the no argument threads? DC, take it to the main board or stick a sock in it.

[Dark Cloud]

Well, if it could have been done better - by which is meant with less loss of men and mounts - surely someone could show us how?

Everything I've seen involves very unspecific 'covering fire' from unstated locations. And this against Indians wrapped around the soldiers following them, making difficult shots. A spiffy firing line by dubious shots on high ground does little more than provide additional easy targets from the west and east high ground.

If it's agreed they have to take and hold the high ground above you first, the window of opportunity to protect the late comers, if any, diminishes quickly. Reno is damned for being among the first to the top, oddly. He had small clue if it would be safer there at that point, and he was surely a prime target.

Ryan and others say the 7th could not fight well from the saddle, absent the enemy running.

And none of the suggested tactical improvements for Reno ever includes the time lines for dismounting, remounting, horseholders, numbers of estimated casualties, and where, and what to do about them, and why this would result in fewer 7th casualties. And based solely, of course, on what Reno could know at the time. There's no way to be sure, obviously, but if Reno's condemned, this implies a superior plan was available to him that could be trotted round the paddock for consideration.

I've yet to read it. Anyone? Hands? Someone? Anyone?

It reminds, in an odd way, of Churchill trying to explain why Jellicoe was replaced by Beatty after the Battle of Jutland. Jellicoe had suffered infintesimal damage, strategically defeated the enemy fleet, lost no ships, savaged his opponents', obeyed the agreed upon tactics of the Admiralty, had prevented the Germans any possibility of winning and breaking the British blockade. This forced Germany to desperate measures on land leading to their defeat. But there had been no new "Trafalgar" of slaughter and absolute victory beloved by children and the media.

Beatty had pointlessly lost three major ships because his ships were bad shots, and so had to get too close to the Germans, who were not bad shots with their slower and lesser armed vessels. Beatty had been clearly defeated in the areas where he was in charge. But he was 'dashing.'

So next time, Churchill pandered, it would have to be done differently. Apparently by risking the entire fleet, naval prominance, and Empire so that childish melodrama could rule. He didn't really believe this, as his actions in the next war proved, but he wrote it.

Beatty got away with it because his losses to the public suggested he'd done all the fighting, rather than the truth, which was that he was bravely incompetent and risked the outcome of the war, not just the Grand Fleet and this battle.

Custer died with his men, so he must have done all the fighting while Reno and Benteen must be inferiors if not treasonous cowards for surviving by retreat and defense.

[Melani]

I am not denigrating anybody; I am engaged in a discussion of historical events. I don't believe that saying that Reno's "charge to the rear" didn't work very well amounts to denigration, and I'm sorry if your hero-worship doesn't allow for criticism of any kind. For that matter, Custer could have handled the whole campaign better--advance scouting comes to mind, for one thing. If he had done that, we very likely wouldn't be having this conversation now, since either the Indians would have discovered Custer and scattered, or Custer would have discovered the size of the village and planned his actions differently. Or maybe there would have been a Rosebud-style attack if the Indians had discovered him. But it sure would have been different, and probably more soldiers would have come out alive.

I have no idea if there was any possibility of Reno sustaining less casualties than he did, but he sure could have handled the retreat better--at least in such a way that it didn't appear that he totally lost control, even if the result was the same. He was certainly in a big bunch of trouble, and it was probably only the distraction of Custer's attack that saved Reno's men. Whether Reno was right or wrong to retreat (and plenty of the guys who were there thought he was right), he came out looking like he totally lost it.

As for Ross Reno, the following appeared in the Army and Navy Journal on Jan. 5, 1884:

"Miss Carrie Swain, the actress, staying at the Lochiel Hotel, was awakened Christmas night by three or four gentle raps on the window. Soon the window was raised, and a young man sprang into the room. Miss Swain cried for help. Her maid, who slept in an adjoining room, at once responded, as did a number of hotel employees, and the intruder proved to be Ross Reno, a son of Marcus A. Reno, late Major U.S.A. Miss Swain declined to prosecute the young man, but the proprietor of the Lochiel told him that he must seek other quarters." --In Custer's Shadow, p.335

That lapse in judgment is remarkably similar to the ones that ultimately got his dad kicked out of the Army. Obviously they both had difficult lives, and I can't help but wonder if things might have been different for both of them if Terry had granted Reno that emergency leave, and if he had somehow managed to have Ross out West with him instead of leaving him to be raised by uncles and cousins. Without his mother, that would probably not have been possible.

Of course we're never going to know the absolute truth about any of this, but it's my understanding that this board exists to discuss Custer, LBH, and everything associated with it, as well as Western history and the Indian Wars in general. So obviously there is going to be a lot of analysis and "what ifs"--isn't that the point?

[markland]

Jan 27, 2009 15:31:17 GMT -6 Dark Cloud said:

Well, if it could have been done better - by which is meant with less loss of men and mounts - surely someone could show us how?

Everything I've seen involves very unspecific 'covering fire' from unstated locations. And this against Indians wrapped around the soldiers following them, making difficult shots. A spiffy firing line by dubious shots on high ground does little more than provide additional easy targets from the west and east high ground.

If it's agreed they have to take and hold the high ground above you first, the window of opportunity to protect the late comers, if any, diminishes quickly. Reno is damned for being among the first to the top, oddly. He had small clue if it would be safer there at that point, and he was surely a prime target.

Ryan and others say the 7th could not fight well from the saddle, absent the enemy running.

And none of the suggested tactical improvements for Reno ever includes the time lines for dismounting, remounting, horseholders, numbers of estimated casualties, and where, and what to do about them, and why this would result in fewer 7th casualties. And based solely, of course, on what Reno could know at the time. There's no way to be sure, obviously, but if Reno's condemned, this implies a superior plan was available to him that could be trotted round the paddock for consideration.

I've yet to read it. Anyone? Hands? Someone? Anyone?

It reminds, in an odd way, of Churchill trying to explain why Jellicoe was replaced by Beatty after the Battle of Jutland. Jellicoe had suffered infintesimal damage, strategically defeated the enemy fleet, lost no ships, savaged his opponents', obeyed the agreed upon tactics of the Admiralty, had prevented the Germans any possibility of winning and breaking the British blockade. This forced Germany to desperate measures on land leading to their defeat. But there had been no new "Trafalgar" of slaughter and absolute victory beloved by children and the media.

Beatty had pointlessly lost three major ships because his ships were bad shots, and so had to get too close to the Germans, who were not bad shots with their slower and lesser armed vessels. Beatty had been clearly defeated in the areas where he was in charge. But he was 'dashing.'

So next time, Churchill pandered, it would have to be done differently. Apparently by risking the entire fleet, naval prominance, and Empire so that childish melodrama could rule. He didn't really believe this, as his actions in the next war proved, but he wrote it.

Beatty got away with it because his losses to the public suggested he'd done all the fighting, rather than the truth, which was that he was bravely incompetent and risked the outcome of the war, not just the Grand Fleet and this battle.

Custer died with his men, so he must have done all the fighting while Reno and Benteen must be inferiors if not treasonous cowards for surviving by retreat and defense.

Eleven paragraphs to repeat nothing?! Sheesh DC, that might set off a bullshit alert loud enough to wake up the living dead in British Columbia although I have heard that those parties in British Columbia are not really dead, merely semi-frozen.

But, since you say it, it is nice to be able to take it to the bank that Custer died at LBH and did not disappear to live with some trapper a few miles from the scene of the crime.

Billy

[Dark Cloud]

Markland is correct, and it's more embarrassing because I've complained about others ignoring the no argument line before. My only excuse is I was directed to this thread by email and started in without reference. I'll start a new thread heading and Merkel can remove stuff to there.

I agree the Independent Research thread ought to be free of argument. Sincere apologies for that.

And, only for that.

Here's the new thread:

lbha.proboards12.com/index.cgi?action=display&board=basics&thread=3382

[Diane Merkel]

I can only move whole threads, not individual posts except by quoting each one. I'm not inclined to spend the time, but someone can if he wishes. Thanks for the new thread in the right spot, DC.

[wcd76]

I found this thread very interesting.
I often wonder if Reno's many traumatic experiences in his life came to a breaking point when Bloody Knife's head exploded onto him in the valley.
This man who had survived the chopping block of the post Civil War reduction in the Army had his life and career spiral downward from this point on. Surely a prime example of PTSD?

[Reddirt]

Perhaps the "breaking point" came about when he was denied permission (by the Army)to attend the funeral of his wife whom he appeared to have loved dearly.

[AZ Ranger]

Is there any research that would indicate that the Cavalry had experience in attacking large numbers of Indians in a village that were willing to fight?

Then more specifically did Reno have that personal experience to draw from?

Seems that the example starting this thread is a police action example and not one where you are severely outnumbered. My bottom line is that tactics are a choice. You can learn from others experiences or your own but you must have them within you when making a decision.

For example Washita taught those present that retrograde was an appropriate tactic when facing large number of Indians willing to fight. I am sure that tactic was discussed and incorporated within appropriate tactical options.